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the new Board of Editors of this Journal is pleased to present Acta Juridica renewed both 
in content and form. The main innovation is that it will be from now published entirely 
in English. Another change is that Acta Juridica Hungarica, with a slightly modified 
title, carries not only papers and studies written by Hungarian authors, mostly previously 
published in Hungarian, but will also keep you informed on legislation and eventually 
judicial practice in Hungary. 
It remains a chief concern of this Journal, as before, to make accesible to foreign 
readers what we think the best of the production of Hungarian legal scholarship 
otherwise doomed to be passed unnoticed due to language barriers. Moreover, we wish 
to open our pages to non-Hungarian scholars too, therefore the Editors wish to invite 
scholars from 'the rest of the world' to submit papers to Acta Juridica Hungarica. 
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László SÓLYOM The First Year of the Constitutional 
Court 
The Constitutional Court (CC) as a new institution was not set on foot simply with a 
clean slate. Given the historical environment of its formation, the CC had exceptional 
freedom to define its status in a constitutional order; including not only its political im-
portance and role, but its legal character in a narrow sense as well. In the midst of 
political changes, the legislators who enacted the Court had but a vague conception of 
the functions of a constitutional court and of the role to be assigned to the Hungarian 
CC. As a result, and because of its hurried technical preparation, the Act on the 
Constitutional Court [Act XXXII/1989; ACC] now appears imperfect and controversial. 
In order that the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction might begin without delay, the Act 
left the rules of procedure to be developed on the way by the CC. 
The dilemmas of our political and constitutional role aware continously during the 
first year. Such dilemmas often confronted us quite directly when apparent political 
cases—such as the land act, the interest tax and the issues related to the President of the 
Republic—were referred to us for consideration. The final solution of many fundamental 
procedural issues and the answers to the open problems of the ACC depend on the defi-
nition of our role. These role-related problems should be distinguished from clear techni-
cal neutral questions such as movement of files or the rhythm of preparing decisions. 
The basic question is whether the primary function of the CC is to ensure abstract 
constitutional order or to remedy individual injuries affecting fundamental human rights. 
Of course, abstract norm control and a constitutional complaint do not exclude each 
other. The establishment of and possible remedy for individual infringements on constitu-
tional rights frequently lead to a legal provision being claimed to be unconstitutional, as 
they constitute direct control over norms. The solution of the above question, however, 
determines the range of persons entitled to make such petitions and the political rele-
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vance of the cases said before the CC and assigns another role to the Court in the politi-
cal system irrespective of the fact that the CC will remain on the same hierarchical level. 
The above basic question has been on the agenda since the CC was set up, though 
its real importance and substance did not begin to be realized and clarified before the end 
of the first year. Since the ACC is entirely based on abstract norm control, the question 
arose first on a different level, i.e. whether the CC is a court or an "authority to protect 
the Constitution". For the nature (judicial or official) of the CC procedure to be deter-
mined it was inevitable to answer this question. So, for the time being, the underlying 
essential problem could only be seen from the fact that application of the contradictory 
oral and public procedure (or just some of its elements) to abstract norm control was felt 
by many judges to be conflicting and unjustifiable from the beginning. 
a) Procedural issues 
The rules of CC procedure are contained in Chapter III of the ACC providing that 
the detailed rules shall be established by the CC. On the proposal of the CC, the rules 
of procedure should be laid dawn in an Act to be passed by Parliament. In addition to 
specifying those entitled to make petitions as well as the powers of the plenary session 
and the three-member councils the ACC did not but formulate random and incongruous 
rules from which the character of the procedure cannot be seen clearly (except that, 
under para (2) of Art. 25, the procedure should fundamentally be in writing). The ACC 
did not tie the CC's hands in defining the character of its future procedure. 
The first five constitutional judges spent a year working out the rules of procedure 
experimentally. The current status of the procedure can at most be ascertained from the 
reminders of plenary sessions or can sometimes be concluded from the decisions. On the 
other hand, the plenary session could always find solutions to vital practical issues 
outside the scope of, but not defenitely contrary to the ACC. 
1. Such a problem confronting the CC, one to be solved by all means, but unfore-
seen in the ACC, was that of screening the great number of petitions submitted by way 
popular action, especially because the ACC provides that, whenever the CC cannot take 
jurisdiction, a case may only be referred to the body having jurisdiction and because it 
vested no jurisdiction in judges ordinary. The only way out was that the petitions not 
falling within the jurisdiction of the CC (and not worth referring somewhere else) were 
treated by the Secretar-Generaly "outside the CC procedure": he would explain in an 
informal (private) letter that the CC could not deal with that particular problem. If the 
petitioner was not satisfied, his second letter would be referred to one of the three-mem-
ber councils, which would issue a formal decision on the lack of jurisdiction or, in some 
cases, judge the case on its merits. 
Instead of this forced solutions, it would be better for an amendment of the ACC to 
empower judges to refuse cases, without "appeal" outside the jurisdiction of the CC. 
Such a solution would also require preparation by the Secretary-General's Office. 
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2. The two basic problems of a "CC case" are publicity and the situation of the peti-
tioner. These are the aspects in which the conception based on a civil case conflicts with 
a written, non-public procedure that is actually followed by the CC in spite of all 
opinions of principle to the contrary. 
The concept of court is now linked with a public hearing. As regards the CC, it is 
controversial from the beginning whether a public hearing is necessary only for stressing 
the image of the court and informing the public, or because the legal status of litigant 
as well as the guarantees of a public, oral, contradictory trial are to be recognized for 
the petitioner. According to the arguments of the first conception, the petitioner for 
abstract norm control will assert rights other than his own and act in the public interest 
(in an extreme wording he does not but yet the CC machinery going), so he needs no 
guarantee as a client. On the other hand, a "trial" requires another party with opposing 
interests; the CC found that the opposing party was the same as the body which had or 
prepared the particular legal provision. Those in favour of a trial supported their stand 
with additional arguments and the benefit of knowing mutual reflections. 
In fact, the CC well a public trial in only one case, that of the interest tax; 
concerning capital punishment, the procedure was rather a public hearing of experts. 
There were a few other cases where the petitioners, or those concerned, were invited to 
the session. The decisions, however, were not affected by what was heard at the 
sessions, so no real trial took place. The CC also refused to hold public sessions on 
certain days, on the Italian model, when the brief opinion of the parties was to have been 
heard for the information of the press and the public. 
As a result, the normal procedural form has become one of handing down rulings 
in writing, an arrangement to which the CC was also pressed by the great number of 
cases. The criteria of "trial" have shifted to written trial. As required by contradictory 
procedures, it has become customary to ask for a routine statement of the legislator and 
occasionally for the reaction of the petitioner. It would be better to ask expressive ques-
tions—if questions should be asked at all—on the basis of our preliminary reflections. 
3. A continental-style constitutional court in general, and when limited to abstract 
norm control in particular, does not have any cause to hold trials. We do not need to 
clarify any facts through a debate of adverse parties; the legal arguments of the petitioner 
(though he has to give the "reasons" for the petition under para (2) of Art. 22) are in 
fact indifferent, since we can hear experts and the friends of the court; all this can be 
arranged in writing more easily; but it is our business to decide how to be assisted in 
formulating our position. The situation would be somewhat different if there were real 
constitutional complaints. Many of our decisions have shown that the proceedings 
resulting from a concrete complaint may lead to far-reaching consequences (administra-
tive jurisdiction, civil procedure), which the petitioner cannot even imagine and a deci-
sion on a real constitutional complaint may become a similarly important precedent: this 
is the real domain of constitutional jurisdiction. 
Before taking any decision, the case must be discussed among ourselves rather than 
with the client. 
8 László Sólyom 
4. Petition is covered by very few provisions of the ACC. All its aspects, both reg-
ulated and unregulated, were treated by the CC in such a way as to leave wide scope for 
accepting cases for consideration or defining the range of matters to be considered. 
Para (2) of Art. 22 of the ACC requires a "specific application". At the beginning, 
the CC helped to construe "questions" of the Parliament as petitions or to turn them into 
petitions. Since the autumn of 1990, however, it has turned against petitions for an inter-
pretation of the Constitution that allowed shifting political or governmental responsibility. 
In the Rabár case it outlined the criteria to be met by petitions for an interpretation of 
the Constitution. However, all it was able to do was to create an authoritative and formal 
basis of reference for itself to continue to accept or to refuse petitions for an interpreta-
tion of the Constitution at its own discretion, for, evidently, it depends on the Court 
whether it finds any "concrete constitutional law problem" in a petition. (See the partial 
problem finally accepted for interpretation in connection with the right to environmental 
protection.) 
In accordance with its agreement, the plenary session gave a wide interpretation of 
the criteria for its acceptance of matters for consideration subject to the nature of petition 
and considered, by invoking their "interrelationship", all legal regulations affected by 
the particular constitutional problem. Thus, the CC made itself independent of the 
petitioner's intent: it released the avalanche effect (civil proceedings) and left room for 
refusal of the original petition, and for declaration of unconstitutionality in respect to 
other provisions of law that went unchallenged (14/1990). All this is an added argument 
against treating the petitioner as a litigant. At the same time, the CC exposed itself to 
the risk of failing to cover all relevant regulations in the decision. (See capital punish-
ment, indication of personal identity numbers in the Trade Register as cases where it is 
justified, and not a shame, to ask for comments by the competent ministries.) 
Nevertheless, the CC retrieved its elbowroom for keeping to the petition and refusing 
to deal with matters it did not want to. 
The CC repeals a regulation beyond the scope of a petition also in cases where re-
peal is practicable for a reregulation of the matter under consideration. In such cases, 
a constitutional provision should also be repealed. (See later, under Section II). The peti-
tion was separated from the petitioner also by an authoritative ruling of the CC, printing 
out that the Court is not bound by a petition that can be submitted by anyone. 
5. In addition to dissenting opinion recognized by the ACC, the CC has introduced 
the institution of concurring opinion (called parallel). This raises the question of individ-
ual decision, personal opinion or work done collectively. The judges accepted the per-
sonality principle as a specific feature of the CC. The institution of dissenting opinion 
proved to be fruitful: it brought into sharp focus conceptional questions of our jurisdic-
tion [retroactivity (5/1990), substance of a fundamental right and methodical conditions 
for its limitation (2/1990), competence of the CC as regards the Constitution itself 
(23/1990)]. There were several instances of the Court later adopting solutions first 
suggested in a dissenting opinion. 
With the introduction of dissenting opinion the CC followed foreign examples with-
out adopting any method in all its aspects. With the concurring opinions, we are getting 
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closer to the American system, though half-way. We decided to publish concurring opin-
ions about capital punishment, when there were incompatible differences between judges 
ordinary in their lines of reasoning or when the statement of uniform reasons would have 
required too great a portion of the original opinions to be ignored. The latter would have 
been in conflict with the concept of personality and certainly with the ambition of the 
judges who had formulated their own opinions of principle. (Shortly before this, the in-
terpretation of Art. 70/A provided an example of collective work, though there was no 
difference between conceptions.) On the other hand, the ruling on the death penalty 
pointed to the danger of fragmentation of views: uniform reasoning unbodied the unre-
served opinion of only three judges, while a comparison should be made to find out who 
of the remaining judges was for or against the particular elements of the CC's reasoning. 
Since reasoning is at least as important as the operative part of a decision, it is impos-
sible that there should be no majority—supported reasons. (Such reasons could also have 
been advanced in the capital punishment case if sufficient time had been devoted to the 
matter.) 
The majority principle could be enforced without sacrificing the personal aspect if 
the American system was fully adopted. This would result in the indication of the judge 
(usually but not necessarily, the judge in charge of legal inquiry) who puts down the 
majority opinion and in the indication of those who form the majority; the judge who 
works out minority opinion(s) could also be indicated. This would certainly put an end 
to secret vote. Another manifestation of personality is the naming of the judge(s) who 
elaborate the opinion (as, e.g., in Poland). 
b) Substantive issues of the judgement procedure 
The activity of the CC should be examined in the interaction of two determinants. 
One is the CC's jurisdiction and the other is the historical environment in which the 
change of regime took place. 
The CC is vested with all the powers that a constitutional court can be under interna-
tional practice. Moreover, the range of persons and organs entitled to make petitions is 
extremely wide. All this gives the CC an enormous scope of action, i.e. political weight. 
The CC could well symbolyse the paradoxical nature of political changes as 
revolution under constitutional court control. Nobody realized this aspect at the time the 
CC was established. 
1. The most important problem faced by CC in the first year was that abstract norm 
control could be requested by anyone. The various aspects of the problem are related to 
the theoretical role of the CC (abstract order or individual legal remedy), the random re-
vision of "old" legal material, the simply formal—hierarchical—unconstitutionality, and 
validity problems, while there is an interrelationship between all these items and the 
specific questions of the change of regime. 
2. Abstract norm control as the primary activity of the CC makes the Court the 
guardian of a hierarchical legal system. 
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Using the leeway provided by Art. 43 of the ACC, the CC has lately tried to move 
from abstract, hierarchic protection of the Constitution to providing remedy for 
individual grievances, i.e. restoring genuine constitutional complaints within the 
frameworks of the Act; as we could not neglect the criterion that in all cases the uncon-
stitutionality of a legal norm must differentiate between legal consequences. In a recent 
decision the CC has, in favour of the person who has submitted a constitutional com-
plaint, as far as the legal consequences are concerned, and has secured, by resorting to 
ex tunc abrogation benefiting only the petitioner, a means to redress his grievance, as 
if rewarding him for raising the question (32/1990-cf. Austrian Ergreiferpraemie). One 
must see, however, that such benefit might be extended to anyone concerned, so the 
reward is not a real one. Therefore the petition leads us to the theoretical questions of 
ex tunc abrogation rather than to the real constitutional complaint. Yet, the above deci-
sion has directly raised, and thrown into sharp relief, the issue of CC's dual function. 
3. With the introduction of popular action to apply for subsequent norm control, the 
ACC determined the nature of most cases that were to be submitted to the CC, for this 
is the reason why the issue of compatibility between the democratic Constitution and the 
legal provisions enacted under the former regime is put before the CC in a large number 
of cases though randomly and fragmentarily. Given its functions, however, the CC 
cannot revise complex legal materials. Therefore, in the domain of complex legal 
branches like social insurance law, the CC abrogates selected, partial regulations that are 
unconstitutional in themselves, rather than investigate the wider contexts. The situation 
is very similar with respect to codes (for example code of civil procedure). The CC 
sometimes goes beyond the petition, and investigates legal material (26/1990) even at the 
expense of annulling rules that are constitutional in themselves, together with those that 
are against the Constitution, thus urging the legislature to reregulate the entire set of 
problems (10/1990, 24/1990). We must admit, however, that the Court followed such 
course of action when it wanted to enforce a very important constitutional principle like 
the equality of men and women or the principle of hearing. 
4. The CC cannot escape from the legacy of unconstitutionality to be declared for 
formal reasons: under para. (2) of Article 35 and para. (3) of Article 37 of the Constitu-
tion, a decree issued by the Government or the Prime Minister is unconstitutional if it 
is contrary to a higher source of law. 
As a result of forty years of government by decree, a number of old regulations are 
unconstitutional, because they represent a source of law at a level other than that re-
quired today. Consideration of formal elements should be therefore limited to new, 
post—Constitution legal provisions, while some sort of substantive unconstitutionality 
should be an added requirement for old regulations to be repealed. A number of our 
cases show that a mere disagreement between hierarchical levels can be far from the 
concept of unconstitutionality. 
The CC initially tried to find substantial reasons for mere formal unconstitutionality. 
These cases were associated with the concept of the former law of constitutional force. 
Under the Electoral Act, those who stay abroad on polling day are prevented from 
voting. The CC considered it to be a restriction of the right to vote and based the 
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abrogation on para. (3), then effective, of Article 8 of the Constitution, arguing that a 
fundamental right was restricted by a simple act, not by one of constitutional force. 
Also, the CC mentioned in its reasoning, not fully elaborated, that temporary stay in a 
foreign country was no sufficient ground for restricting the right to vote under conditions 
of modern communication and transport. 
The CC abrogated the act on interest tax also for formal reasons, because it had been 
passed without a two-thirds majority of votes as required for an act of constitutional 
force. With a theoretical edge, however, the CC explained that two-thirds majority was 
not a formal prerequisite, but that a high degree of consensus among MPs required for 
regulation of fundamental rights and obligations had relevance as a guarantee. 
Furthermore a two-thirds consensus would also have been necessary because of the grave 
social problems generated by the interest tax. After the amendment of Article 8, para. 
(3), of the Constitution, this two-way argumentation seems to fade and the CC started 
to declare unconstitutionality only for hierarchical reasons. 
Most recently, however, the CC has started to adopt a differential approach to abro-
gation on formal grounds. This practice is related to the above problems concerning the 
present constitutionality of legislation passed under the former system. Failure of the leg-
islative process to have followed the logic of the former system regarding "accommoda-
tion of social interests" is not deemed by the CC to be unconstitutional. (On this basis, 
petitions for repeal submitted both by former "representative organs" that had been 
removed from power and by newly formed ones longing for influence, and even by a 
private person who was found to have no recognizable interest.) The CC revises the leg-
islation act on a theoretical basis, according to the criteria of a law-governed state. As 
a first step, it dismissed a petition for declaring the unconstitutionality of legal provisions 
which had abolished nation-wide debate (28/1990-22 September). The CC has since rad-
icalized its stand, declaring that failure to conciliate interests during the preparation of 
a legal provision did not make the legal provision unconstitutional and that violation of 
the legislation act did not lead to unconstitutionality in itself, but only in the context of 
a particular provision of the Constitution. Within this logic, the plenary session de-
clared—for the time being in an authoritative ruling—that the right of trade unions and 
representative organs to give their consent in the legislative process was likewise incom-
patible with the criteria of a law-governed state (Article 2, para. 2, of the Constitution). 
5. A part of the problems arising from the legal consequences of Constitutional Court 
decisions is related to the fact that the normal consequences of abstract norm control 
mingle with those of constitutional complaints. The confusedness of Articles 40 to 43 of 
the ACC had caused no problem to the CC until the court began to give special 
"rewards" for submission of constitutional complaints. 
The CC has frequently departed from the general rule that an unconstitutional legal 
provision shall lose effect on the day the decision is published by setting a future date 
for repeal. By so doing the CC sought to avoid legal gaps in the language used in its 
statement of reasons, i.e. to leave the legislator sufficient time for reregulation in 
accordance with the Constitution. 
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Abrogations with future dates, which have become routine practice, involve more 
risks as they might set the CC back to the status of the former Constitutional Council, 
whose function was confined to signalizing unconstitutionality, for what we do in this 
respect is in fact set a deadline for the legislator to rectify unconstitutionality. So in this 
case, repeal is virtually a mere sanction for failure to have corrected a legal provision. 
(I wonder whether the legislators keep a record of these deadlines.) Repeal with effect 
from the date on which the Official Gazette is published is much more favourable to 
legal certainty. Finally, it would also require a theoretical explanation whether avoidance 
of a legal gap is enough justification for the continuing application of a legal provision 
for long months after the CC has established its unconstitutionality. 
6. Thus in its decisions so far, the CC has either applied the general rule of ex nunc 
repeal or has departed from it with regard to the future. Ex tunc repeal was ordered in 
a single case of constitutional complaint, with its applicability confined to the petitioner 
only, while the unconstitutional legal provision was declared null and void in respect to 
everyone else from a future date (32/1990, administrative jurisdiction). The tremendous 
influence a decision may have on judicial practice seems to fade the theoretical 
problems, which are no less important for the CC. 
In its decision the CC explained that the constitutional complaint itself and the 
resulting norm control had different consequences. While I find this differentiation 
justifiable, I am definitely dissatisfied with the ruling, which terminated the effect of the 
legal provision erga omnes ex nunc (or with regard to the future) and ordered ex tunc 
repeal with regard to the petitioner. I think that a ruling to the effect that a legal 
provision is applicable to particular persons is contrary to the normativity of the legal 
provision on the one hand, and disputable from the point of view of constitutional law 
on the other (several countries prohibit laws with applicability to particular persons). It 
is imaginable, however, that a legal provision is effective at various points of time—e.g. 
coming into effect or losing force by stages—, though always for groups subjected to law 
as defined with objective sets of facts. 
The problem is rooted in the fact that the ACC makes no real distinction between 
abstract norm control and constitutional complaints, as both concern the un-
constitutionality of legal provisions and, their consequences being the same, the 
conditions prescribed for filing a complaint are meaningless restrictions as compared to 
a review of norms that can be petitioned for by anyone. Art. 43, (4), of the ACC makes 
exceptions to ex nunc repeal and the rule that abrogation shall not affect legal relations 
established before publication of the relevant decision. This paragraph empowers the CC 
to depart from the general rule on repeal in setting a date for "the application of a legal 
provision to concrete cases", "if so warranted by a particularly important interest of the 
petitioner". This recourse, however, is not limited, as it should be, to constitutional 
complaints, but is also admissible in the case of abstract norm control. The same 
paragraph likewise allows the CC to repeal a legal provision ex tunc (or from a future 
date), not only in the case of corresponding abstract control, but also of complaints. 
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Para. (4) of Art. 43 ACC contains a double mistake. On the one hand, it integrates 
the legal consequences of abstract control and constitutional complaints and, on the 
other, sets no suitable condition for the application of any of those consequences. "Legal 
certainty" generally precludes ex tunc repeal, while the petitioner submitting a constitu-
tional complaint is interested in receiving a remedy for his personal matter. In order that 
suitable conditions may be evolved and that the CC initiative, which is correct in sub-
stance, but dogmatically untenable because of its "effectivity to individual cases", may 
also conceptually be developed, we must put in order the concepts used in the ACC. 
The ACC uses three different terms to define the consequences of declaring uncon-
stitutionality: the ACC annuls a legal provision (Art. 40), in which case the legal 
provision loses effect on the day the relevant decision is published (Art. 42), and it is 
inapplicable from that day (Art. 43). 
"Annulment" seems to be contradictory to ex nunc repeal mentioned in Art. 42. 
Annulment should be in harmony with ex tunc repeal as the CC merely declares uncon-
stitutionality existing from the time a legal provision is contrary to the Constitution. 
Consequently, what the CC should state is that the legal provision concerned is null and 
void from that time. For practical reasons, however, this logical requirement is not met 
in full by any legal system. On the other hand, para. (4) of Art. 43 of the ACC allows 
ex tunc annulment in exceptional cases. Thus "annulment" may be construed as a general 
concept which, in addition to "real" annulment with retroactive effect, includes partial 
consequences of nullity: "revocation" of a legal provision with regard to the future only 
and other limitations on its applicability. 
An act on a constitutional court, whether based on ex tunc annulment or on ex nunc 
repeal, cannot but choose to make exceptions from the rule by reason of legal certainty 
or equity. Even if, it admits ex tunc annulment of legal provisions, it does not allow its 
consequences to be enforced in all cases, or else it would be necessary to examine every 
legal transaction entered into under a non-existent legal provision and to clarify the legal 
situation relating to it. To avoid the burdens and legal uncertainty ensuing from this, ex-
ceptions are usually allowed to all legal relations "carried into effect", annulment having 
no bearing on cases finally decided, obligations fulfilled and rights acquired. So, practi-
cally, ex tunc repeal affects only such legal relations as have not yet been settled with 
all their consequences. 
The final result is practically the same in the laws where ex nunc repeal is the 
general rule. Here it is equity that requires annulment to be retroactive in certain cases. 
Again, these cases may not be settled ones, at least in so far as they have been submitted 
to the Constitutional Court, albeit after their final decision, but not later than the 
deadline fixed for the judgement of a constitutional complaint. 
Both solutions meet with the said dogmatic difficulties. The normativity of a legal 
provision does not allow its force to be unduly fragmentized. This difficulty is sought 
to be overcome by the category of "applicability to concrete cases" of the ACC, where 
a legal provision can or cannot be applied irrespective of a decision concerning its 
validity. 
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On this basis it would be necessary to separate, in Art. 43 of the ACC, the conse-
quences of abstract norm control on the one hand, and those of concrete norm control 
and of a constitutional complaint on the other. In both cases, the theoretical barrier to 
the retroactivity of annulment is that the latter is limited to legal relations with some 
"continuing" relevance, like adverse consequences in criminal law, on the day the deci-
sion is published. Exceptionally, ex tunc repeal could be allowed, but the law should 
spell out that its legal consequences "may only be applied in concrete cases" where legal 
relations have not yet been carried into effect in all their aspects. On the other hand, in 
case of concrete norm controle—as they are pending—the general rule is the "non-appli-
cability" of unconstitutional provisions of law, irrespective of how the CC decides the 
question of erga omnes effect. 
c) Questions of interpretation of the Constitution 
Interpretation of the Constitution has two implications for the Hungarian CC: special 
powers under Art. 1, para, (g), of the ACC "to interpret provisions of the Constitution", 
i.e. "theoretical" interpretation independently of concrete cases on the one hand, and, 
on the other, interpretation of the Constitution in decisions on concrete cases, which is, 
however, not less "theoretical" and not necessarily less important in its practical effect. 
The difference between the two kinds of interpretation is but apparent, the former being 
abstract and the latter concrete (as is stated in, e.g., the motivation to the ACC), since 
a state organ entitled to ask for an interpretation of the Constitution under para, (g) of 
Art. 1, will never do so in order to satisfy its scholarly interest, and the concrete case 
for which it actually needs information is usually known. So, "abstract" interpretation 
of the Constitution is actually akin to preliminary norm control, though in an earlier 
phase of legislation, and adds up to a preliminary assurance obtained for an even wider 
range of political activity. 
It is a moot point whether it implies a shift of responsibility at the same time. In 
daily politics, application for interpretation leaves the applicant with an elbowroom and 
a time-span different from those involved in the abstract norm control. Theoretically, 
however, the Constitutional Court takes the same responsibility, and what it should not 
consider are precisely the circumstances of the political game and public reactions. It is 
very difficult to do so in practice. That is why both functions are much assailed in litera-
ture as implying a direct involvement of the Constitutional Court. 
The kind of procedure followed by the CC in its most significant interpretations of 
the Constitution is in fact accidental. The difference is that the forward decisions on in-
terpretation of Constitution are binding, while interpretations forming part of the Court's 
reasoning are not, but the CC can be expected to hand down similar interpretations in 
other cases as well. 
1. The CC started its operation with interpretations of the Constitution under Art 1, 
in para. (9), of the ACC (1/1990, 4/1990). These cases, however, were turned into ones 
of interpretation only by the goodwill of the CC. In fact, it was because of its unfamil-
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iarity with the CC's role that the Parliament referred to the CC its disputes about the 
interpretation of laws, and in January 1990 the Court did not want to establish bad con-
tact with the Parliament by its prompt refusal of applications. So the CC gained two ba-
sic experiences at the very beginning. First, the CC is empowered to establish or to ex-
clude its own jurisdiction; second, it learnt how to separate legal argumentation from po-
litical decisions in a delicate political debate (see the interpretation of the referendum on 
the mode of the presidential election). In the third of such decisions, the exercise of the 
powers of the President of the Republic by the President of Parliament was interpreted 
as a right vested in the current Speaker (7/1990). This was also an important political 
case and the first real interpretation of the Constitution. 
The two questions concerning the President of the Republic could be answered by 
a correct positivistic interpretation of the Constitution. 
In contrast, the Prime Minister's petition for an interpretation of Articles 70/A and 
13 of the Constitution—the so-called "land act case"—required the CC to outline a priori 
the concept of unfavourable discrimination (21/1990). To this extent, therefore, the peti-
tioner ran a very great political risk as the decision depended on the subjective position 
of the CC on an open theoretical question. At the same time, the opinion of the CC was 
not unknown on principle, because one of the lines of its interpretational activity was 
related precisely to cases of discrimination; the CC published its basic theoretical posi-
tion in an insignificant case (9/1990), but the politicians were unlikely to have known 
about this. 
2. With the land act judgement, the CC has properly defined its role at the intersec-
tion of politics and constitutionality. The response showed that, in general, the decision 
had not been studied in its interrelated aspects. Those who gave their comments referred 
only to selected passages which met their interests. What is more serious is that the role 
of the CC was also misunderstood by the Government, as it became evident from the pe-
tition submitted by the Minister of Finance for an interpretation of the Constitution. In 
fact, the petition sought a constitutionality revision of conceptions about the increase of 
the interest rate on housing loans by virtue of a legal provision. In its decision dismissing 
the petition (31/1990), the CC had to interpret its own jurisdiction narrowly and to speci-
fy the essential requisites of petition for an interpretation of the Constitution. The CC 
will interpret the Constitution only if a qualified petitioner applies for the interpretation 
of a specified provision of the Constitution in connection with a concrete constitutional 
problem. The decision pointed out that an expansive interpretation would lead to the CC 
taking over the responsibility of the legislative and executive powers and becoming some 
sort of a government at variance with the doctrine of the division of powers. 
One of the parallel opinions stated in the decision on housing loans suggested 
additional general principles concerning the interpretation of social rights by the 
Constitutional Court. Accordingly, in respect to Article 70/A of the Constitution, the CC 
may not but clarify the nature of social rights, i.e. whether they imply state responsibili-
ties or are subjective rights, and may not give an interpretation going beyond this scope. 
(According to the opinion, Article 70/A grants no one a subjective right to "social 
security".) Apart from this, the Court may establish omissions only. This makes it 
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possible for the CC to formulate and enforce its own minimum requirements in 
connection with social security, naturally in borderline cases. Therefore, constitutionality 
problems arising within these limits may not affect except on other constitutional 
provisions, such as non-discrimination. 
The theoretical limits to a CC's interpretation of the Constitution are outlined in a 
similarly explicit way by a single parallel opinion (23/1990), which puts down 
methodological and substantive aspects of "the freedom of the CC in adopting its 
decisions". On the one hand, it recognizes the interest-neutrality of the concept of 
constitutional rights inasmuch as rights in a pluralist society can embody different values 
as long as the entire constitutional system of rights remains coherent and operative. In 
borderline cases and when faced with a choice between incompatible interpretations, 
however, the Constitutional Court enforces its own substantive conceptions by setting the 
standard of interpretation by its continuous interpretational activity, though starting from 
the Constitution as a whole. 
3. The above two opinions allow an important conclusion to be drawn with regard 
to the interpretation of the CC's adverse decisions. When a statutory solution is not con-
sidered unconstitutional by the CC, it does not cause an opposite solution to become un-
constitutional: a number of other solutions which are appropriate or fair in varying de-
grees may well satisfy the criteria of constitutionality. So the decisions of the CC are not 
of an "either or" type, but seek to preclude extremities and apparent unconstitutionality. 
Evidently, an interpretation of the right to life which allows, and another interpretation 
which precludes, capital punishment cannot be constitutional at the same time. But the 
fact that incompatibility between an MP's and a mayor's post is not in conflict with the 
Constitution does not by itself admit of the conclusion that compatibility between the two 
positions is against the Constitution. The full enjoyment of constitutional rights is limited 
not only by other rights, but also by several technical aspects, expediency, etc. These 
limits by statutory solutions as well, and the CC has to establish the critical point at 
which a limitation becomes unconstitutional, e.g. because of its extent or insufficient rea-
sons. The CC was faced with this problem in several cases when it had to offer interpre-
tations in connection with the establishment of unconstitutionality. For example, in the 
petitions against Electoral Act every technical procedure affects a fundamental right: is 
a more appropriate arrangement than that ordered by the law against the constitution? 
(The CC found that mere technical reasons were not sufficient for a limitation of the 
right to vote.) Judging by our practice so far, it is time we set out this methodological 
position on interpretation with a theoretical edge in one of our statements of reasons. 
4. From the foregoing it can be seen that when the CC interprets the Constitution 
on the basis of a relevant petition or in deciding on a concrete case makes no real 
difference as regards its method, its formulation of philosophical principles, the 
importance of its interpretations, or its responsibility. Nevertheless, I think we should 
avoid theoretical explanations unsupported by concrete cases. From the CC's insistence 
on considering concrete constitutional problems (23/1990) follows the need to dismiss 
petitions for interpretations of individual rights and related state responsibilities, hence 
also petitions for an explanation of the right to a healthy environment. In addition, 
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however, it would be ideal for the CC to always define the substance of abstract 
constitutional rights in its "invisible constitution" by relying on its opinions expounded 
in concrete cases. As a court vested with judicial powers and intervening also in 
legislation, the CC has had opportunity to gain some experience in the legal development 
of real case law over the past one year, so its opinion is in line with its practice. The 
substance of rights is slow in crystallizing, under the pressure of repetitions and 
analogies, existing in variations without hardening into a single definition. Our decisions 
also show that certain ideas merge and then some are to stay—e.g. a necessary restriction 
of a right may only be proportional—, working out differently in individual decisions, 
but forming a stable and predictable part of our judgements. 
This does not mean that there is no need for theoretical definitions frequently 
appearing in our decisions. Some of them are expressly interpretative of rights (see 
positive discrimination, nature of two-thirds majority as a guarantee, main substance of 
a right, specificity of the right to life, etc. as mentioned earlier). Another part a priori 
give concrete substance to constitutional rights, with concrete rights deduced from them. 
For example, from human dignity and the right to self-determination the CC deduced the 
right of workers not to be represented by the trade union without his consent (8/1990). 
However, this was also theoretically set out by the CC, declaring that it regarded the 
right to human dignity, included in the Constitution, as one of the wordings for general 
personal right and that it is a "parent right" which the CC and other courts can always 
invoke to protect the autonomy of the individual if none of the fundamental rights, 
concrete or nominate, can be applied to the given case. 
On the other hand, even these general principles exist in the context of a given case 
and need to be put into a different context when applied to another case. This leaves the 
CC free to distance itself from earlier applications of a principle when dealing with a 
new case and to "shift" the interpretation. For example, in the same case (13/1990) in 
which the freedom of contract is interpreted as being implicitly included in the content 
of Article 9 of the Constitution, because this section qualifies the Hungarian economy 
as a market economy, the CC has stated that neither the termination of the banking 
monopoly nor the marked inflation can be a sufficient justification for legal provisions 
to change the deposit rates at the expense of depositors. Its own reasoning undoubtedly 
ties the CC's hands in the matter of interest rates on housing loans as well, yet it has to 
consider the differences between the two cases (i.e., in the CC's view, the amendment 
by legislation of contract terms concerning deposit rates gave on unjustifiable advantage 
to the National Savings Bank). At any rate, the first decision made it very difficult, 
though not impossible, to use inflation as an argument for raising interest rates. 
5. The most frequent subjects of interpretation by the CC were enjoyment of equal 
rights (Article 70/A of the Constitution), the right to human dignity (Article 54), the 
grounds for restriction of fundamental rights (Article 8) as well as the right to protection 
of personal data and the principle of constitutionality. 
The equality of rights is the commonest basis of reference in petitions that may be 
submitted by anyone. This may be influenced by the ideology of equality prevailing 
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under the former regime and the fact that equality (of rights) is a constitutional right that 
is most readily apparent to primitive approaches: someone in a disadvantageous position 
considers it unconstitutional if someone else is in a better position, namely he finds dis-
parities to be contrary to the Constitution. The rigid conception of rights held by 
(non-professional) petitioners is characteristic of other aspects as well (such as equality 
and even formal requirements). By contrast, the CC set out its flexible position on the 
admissibility of distinction and its conditions quite early (9/1990). The CC extended the 
postulate of equality to treatment as equal persons (treatment as persons with equal digni-
ty, i.e. equal consideration of aspects) and explained that unequal treatment might be jus-
tified by a social purpose not offending the Constitution or by exercise of a constitutional 
right unless it infringed another positively worded constitutional right. The CC's solution 
has its source clearly in Dworkin's explanation for cases of affirmative action. The posi-
tion expounded on this basis has been simplified in subsequent decisions and has come 
down to the requirement of "constitutional grounds" for discrimination (10, 21, 24, 
33/1990), supplemented by restrictive condition for discrimination "within the same re-
gulatory concept" since the judgement on the land act. The importance of the constitu-
tional test of positive discrimination, contained in the decision on the land act, has been 
discussed earlier; in subsequent cases of lesser importance the CC was satisfied with the 
simple formula. 
The importance of expansive interpretation of the right to human dignity (Article 54) 
is comparable to that of the equality of rights. Here the CC has adopted the results of 
legal development achieved in the field of "general personal right" and constitutional 
privacy on the one hand and, on the other, has expounded original conceptions about the 
relationship between the rights to life and dignity in connection with capital punishment. 
Accordingly, the CC has ab initio treated the right to dignity as a source of innominate 
freedoms. Not confronted, for the time being, with the problem of recognizing trivial 
minor "rights" as separate ones, the CC has thus found it possible for the right of trade 
unions to legal representation and the restrictions on sportsmen's registration to another 
club, paraphrased as a right to self-determination and general freedom of action, 
respectively, to be declared unconstitutional. Capital punishment, however, gave 
occasion to go to opposite extreme: certain parallel opinions reached beyond the inter-
pretation of human dignity as a "parent right" in the above sense. One opinion regarded 
it as a value existent prior to, and to be protected by the law; another opinion regarded 
it as a right in unison with the right to life, but considered it notionally unresectable. 
Such absolutization will have serious consequences in other cases relating to the rights 
to life and dignity, e.g. the authors of the above opinions will be forced to take an 
extreme stand in the abortion issue. (The a priori approach to values is to lead to restric-
tions on the possibility of abortion in order to save the mother's life. And the absolu-
tization of these rights will logically be conducive to the negation of the embryo's 
subjective right to life and dignity. Similar difficulties can be expected in the euthanasia 
issue or in other cases closely related to the rights to life and dignity.) 
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As the Constitution spells out the right to protection of personal data (Article 59), 
the CC did not need to invoke the general personal right in interpreting the protection 
of data. 
Article 8, which imposes limitations on the state's disposal of fundamental rights, 
was a frequent subject of interpretation by the CC (2, 3, 4, 11, 20, 23/1990). In most 
of its decisions the CC had to apply paragraphs (2) and (3), which were still in effect 
before the amendment of the Constitution (Act. XL of 1990), and provided that 
constitutional rights and obligations must be regulated exclusively by a law of 
constitutional force for reasons listed in the Constitution. Lack of a law of constitutional 
force provided the CC with an obvious reason for formal unconstitutionality; an early 
decision extended the formal approach, ruling out any distinction by the nature of rules 
governing fundamental rights (4/1990). However, this was also coupled with the CC's 
effort to examine the possibility of restricting a fundamental right from the point of view 
of its substance. It was first stated in a dissenting opinion that the mere existence of the 
reasons listed in para. (3) does not make limitations on a fundamental right un-
constitutional. Protection of another fundamental right is therefore not a sufficient cause; 
the State may use the ultimate means of limitation only if the protection of another right 
cannot be ensured by any other means and limitation must not be greater than is 
absolutely necessary (2/1990). The American doctrine of compelling state interest as well 
as the German doctrine of proportionality have since appeared now and then in the 
practice of the CC. In the meantime, the causes allowing limitation were replaced by the 
amendment of Article 8—also on the German model—with the prohibition of limitations 
on the main substance of fundamental rights. This was mixed with the above criteria (an 
unnecessary and disproportionate limitation derogates from the main substance, 
20/1990), but the absence of necessity for limitations was stated again as a separate 
cause of unconstitutionality, without reference to Article 8. (The purpose of a restrictive 
regulation can also be achieved by other means, 27/1990.) The CC's interpretation of 
Article 8 has taken a relatively firm dogmatic form, in a single instance among recurrent 
cases of interpretation. This is nevertheless understandable, as it started with a dogmatic 
formula originally adopted elsewhere. 
Among the rights listed in Article 59 of the Constitution, the definition of the 
substance of the right to protection of personal data is an important achievement of the 
CC's interpretational activity. This right was first interpreted, again in a dissenting 
opinion, as a right to self-determination in respect of information, with its substantive 
elements stated to be constituted by the most important rights usually laid down in 
legislations on data protection (2/1990). Then a three-member council applied this 
protection to identity numbers (11 and 18/1990). Finally, as a result of the above 
necessity—proportionality test, the plenary session also considered the data on the 
financial situation of party leaders to be protectable personal data (20/1990). The defini-
tion of this right enables the CC to correct the mistake of the legislator, who, under a 
conservative approach, put data protection into the same category with the protection of 
reputation and of secrets, separating it from the freedom of information as its natural 
20 László Sólyom 
complement (which the Parliament again wrongly linked to the freedom of the press). 
The CC has opened the way to expansive interpretation, thus meeting the want of a data 
protection law. In addition, the restrictive interpretation by Decision No. 11/1991 of the 
authorization to use identity numbers serves the same purpose. 
6. Is the CC empowered to alter the Constitution? After we have seen that the inter-
pretation of the Constitution is a daily task of the CC, which establishes the substances 
of individual fundamental rights according to its own conception sets limits to their 
exercise in conflicts between constitutional rights and, moreover, formulates criteria, as 
was claimed in a judiciary opinion, for its interpretation of the Constitution, the above 
question must concern something else than the substance of the freedom to interpret the 
Constitution, namely the existence of cases where the CC has to emerge from behind in-
terpretation and bring into the open the conflicts of fundamental rights within the 
Constitution. This leads to the second part of the question, whether an obvious conflict 
can be resolved within the power of the CC. Another problem is whether the CC devel-
oping some kind of hierarchy within the Constitution is to invest itself with authority to 
resolve such conflicts and to actually use that authority. 
The decision regarding the constitutionality of capital punishment raised this ques-
tion, but the majority did not pay it the attention its importance merited, and finally the 
issue was only mentioned in a brief dissenting opinion. According to the CC's line of 
reasoning, Article 54 para. (1) of the Constitution did not preclude the possibility of 
one's arbitrary deprivation of life, while the prohibition of capital punishment can be de-
duced from the new text of the para. (2) of Article 8 passed in the meantime, providing 
that the main substance of a fundamental right shall be subject to no limitation. Accord-
ing to the dissenting opinion, to resolve conflicts between constitutional provisions is the 
prerogative of Parliament, which is vested with powers to adopt and to amend the Con-
stitution, and the CC can not vindicate that prerogative. Only one of the parallel opinions 
reverted to the question, though not on the merits, because, according to the position ex-
pounded therein, there was no conflict in the Constitution, not even in its original word-
ing and capital punishment had been against the Constitution before the amendment of 
Article 8. So the CC tacitly decided that the conflict, which was not denied by the 
majority, should not be made explicit, but could be resolved within the framework of 
interpretation. 
Is, then, the CC a judge to decide the constitutionality of the Constitution? Yes, it 
is, within the broadest limits of interpretation as indicated above. However, can the leg-
islative assembly act in case of an open violation of the Constitution, one that cannot be 
remedied by interpretation? Decision No. 3/1990 of the CC annulled the provision of the 
Electoral Act which stated that citizens staying abroad on polling day must be deemed 
to be prevented from voting. This rule restricted a fundamental right. In view of the fort-
coming elections, the CC invited the Parliament to fill the resultant gap in law possibly 
with effect on the current elections. The Parliament could not find an immediate tech-
nical solution for the voting of citizens staying abroad and, panicked at the pressure of 
time, ended the non-regulation of the question by depriving those citizens of their suf-
frage (Article 70 para. (1), of the Constitution). The Constitution itself cannot be at-
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tacked in this case. It was the law amending the Constitution that was in obvious conflict 
with former Article 8 of the Constitution, because the curtailment of the right to vote 
could not be justified by any of the grounds listed there for the limitation of fundamental 
rights. So the question is this: to what extent may the legislative assembly ignore the 
Constitution? The Hungarian Constitution contains no "eternal" norms, like those in e.g., 
the German Fundamental Statue, the unchangeability of wich is guarded over by the 
Constitutional Court. The CC did not think, even in its decision on capital punishment, 
of attaching such consequences to the rights to life and dignity created as they are, with 
distinction. On the above analogy, the most the CC can do is to try to emphasize the sig-
nificance of the procedural rules of Article 8 as providing guarantees and to separate the 
provision intended to express the substance of the Constitution from the amending act 
itself; it is in the aspect of amendment that this conflict can be detected, i.e. the legisla-
tive assembly fails to observe the limits it has set, though it may naturally overstep them, 
but not tacitly. (As against this, one may ask whether the previous conditions listed in 
Article 8 and the present impossibility to restrict the main substance hold for the Consti-
tution.) By trying to annul the amending act, the CC would at least point up the prob-
lem, though the consequences of such a decision, e.g. refusal by Parliament, would 
bring additional problems to the surface. (Opposition to Parliament and challenging its 
powers are not the same as now-enforcement of the CC's judgement in default.) With 
the CC holding great sway over sovereign anyway, this borderline question might arise 
as one of the CC openly placing itself above the Constitution and challenging Parlia-
ment's power beyond the CC's control in this respect, implying that Parliament is 
sovereign nevertheless. 
7. The ACC rule on unconstitutionality as manifest in default is not unambiguously 
clear. Does the text lay a conjunctive condition or refer to a casual relationship? (If "the 
law—making organ has omitted making a law under an enabling provision of law and has 
thereby given ground for unconstitutionality", the CC will establish the default; Art. 49 
of the ACC.) Default is also readily apparent to primitive and non-professional "interpre-
tation of the Constitution" and is indeed evident from petitions pleading default. With 
the requirement of possessing legislative powers, the ACC has introduced but an appar-
ently formal condition, since the Constitution makes it a duty, as a rule, of the Govern-
ment to enforce the Constitution, whereas the legislation act requires it to carry out reg-
ulatory activities according to need. So far the CC has normally required concrete 
authorization as a condition for establishing default, stating on a theoretical plane that 
mere omission to regulate a problem in need of regulation is no ground for unconstitu-
tionality (22/1990), and that non-compliance with a duty to pass laws must be a ground 
of unconstitutionality. Departure of an implementing provision of law from being intend-
ment of the enabling act was likewise deemed by the CC to constitute omission, which 
was a ground of unconstitutionality (16/1990). In another case, however, the CC dis-
pensed with a rigorous examination of the existence of authorization and established the 
theoretical premise that if a previous legal provision deprived citizens of the possibility 
of exercising their constitutional rights, omission to adopt a legal provision allowing as-
sertion of such rights gave by itself, i.e. even in the absence of formal authorization, 
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ground for unconstitutional default (22/1990). Thus the CC has devised a sufficiently 
solid dogmatic formula for a partly restrictive, partly expansive interpretation of Art. 49 
of the ACC. The "reparative" criterion is narrow enough to give ground for un-
constitutionality, for, in the absence of concrete authorization to pass laws, non-regula-
tion may ensue from the legislator's will, and in such a case it would be controversial 
if the CC obliged the legislator to make laws without reliance on established criteria for 
unconstitutionality. 
In the majority of cases, the CC found that lack of legal regulations required for the 
exercise of rights was the source of unconstitutionality. The most important of its de-
cisions in this respect established unconstitutional default because of the failure to have 
enacted a law on administrative jurisdiction (32/1990), but similar reasons were also 
stated in Decisions Nos. 22 and 30/1990. 
8. The decisions of the CC are binding on all. If the CC annuls a legal provision, 
the decision needs no separate execution and the guarantees for the observance of such 
"negative legislation" are the same as for that of positive legislation. Theoretically, the 
deadlines set by the CC for the repeal of legal regulations make no difference. Ex nunc 
repeal practically tends to weaken the character of repeal as a sanction, as has been 
mentioned earlier. Behind repeals with future effect there is always an invitation too, to 
correct unconstitutional provisions. This serves to bring such cases closer to rulings 
obligating concerned organs to make laws by way of mending default. In one case the 
CC established default and unconstitutionality at the same time and the "deadlines for 
replacement and correction" coincided (16/1990); in another case, the CC sent to 
Parliament its decision on repeal with a recommendation to fill the gap in law without 
delay (5/1990); but the deadlines for ex nunc repeals always imply the intention of the 
CC to allow sufficient time for annulled provisions of law. 
However, the CC has no means at all to enforce its decisions on law-making. The 
necessary legal provisions, including legislation on social insurance, were generally 
adopted, though the Social Insurance Directorate indicated its difficulties by letter and 
tried to get new deadlines. No new provision of law was passed to replace Article 17 of 
Law-Decree No. 2 of 1989 on savings deposits, which had ceased to have effect on 31 
December 1990 (13/1990). It is more serious that the legislator failed to repair its default 
concerning the payment of POW allowances (22/1990), the deadline for which had expir-
ed also on 31 December 1990. The Government did not put forward the bill on the judi-
cial revision of administrative decisions until 31 January 1991 (32/1990). In its decision, 
however, the CC pointed to the consequences of the delay: the judicial procedure was 
to commence on the basis of the Constitution, meaning that the restrictions otherwise 
allowed by Article 70/K of the Constitution would not apply either. 
Of course, the CC is not under obligation to motivate its decisions, but the legislator 
is interested in considering the theoretical position contained therein, if it is to avoid 
subsequent annulment. At once occurred that the dissenting rather than the majority opin-
ion was taken into account: the second canvassing card did not show the identification 
numbers which had been held unconstitutional by a single judge of the CC. 
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Imre VEREBÉLYI Fundamental Features of Local 
Self-Government 
The Hungarian system of self-government consists of local self-government (of 
settlements and counties) with a broad scope of responsibility and with operational 
democracy and autonomy. 
1. Broad scope of comprehensive responsibility 
(a) Unlike self-government organized for a single purpose, local self-government 
with comprehensive responsibility is characterized by local management concurrently of 
various public affairs. Comprehensive responsibility allows local self-government 
authorities to use the benefits of independent and democratic exercise of local power in 
a variety of local affairs within the frameworks of law and in response to local needs. 
In the case of comprehensive local administration, comprehensive responsibilities and 
functions leave scope for local coordination of matters with many interlinkages, for the 
realization of territorial complexity. 
The advantages of independent and democratic exercise of local power are fully felt 
when comprehensive local administration embraces the widest possible spectrum of pub-
lic affairs that emerge in loco (as well). Obviously, the comprehensive responsibility of 
self-government cannot extend to all local affairs of public concern, but local self-gov-
ernment is the more effective the more the local public affairs of importance it attends 
to. Our self-government Act has adopted the concept of local self-government with a 
broad scope of responsibility by providing (in Chapter I) that the responsibilities and 
functions of local self-government shall embrace a wide range of local public affairs and 
that legislation may only exceptionally refer management of local public affairs to 
another organization. The delegation of a broad scope of responsibility is supported by, 
inter alia, the way in which local tasks emerge. 
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As distinct from, e.g., the British or certain American self-government, the Hungar-
ian self-government may take care not only of affaires which the central legislator has 
explicitly empowered or required it to administer. The broad scope of responsibilities 
and functions of our self-governments are in part evolved by these same authorities 
through voluntary administration of public affairs in part determined by the legislator, 
who defines in mandatory terms the public affairs to be managed by them. The board 
scope of responsibility is established by a combined application of techniques regulatory 
of negative and positive powers. Our self-governments may voluntarily take care of any 
local public affair not referred by law to the competence of another organ. They may, 
in the light of local needs and possibilities, freely determine which function to perform 
to what extent and how. 
Local freedom to accept performance of functions means freedom in relation to the 
legislator rather than to the will of local electors. Local self-government bodies and their 
senior executives may be "forced" by the local population to attend to optional tasks of 
the greatest importance in the locality and even to keep exploring the necessary sources 
of finance. An elected self-government focusing, on fulfilling functions mandatorily de-
fined by law and making no attempt to attend to self-imposed tasks, is bound to face 
serious consequences at the next local elections. 
In carrying out voluntarily accepted responsibilities, a local self-government may do 
anything not offending the law. In addition, the law determines mandatory responsibili-
ties and functions to be performed by self-government authorities. This does not mean, 
however, that there is no autonomy in the local performance of mandatory tasks. The 
element of autonomy inherent in the substance of a public affair is considerably rein-
forced by the need for Parliament to secure the necessary material conditions for attend-
ing to such local tasks. Local budgets must make allocations primarily for discharge of 
local responsibilities and functions mandatorily determined by law, and performance of 
optional tasks may not jeopardize autonomy in the local fulfillment of obligations 
prescribed by law. 
The Hungarian self-government Act has guaranteed for local self-governments a 
broad scope of responsibilities and functions and has entitled them to make submissions 
to higher organs in matters falling within the competence of state organs. The representa-
tive body of self-government may, in any matter affecting it but falling within the com-
petence of state organs, request information and data and, in professional matters and 
questions relating to interpretation of law, a statement of position or may make sugges-
tions, etc. The organ approached is under obligation to give a substantive reply to a 
request within 30 days. 
The term "local affairs" cannot be given a precise definition. A local public affair 
is always one deemed to be such by the legislator or accepted by the decision of a local 
self-government for management by the community. Nevertheless there are certain spe-
cifics which may qualify a type of matters as local public affairs. The substance of each 
local public affair reveals elements of local motivation which enable self-governmentents 
to be purposively involved in managing public affairs by exercise of discretionary pow-
ers. In most cases, affairs with elements of local motivation are also concurrently of 
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concern to central state organs. Where such is the case, the state does well not to ex-
clude an affair from the competence of self-government, but to enforce its national rele-
vance (interest of the state) by means of central regulation, provision of finance and spe-
cial state supervision. A matter may be a public affair, where a self-government can be 
supposed to have the capability to address it and to assume responsibility for taking care 
of it. Central assistance and local association may enable self-governments to do a great 
deal, but not everything. (Public affairs requiring sophisticated expertise, larger funds 
and national overview should, by their very nature, be referred to organs other that self-
governments, whose action may be ruled out by conflicts of interest, inherent in adminis-
trative measures, between the clientele and self-governments, etc.) Amenable to self-
government action are public affairs whose territorial scope in such as to allow their 
management in a given settlement or county without prejudice to the interests of another 
sel f - go vern ment. 
Given their categories, public affairs managed by self-governments are related to or-
ganization of municipal services and to exercise of local public power (local admin-
istrative regulations, administrative measures of self-governments) and associated with 
creation of conditions in terms of organization, personnel and resources for the 
performance of these two "extraneous" functions. 
(b) Matters amenable to self-government action are attended to by self-government 
of settlements (villages, towns, towns of country rank, capital city and districts) or 
counties. In regulating the division of labour between them, the Hungarian legislator 
endeavoured to assign management of local public affairs to the self-governments of set-
tlements, with subsidiary involvement of counties in the delivery of municipal services 
"extraneous" to self-governments and their exercise of public power. 
The functions of local self-governments in settlements relating to municipal services 
are enumerated examplificatively in the Self-government Act (settlement planning and 
development, protection of the environment man-made and natural, water management 
and rainwater drainage, sewers, maintenance of public cemeteries, local public roads and 
public areas, local mass transportation, public sanitation, fire-protection, public safety, 
cooperation in local energy supply and in the solution of employment problems, running 
of kindergartens and primary schools, provision of health-care and social services, 
places of public assembly, support for cultural, scientific and artistic activities and 
sports, ensuring the enjoyment of rights by national and ethnic minorities). 
The enumeration shows that the Hungarian self-governments of settlements are not 
organs performing marginal functions, but attend to a really wide range of matters ex-
ceeding by far the responsibilities of taking care of the local technical infrastructure and 
even including human services (primary health-care and social services, primary educa-
tion), which the legislations of several other countries have entrusted to organs other 
than local self-governments, other than grass-root self-governments of settlements. 
The Self-government Act made it a duty of self-government in each settlement to 
make provision for safe water supply, primary education, primary health and social care, 
public lighting, maintenance of local public roads and public cemeteries, either on its 
own or through associations, as well as for the local exercise of rights by national and 
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ethnie minorities, among the responsibilities enumerated above. Of course, mandatory 
delivery of services by all local self-governments may also be prescribed by other legis-
lations (as was the case with the legislative enactment which made it a duty of self-gov-
ernment authorities in settlements to maintain kindergartens or public libraries, to name 
but a few). 
The law may assign more mandatory responsibilities and functions to self-govern-
ments with more capabilities in larger settlements than to self-governments of smaller 
settlements, in addition to the duties imposed on all local self-governments. Such subsid-
iary duties, exceeding those of self-government in all settlements, to provide basic ser-
vices include, e.g., fire-fighting and salvage operations. Provision of such a mandatory 
municipal service is a task only for self-governments of larger settlements like towns, 
and even among towns only for larger ones, where established professional fire services 
of self-governments have their bases. Such fire-departments have the duty to provide 
service for districts, outside their seats, embracing another village or smaller town. (The 
state allocates budgetary support for the performance of subsidiary tasks, while smaller 
settlements with no professional service may also organize voluntary fire-brigades.) The 
benefits of this arrangement are coupled with the disbenefit that no room is left for the 
settlements receiving this service to influence the administration of district service 
subordinated to the town self-government only. 
(c) As is known, village and town councils in Hungary were subordinated to the 
counties before the change of regime. Settlements were administered by counties. Often, 
the county council senior executives did not but transmit central expectations to the 
settlements, with the county exercising allocative and personnel administration functions 
in matters of villages and towns. With the introduction of the system of self-govern-
ment, the county as an elected self-government, in exercising its functions, translates 
into reality, through transmissions, the self-government of the electors' county commun-
ity. (Such transmissions do not alter the fact that the county self-government is a special 
self-governing community of electors, as it is elected by delegated members of the local 
electors' representative bodies of settlements, mostly from among their own ranks.) 
There is no hierarchical relationship (subordination and superordination) between 
equal local self-governments in counties and settlements, their responsibilities and 
functions are delimited, and in cases where their municipal services and interests are 
interlinked, the self-governments collaborate as ones invested with equal rights. The 
responsibilities and functions of county self-governments are also comprehensive, but 
do not embrace as wide a variety of matters as those of self-governments in settlements. 
A basic task of the county self-government is to organize those municipal services 
(e.g. maintenance museums, special social and health-care institutes) which are rendered 
for several settlements and which it would be difficult for a town or an association of 
settlements to deliver effectively and democratically. 
Legislation may assign to the county self-government a dual duty to deliver munici-
pal services: first, to provide municipal services for a district comprising the whole or 
a large part of the county; secondly, to organize municipal services also for an area 
within the county where the majority of beneficiaries do not live in the territory of the 
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local self-government of the settlement in which the institution delivering the service has 
its seat. It would not be practicable for legislation to make it a duty of the self-govern-
ment of that locality to run and develop for its own use municipal services destined to 
serve district interests in the first place, while the elected county self-government has 
the capability to extend important district services destined to serve district interests in 
the first place, while the elected county self-government has the capability to extend im-
portant district services to towns and villages. These two arrangements are democratic 
in that a middle-level or special institution with a larger clientele is placed under man-
agement by the elected self-government embracing a larger area (county), which in-
cludes representatives of the users of services rendered by the given institution. This ar-
rangement via the county self-government may be said to be effective because it leaves 
room for municipal services with a larger clientele to be organized and harmonized com-
petently and economically county-wide. The legislator has assigned to the county manda-
tory responsibilities whose performance serves the interests of the settlements represented 
by the county. However, such powers and duties established by law produce situations 
in which measures taken by the county in attending to these responsibilities may fail to 
suit the interests of all the settlements represented by the country. 
Along with mandatory functions, the county may perform voluntarily assumed tasks 
of public concern and of greater dimensions which legislation has not referred to the 
exclusive competence of another organ or the performance of which does not prejudice 
the interests of villages and towns represented by the county. This provision implies a 
serious limitation, for the county cannot undertake to carry out such optional tasks, 
affecting, e.g., the area of a village or town represented by it, as the self-government 
involved wishes to address itself for whose performance it deems to be contrary to its 
own interests for some other reason. Functions of the county clearly not prejudicing, but 
serving the interests of a settlement include, for instance, regional coordination with 
other than hierarchical tools, acceptance by collegiate decision of commissions from 
settlements, or methodological assistance for settlements. 
In exercising its functions to carry out mandatory and optional tasks in the field of 
municipal services the county evidently performs related representative functions as well. 
Despite attempts, the county was not prohibited from representing certain interests of 
settlements. Function-related representation, however, does not prevent settlements from 
having other interests expressed or defended by themselves or through their regional or 
national representative unions. 
(d) Given the size of their populations and capacities, larger towns do not depend on 
mandatory or optional delivery of services by the county. They are capable of organizing 
in their own areas the specific municipal services which other settlements provide with 
the help of the county self-government of their representatives indirectly elected from 
their respective areas. Large towns have the ways and means of affirming the interests 
of their electors, whereas villages and smaller towns in a country are in a position to 
satisfy, without subordination to a large town, their specific needs beyond the scope of 
their basic responsibilities. The representatives of towns with over 50000 inhabitants 
have no seats in the county body (assembly) of smaller self-governments, which serves 
28 Imre Verebélyi 
as a guarantee that regional or district interests of large towns and smaller settlements 
may be articulated independently, without suppressing each other, in the corresponding 
self-government. Where such interests are closely interlinked, the self-governments of 
a county and a large town collaborate on the bases of the principle of equality and, in 
justified cases, may even run and develop joint public utility works with larger clienteles. 
Such undertakings can be facilitated by close working relationships and continuous 
exchange of information (invitation of representatives to attend meetings of each other's 
bodies with voice but no vote, holding joint committee meetings, regular meetings 
between elected leaders, daily working relationship between specialists, etc.) 
(e) A town with over 50000 inhabitants may be given by Parliament the status of 
county (town of county rank). (It is to be noted that the Bill originally proposed a larger 
number of inhabitants.) A town of county rank does not form part of the county self-
government, but may, in its own area, even exercise county functions, with correspond-
ing differences, along with its local responsibilities. Towns of county rank and smaller 
settlements as self-governments have an equal standing in terms of basic rights, but 
legislation may assign additional responsibilities and functions to the former. Where ser-
vices are predominantly used in urban areas the municipal services mandatorily delivered 
by a town of county rank may extend beyond the confines of the town in respect to the 
boundaries of the district served. Therefore, with the necessary conditions created, a 
town of county rank may not deny delivery of services to a district. In view of the dif-
ferent sets of conditions, the legislator may choose not to impose on a town of county 
rank all of the tasks that are mandatory for a county. In such a case the town concerned 
is free to decide to carry out a similar task as an optional one in its own area, with the 
necessary conditions prevailing. The right to assume a duty of a county (delivery of mu-
nicipal services) derives not from the county status, but from the fact that a town of 
county rank is in most cases the seat of a county institution providing municipal services 
for the surrounding county. The mandatory responsibility of a county to deliver 
municipal services is not reserved exclusively for the county! In the case of already 
existing county institutions providing municipal services on a district-wide basis the 
settlement in which such an institution has its seat may take over from the county that 
institution for voluntary operation if its services were used, on the average of the 
previous 4 years, mainly by the inhabitants of the settlement. On the other hand, a new 
institution intended to provide services on a district-wide basis may be voluntarily 
created by any settlement or its association if it has the necessary resources to operate 
it. An important financial constraint regarding both existing and newly established 
district institutions consists in that the settlement in which an institution has its seat 
cannot apply for any extra support from the state or the county in addition to that 
granted from the state or the county budget in the form of authorization for the 
settlement to retain a part of local revenues. A settlement, which has taken over such a 
county-operated service facility or has voluntarily established one, may not refuse to 
satisfy needs arising in another locality for the municipal service it operates. These rules 
allow scope only for undertaking tasks with restraint and responsibility. At the same 
time, the first phase of the switch to a self-government system called for the adoption 
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of special statutory enactments (e.g. a town or village is not required to declare its wish 
to take over the delivery of a county-operated municipal service, but certain respon-
sibilities concerning education in a district may be retained by the settlement until it 
decides to surrender them). 
(f) The Capital as the largest city of the country needed a special legislative 
coverage different from that applicable to the self-governments of settlements. The dif-
ferences are treated by a separate chapter of the Self-Govemment Act and by a separate 
enactment on the metropolitan and district self-governments. Passing over the details, 
we shall single out the following main aspects of regulation for the present discussion. 
In the case of the Capital there are elected conceptually two kinds of independent, 
but collaborating self-government and a self-government in each district. (During the 
political debate the legislators rejected the professional proposal that a town should have 
one self-government with local offices and administrative agencies in districts. Also, 
under a liberal approach, they rejected the proposal that, once the districts have self-
governments of their own, the metropolitan self-government should be empowered to 
place stronger limitations on district autonomy.) Of the two self-governments, the larger 
part (66 members) of the capital city's representative body is directly elected by electors 
and a smaller part (22 members) indirectly by the district self-governments. (These 
ratios and this size were the result of a political bargain among MPs, who agreed to 
increase the size of the metropolitan assembly by one member in only one case, since 
originally the Lord Mayor, elected subsequently, was not to be a member of the 
assembly.) 
The metropolitan district self-governments have the duty to provide the basic ser-
vices specified by law and the right to voluntarily assumed management of public affairs 
along with the former. A district self-government is entitled to have certain direct 
revenues of its own. It has its own budget separate from that of the Capital. The met-
ropolitan self-government takes care of matters affecting the whole or a large part of 
the Capital (the Capital renders limited-scope services, too, which are provided by, e.g., 
villages elsewhere). The Capital has a separate budget and direct revenues. In addition 
to collaboration between the two self-governments on an equal footing, the unity of city 
management is guaranteed by the power of the metropolitan assembly to adopt the Capi-
tal's city-planning programme and general development plan. The assembly may by de-
cree transfer to the districts the organization of certain projects, and its consent is 
required to the assumption of such responsibilities by a district. The metropolitan self-
government decides by decree on the distraction of sizable revenues, which, by virtue 
of law, are shared by the Capital and its districts. The political compromise, as em-
bodied in the Bill that such decrees of the metropolitan self-government must be subject 
to the consent of the majority of district representative bodies, is intended to counteract 
abuse of metropolitan power. (It will be noted that there was an exaggerated political 
proposal, ultimately rejected, to require the consent of the majority of districts to the 
most important decrees of the metropolitan self-government.) 
(g) As would be the case in all similar situations, questions of terminology arose, 
perhaps unnecessarily, a great debate before and, unfortunately, after the preparation of 
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law. A salient question concerned a general name for self-governments of different 
types. There was agreement that it was not enough to talk of self-governments, but that 
it was necessary to designate them in concrete terms (thus marking them off from pro-
fessional self-governments). The version of "territorial self-government" was also pro-
posed. In a phase of the legislative process that was strongly biassed against the county, 
the Bill was given the title "settlement self-governments" and then "settlement and coun-
ty self-governments", but the legislator finally accepted the professional proposal to use 
a comprehensive terminology similar to the European Charter of Local Self-Govern-
ment, thereby expressing the concept that the self-governments of settlements and 
counties are all regarded as local self-governments versus the self-government of 
central power (Parliament). 
(h) Along with the function to deliver municipal services, self-governments are 
vested with the right to exercise local public (administrative) power. The representative 
body of self-governments in settlements may issue local decrees to regulate local social 
relations not governed by law or, in exercise of the authority delegated by law, to en-
force that law. Under the enabling law, it is mandatory as a rule to issue local decrees 
enforcing a law, but legislation may leave adoption of detailed decrees to local discre-
tion. (In special cases the legislator may also choose to give the provisions of a law 
governing local problems a subsidiary character, i.e. they are not applicable unless a 
particular matter is regulated otherwise by the self-government.) The self-government 
of a county may, in a narrower scope than the self-government of a settlement, issue 
decrees in its own field of activity and by virtue of law. 
A law or a self-government decree may make it a duty of the local representative 
body to take care of individual matters of concern to the clientele (local administrative 
matters). Related decisions of the representative body are within the discretionary powers 
of self-government (e.g. issuance of permits conceding some benefit on grounds of 
equity in individual cases). Such administrative matters had previously formed part of 
a single group of matters amenable to action by state administration, but were referred 
by law to the competence of the representative body. An appeal against its decision may 
be filed with the self-government only, or if the decision offends the law, it may be 
brought before the court. In individual cases the representative body may delegate its ad-
ministrative power to its committee or the mayor except when delegation is prohibited 
by law or by a decree of self-government. An appeal lies with the representative body 
in such cases, including matters within its discretionary powers, and when a decision 
offends the law it may be brought before the court. The representative body is free to 
decide what functions to delegate, and how, to the mayor or the committees. 
2. Democracy, autonomy, effectiveness 
(a) Local self-government cannot be equated with the local oligarchy of "petty mon-
archs" or with a passive "yesman" collegiate body. Local power is exercised by local 
self-government authorities in a democratic way. Our legislative enactments on self-
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governments and, by and by, also the social practice of self-governments indicate that 
the fora of public power which have been established democratically employ democratic 
methods and procedures by their use of autonomy inherent in a broad scope of local re-
sponsibilities. Of course, the first measures resulting from a democratic operation have 
also entailed unexpected difficulties. The legal frameworks existed, but traditions did 
not, for a local democracy to function. Initially the representative bodies were preoc-
cupied with themselves and with taking stock of their apparatuses and came face to face 
with the needs and problems of local societies at a later stage. These bodies and the 
mayors often worked unaided, also by reason of the fact that hardly any or no basic 
cells—self-organizing small communities—of civil society had yet emerged in local 
societies. 
Democracy in every country finds its roots in local self-governments. Strong self-
governments act to promote local exercise of self-organizing power, by means of which 
the population manages local public affairs directly or through its representatives elected 
on competitive and pluralist bases. Democratic exercise of local power is governed by 
the constitutional principle of people's sovereignty, according to which only the people 
can be the source and possessor of public power, including local public power. Local 
self-government is a collective right to be exercised solely by the local community of 
electors, a self-government or by the representative body of the local self-government. 
Local referendum (people's initiative) is a democratic form less frequently used. 
There is no doubt that submission of more important local matters to a local referendum 
involves much more electors in local decision-making than adoption of decisions by the 
local representative body, even though after a social preparation. The democracy of rep-
resentative bodies has qualitative advantages (effectiveness) over the quantitative ones 
of democracy practised through referendum. A decision by referendum depends to a 
great extent on how a matter is presented by a smaller group of people for decision. A 
local referendum has but two options, either affirmative or negative, in a question for-
mulated in advance. By contrast, the democratic decision-making procedure of the local 
representative body enables representatives to participate in preparing (formulating and 
reformulating) matters for decision, to present a variety of options, to come to compro-
mise by confronting opposing views during debates in the representative body and its 
committees. 
Within the frameworks of the Self-Government Act the local representative body is 
free to evolve the everyday democratism of its procedure, both in its statute and in its 
practical functioning. A question of collegiate democracy is, for instance, that of 
enabling local representatives to join as soon as possible in preparing for decision mat-
ters of greater importance. Scope for doing so is allowed by a system of committees 
under which a committee is likewise involved in the preparation or commissioning of sub-
missions in addition to commenting on submissions by the apparatus. In collegiate 
debates during the preparation of decisions it is highly important for a representative to 
act in furtherance of his electors' partial interests in awareness of the responsibility he 
bears for the entire self-government (the whole of the given settlement). It is quite true 
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that under democracy everyone is free to represent any partial interests and that it is 
ultimately for a majority-based collegiate decision to integrate such interests. However, 
such a majority decision is hard to arrive at under conditions of a "quarrelsome" 
democracy, in which a representative does not respect and consider opinions but his 
own. To be enforced, the public will need majority decisions. The rights of the minority 
are safeguarded by the law making important local decisions subject to a two-thirds 
majority of votes, for which—in questions of settlement policy—there is more room at 
the local level than in the Parliament, strongly segmented as it is by political parties. 
Also, the rights of the minority are guaranteed by the provision of law that it may 
initiate a procedure preparatory to decision-making (the representative body must be 
convened on a motion by one-fourth of local representatives, the proposal of a 
representative must, at his request, be discussed at the next committee meeting, etc.). 
A local representative may ask that his opinion be put on record separately, he may 
argue, ask questions, interpellate, etc. The right to elect a spokesman is a separate 
guarantee for national and ethnic minorities living in the territory of the local self-
government. If the spokesman was not elected representative during the elections, he 
may attend the meetings of the self-government with voice but no vote. The represen-
tative body must be informed of any opinions expressed, but defeated, at the various fora 
open to the population. 
It is an attribute of democracy that a multiple control mechanism is built in the sys-
tem of self-government. The committee or the alderman (local representative elected by 
the assembly to take charge of important business of the local self-government), for 
instance, may control the work of the body's office in preparing and enforcing self-gov-
ernment decisions and, where it observes departure from the objectives and interests of 
the self-government, the committee may initiate measures by the mayor. By its use of 
delegated authority, the committee may take a decision, which, however, the mayor may 
suspend and refer to the representative body. The chief executive has the duty to signal 
to the body, the committee or the mayor any contravention of law he may have observed 
in their decisions. 
Democracy is inconceivable without guaranteeing publicity as a general rule (public 
collegiate meetings, inspection by electors of submissions and record except those of 
closed meetings, etc.). 
Local democracy is one of equals. Equality is to be construed as including the equal-
ity of elected representatives, with "no one more equal among equals". Functions (may-
or, deputy mayor, committee chairman) may imply extra duties and rights, which, 
however, may not be performed and exercised except for the discharge of functions. 
Thus, for instance, local regulations may stipulate that the mayor presiding over 
meetings may not set out his views except at the end of the debate or, if he wishes to 
participate in the debate, he may rise from the chair, with someone else taking over the 
presidency for that time, etc. Under the Hungarian system of self-government, 
democracy prevails in relations between the various local governments, whose 
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fundamental rights are equal regardless of their type and size, while their responsibilities 
and functions may differ. 
Representative democracy has the more substance the more it is coupled with forms 
of participatory democracy. Opportunities for direct participation by the population are 
provided for by population convened by organs of the representative body, with arrange-
ments leaving time for asking questions and hearing the public between agenda items, 
allowing interest representatives to be elected to committees up to 40 % of their member-
ships, involving the population's self-organizing small communities in the management 
of public affairs reserved for self-governments, etc. Our "participatory" local democracy 
is rather imperfect, parochialists with an inquiring mind are few in number, the various 
self-organizing communities of the population are still in the making, local masses of 
people are hard to kindle into action along with elected people participating in 
"representative" democracy. 
In a self-government democracy, interests are allowed free scope for being articu-
lated in the internal functioning of local self-government on the one hand and, "out-
wardly", in an association-like organization of self-government interests on the other. 
As is provided for in the European Charter of Local Self-Government, "the entitle-
ment of local authorities to belong to an association for the protection and promotion of 
their common interests and to belong to an international association of local authorities 
shall be recognized in each State". The provisions of the Charter are incorporated in the 
Hungarian Constitution and additional partial rules are laid down in the Self-Government 
Act. 
Under the Self-Government Act, the representational organization of self-govern-
ment may exercise the right to make submissions to state organs (requesting interpreta-
tion, data and information, raising objections, presenting proposals). The national 
representational organizations of self-government may—in addition to the rights of terri-
torial or regional associations—give opinion on draft laws and other state regulations af-
fecting self-governments, and their position must be communicated to the central 
decision-making organ. 
Just as our system of self-government now in the making is coping with its infantile 
disorders, its movements to form associations have been unable to avoid initial pitfalls. 
While immediately before the change of regime there was but one national association, 
it has grown in number since the municipal elections (currently there are 16 national and 
regional associations). One half of associations are regional, which cannot be objected 
to, but it is all the less propitious that the number of so-called national associations— 
with which the centre is supposed to coordinate its work individually—is larger than 
justified. Self-governments of the same type (e.g. in settlements) have formed parallel 
associations competing with each other. Party considerations have played a role in this 
separation, and some national associations have few affiliates, whereas a few of them 
have overemphasized their role to represent and protect interests and have neglected or 
even failed to develop their function to deliver services. On the other side, government 
offices or parliamentary committees have often bypassed associations or have taken a 
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selective approach to them, so there are less to act upon. Professionally, we have a clear 
view of the target, too: less associations, possibly one, for each type (sub-type) of self-
government, a national coordinating organization established by various associations, 
associations to be stable, with leading posts varying by electoral results (of political 
parties), continuous working relationship with government organs, larger memberships 
and more thoughtful patterns of attitude, widening scope of services. A significant and 
serious national association whose decisions are accepted by the members is suitable to 
sign agreements with the government on specific issues. 
By contrast, one can only write nice things about our affiliation to associations in 
international organizations. Some of our associations have already joined an international 
association. Our associations have by consensus sent 7 Hungarian delegates to the 
organization of the Council of Europe concerned with matters of self-government, where 
they take an active part in work. 
(b) In the initial period of evolving the Hungarian system of self-government the 
new legislature sought to maximize democracy and to minimize the role of administrative 
organs. That endeavour was inspired by the objective situation that during the decades 
previous to the change of regime there had been reserved too large a role for local 
apparatuses and too small a role for democracy. (Essential matters were decided in 
advance by local apparatuses at narrow fora of closed meetings held by heads of 
apparatuses. In most cases, local bodies did not but sanction submissions by apparatuses, 
the latter "setting in motion" the former, rather than conversely.) That legacy had to be 
done away with by all means. Another rationale for restricting the scope of action of 
apparatuses was that the "peaceful revolution" did not want to sack, and rightly so, some 
30000 staffs constituting the local apparatus of the previous regime, but was distrustful 
of them. Given these national conditions and specifics, the legislator establishing a 
Hungarian system of self-government went, where he could, as far as the maximum of 
democracy and the sustainable minimum of administrative efficiency. The Self-Govern-
ment Act invested the local administrative organ and its head, the chief executive, with 
no power to decide on matters of self-government. The chief executive and the office 
may not adopt any self-government decision within their own sphere of competence or 
in exercise of delegated authority. The main responsibility of the administrative apparatus 
is to prepare and to implement self-government decisions. This is an added reason why 
the local office was deprived of its formerly independent legal status as a juristic person. 
By contrast, the legislator formulated different rules on administrative matters. 
Following the example of other countries, there were at hand several workable 
models for the direction and the immediate administration of the office of self-govern-
ment. As is known, some well-functioning countries have devised structures with a 
"weak" mayor, who is attached only to the representative body, acting as its president 
and performing other representative functions, and the apparatus is directed, on the basis 
of collegiate decisions, solely by a "strong" career head official, who is employed by the 
representative body generally for a definite period, for the tenure of representatives' 
office. The head official appoints public servants for indefinite periods and exercises 
employer's rights over them. On another, equally well-functioning, model a "strong" 
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mayor will be the supreme head official, too, who is "only" assisted by a secretary, with 
the right of appointment exercised by the mayor or, with his approval, by the represen-
tative body. Between the two models there are intermediate arrangements, cases being 
not infrequent where several models are concurrently followed in different parts of a 
country. The Hungarian structure, appropriate to the distinctive features of democra-
tization in the wake of the change in regime, follows the model with a "moderately" 
strong mayor. 
In accordance with the Self-Government Act, the office is directed by the mayor 
through the chief executive, while it is headed as single office, and its work organized, 
by the chief executive, an administrative specialist appointed by the representative body 
for an indefinite period. With the exception of appointment, all employer's rights are 
exercised by the mayor in respect to the chief executive. The mayor appoints the office 
staff and exercises employer's rights concerning them. His rights to provide guidance 
for the work of chief executive and the office are based on the fact that the larger part 
of the responsibilities of local administrative authorities consists of preparing and imple-
menting self-government decisions and that the office collaborates in performing the 
mayor's own administrative functions as well. At the same time, the mayor may not 
direct, in matters of substance, the work of the chief executive and the office administra-
tor in discharging their own administrative responsibilities and functions. Direction by 
the mayor as an elected local politician is based on self-government interests and 
decisions. In carrying out his directing activity the mayor may rely—to a greater or 
smaller extent depending on the special situation of the self-government, on whether he 
attends to his duties on a full-time or a voluntary basis—on the chief executive, a 
specialist heading the office. The chief executive at the head of the office takes care to 
see that the work of his office meets the criteria of administrative competence and 
legality. He is an administrative generalist, while the executives heading internal units 
of a larger mayorality are concerned primarily with specific administrative matters of a 
professional character. 
Control over the magistracy is assisted by committees and by aldermen, who may 
be elected to discharge such function as well. 
Under the arrangement responding to the political needs of Hungarian legislation, the 
mayor's "strong" position is weakened by the regulation that there is a separate head of 
office appointed by the representative body for an indefinite period, the representative 
body may remodel the organization, the mayor performs a directive function through the 
chief executive (one-channel direction) and may not direct the administrative activities 
of the chief executive and the office administrator within their respective spheres of com-
petence. The mayor's position is strengthened by the mode of his election, i.e. he cannot 
be recalled regardless of whether he is elected directly (in settlements with less than 
10000 inhabitants) or by the representative body. Precisely in view of, inter alia, his 
directive function, legislation has widened the range of persons eligible for the post of 
mayor (the representative body may elect to be mayor a person without a representa-
tive's mandate "from without" in the absence of another suitable person in the 
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settlement). Appointment of the office staff is part of a "moderately" strong position. 
According to the Government's original bill, employer's rights over the office staff with 
the exception of appointment and disciplinary power were to be exercised by the chief 
executive, but the political decision vested all rights in the mayor, with the chief 
executive collaborating their exercise. 
In the functions of the chief executive and the mayor, administrative matters are, by 
their nature, separated from self-government matters, as they should be dealt with 
according to uniform criteria nationwide and require consideration of strongly profes-
sional aspects; decisions on individual matters leave by themselves little room for discre-
tionary consideration of settlement policy and usually do not affect a large number of in-
habitants; appeals against such decisions should be considered by a higher organ, really 
independent of the authority of first instance, by reason of protecting the interests of the 
persons or organs concerned. As a general rule, decision at first instance on a large part 
of administrative matters is referred by the legislator to the competence of the chief exe-
cutive in self-government closest to the population and, in exceptional cases, to that of 
the mayor or the office administrator. As can be seen, decision-making power is not 
vested in the representative body, to which persons dealing with administrative matters 
are not subordinated in respect of performing this function. Appeals against local deci-
sions of first instance are, as a rule, considered by the commissioner of the Republic, 
the underlying reason being to allow scope for discretion and meeting criteria of legality. 
The chief executive performs a number of administrative functions in first instance. 
(Legislation may also empower the chief executive to settle administrative matters 
beyond the boundaries of a local self-government.) 
In Hungary, matters that occur en masse (involving permits, orders establishing 
obligations), including those which in other countries are attended to by deconcentrated 
organs other than self-governments (building permits, proceedings involving petty 
offences, guardianship administration, etc.) are settled at first instance by self-
government organs in settlements. 
However, discharge of functions to decide on administrative matters in first instance 
may not impose on the person acting on such matters so great a burden as to divert him 
from his basic responsibilities to prepare and implement self-government decisions. This 
is an added reason why the mayor is only exceptionally vested with administrative 
powers by law or an enforcing government decree. The mayor may involve the chief 
executive and the office in the preparation and implementation of related decisions and 
may empower to act on his behalf to sign documents for him. The chief executive, a 
person with professional qualifications and with much wider administrative functions, 
may also proceed likewise. 
Naturally, decisions of first instance on administrative matters not only impose 
burdens on the self-governments of settlements, as the elected self-government of the 
population is ultimately interested also in the way of dealing with individual matters of 
electors en masse. Although the self-government of a settlement (or the mayor on its 
behalf) may not give instructions concerning such individual matters, it may create a 
favourable set of local conditions for dealing with administrative matters. By its de-
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cisions concerning organization, personnel and material resources it may enhance 
administrative expediency, improve the standards of services for the clientele, and reduce 
symptoms of red-tape administration. 
Mention should also be made of the possibility to involve the mayor, in exceptional 
cases, in local efforts to resolve central (national) administrative tasks (relating to 
national or civil defence or prevention of disasters). 
The mayor is assigned administrative tasks mainly in times of emergency, when only 
an elected politician is in a position to decide which of his specialists' proposals is most 
tolerable for the population. The cases of emergency in which the mayor chief executive 
may receive instructions from higher state organs are specified by central legislation. 
The elected organs of self-government except of the chief executive and his office 
staff as public servants loyalty (not fealty to party politics, but commitment to the pro-
jects and decisions of the representative body), expertise, and a high standard of profes-
sional services, whereas the apparatus needs stability in the performance of its functions, 
considering that the representative body and the mayor are cyclically replaced under 
democratic systems. The stability of the apparatus and its head is primarily guaranteed 
by appointments for indefinite periods, strict restrictions on dismissal, legally guaranteed 
remuneration and career progression. The arrangement is also conceivable for local 
employees' security of tenure to be ensured by requiring the approval or decision of 
superior state organs in individual cases. The Self-Government Act has opted for the 
former arrangement. Unfortunately, however, the Parliament has not yet created the 
fundamental conditions for executing this option, i.e. it has not yet passed the Bill on the 
Status of Public Servants, which is a source of considerable uncertainty. 
(c) Genuine local self-governments are autonomous and act to promote decentral-
ization of power. In possession of autonomy a local self-government may respond to lo-
cal needs, make allowance for local conditions, and kindle its electors' spirit of initia-
tive. Through their national network of organizations, local self-governments operate 
to force the central government to ensure that centralism, which is always needed to 
maintain the country's unity and operating capacity, is democratically enforced, but 
reduced to the lowest possible degree, while free scope for democratic decentralization 
is allowed as a general rule. With these conditions prevailing, self-governments can be 
expected to carry on bustling activities, and they are able to use their counterweights to 
soundly balance central interventions. It is not accidental that the fundamental rights 
equally enjoyed by all self-governments and protected by courts and the Constitutional 
Court are linked in their majority to some area of self-government autonomy. 
Self-government autonomy prevails in three areas: autonomy in the substance of 
local management of public affairs, financial autonomy constituting the basis of 
independent management, and local freedom to devise the organization of self-govern-
ment and to recruit its personnel attending to local matters. Decisions on matters within 
the competence of self-governments are final and are subject to revision only by the 
court and only in case of violation of law. 
In matters of personnal, the third area of local autonomy, a degree of autonomy 
impressive even by European standards is guaranteed by the Constitution, the Self-Gov-
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ernment Act, and the Act on the Capital and its districts. In the legal sense, arrange-
ments appropriate to autonomy have been adopted for both the provision and the util-
ization of funds. Coupled with the burdens of inexperience and increased local respon-
sibility, the painful problems of autonomy which self-governments face daily arise 
mainly from scarcity of finance compared with local needs and from the fact that 
management of local affairs is still regulated by an unduly great number of central laws 
or that, in other areas, lack of the necessary laws make full use of autonomy impossible. 
In the experience of other countries, it takes several years to remedy the lack of 
autonomy in the management of local affairs as regards their professional substance and 
the essential aspects of self-government policy. The new system of self-government has 
inherited the prevailing laws and regulations, including a plethora of ministerial and gov-
ernment decrees, adopted over the past decades. The problem could be solved rapidly 
if the only task was one of deregulation or repeal of the legislation in force. In a number 
of questions, however, laws repealed should be replaced by new, pro-self-government 
ones, but Parliament, coping as it does with a heavy agenda in the initial period, is 
unable to act swiftly. As for the future, there are two courses of action open: either to 
speed up the legislative process, accepting temporary gaps in legislative coverage, con-
flicts between old and new laws, and a greater need for interpretations of law, or for 
legislation to give the Government wide powers to issue decrees subject to subsequent 
revision by Parliament, which will either make them law or amend them by legislative 
enactments. 
Autonomy implies an obligation to carry out responsibilities with efficiency. In order 
to correct the injustices caused by the previous forceful amalgamations and fusions of 
settlements, the Hungarian legislator has recognized the right to local self-government 
for all settlements (communities of electors) able and willing to accept that challenge. 
In doing so, however, the legislator offered for local self-governments various forms 
of voluntary fusion along with autonomy. Among the three main types of fusion, ground 
has been gained by fusion in administrative management and by joint administration. 
Fears were not borne out that numerous small communities could not be granted 
autonomy or be let retain it because their representative bodies would probably refuse 
to have a joint administrative apparatus. Even if one considers only the figures on joint 
administration, the most comprehensive form of administrative fusion, it is obvious that 
autonomy in the domain of competent administration has resulted not in separation, but 
in collaboration based on mutual interest (representative bodies in 1526 villages, mainly 
small ones, established 529 joint administrations on a voluntary basis). The picture is not 
so favourable in respect of setting up joint organizations to manage common services. 
Nor can one rest content with the fact that the process of setting up joint representative 
bodies on a voluntary basis has failed to get under way. Proposals for economic and 
legal regulations to encourage more advanced forms of integration for delivery of 
services and exercise of public power are in preparation. Should attempts at voluntary 
integration fail, one cannot rule out ex nunc legislative intervention, based on social 
consensus, in furtherance of the country's interests. 
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János ZL1NSZKY Two Questions about the Adaptation of 
Juridical Models: The XII Tables and 
Hungarian Reception 
The history of Rome's law spans approximately 1000 years. These 1000 years start and 
end with great and comprehensive legislative works: the XII Tables in the beginning and 
Justinian's codification at the end. About the latter we know that it has served as a legal 
model for more than 1500 years. The originality of the former is dubious. 
Our short essay is divided into two parts. In the first part we are going to examine 
the rules of the XII Tables: to what extent ius Quintium was a unique production of a 
special historical situation and to what extent it represents, or is the recipient of, earlier 
legal models. In the second part we are going to examine the repercussions of the 
"keystone" of Roman legal development, the legislation of Justinian. The reception of 
Roman law is a discussed problem. We would like to examine how it served as a model 
in Hungary where it was not accepted as code. 
I. Traditional stories about the origin of the XII Tables say that before the 
codification the Romans sent a deputation to Athens to study Greek law. Liv. 3. 31. 8.: 
"...cum de legibus conveniret, de latoré tantum discreparet, missi legati Athenas Sp. 
Postumius Albus, A. Manlius, P. Sulpicius Camerinus iussique inclitas leges Solonis 
describere etaliarum Graeciae civitatum institute, mores iuraque noscere. " Ibid. 32. 6.: 
"Iam redierant legati cum Atticis legibus. Eo intentius instabant tribuni, ut tandem 
seribendarum legum initium fieret. " Dion. X. 52. : "...legati legum a Greacis petendarum 
causa creati sunt. " 
The XII Tables themselves contain—it seems—details of the provisions of Solon. As 
the fourth book of Gaius Comments, the XII Tables according to D. 10. 1. 13. (XII. 7. 
2.): "sciendum est in actione finium regundorum illud observandum esse, quod ad 
exemplum quodammodo eius legis scriptum est, quam Athenis Solonem dicitur tulisse. 
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Nam illic ita est: 'ean tis haimasian'..." Solon 23. of Plutarch (Bioi paralelloi) says the 
same. 
Other rules are said to be contained by fragment XII. 10. 2. Cic. De leg. 2. 23. 59.: 
"Iam cetera in XII minuendi sumptus sunt lamentationique funeribus, translata de Solonis 
fere legibus ... quod eo magis iudico verum esse, quia lex Solonis id ipsum vetat." Plut. 
21. is quite similar: "Most of these prohibitions can also be found among our legal 
rules. " As we can see on the basis of certain coincidences, the fact of reception was not 
dubious for the ancients. 
Today's scientific community does not accept the significance of the Greek influence 
on the XII Tables. According to Bonfante: "Spigolare nelle XII Tavole se questa о quella 
massima sia derivata del diritto greco, è uno sport intellettuale, che porta anche non 
essere totalmente inutile, ma la messe è assai dubbia, nè vale mai le spese e i sudori ... 
perché tutto è rudo e primitivo, rappresentino un diritto prettamente romano."1 Less 
sceptical are, for example, Jolowicz and Nicholson, who, mentioning the traditions and 
quoting Pliny and Pomponius on the co-authorship of Hermodorus of Ephesus, say the 
following: "Modern opinion has generally been sceptical. But in so far as this scepticism 
has been founded on the supposition that the horizons of the Roman world did not yet 
extend so far, it has been shown by recent archeological discoveries to be unjustified. "2 
According to their last conclusion: "No doubt some disputed points were settled and 
some innovations were introduced, of which a few may well have been copied from 
Greek originals, but as a whole the XII Tables are based on the customary law of Rome 
herself.3 Selb, in the fourth edition of "Jörs-Kunkel-Wenger", came to the same 
conclusion.4 Wieacker has examined this problem in detail several times.5 In one of his 
essays6 he gives a profound analysis of the traditions, and, not denying the Greek 
influence on certain elements, he emphasizes the Roman character of the whole work. 
This is the common opinion of the scientific community today. 
All the more interesting is, that recently the originality of this legal piece of work 
has been queried again. Raymond Westbrook in his essay titled "Nature and Origins of 
1 B O N F A N T E , P.: Storia del diritto romano. I. Milano 1958. p. 129. 
2 J O L O W I T Z , H. F . - N I C H O L S O N , В.: Historical Introductionto the Study of Roman L a w , 3 . Cambridge 
1972. p . 112. 
3 J O L O W I T Z - N I C H O L S O N op. cit. p. 113. 
4 JÖRS, P . - K U N K E L , W . - W E N G E R , L.—SELB, W.: Römisches Recht. 4. Berlin-Heidelberg 1987. 
p . 6 . 
5 WIEACKER, F.: Zwölftafelprobleme. R I D A m (1956) pp. 4 5 9 - 4 9 1 ; Der römische Staat als 
Rechtsordnung, in: Vom römischen Recht, 2. Stuttgart 1961; Die ХП Tafeln in ihrem Jahrhundert, in: 
Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique, Tome ХШ. Les origines de la République romaine, Genève 1967. pp. 
293—362; Rechtsauftrag und Rechtsvorstellung im archaischen Rom, in: Entstehung und Wandel rechtlicher 
Tradit ionen, red. W. FIKENTSCHER, F re ibu rg -München 1980. pp. 5 8 1 - 6 0 8 . ; Die Entstehung einer 
archaischen Rechtsordnung, in: Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsentwicklung. Göttingen 1980. pp. 3 2 - 5 2 ; 
Römische Rechtsgeschichte, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 3 .1 .1 . München 1988. 
6 WIEACKER, F.: Zwölftafelprobleme 1956. 
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the XII Tables",7 while analysing the question accurately, traces back many rules of 
the XII Tables to Babylonian law and not to the Greek one. He points out that in 
reflecting on the newest cuneiform findings, the provisions of Hammurapi do not seem 
to be a unique and mysterious work of law anymore. Their content can be found in the 
contemporary and, partly, in the later legislation. It had an influence on Phoenician and 
Egyptian codices; it was transferred to many Greek and Hebrew pieces of law. As the 
migration of legal models is so general, we cannot preclude the possibility of the 
Romans sharing this tradition too. Both archeological and written sources show not only 
Roman—Greek but Roman—Carthaginian connections as well. Besides the connection 
with Etrury, the Etruscan relations to Rome are a common fact today. 
This newest opinion, which has surfaced in spite of opposing common consent, 
makes me wonder. Which part of the Roman legal rules belong to the common antique 
model? Which part of them is original and why? These are the questions I am trying to 
answer in a short and not too detailed way. 
Many experts have given thorough analysis of the Greek influence on the XII Tables. 
This influence is reflected in two areas of legal regulation: the norms of neighbourhoods 
and the rules against luxurious funerals. Wieacker mentions even the structure of legal 
norms. Ferenczy8 declares the Locri Code of Zeleucus as a model. Westbrook correctly 
mentions, that this theory "is based on the merest generalities". These generalities are: 
the popularity of this code all over Magna Graecia; its private and penal character, the 
role of procedural rules, the mentioning of "talio" and the prohibition of luxurious 
funerals. 
There is no question that the Greek influence on the provisions of the XII Tables 
cannot be excluded, especially on the basis of textal coincidences. On the other hand, 
we can find an explanation of both of these coincidences. Rome was built among the 
far-settled small Latin towns. Here, dispersed agricultural units were common, and 
rarely built around cultic centers.9 Such groups of huts existed on the hills of Rome 
already by the 10th century B.C. but can hardly be called a colony.'0 Rome was 
founded, as tradition says, for purposes of defence, and many facts show the necessity 
of this." The founders were outlaws in the middle of the 8th century B.C., who wanted 
to defend themselves.12 In other words, there was a relatively great mass of people to 
be gathered at a defensible place in the colony. The first Romans could not bring 
normative examples of such a cohabitation from their places of birth and they got 
acquainted with Etruscan "polis "-building only much later. Many experts declare this 
7 SZ 105 (1988) pp. 7 4 - 1 2 1 . 
8 F E R E N C Z Y , E.: La legge delle XII Tavole e la codificazionegreche, in: Studi Guarino IV. Napoli 1984. 
pp. 2 0 0 1 - 2 0 1 2 . 
9 To the settlements see DE FRANCISCI, Pietro: Primordia civitatis, Roma 1959. p. 133. 
10 See M Ü L L E R - K A R P E , H. : Vom Anfang Roms, Heidelberg 1979. p. 30 . 
11 M O M M S E N , T. : Römische Geschichte, Berlin 1941. p. 15. 
12 Livy 1. 8. 4 . ; Dion. Ha. Ant. Rom. 2. 15.; Plut. Rom. 9. 
42 János Zlinszky 
Etruscan influence to be the "town-builder" during the process of the Stadtwerdung.13 
While making order in Roma quadrata crowded with little "herediums", one had to use 
a polis as model. The merchant colonies of Magna Graecia were such densely populated 
areas. The reception of the rules of Solon about neighbouring grounds originated here. 
The provisions of newer Roman law about boundaries, overfalling fruits, overbending 
trees, aquaeducts, and the real servitudes of passage and ladling water all have the same 
roots. In this connection we can suppose that Rome adopted some Greek "town-
planning" rules and used them as a model. 
A possible explanation of funeral prohibitions might be that after expelling the 
Etruscan kings, Rome tried to prevent the Etruscan luxurious way of life. In this case 
the rules are younger than the previous group of norms. They appeared only when the 
"grande Roma dei Tarquini"14 already had international connections and they could 
consciously choose between Etruscan luxury and Greek modesty. 
These changes can also be connected to religious influences. During the 5th century 
B.C. Rome, having its own Latin gods, and having already accepted the cult of Etruscan 
gods too, meets Greek cultic influences. At the beginning these Greek provisions might 
have been simple cultic norms without the domination of prohibitive characteristics. We 
also have a theory of this Greek cultic influence, and we cannot preclude the possibility 
mentioned. Nevertheless, it is questionable that in both cases there may be the use of 
rules as a model and the receipt of their content as well.15 The other arguments 
mentioned by Ferenczy and Wieacker are too general to be a sound foundation for an 
influence theory. 
And what about the issue raised again by Westbrook, that was first and, for a long 
time only, mentioned by Müller in 1903," saying the law of the Middle East had 
influenced the XII Tables as a model? 
First and foremost, Westbrook refuses the idea of developing the XII Tables on 
political grounds. The XII Tables, as they have come to us, do not contain the "liberties" 
of the plebs, he says. 
Secondly, as increasing numbers of legal sources of the Middle East show, the Code 
of Hammurapi and the Old Testament are not unique in their own age. Originating 
between 2100 and 600 B.C., and thus earlier than the XII Tables, Westbrook can today 
enumerate nine original codices in the Middle East and Near East, whose interaction is 
13 First of all GJERSTÄD, E.: Early R o m e , 1966-73; The Origins of the Roman Republic, in: Entretiens 
(N- 5) PP- 1 - 4 4 ; Innenpolitische und militärische Organisation in frührömischer Zei t , in: ANRW I. 1. pp. 
1 3 6 - 1 8 8 . 
14 PASQUALI, G . : La nuova antológia, 1936. p. 405; also MOMIGLIANO, A. JRS 1967. p. 212; against 
ALFÖLDI, A.: Das frühe Rom und die Latiner, 1977. p. 282. ; Römische Frühgeschichte, Heidelberg 1976. 
p . 111. 
15 In accordance with historiographical sources. 
16 MÜLLER, D. H . : Die Gesetze Hammurabis , Wien 1903. 
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obvious and clearly show the circulation of a certain legal model.17 So in antiquity we 
can talk about a common legal approach eastwards of the Mediterranean. This way of 
thinking, however, had an influence on the surrounding smaller forms of society through 
commerce, diplomacy, science, cultic connections and conquest. 
The existence of trade in this area is accepted on the grounds of archeological 
findings.18 It could have been realized through personal contacts and perhaps chain-
trading. It postulates the settling of travellers, owing mostly to the season-dependency 
of travelling by sea. In support of this tradesmanship we can also detect diplomatic 
relations that partly contain cultic elements; it is enough just to mention the visiting of 
oracles. But, beyond others, during the first millenary B.C., different federalisms, 
agreements guaranteeing temporary peace, and wars alternated with each other. Great, 
all-against-all wars quite rare, although certain nations, especially the Phoenicians, 
encountered other populations through waiMike ways as this. During their dispersion 
in the first centuries of the millenary, the ancient Greeks mixed with people of Asia 
Minor, Italy, Iberia, etc. and they kept their inner connections as well. Ulysses is not 
the only globe-trotter of this age. 
By the assimilation of religious elements, Westbrook firstly means the appearance 
of the cult of Heracles that is known in Rome from the beginnings. This cult contains 
many Oriental elements, at the same time it differs from the ways of religious services 
as in the ancient Latin community, and later in the Etruscan State. 
In Rome Heracles was adored as the god of private people; we may say that he was 
the god of enterprisers and not of heroes. 
Among the types of Oriental influence we should note the Roman belief in its Troyan 
origin." Poucet, the great sceptic of traditions, says that this is supported by the 
greatest number of facts.20 
As for the conquests, it is a proven fact that in the 6th century B.C. Rome was ruled 
by Etruscans. One of the theories connected with the origin of this nation says they were 
Eastern sailors; this is just as possible as other explanations21 Nevertheless, it is 
proven that parts of Magna Graecia came under their rule and that they had connections, 
as well as confrontations, with the Puns. Archeological findings make it probable that 
they had commercial and other kinds of relationships with Crete, Mycenae and Asia 
Minor. They could have even transferred these models to Rome which, in a cultural 
17 These are: Codex U r - N a m m u (c.2100 B.C.), Codex Lip i t - I sh ta r (c.1930 B.C.) , Codex Eshnunna 
(c.1720 B.C.), Codex Hamraurapi (c.1680 B.C.) , Assyrian Laws (end of 12th century B.C.), Hittite Laws 
(13th century B.C.), Neo-Babylon ianLaws (6th century B.C.), Covenant Code of the Bible (beginning of the 
first millenium B.C.) , Deuteronomic Code (7th century B.C.). 
18 MEYER, J . C . : Pre- republ ican Rome, Odense 1983. p. 160. 
19 LATTE, К. : Römische Religionsgeschichte, München 1960. p. 213. 
20 POUCET, L : Les origines de Rome, Bruxelles 1985. p. 187. 
21 HEURGON, J.: Rome et la Méditerranée occidentale jusqu 'aux guerres puniques, Nouvelle Clio 7, Paris 
1980. 
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sense, became a real town under their rule.22 All the more, because the Etruscan 
government in Rome ordered great building operations and communal works which 
probably meant a considerable wave of immigration as well. In my opinion this was the 
time when the masses of the later plebs settled down in Rome; they were enterpreneurs 
and engineers, well-to-do, who were neither peasants nor warriors, but simple 
workers.23 These people brought their own beliefs and cultic habits. After the expulsion 
of the kings and the Etruscans, the plebs remained and became an integral part of the 
Roman society, however they were foreigners in ancient rural Rome. This adaptation to 
the constitutional world of Quirites was the first great testing of the young republic.24 
According to Roman tradition, the enactment of the XII Tables was part of this 
progression. 
Of course this adaptation could not happen without recognizing the traditions of the 
plebs; It is proven by having their own priests, sanctuaries and magistrates. In this part 
we can even corroborate the possible existence of mediators in Westbrook's theory. The 
only problem is that he does not take the Etruscans into consideration at all and 
emphasizes the significance of the Punic connection. In my opinion this connection could 
exist only through Etruscan mediation in that age, though we cannot preclude the idea 
of forming a league with the anti-Etruscan Puns while expelling the Etruscans.25 As 
we can see, there was a way for Oriental ideas to reach Italy, the only question is if the 
models themselves can be found in the Roman Code. 
Westbrook talks about the characteristics of the model and the copy and he supports 
his opinion by the following arguments. The "codices" contain casuistic rules solving 
everyday problems and not having sacral features. The typical casuistic form says "If a 
man does X, the punishment shall be Y." We cannot find the method of abstraction and 
there are not definitions at all. Eastern "codices" are much more collections of decisions 
than codices, according to what we mean by "codex" today. In the connection of 
deciding, in these legal pieces, there is an adaptational method that appears in one 
instance after another and solves the same case in different ways by changing certain 
factors, so CH 229-231.26 Such gradual adaptation can be found on nearly every page 
of all the Eastern codes but we can see the same in the cultic texts as well. According 
to Westbrook, it belongs to the methods used by Babylonian science. He says it is 
impossible that Mesopotamian science had an influence on the form of the XII Tables 
without also influencing its content as well. On the other hand, the homology of content, 
22 See G J E R S T A D op. cit. N . 13. 
23 Z L I N S Z K Y , J.: Arbeit im archaischen Rom, S I H D A 1988, in: RIDA 1989. p. 4 2 1 - 4 4 6 . 
24 M O M M S E N , T. op. cit. p . 37; Das Volkstribunat und die Dezemvirn; BINDER, J.: Die Plebs, Leipzig 
1909. p. 375 ; FERENCZY, E. : F rom the Patrician State to the Patricioplebeian Slate, Budapest 1976. 
25 See A N R W . I. 1. FERRON, J . : Un traité d 'a l l iance entre Caere et Carthage contemporain des derniers 
temps de la royauté étrusque à Rome où l'évenement commémoré par la quasi-bilingue de Pyrgi, pp . 189-216; 
PETZOLD, K . -E . : Die beiden ersten römisch-karthagischenVerträgeund das FoedusCassianum, pp . 364-411. 
26 CH = Codex Hammurabi, also §§ 209-211. 
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together with formal similarities, is a strong argument in support of the adaptation of the 
whole model. Westbrook seeks to defeat two coincidences. One is the list of injury 
types: fracturing members, breaking bones, hurting in other ways, cutting out trees. 
According to Pólay this list could be continued.27 Wieacker says other provisions would 
fit the list as well.28 This is an example of the element-changing, horizontal and 
practical "judge-made" law in Westbrook. The other point of coincidence is in the 
regulation of theft; there is the night thief, the thief defending himself with a weapon, 
the thief caught in the act, the receiver of stolen goods, the thief who sells the stolen 
goods. Westbrook emphasizes that we can make similar distinctions in many Mesopota-
mian codes. 
It is very interesting that both Wieacker and Westbrook declare that technically the 
XII Tables are remarkably developed for their own era in which we must place them, 
according to the prevailing opinion of today. Wieacker uses exactly this technique as an 
argument in proving the presence of common Greek influences.29 Many experts have 
already had the idea that this technique of legislation can be traced to patterns of sacral 
texts.30 However, these sacral texts and their owners, the sacerdotal groups were 
practically the only ones which could have been in connection with one another in that 
time. As we have mentioned, the presence of sacral interrelations is obvious in Rome 
too. 
It is my opinion that the Roman development of the economy and society and the 
scientific—literal traditions do not give exact ground for either making or inheriting such 
legal works. The XII Tables seem premature in the primitive society of poor peasants. 
The rough, disintegrated rules reflect this society quite well; it is just their own 
appearance that seems too early. In social units on a level like this, such a literary 
product is quite unusual. We have to find secondary reasons beyond the level of society 
and economy.31 
We might easily select the provisions brought by the culturally much more developed 
Etruscan aristocracy, especially in that we know nearly nothing about Etruscan law, and 
in making theories our fantasy can be quite free. But, as tradition says, parts of the 
Tables are even earlier that the Etruscan government, other parts were codificated only 
after the expulsion of the Etruscan kings. Certain provisions of the XII Tables intend to 
repress exactly the Etruscan habits. 
At the same time, it is necessary to notice the absolutely unique trial procedure. One 
may find parallels to the ideas of ius, mos and lex. But the ways of jurisdiction and 
legislation and the separated judication on the one hand, cognition on the other hand, 
27 P Ó L A Y , E .: Iniuria Types in Roman Law, Budapest 1986. 
28 WIEACKER, F. : Zwölftafelprobleme, see N. 5. 
29 WIEACKER, F. op. cit. N. 5. 
30 WIEACKER, F . : Altrömische Priesteijurisprudenz, in: Iuris professio, Festgabe fü r Max Käser 80, Wien 
1986; NO AILLES, P. : Du droit sacré au droit civil, Paris 1949. 
31 See ZLINSZKY, J.: Staat und Recht im archaischen Rom, Helicon-XXVIII (1988) pp. 169-182 . 
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shows a very special ambiguity. They represent the fact that in ancient and primitive 
Rome the conflicts were arranged in double ways. Of the "twin procedures" only one 
is similar to the Mesopotamian model, the domination of the legislator. The other 
directly comes from the world of tribes and clans where chieftains were arbitrators as 
well, where the enforcing of rights was spontaneous and peace was sought among 
kinsmen.32 
The Mesopotamian codes are far back from this legislatory position. Only the Jews 
of the Old Testament saved it for themselves; a nation that put down its own law of 
declared divine origin in foreign surroundings, at a noticeably lower level of economical 
development. This was the moving spirit of legislation by the Jews. But what was that 
of the Romans? 
We divide this problem into two. The first question is: what was the reason of the 
ambiguity of archaic Roman law, the introduction of both legislatio and jurisdiction The 
second question is: what was the reason for codificating the rules of the XII Tables? 
Though it is generally accepted that, in spite of new motives, the XII Tables did not 
mean new legal rules. The comparison of these two questions is very rare. 
I. In my opinion this approach carries important possibilities. We may believe in 
either way of Rome's origin, either the theory of "Stadtwerdung" or "Stadtgründung", 
but there are 3 - 5 centuries between the first pioneers of Roma quadrata and the creators 
of the XII Tables. And, if we accept that the economic surroundings of the XII Tables 
were much more primitive than other communities creating similar books of law, we 
must also accept it in connection with the previous, pre-Etruscan, times. It is true that 
we hardly know any specific historical facts about this era,33 but recent archeological 
surveys draw a detailed picture about economic and social life.34 Pasturing and 
primitive agricultural colonies of small huts and social equality are the characteristics of 
the era. But why isn't the habits of clans enough, what requires military power, legis-
lation and jurisdiction in this early state? Why does this primitive society have to use 
sacral norms in its everyday life? 
There must be some special deficiency or contradiction in the norms of ancient 
Roman society that requires such solutions. This deficiency is explained by the historical 
tradition that Rome was founded by outlaws of different nations and became bearer of 
different customs as well. The habits of various populations, and the customs of clans 
were not sufficient any more as there weren't original tribes and clans.35 New rules had 
to be created and the valid ones had to be chosen from the existing multiplicity of 
32 WESEL, U . : Frühformen des Rechts in vorstaatlichen Gesellschaften, Frankfur t 1985. 
33 See P O U C E T , op. cit. N. 20. 
34 DE MARTINO, F.: Clienti e condizioni materiali in Roma antica, in: Misc . di Studi Classici in on. di 
E. Manni, II. p . 691 : "mostrarci una società agricolo—pastorale in fase di g ran arretrezza". 
35 ZLINSZKY, J. : Staat und Recht , N . 31. 
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norms. This is the significance of jurisdiction At the same time the newly gathered 
and unusual community produced new situations that required new rules. These rules had 
to be found, chosen and declared. This is the supposed way of legislation. Parallel to 
that, the rules of ius and mos that are part of the common spirit of relative nations 
continue to have their own spontaneous effects. One only has to establish the missing 
dignity of the chieftain, and the missing council of the heads of clans and the elders 
when it is necessary to make decisions in realizing the new rules. Spontaneous 
realization does not need such an institution at all. 
Did models of other cultures have a role in searching for solutions to problems given 
by the new situation? Possibly they had. It is not a mere coincidence that the priestal 
bodies are the guards, inspirers and representatives of these solutions. The necessity of 
solving the new problems is given by the unique genesis of Rome (unique in success of 
surviving, not in the experience37). And, as this society met the legislation in a very 
early phase, when ethnically it was heterogeneous, the "ius" became common property, 
part of the identity of the "civis Romanus". The vision of "supplex turba timebat iudicis 
ora sui"38 is a flashback to views of a posterior society. This era wasn't a kind of 
"golden age" at all. It was a "struggle for life" in the best form and it meant external 
wars. Infighting most likely arose from the wildness, roughness and rootlessness of the 
massed-up crowd. Roots had to be created by legal instruments and internal contradic-
tions had to be controlled by divine decisions. 
That is the way in which the free selection of judges, the jurisdiction of magistrates, 
the spontaneous enforcing of law "inter Quirites", and the legislation meet in the norms 
of Roman society. The power, created by the society for selfdefencing purposes, was 
used for plundering expeditions as they happened in the wild neighbourhoods,39 
introduced jurisdiction, or, better to say, declaring of legal rules just to make an end of 
internal tension. This power was new in this environment and it was used under pressure 
and not voluntarily. The position of a Roman rex was absolutely different from the 
dignity of a Mesopotamian despot.40 He served as a substitute for a simple chieftain by 
right of sacral elections. He was not an omnipotent lord but only the head of armed 
bandits. Following the example of other nations, he tried to make peace because peace 
was needed. The rules about murder seem to be a good example of this point of view. 
"There were not special norms about murdering a blood relative, but, in a special way, 
36 ZLINSZKY, J . : Gedanken zum "legis actio Sacramento in rem" , in: SZ 106 (1988) pp. 106-151 , esp . 
p. 139. 
37 ZLINSZKY, J . : Staat und Recht, N . 31. 
38 Ovidius, Metamorph. De quattuor aetatibus. 
39 See ALFÖLDI, A. : Die Struktur des Römerstaates im 5 . Jh . vor Christ, in: Entretiens sur l 'Antiquité 
classique ХП1; Les origines de la République Romaine, 1867. pp . 225 - 2 9 0 , esp. p . 238. "Der Krieg, de r 
Normalzustand in Latium". 
40 COLI, U. : Regnum, in: Studia et Documenta Históriáé et Iuris XVII (1957). 
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all murders were declared a killing of a blood relative."41 It shows that in the 
surrounding communities the prohibition against murdering relatives was a well-known 
fact. Killing a foreigner leads to a blood feud but it doesn't affect the society. But what 
happened if the population of a town consisted of outlaws coming from different tribes? 
Was it possible to let murders be avenged only by a blood feud? It would be a danger 
of the new community to destroy itself. In such a situation there was a possible 
alternative to let everybody be a relative in the eyes of the law and let every murder in 
Rome be "paricidas" (killing of a blood relative) subject to public retaliation, as without 
this the community itself would be indifferent to the acts endangering its own 
existence.42 So, after the "Staatsgründung" (not even "Stadtgründung") possibly 
happening in the 8th century B.C., the legal rules of Rome were created by necessity. 
It is real "case law" like Mesopotamian dispositions, giving answers to questions raised 
by everyday practice. In this respect those certain faraway rules may even serve as a 
model for them. A necessity for this supposition to explain the legislation of Rome does 
not exist. 
In my opinion, in this era it was not the Eastern law that had certain effects on 
archaic Rome, but that necessity forced the community to select its own rales that were 
valid among more primitive circumstances. May be sacral sciences and traditions had 
their own role in creating and preserving these norms. In this sense the sacral "common 
property" of the Mediterranean had an influence on the inner forming of Roman law. 
But, the subject of these legal rules was determined by problems and decisions arising 
from a special historic period. 
The Etruscan kings and their much more developed order burst into this world of 
special norms. They reshaped it both economically and socially; they built a new town, 
they created traffic and transport. Social differences were born together with these 
changes too. "Aristocracy" appeared in the old, homogeneous world of peasants,43 new 
trades and needs appeared in the homogeneous process of production, but, most of all, 
a new town grew out from the earth. The "Stadtwerdung" took place at that time, during 
the 6th century B.C.44 
The new professions, new activities, and especially the new building operations 
attracted not only masses of workers but masses of educated and rich people as well. 
They settled down besides the "Quirites", "supra infraque Romam".45 At the beginning 
41 Plut. R o m . 22 . L. R. 1. 10., Festus P. 221. L. R. 2 . 16. 
42 M E Y L A N , Ph. : L'étimologie du mot "parricide" à t ravers la formule "paricidas esto" de la loi romaine, 
Lausanne 1928; COLI, U.: Paricidas esto, in: St. Paol i , Firenze 1956. pp . 171-194; C L O U D , J. D.: 
Parricidium f r o m the Lex Numae to the Lex Pompeia de parricidiis, ZSS 88 (1971) pp. 1-66; M A G D E L A I N , 
A.: Paricidas, in: Du châtiment dans la cité, Rome 1984. pp . 549-571. 
43 ALFÖLDI , A.: Der frührömische Reiteradel und seine Ehrenabzeichen, Baden-Baden 1952. 
44 See N. 13. AMPOLO, C.: Die endgültige Stadtwerdung Roms im 7. und 6 . Jh . vor Chr.; W a n n entstand 
die Civitas? in: Palast und Hütte, 1979. 
45 Festus: "Dicti sunt, qui supra infraque Romam habitaverunt." 
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the society could not offer a position for them, so they became the familiars, clients, or 
guards of the kings.46 This was the only way for the "Reiteradel" as well as the rich 
newcomers, the "assidui",47 and the workers, the "proletarii",48 to gain a position 
outside the rows of the Quirites, but inside of the walls of the newly built Rome. After 
settling they remained where they were and had their own share of military obligations 
too; "centuriae" took place of the former "curiae", and we meet a few companies of the 
"celeri", "opifices" and "proletarii". It meant a new step towards new political rights; 
they gained the position of the "filii familias" or "clientes", but they did not become 
Quirites with full rights. They did not have a "gens".49 
The Etruscan rule was an aggressive one which was hardly tolerated by the militarian 
Rome at all, and they broke from its bonds as soon as the circumstances of foreign 
affairs made it possible. While fighting against foreign powers, they had to separate it 
from its native backing. András Alföldi revealed this fact in connection with the royal 
horse guard during the early Republic;50 the economic part of the Quintal rights, the 
commercium was offered to the other two groups of royal clients, too. Probably at the 
same time the "clientes gentiles" were given the same right as well. In this way the 
opposers of the Etruscan rule managed to make the newcomers interested in the 
revolution.51 But, after establishing the new order, it became obvious that the bait was 
not as fat and as sweet as it had seemed previously. "Commercium" was a useless right 
without "heredium", without land. At the same time the great enterprises and great 
building operations came to an end and trade stagnated. The world "trans Tiberim" 
became hostile.52 
Historiographers truly described the nostalgia of the plebs of the Tarquinian world 
and their riot not long after the expulsion of the Etruscan kings.53 It could not have 
happened in another way. The appearance of new solutions support this theory; instead 
the patrónus plebeians received a new magistrate, the tribunus plebis; the plebs were 
given sacral protection and cultic unity, at the same time the government guaranteed 
work and corn supply. These measures did not change the main character of the position 
of the plebs. The plebes could not enter the world of the ancient Quirites, they could not 
take part in the interpretation of legal rules, or become knowledgeable about them. They 
were not allowed to be members of the priestal bodies. Obviously, it resulted in 
uncertainty. Law can be manipulated and it was manipulated in ancient times as well. 
Unwritten law has this characteristic too, especially in a world where it was not naturally 
46 ZLINSZKY, J . : Arbeit im archaischen Rom, see N. 23; BINDER, Julius: Die plebs, N. 24. 
47 ХП 1. 4 . : "Assiduo vindex assiduus esto. . ." 
48 ХП 1. 4. : "Proletario iam civi qui volet rindex esto." 
49 "Quad gentem non habent", see GUARINO, A.: La rivoluzione della plebe, Napoli 1975. p. 159. 
50 ALFÖLDI, A. op. cit. N. 43. 
5 1 ZLINSZKY, J . : Arbeit im archaischen Rom, see N. 23 . 
52 ХП 3 . 5 . "Trans Tiberim peregre venum ibant." 
53 L i v y 2 . 24. 
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born but was an artificially established phenomenon. History has knowledge of another 
riot. The tribuni prevented recruiting and with it they attacked the base of Roman order, 
the res publica Romana. That was perduellio in its classical form, riot and collaborating 
with the enemy,54 but the participating crowd was so great that the government could 
not allow the luxury of settling a deterring example. The new compromise offered 
putting the legal rules into writing which meant the dawn of a monopolistic situation as 
well. Westbrook says if historiographers did not mention the enforcement of codificating 
the XII Tables we would not be able to realize it by its contents. This is true. Only 
security was created for the plebs and not new legal rules improving the situation of the 
poor. However, there are parts of the XII Tables which support the tradition. First of 
all amnesty was declared to everybody who took part in the riot; at least we can 
interprete "Forcti sanatique idem ius esto" this way.55 Some kind of Latin con-
federates56 were not supposed to exist at the time and historians do not mention them 
at all. At the same time, in respect of the borders of "Roma quadrata", the plebeians 
were settled down "infra supraque Romam"; the Aventinus, with the sanctuary of the 
plebs was declared extra-mural for a very long time.57 This is idem ius what otherwise 
traitors, "perduellis", lost; it concerns commercium, nexi mancipique ius. On the 
contrary, it does not concern connubium, as the Tables lay it down separately.58 Like 
the system of "centuriae", the law makes a distinction between rich and poor plebeians: 
"Assiduo vindex assiduus esto, proletario iam civi quis volet vindex esto".59 The rules 
concerning debtors seem to be anti-plebeian, too, but we should not forget that in this 
time "financiers" were mostly plebeian newcomers and not members of the old Quiri-
tarian group. The fact that the XII Tables are not debtor-centric can be explained by the 
fractions in which the plebs were divided; it was the group of rich plebeians who had 
a certain influence on legislation and they used the poorer plebeians for political 
pressure. The rules concentrate much more on creditors, though we must take into 
consideration that the XII Tables contain some advantages for the debtors60 as well, and 
the only sale possibility of personal retaliation—selling and killing the debtor—forces both 
the creditor and debtor to pacisci. 
If we accept the explanation given by historic tradition, we have enough reasons for 
the genesis of the XII Tables. In its drafting, not social and economical, but political 
requirements had the main roles. Regarding its content, both neighbouring Latin tribes, 
54 Perduellio: "Qui hostem concitaverit" XII 9. 5. 
55 XII 1. 5 . : "NEXI mancipique F O R C T I SANATIsque idem ius esto"; see H O F F M A N N , E.: Das Gesetz 
der XII Tafeln v o n den Forden und Senaten, Wien 1966; ZLINSZKY, J.: Arbeit im archaischen R o m N . 23. 
56 Festus; A L F Ö L D I op. cit. N. 14. 
57 Plebeians o n the Aventine; NIPPEL, H.: Aufruhr und Polizei in der römischen Republik, Stuttgart 1988. 
p. 27; LATTE, op . cit. N. 19; G U A R I N O , op. cit. pp . 75 . ss. 
58 XII 1. 4 . ; see GUARINO, A. : Le origini Quiritarii, Napoli 1973. p. 217. 
59 XII 1. 4. 
60 "Dies iusti sunto, quis eo vindex esto, tertiis nundinis, libras farris endo dies dato", XII 3. 1., 3 . , 4 . , 5. 
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Etruscans and Greeks, or what is more impossible, in my opinion, even the Phoenician 
model could have had an influence on the rules. In this meaning both Wieacker and 
Westbrook may be right. But the situation that made the legislation necessary is a unique 
moment in history. It is consistent with the period in which, according to traditions, it 
was created; it is consistent with the economic surroundings of that age and place. It is 
not scholastics at all, but politically required registration of the results of jurisdiction 
born case by case. In this respect it is a typical but unique Roman production.61 
II. It was the emperor Justinian who laid down Roman law in the way we know it 
today.62 Most of these legal rules had been out of use instantly after his era; only 
fragments were used in practice. All his code was not used even in Byzantium; it existed 
only in the shape of translations and extracts. At the same time, the part accepted by 
everyday practice meant progression for the new states of Europe; it was switchover 
from barbaric customs to civilisation. The Church accepted it—"vivit lege Romana"63-
—and it became master of the new European nations. By authority, the Roman law 
became the model of the social norms of the new German kingdoms in Europe. The 
christianization of Hungary was the result of a political decision. Our first king 
undoubtedly supported Christianism wholeheartedly, but the basis of his mission was 
power and not evangelization. 
He accepted and secured the Christian legality, too, and he appreciated the legal 
customs and traditions brought by the newcomers: "Sicut enim ex diversis partibus 
veniunt hospites, ita diversas linguas et consuetudines diversaque documenta secum 
ducunt, quae omnia Regnum ornant et magnificant aulam, et perterritant exterorum 
arrogantiam. Nevertheless, even in Hungary, national custom grew pretty soon from 
the accepted norms;65 it means the parts that were accepted and used by the home 
judicial practice. "Sciendum quod quamquam omnia fere iura Regni huius originaliter 
ex Pontificii Caesarique iuris fontibus progressum habeant, municipalis tarnen haec 
nostra consuetudo, qua in iudiciis modo generaliter utimus, ex tribus fundamnetis 
constat. Primo ex constitutionibus ... secundo ex privilegiis Principum, tertio vero ex 
Judicum Ordinariorum Regni sententiis."66 
61 As common sense it means, e. g., WIEACKER, BONFANTE, KASER. 
62 Corpus Iuris Civilis, ed. M O M M S E N - K R Ü G E R I - Ш . Berlin 1905. 
63 FÜRST, C. G. : Ecclesia vivit lege Romana? ZSS Кап. ХСП (1975). 
64 St. Stephen I. Deer. §. 6. 2. 
65 BONIS, Gy.: Einflüsse des römischen Rechts in Ungarn, in: IRMAE 1964. V. 10; about consuetudo see 
ZLINSZKY, J.: Die Rolle der Gerichtsbarkeit in der Gestaltung des ungarischen Privatrechts vom 16. zum 
20. Jh . , in: lus Commune X (1983). 
66 Tr ip . П. 6. , similarly: "In regno Hungaria non secundum iure civili aut canonico in causis procedatur, 
sed secundum consuetudines regni et statuta." M o n . Vat. L. 2. 213. tailoring BONIS, Gy . : Középkori jogunk 
elemei, Budapest 1972. p . 113. N. 21. 
52 János Zlinszky 
During the 15th century this previous practice watched suspiciously the possible 
reforms. It is the same era when the Roman law, in the shape of "ius commune", gained 
new and theoretically based validity in Europe. 
This process in the 16th century was partly influenced by he mistrusting imperial 
legislation. The more the remaining parts of Hungary became necessarily dependent on 
the empire, trying to avoid Turkish conquest,67 the more it guarded jealously the 
remnants of its legal independence. We can find many signs of this in the legislation of 
the 16th century. For a long time history of law declared that this effort to gain 
independence prevented the reception of Roman law as well as the fact that Hungarian 
legal experts were not willing to accept it.® 
The keystone of Hungarian legal development in the Middle Ages is the work of 
István Werböczy's "Opus Tripertitum", published in 1517.® It contains Hungarian 
customary law as it was mentioned before. Its parallel is Henry Bracton's "De legibus 
et consuetudinibus Angliáé". 
The fate of these two is nearly the same. Both are summaries of feudal "consuetudo" 
in the sense mentioned before. Both became a symbol of the rex being imperátor in his 
regnum, and it means that the king has legislational pot estât is plenitudo and within the 
borders of his regnum the ius imperiale, the imperial law is not valid any more; at the 
same time, it has some legal effects if iure rationis it was accepted by the courts.70 The 
declaration of "Nolumus leges Angliae mutare" is reflected by the declarations of the 
feudal "dietae" of Hungary, 150 years later.71 
It is possible that, contemporaneously with the imperial reception, the Roman law 
was not the model for the Hungarian legislation any more? Is it true what our historians 
critically say, that in Hungary there was not any suitable base for intellectuals, to accept 
the new trend? Undoubtedly it was "Gelehrtenrecht" and it required "Juristenstand" to 
be accepted. Was it legal science that was opposed by the low-educated Hungarian 
lawyers? 
One reason for the English and Hungarian isolation (and we may add France and the 
Scandinavian countries as well) unquestionably was a suprématie one. Neither of the 
countries in question wanted to appear as if it were under the legal supremacy of either 
the emperor or the Papal State. Beyond this, the other reasons are quite different. There 
is no doubt that during the 16th century Roman law was accepted as the model of early 
capitalist legal development, either scientifically, or in the shape of legal provisions. It 
was not needed at all in the areas which already had their own "Code of Commerce". 
No wonder that the Hansa towns were less willing to take part in the reception of Roman 
67 SHAW, S.: History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey I - П . Cambridge 1 9 7 6 - 7 7 . 
68 ZLINSZKY, J.: Ein Versuch zur Rezeption des römischen Rechts in Ungarn, in: Festschrift Herdlitzka, 
München 1972. p. 315. 
69 Mittelalterliche Gesetzbücher Bd. П. Tripertitum, op. red. A. W O L F . 
70 Trip. II. 6. 3. COING, H . : lus Commune I. München 1985. 
71 Op. Quadr. Praef., Deer . 1563:49; 1567:27; 1569:41. 
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law.72 England and the Netherlands were ahead of their time;73 through their case law 
most of the legal principles of the Roman law of obligations were "domesticated" by the 
time of their scientific or central introduction. In the areas of French and Spanish "droit 
écrite" the base of Roman law was never missing, though it existed in a very vulgarized 
form. So in these areas the "mos Gallicus" does not take the Glossa and the Commen-
taries as an example; instead they tried to improve their own Romanistic traditions from 
a clear humanistic point of view.74 
The Hungarian situation of the 16th century is absolutely different. Our country 
reached the level of European culture exactly by the 15th century. Hungarian 
Renaissance precedes that of Germany, England and France and derives directly from 
the Italian Renaissance.75 In the end of the 15th century the Decretum Maius of our 
king Matthias expressly declared a programme that legislational unity should be required 
on Roman grounds.76 The Italian echo of his efforts was to show that our great ruler 
planned the whole reception of the Justinianean law,77 but the reform came to a stop 
at the first step; after the early death of the king it did not get beyond the reforming of 
procedural law.78 Under the rule of his successor, who was educated in the Renaissance 
spirit, the selfish opposition of magnates prevented the creation of legal frameworks for 
the just beginning achievements of the Hungarian "bourgeois". They only allowed the 
declaration of the rights of the gentry;79 the efforts of the upper classes were destroyed 
in a sanguinary peasant insurrection, as it happened similarly in Germany. The economic 
development, possibly demanding a new legal framework, was prevented by perpetual 
war that, after stagnation, resulted in regression. 
In Transylvania, where this stagnation and regression emerged much later, the rate 
of progress brought the only example of Hungarian reception appearing in the statutes 
of the Transylvanian Saxons.80 The leading Saxon intellectuals were systematically, and 
in great numbers, educated in German universities of Protestant spirit, and for them the 
first printed base of Justinianean law was the book of Hontems.81 First it was used by 
72 On reception in the Hansa towns see WIEACKER, F.: Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, p. 227. 
73 On reception in Great Britain and in the Netherlands, see WIEACKER op. cit. N . 72. 
74 On "mos Gallicus" and humanistic science see COING, H . : lus Commune I. N . 70. pp. 25-67. 
75 On Hungarian renaissance see: Mathias Corvinusund die Renaissance in Ungarn, Schallaburg 1982. W i e n 
1982. Textteil. 
76 Deer. Maius Prol. 1-6. ; BONIS, Gy . : King Matthias the Legislator, in: Hungarian Quarterly 6 (1940). 
77 Justinianean law in Hungary, see: BONIS, Gy. op. cit. N . 65 . 
78 Deer, 1492 of Wladislav П. 
79 Trip. I. 9. 
80 SZABÓ, В.: Az erdélyi szászok "római" joga, Miskolc 1985. Diss. (Römisches Recht der Siebenbürger 
Saxen, in ZSS under publishing). 
81 HONTERUS, J . : Compendium iuris civilis in usum civitate ac sedium Saxonicarum in Transilvania 
collectum, Brassoviae 1544; Sententiae ex pandectis Iustiniani decerptis, Brassoviae 1539. 
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Bommel,82 later by Fronius83 while preparing their own drafts. These drafts became 
the source of the Roman law for the Transylvanian Saxons as well. Transylvania was not 
the only spot of receptional success of German-speaking people. It is the land where the 
first complete Hungarian-Roman "Institutio", the "Syntagma iuris Institutionum 
imperialis ac Tripartiti" of János Baranyai Decsi was born.84 As this book explicitly 
wanted to continue the development of the Hungarian law book "ut illius naevos huius 
aequitate temperarem, defectus ubertate supplerem, confusionem methodo corrigerem, 
squallorem et barbariam elegantia mitigarem et expolirem", it is important from our 
point of view. The work of Decius was not the first literal experience of this kind at all. 
Much earlier it was the Canon Pápóczy of Pozsony who tried to partially introduce 
Roman law in Hungary.85 Decius is the author of the first comprehensive system in 
which one tried to reshape the Hungarian legal traditions, the "Tripertitum" and 
"Quadripartitum", using the Roman system of Institutions as an example. Where he 
found legal gaps, he tried to fill them with Roman legal rules. In the end the result was 
that his book contained mostly Roman law and only a minor part was about Hungarian 
legal customs. 
Johannes Czimor was born in the little village of Decs near the Danube which was 
situated in the Upper-Baronian Superintendancy. That is why he called himself Johannes 
Decius (Czimor) Barovius or Baronius. After attending the protestant colleges of Tolna, 
Debrecen and Kolozsvár, he was sent to the universities of Strasbourg and Wittemberg 
by Transylvanian magnates, giving company to their sons on their "Kavalierstour". 
Between 1587 and 1590 he was in Wittemberg, between 1590 and 1592 he spent two 
years in Strasbourg. In Strasbourg he presented his paper for philosophical doctorship, 
titled "Synopsis Philosophiae" in 1591 (second edition 1592). As he says, because he 
was beside the young magnates, he had to study political, historical and legal sciences 
as well, both in the universities of Wittemberg and Strasbourg. During these years he 
realized that "...leges nostras non solum ordine confuso collectas ас stylo squallido 
conscriptas esse, sed etiam plurimis naevis atque defectibus scatere. " According to 
Decius, "quidquid bonarum rectarum salutariumque legum décréta Hungarica habeant, 
id omne ex iure Romano transsumptum sit. Immo quidquid naevorum ac defectuum leges 
nostrae continent, quibus iusto plus abundant, id certe nonnisi ex his ipsis Romani iuris 
fontibus corrigi supplerique potest. " As soon as the young humanist became aware of 
this, he tried to win his teachers over to the cause: "Coepi quosdam excellentes 
Germaniae et Galliae iureconsultos obnoxius obrogare, ut non gravarentur ius nostrum 
Hungaricum institutis Imperialibus coniungere. " His efforts were unsuccessful, as ".. .hoc 
82 BOMMEL, T b . : Statuta iurium municipalium civitatis Cibiniensium rel iquarum civitatum et universorum 
Saxonum in Transylvania 1560. 
83 FRONIUS, M . : Statuta iurium municipalium civitatis Cibiniensium rel iquarum civitatum et universorum 
Saxonum in Transylvania 1583. 
84 ZLINSZKY, J . : Ein Versuch, p . 319. N. 68. 
85 BONIS, G y . : Középkori jogunk elemei. IRMAE N. 65-66. 
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ego ab iis impetrare non potui, vel quod vernacula quadam characteris obscuritate ad hoc 
instituto deterrerentur, vel quod maioribus occupati studiis nollent minoribus iisque 
alienis sine maxima mercede ope ram suam navare. " In the end the young man decided 
to begin his work alone, and—trying to compile the two kinds of law—taking the system 
of Roman law as an example, in four books, under the titles of "Persons", "Property", 
"Obligations" and "Claims", in the form of questions and answers "...genera revocavi, 
generibus species subieci, easque cum definitionibus expressi, tum exemplis illustravi." 
The base of his work was Hungarian law, but he filled its gaps with Roman legal 
principles and rules. This is the confession of the author about his work. It appeared in 
an unfortunate moment in history, just before the 15-year war. The prince did not take 
notice of it86 but his contemporaries did—in a negative way. Kitonich, the codificator 
of Hungarian procedural law,87 mentions Decius in his books published two decades 
after him, but he is doubtful about its practical usefulness as Kitonich was a man of 
theory and not of practice.88 The fact that Decius knew it all, confessed it, and foretold 
it, did not make his critics' hearts softer. The "Bibliotheca Hungarica" of Schmeizel 
directly talks about the work of Decius as "ad praxim vero et usum forensem valituras 
ut magnum nihil."89 They were wrong. Decius is not unique, as early researchers or, 
better said, their purposeful silence on the subject tried to suggest. He was one of those 
high-educated humanists who attended foreign universities during the 16th and 17th 
centuries and returned home to make their knowledge useful in Hungary, under poor and 
difficult circumstances. Humanist sciences, and jurisprudence as well, were an example 
for them while trying to develop Hungarian sciences up to their level. These efforts were 
succesful in the fields of exact sciences, philosophy or theology; even the poorer colleges 
of Debrecen, Enyed, Sárospatak or Marosvásárhely had experts of European fame and 
educational level on their staffs.90 But law is not an abstract kind of science. First and 
foremost it is not a logical system but a political expression of economic facts. If there 
is no economic base, no social demand behind it, if the legal cases are missing, even the 
greatest sciencificity, the strongest power is unable to substitute them. 
Decius was not a great lawyer at all; such kind can be brought up by practice only. 
The contemporary power of the state did not support him. The politicians educated in 
a humanist spirit like himself were interested in his activity but the Prince of Transyl-
vania was not. So this experience, which was begun by the initiation, or at least support, 
of upper circles,91 remained singular in this extent. On the contrary, during the 
86 ZLINSZKY, J . : Ein Versuch, p. 321. N. 68. 
87 ZLINSZKY, JL: Ungarn-Zivilprozessrecht, in: COING: Handbuch 3/2. 11. 1. p. 2819. 
88 See ZLINSZKY, J . : Die Rolle der Gerichtsbarkeit... p. 56. N. 65. 
89 SCWEIZEL, M . : Bibliotheca Hungarica 24. 
90 Science, see e .g. BARTONŒK, E. : Fejezetek a XVI-XVD. századi magyar történetírás történetébői 
[Chapters from the History of Hungarian Historiography in the XVIth-XVÜth Century], Budapest 1975; 
Magyarország története Ш/2 [History of Hungary] 1526-1686. Budapest 1985. pp. 1781 skk, 1861. skk. 
91 Proven by ZLINSZKY, J.: Ein Versuch. . . p. 322. 
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following century, many books were written by peregrinating lawyers, either on purpose 
of making the ius commune known and systematized, or detecting its connections with 
Hungarian law and making it known abroad. Some of these legal works became popular 
only in Hungary, others were published many times abroad.92 
At the end of the 17th century the royal Hungary tried to modernizate the law of the 
country; what is more, the initiator was the central government. Every 
"Einrichtungswerk" contained the necessity of reforming our judicial system and 
modernizing our law. There were efforts in it. One of the duties of the newly founded 
Nagyszombat faculty of law was: "Professores iuristae id maxime incumbent, ut iura 
municipalia combinent cum Caesareo et Canonico, in quantum fieri poterit. Et quae in 
nostris desunt, ex iis supplere studeant.п9Э The manuals of Hungarian law in the next 
century show some willingness to do it.94 But it remained an obstacle for a very long 
time that the Hungarian magnates did not wish to change their "home liberties" to the 
order of the Empire. As the economic circumstances did not urge a change up to the 
first third of the 18th century, all the efforts were prevented. 
The first official attempt to incorporate new legal models was the Decree No. 117. 
of 1723: "Consilium Locumtenentiale specifica instituendorumcommerciorum elaborabit 
et suae Maiestati sacratissimae submittet: ut eadem, vicinis etiam provinciis et regnis 
communicari, et cum eodem concursu commercia ipsa meliori successu institui et 
continuai! valeant."95 
It is obvious that as soon as everyday society required new rules, legislation required 
it as well, though it is true that the reforming of the legal order was stopped quite often 
by the differences in ideas about constitutional power. So the new legal rules were 
present in education and it was introduced to the practice by decrees and other 
provisions, where it was necessary;96 the other way of reception remained the old one, 
as court practice accepted new rules as naturalis ratio from the ius commune if it was 
necessary to solve practical problems. In this connection Roman law served as an 
example of the development of the Hungarian legal system, as it happened in most of 
the European countries, directly or indirectly, but it had an influence on the reception 
of modern forms of civil, commercial and procedural law as well.97 
92 H Ó M A N , B . - S Z E K F Ű , Gy. : Magyar történet [History of Hungary] VI . pp . 14 ff. 
93 Diplom of the Faculty of Law, see ZLINSZKY, J . : Die Rolle der Gerichtsbarkeit. . . p. 59. N . 65 . 
94 ZLINSZKY, J.: Die Rolle der Gerichtsbarkeit... p . 61 . N. 65. 
95 See ZLINSZKY, J.: A nemzetközi magánjog kezdetei Magyarországon [The Formation of Private 
International Law in Hungary], in: Jogtudományi Közlöny XXXVI/11. (1981) pp . 941-949 , esp. p . 945 . 
96 See ZLINSZKY, J.: A nemzetközi magánjog kezdetei, p . 946. 
97 See ZLINSZKY, J. in: Coings Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der europäischen Privatrechtsge-
schichte III. 2 . 14. Ungarn. 
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Zoltán PÉTERI The Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen and the Hungarian Constitution 
Revised version of the Report submitted to the 
XHIth International Congress of Comparative Law 
The scope of writings on the influence of the ideas of the French Revolution of 1789 al-
ready amounts to libraries, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen having 
stimmulated political and legal thinking far beyond the borders of France.1 However, 
a comprehensive survey of its effects has been mostly in the sphere of political and legal 
ideas while the influence of the Great Declaration on positive constitutional law has 
been, so far, restricted to the institutions of some countries.2 As a result, a comparative 
analysis of the influence of the French Declaration on the constitutional development, 
1 In the Hungarian literature see ECKHARDT, S . : The ideas of the French Revolution in Hungary fin 
Hungarian). Budapest, 1924. 
2 See the reports submitted to the Ninth International Congress of Comparative Law (Teheran, 31 August-7 
September, 1974) on the topic "Human Rights Declarations and their Place in the History of Constitutional 
Law" (Section I. A. 2.): BARILE, P. : The particular value of the rights of freedom set out in the present 
Italian Constitution in the lights of subsequent trends, in: Italian National Reports to the IXth International 
Congress of Comparative Law, Milano, 1974. pp. 43-53. and GALIZIA, M . : The declarations of rights and 
their place in the history of Italian constitutional law, ibid. pp. 31-41.; C S I Z M A D I A , A.: Les déclarations des 
droits de l ' homme et leur place dans l'histoire de la Constitution hongroise, in: The comparison of law-La 
comparaison de droit, ed. PÉTERI, Z. Budapest, 1974. pp. 11-32.; D E M E T E R , I.: "Les déclarations de 
droits" et leur place dans l 'histoire du droit constitutionnel, in: Revue Roumaine des Sciences Sociales, Ser. 
Sei. Iur. no. 18. pp. 21-33.; GILISSEN, J . - M A G I T S , M . : Les déclarations de droits dans l 'histoire du droit 
des provinces belges, in: Rapports belges au K e Congrès de l 'Académie international de droit comparé, 
Bruxelles, 1974, pp. 1-32.; S C H O T T , С. : Die Grundrechte in der deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte, Zschr. 
f. Vergl. Rechtswiss, 75 (1975) pp . 45-66. 
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both universal and regional, is still lacking, so the attempt to put the subject on the 
agenda of the XHIth World Congress of Comparative Law may, in this sense, be a 
pioneer undertaking.3 
This characterization seems to be particularly justified in the light of the past and 
present development of comparative law, taking into account its further perspectives as 
well. On the one hand, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen has marked the 
beginnings of a new era not only in France but also in world history altogether. Thus 
the national achievements in several countries as the results of the influence of the 
French Declaration could be classified as parts of a universal pattern determined by some 
generally valid laws of development, the discovery of which having been held as the 
central task of the so-called droit comparé in the last century.4 On the other hand, a 
comparative survey of the constitutional development in countries with various historical 
traditions, and dissimilar political, social and ideological backgrounds may prove the 
existence of significant differences in the interpretation of the rights and liberties listed 
in the French Declaration as well as providing for a particularly fertile ground for a so-
cially oriented legal comparison.5 At the same time, considering the split in our world, 
the search for some generally acceptable patterns of development seems to be more im-
portant than ever, not only as the logical precondition of every comparison but also as 
its "fond commun".6 The rights of man and citizen fixed in the Declaration could serve 
as a starting point in seeking out the "common core"7 of our institutions which—as an 
organic part of the common cultural heritage of mankind—could also promote better un-
derstanding among nations. Therefore, as an expression given to the general feeling, it 
may truly be asserted that "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity were the watchwords with 
which the Revolution placarded the walls of France, and whatever may have been the 
disappointments and disillusionments of the succeeding time, they still possess the souls 
of the Western world, and we know that so far as there has been, or it is to be any real-
ity of social and political progress, it is under these terms that we must look for it."8 
3 The discussions at the Congress of Tehe ran were concentrated on both the American and the French 
Declarations; moreover no written general report was submitted or published later on the topic. 
4 LAMBERT, É. : Conception générale et définition de la science du droit comparé , sa méthode, son 
histoire; le droit comparé et l 'enseignement du droit. In: Congrès International de Droit Comparé . Tenu à Paris 
du 31 juillet au 4 août 1900. Procès-verbaux des Séances et Documents. Tome premier. Paris, 1905. pp. 38 . 
et seq. 
5 PÉTERI, Z .: Some Aspects of the Sociological Approach in Comparative Law. In: Droit Hongrois-Droi t 
Comparé, ed. PÉTERI, Z . Budapest, 1970. pp . 7 5 - 9 4 . 
6 SCHLESINGER, R. : Comparative Law. Cases -Tex t -Mate r i a l s . 3. ed. New York , 1970. pp. 30. et seq. 
7 This term is used here in the sense indicated by Prof. H A Z A R D , J. N. in his "Communists and their 
Law—A Search for the Common Core of the Legal Systems of the Marxian Socialist States." C h i c a g o -
London, 1969. 
8 CARLYLE, A. J . : Political Liberty. A history of the conception in the middle ages and modem times. 
Liverpool and London, 1963. p. 170. 
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On the other hand, however, some incertitude concerning the topic seems to be 
justified. As a matter of general knowledge, the word "constitution" having come of 
current use only recently, was understood differently among nations in the course of 
world history and also this modem use is ambiguous.' Even if the long-lasting distinc-
tion between written and unwritten constitutions could be set aside for the moment, only 
very few direct conclusions may be drawn concerning the institutional framework from 
the rights and basic principles laid down in the Declaration. And even if a direct line of 
causal relations could be detected between the French model and the constitutional devel-
opment of any country, the effects produced may often be perceptible only much after 
the influence of other factors. Limiting the topic in every respect seems to be, therefore, 
a proper undertaking. In any case, it seems to be a well-established view that the chief 
importance of the French Declaration could be ascertained both to its solemn announce-
ments of man's basic, "natural" or "inborn" rights and to its composing some institu-
tional patterns or guarantees for their protection. In the following these basic aspects of 
the problem will be dealt with. 
II. 
1) The singular character of the Hungarian contribution to such a comparative syn-
thesis may be emphasized without any exaggeration. This is due partly to the historical 
fact that in the course of the nearly thousand years of Hungarian legal development up 
to the middle of this century, no written constitution had been produced, the creation and 
eventual amendments of which could be analyzed in the light of the French Declaration. 
Consequently, such an inquiry could, save for the draft constitution of the short-lived 
Hungarian Republic of the Councils (1919), start with the Constitution of the Hungarian 
People's Republic enacted after the Second World War (Act XX of 1949) as a landmark 
of Hungary's transition both to the socialist road of development based on the Soviet 
model, and to the idea of the written constitution. However, such an approach would be 
deceptive and as such, could lead to erroneous conclusions. Because the nearly 1000 
years' existence of the Hungarian Kingdom (established in A.D. 1000) was, as in En-
gland, connected to the idea of a "historical constitution", the integrative parts of which, 
e.g. the law instituting the hereditary monarchy instead of the old electoral one (1687), 
the famous Pragmatica Sanctio initiating in Hungary the female succession of the House 
of Hapsburg (1723), the "Laws of April" enacted during the revolution (1848) abolishing 
most feudal remnants of the past, having been put together successively in the course of 
a long historical development, were held and preserved as the constitution of the country 
all through Hungarian history.10 
9 KOVÁCS, I.: New elements in the evolution of the socialist constitution. Budapest, 1968. pp. 72. et seq. 
10 BALOGH, A.: A magyar államjog alaptanai (The bases of Hungarian Public Law). Budapest, 1901. p. 
131. 
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The fundamental or cardinal laws (leges fundamentales or cardinales) having been 
always understood as integrative parts of the historical constitution," the long-lasting 
struggles for national survival and the safeguarding of national independence were 
contended repeatedly with reference to the rights and liberties guaranteed by them 
against autocratic rulers. These fights may be traced back to the Middle Ages as 
inseparable parts of Hungary's political and legal development, their achievements and 
failures being—like in most small countries in Eastern Europe—dependent on the 
international power relations and on the comprehensive processes taking place there and 
also indicating the limits of national endeavours. 
Also the distinction made between the "broad" and "narrow" meaning of the 
constitution used to be represented in Hungarian writings on constitutional law; the 
former having meant a state structure in general, while the latter as a body of legal rules 
as guarantees against any misuse of state power.12 This broader concept of the 
constitution prevailing in Hungarian political and legal thinking up to the end of the 
Second World War'3, had its roots in Romanist traditions: just as "constitutio" was the 
generic name used for the legislative enactments, i.e. the decrees (décréta), edicts 
(edicta) and orders (mandata) made by Roman Emperors14 so, similarly, in medieval 
Hungary, since the second half of the 12th century, this word was used for the products 
of the legislative activity of the kings.15 
However, this legislative activity used to be, following Western patterns, restrained 
by the rise of feudalism. The laws connected to the names of the first kings of Hungary 
were—on the evidence of their wording—recalling the idea of the "King in Parliament", 
by the king's decree with the assent of the people (decreto regali et consensu populi) or 
by the king's decree with the testimony of the whole clergy and the people (decreto 
regali cum testimonio totius cleri et populi). This meaning became established with the 
rise of the feudal aristocracy and its counterpart, the class of other noblemen, and their 
growing role in legislation. As it was laid down in the Tripertitum, a collection of the 
medieval Hungarian customary law published by a highranking judge, Stephen Werbőczy 
(1517) and applied—though in lack of formal enactment—as valid law up to the post-war 
changes in the second half of the 20th century, the right to legislate had been reserved 
to the king and the people assembled in Parliament.16 Of course, the people (populus) 
11 KARVASY, A.: A politikai tudományok (Political sciences). Győr, 1845. p. 24. 
12 KOVÁCS, I.: Magyar alkotmányjog. (Hungarian Constitutional Law.) Szeged, 1990. p . 243. et seq. 
13 MOLNÁR, К. : Magyar Közjog. (Hungarian Public Law.) Pécs, 1929. p. 244. 
14 WALKER, D.: The Oxford Companion to Law. Oxford, 1980. p . 279. 
15 MARCZALI, H.: Alkotmánytervezetek 1790—ben. (Draft constitutions in 1790.) In: Budapesti Szemle, 
1906. Vol. 125. p. 395. 
16 ". . .princeps proprio motu. . . constitutiones facere non potest, sed accersito interrogatoque populo". 
(Tripertitum opus juris consuetudinarii regni Hungáriáé. Viennae, 1517. Pars П. Tit . 3 . The word 
"parlamentum" emerged for the first time in Hungary at the end of the 13th century. LADÁNYI, G.: A 
magyar királyság alkotmánytörténete a szatmári békekötésig. (Constitutional history of the Hungarian kingdom 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 61 
used to mean in medieval Hungary, similarly to the legislative practice introduced in the 
form of the capitularies by Charlemagne, the closest and most devoted adherents of the 
monarch, the ecclesiastical and secular chiefs of the country.17 The laws enacted jointly 
by the king and Parliament retained their central place among the sources of written law 
during the Middle Ages and also in newer times, the most important ones as "leges 
fundamentales" having the rank of an unwritten, "historical" constitution. 
The new-meaning Latin word "constitutio" first appeared in Hapsburg-ruled Hun-
gary, under the influence of French Enlightment, at the end of the 18th century.18 The 
laws enacted in the years 1790-91, having emphasized the principle that legislative po-
wer shall be vested jointly in the lawfully crowned king and Parliament, and having res-
tricted subordinate legislation in the form of royal decrees or patents to "affairs in con-
formity with Acts" (Act no. XII of 1790-91), specified Hungary as "a country inde-
pendent from every other people, having an existence and constitution of her own" (Act 
no. X of 1790-91). Therefore, it may be said without exaggeration that the role of the 
French Declaration in influencing Hungarian constitutional development could be dealt 
with not only in the field of ideas but also concerning positive constitutional law itself. 
2) Also the idea of some basic rights and freedoms has had ancient roots in Hungary. 
The Golden Bull of King Andrew II (1222), a document coupled with the golden seal 
used by the kings of Hungary since the 13th century for ratifying their most important 
decrees, had some similarities with the Magna Charta of England (1215) as an agreement 
between the monarch and the feudal barons of the country." The Bull imposed consider-
able limitations on royal power, moreover it contained important guarantees inclusive 
of the right of armed resistance against the illegal acts of the king (Art. XXXI).20 The 
noblemen compelling the king to promulgate the Bull made their complaints appear as 
a protest against the infringements of the "ancient liberties" laid down by the founder 
and first law-maker of the Hungarian kingdom, king St. Stephen (A.D. 1000-1038). 
In reality however, they succeeded, by its enactment, in reaffirming their feudal pri-
vileges, the most important ones being the freedom of the person, the privilege to be put 
on trial before the king's courts, the immunity from taxes and the "ius resistendi" men-
up to the Treaty of Szatmár) Debrecen, 1871. p. 117. 
17 KOLLÁR, Á. F . : De originibus et usu perpetuo potestatis legislativae apostolicorum Regum Hungáriáé 
circa Sacra. Wien, 1764. pp. 2 8 - 3 0 . As it was also put down in the Tripertitum, "nation" (populus) included 
only the noblemen: Nomine autem et appelatione populi... intellige solummodo dominos praelatos, barones 
et alios magnates, atque quoslibet nobiles, sed non ignobiles." (Pars П. Tit. 4.) 
18 KOVÁCS, I.: On the problem of Act of Parliament and Law—Decree. Acta Universitatis Szegediensis 
de Attila József Nominatae. Tom. ХХШ. Fase. 4. Szeged, 1976. pp. 17 -18 . 
19 PÉTERI, Z. : The Golden Bull of Hungary and the Problem of Human Rights. In: Essays in Legal History 
in Honor of Felix Frankfurter , ed. by FORKOSCH, M. D. Indianapolis, Kansas Ci ty , New York, 1966. pp . 
2 1 1 - 2 2 5 . 
20 This claim was given up only by Act no . IV. of 1687. 
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tioned above.21 These privileges, inclusive of the equality of all noblemen (una eadem-
que nobilitas), were guaranteed also by the Tripartitum as belonging to the old customary 
law of the land.22 
On the other hand, however, the overwhelming majority of the population, and first 
of all the peasantry, had not enjoyed any privileges at all but a long series of feudal 
burdens in the form of various pecuniary and natural services to be performed for their 
landlords (similar to those which existed in the West, e.g. socage, relief, aid, etc.). As 
some of other countries, in Hungary the lower classes of the population sometimes tried 
to get rid of their burdens by employing revolutionary methods. The huge peasants' 
uprising 1514, (among the aims of which were the abolition of the monarchy, the 
destruction of both spiritual and lay aristocracy and the assurance of equal rights for 
every group of the population) proved to exert a lasting influence on later development. 
The privileged classes, after having suppressed the uprising, not only restored the 
formerly existing feudal burdens but also aggravated them, inasmuch as they imposed 
on the peasants the penalty of a "total and eternal servitude" (mera and perpetua 
rusticitas) inclusive of the ban on their freedom of movement (Act no XXV of 1514). 
The tragedy of the business lies in the fact that these rules had been included also into 
the freshly-compiled work of Werbőczy as parts of the customary law of Hungary,23 
and, although subsequent legislation about half a century later restored the freedom of 
movement of the peasants (Acts XXVII-XXXII of 1556), this newer regulation had to 
yield to the opposite course of the landlords based on the great authority of the 
Tripartitum. The penalty as inflicted on "sinners and innocents alike" seemed to be an 
"incomprehensible contradiction" also in the eyes of posterity; moreover, as a treatment 
"more repulsive than slavery in ancient times" resulted in the exclusion of a group of 
people from the nation as a whole and may be held responsible for the fact that "our 
land had to suffer a century-long stagnation and poverty until the latest times".24 
Actually, real improvement in peasant life occurred only step by step, first at the 
beginning of the 19th century by facilitating the payment of indemnity to the owners of 
real property ("fee simple"), then by the abolishing of all feudal burdens. 
21 ".. . ipsi, nisi primum citati vel evocati, ordineque judiciario condemned fuerint , in eorum personis. . .per 
neminem detineri possint"; " . . .quoque princeps noster . . .neminem eorum praeter viam juris et altera parte non 
audita, in persona, vel rebus suis, ordinaria autoritate impedire potest"; ". .ab omnique conditionaria Servitute, 
ас datiarum et collectanim, tributorum, vectigalium, tricesimarumquesolutione, per omnia immuneset exempti 
habentur. ."; ". . .si quisqiam regum et principum nostrorum, libertatibus nobilium...declaratis et expressis 
contravenire attentaret: extunc sine nota alicujus infidelitatis, liberam illí resistendi et contradicendi habent in 
perpetuum facultatem." (Tripartitum Pars I. Tit. 9.) 
22 " . . .omnes domini praelati et ecclesiarum rectores, ac barones et caeteri magnates, atque nobiles et 
proceres regni hujus Hungáriáé, ratione nobilitatis, et bonorum temporalium, una eademque libertatis, 
exemptionis, et immunitatis praerogativa gaudent.. ." (Pars I. Tit. 2.) 
23 Tripartitum Pars HI. Tit. 25. 
24 H O R V Á T H , M.: Az 1514—diki pórlázadás, annak okai és következményei. (The peasants' uprising of 
1514, its causes and consequences.) Pest, 1868. 
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This state of affairs suited well the interests of the privileged classes; any attempt 
aiming at its modification met with their opposition. Prohibitions in the laws enacted by 
the Hungarian diet in the Middle Ages were drafted repeatedly against "harmful 
innovations".25 This conservative attitude, supported by the famous Art. XXXI of the 
Golden Bull, had also a peculiar meaning in Hungarian history. The repeated allusions 
to the "ius resistendi" were meant to serve as a shelter not only from the unlawful acts 
of the kings but also as the justification of armed or unarmed struggles in defence of 
national independence. This fact could partly be explained by the historical experience 
gained in the periods of reiterated assaults against the independence of the country and, 
respectively, by the fear that any changes in the traditional institutions and the old 
system of constitutional guarantees would endanger Hungary's national existence.26 
As a consequence of this, the idea of national independence and the right of Hungary 
to be governed according to her own laws and ancient customs, inclusive of the 
privileges of the noblemen, could play a mobilizing role in a long series of wars, 
uprisings and revolutions against foreign rulers and was repeatedly emphasized and 
guaranteed in the several peace treaties concluded during the 17th and 18th centuries 
between the Princes of Transsylvania as successors of medieval Hungarian monarchs, 
and the Hapsburg Emperors.27 
The efforts of the Hapsburg dynasty aimed at the establishment of a uniform and 
German-speaking Austrian Empire were permanently frustrated by Hungarian national 
resistance in defence of the historical constitution of the country, inclusive of the 
privileges of the noblemen.28 
3) The concept of natural law has its early origin in Hungary in the serf-liberating 
documents called arenga dating back to the 13th century.29 Later on, the Tripartitum 
contained a rather detailed analysis of the distinction between natural law (ius naturale) 
25 E.g. "Novitates et nocivae constitutiones introductae aboleantur et destruantur" (Act IV. of 1439) or 
".. .quod nullas prorsus quemadmodumpraefatus quondam dominus rex Matthias fecerat, introducamus.. . " (Act 
П. of 1490). 
26 M A R C Z A L I : Op. cit. p. 394. 
27 The treaties concluded in Vienna (1606), Nikolsburg (1622) and Linz (1645) guaranteed, among others, 
the free exercise of Protestant religion which had previously been menaced with detention and death by burning 
under Act IV of 1525: "Lutherani etiam omnes de Regno exstirpentur et ubicunque reperti fuerint, non solum 
per ecclesiasticos, verum etiam per seculares personas libère capiantur et conburantur". 
28 After the revolutionary wars led by Princes I. Thököly (1678-1685) , then F . Rákóczi ( 1 7 0 3 - 1 7 1 1 ) , the 
Habsburg Emperors had, in their capacity as Kings of Hungary, to guarantee in their "diploma inaugurale" 
confirmed by oath before the coronation and enacted by an Act of Parliament, the freedom, laws and customs 
of the country (e .g. Act П. of 1715., Act П. of 1741. etc .) . 
29 BÓNIS, Gy . : Középkori jogunk elemei. (The elements of our law in the Middle Ages.) Budapest, 1972. 
pp. 6 2 - 6 3 . 
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and civil law (ius civile),30 the intended purpose of the former being to protect the 
natural order of society. A new, revolutionary meaning was attached to the original idea 
in the years before the peasant uprising of 1514 when arguments based on natural justice 
and the equality of all men were advanced against feudal privileges.31 In the second half 
of the 16th century the most radical principles formulated by the school of the French 
monarchomachs (Du Plessis etc.) concerning the relations between the monarch and his 
subjects were drawn into the disputes between Protestants and Catholics inasmuch as 
Protestant authors, in justifying the subjects' duty of obedience towards their rulers, 
disclaimed such a duty towards a Hapsburg (i.e. Catholic) monarch who, allegedly, had 
violated the covenant concluded by him with his subjects.32 
Protestant ideas also found their way to Transsylvania which, as formerly a part of 
the Hungarian Kingdom, could retain some kind of independence after the split of 
Hungary as a result of the Turkish invasion. Several young men had been sent then from 
the principality of Transsylvania to German, Dutch and other Western universities who, 
after having finished their studies, returned home as propagandists of the ideas of 
Enlightenment and Protestant schools of natural law.33 These ideas and first of all, 
those of Althusius, inclusive of his justification of rebellion against the tyrant, were 
summarized in the "Hungarian Encyclopedia" written by a former student of Dutch 
universities, János Apáczai Csere who, after having returned home, became an eminent 
scholar and high school professor in Transsylvania. Apáczai distinguished between two 
kinds of covenants, that is, one between God and the directors of the civil society on the 
strength of which the laws of God shall be made to be obeyed by everybody, and that 
between the directors themselves on the strength of which the laws of the civil society 
shall be obeyed.34 According to Apáczai, the tyrant, i.e. the person having distorted 
and suppressed the just cause of the people, may be resisted and even killed,35 a really 
revolutionary and risky demand in contemporary Transsylvania ruled by absolute 
monarchs called princes. These revolutionary ideas proclaimed by the adherents of 
natural law in Western countries were echoed in Transsylvania mostly in the documents 
30 "lus igitur naturale: est commune omnium nationum, eo quod ubique instinctu naturae, et non 
constitutione aliqua habetur; sive, quod natura omnia animalia docet et docuit." (Introductio, Tit. П.); "lus 
autem civile est, quod quisque populus, vel quaeque civitas, sibi propter divinam, humanamque causam 
constituit." (Introductio, Tit. П.) 
3 1 SZŰCS, J . : Nép és nemzet a középkor végén. (People and nation at the end of the Middle Ages.) 
Valóság, 6 - 1 9 7 2 . p . 22. 
32 MAKKAI, L . : Etat des ordres et théocratie calviniste au X V I - e siècle dans l 'Europe Centra—Orientale. 
Studia Historica, Budapest, 1975. p. 10. 
33 BENKO, S.: Веке Sámuel élete és halála. (Life and death of Sámuel Веке.) In: Haladás és megmaradás. 
(Progress and survival.) Budapest, 1979. p. 423. 
34 APÁCZAI C S E R E , J.: Magyar Encyclopaedia. (Hungarian Encyclopedia.) Tizedik rész. (Pars. 10.) 
XXV. Bukarest, 1977. pp. 409. et seq. 
35 Ibid. X X V i n . pp . 417. et seq. 
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of the several uprisings and even wars made against Austrian Emperors.36 The authors 
of these documents used to justify their claims with arguments based on the teachings 
of Grotius concerning "social contract" violations by the monarch.37 There are, 
however, written proofs of the availability also of the most important contemporary 
works of Western Enlightenment in Transsylvanian libraries.38 
However, in the Western part of Hungary ruled by the Hapsburgs, the characteristic 
features of contemporary natural law theories, presuming the existence of some innate 
and inalienable human rights and the "social contract" as the basis of civil society and 
prescribing the sphere of authority of the monarch towards his subjects, took a rather 
conservative meaning based mostly on German and Austrian patterns. In the years of the 
enlightened absolutism practiced by Emperors Maria Theresia and Joseph II (1740-
1790), the German theories of natural law and, first of all, that of Ch. Wolff, were taken 
over and spread troughout the Hapsburg Empire by the mediation of C.A. Martini, 
professor of the university of Vienna, one of the legal advisers of the monarch.39 In 
Martini's interpretation of the "social contract", emphasis was put on the subjection as 
its most important constituent, thus subordinating entirely the members of the "civil 
society" to the authority of the monarch.40 
This conservative theory of natural law introduced officially as an obligatory part of 
the university curriculum,41 gained pre-eminence also in Hungary as one of the means 
of centralization adopted by imperial authorities. On the other hand, arguments based on 
natural law were also used on the side of the opposition, with emphasis on the contract 
stipulating the rights and duties of both parties and violated several times by the unlawful 
acts of centralized state organs.42 However, the "natural" or "inborn" rights, mentioned 
repeatedly in the petitions addressed to the Emperor by the Hungarian noblemen, 
constituted in accordance with their residences in the counties, and resembling both in 
form and content the "cahiers de doléances" in pre-revolutionary France,43 were usual-
36 E .g . the Proclamation of the Hungarian Orders (1605); in BENDA, K.: A Bocskay—szabadságharc. (The 
war of independence of Bocskay.) Budapest, 1955. p . 101. 
37 R Á D A Y , P.: Animadversiones apologicae. In: A Rákóczi-szabadságharc és Európa. (The war of 
independence of Rákóczi and Europe.) Budapest, 1970. p. 13. 
38 T O L N A I , G. (ed.): Egy erdélyi gróf a felvilágosult Európában. Teleki József utazásai. (A Transsylvanian 
Count in enlightened Europe. The travels of József Teleki.) Budapest, 1987. p. 10. 
39 SZABÓ, I.: A burzsoá állam— és jogbölcselet Magyarországon. (Bourgeois philosophy of state and law 
in Hungary. ) Budapest, 1980. pp. 4 3 - 4 8 . 
40 MARTINI , K. A.: Lehrbegriff des allgemeinen Staatsrechts. Wien, 1783. p. 41. 
41 Obligatory courses on natural law started in Hungary in 1760; Martini 's works found their way to 
university curriculum in 1777. See ECKHART, F . : A jog- és államtudományi kar története. 1667-1935. 
(History of the Faculty of Law and State 1667-1935.) Budapest, 1936. p. 186. 
42 In an anonymous pamphlet published in 1790 mention was made of the "thread of succession interrupted" 
(filum successions interruptum), i.e. the loss of the right of the House of Hapsburg to the Hungarian throne 
as a consequence of these infringements. See M A R C Z A L I : Op. cit. p . 323. 
43 La déclaration des droits de l 'homme et du citoyen. Présentée par. RIALS, S. Paris, 1988. p . 115. et seq. 
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ly identified with the traditional privileges of the noblemen.44 Also the concept of the 
social contract obtained a "harmless", i.e. conservative meaning as a synonym for any 
agreement of general character. By reason of such an interpretation, the Golden Bull 
itself and each of the subsequent compromises or treaties between the monarch and the 
Estates of the Realm (e.g. the Pragmatica Sanctio (1723) extending the order of suc-
cession of the House of Hapsburg to Hungary) could be held as a kind of "social 
contract". Such an explanation and practice allowing a series of compromises both in the 
past and in the future between the monarch and the feudal landlords, could contribute 
to creating and maintaining the general belief that the conservative reforms proposed by 
the noblemen and casually agreed to by the Emperor, had their justification in the idea 
of the social contract based on natural law.45 
The reform plans based on conservative patterns of natural law thinking usually 
confined themselves to striving after only smaller changes in the traditional order of state 
and society. E.g. the draft constitution submitted anonymously in 1790 involved the 
establishment of a moderate form of government in Hungary while reference was made 
to the "extremely dangerous" nature of a quite new constitution "now when the whole 
Europe is excited by the philosophical (French) ideas", (sic!)46 
However, since the last decade of the 18th century onwards, a revolutionary trend 
in the Hungarian reform movement gained ground, mostly as a result of general 
discontent and nourished by the news coming from Paris.47 Its adherents also aimed, 
according to the testimony of a rather extensive scope of literary works,48 both at the 
"modernization" of the existing constitutional structure in Hungary and the fulfilment of 
the main requirements of the bourgeois transformation based on the French model. 
Revolutionary ideas soon led to revolutionary action, amounting in an underground 
organization. One of its animators, the revolutionary-minded abbot, I. Martinovics, 
planned to establish in Hungary two secret societies.49 One of them, called "Reformers' 
44 E .g . an anonymous pamphlet (1765), having enumerated the examples of abusing royal power, stood up 
for the inviolability of noblemen's privileges. C O N C H A , GY.: A "Vexatio dat intellectum" c. röpirat 1765 — 
bői. (The pamphlet "Vexatio dat intellectum" f rom 1765). In: Hatvan év tudományos mozgalmai között. 
(Amidst sixty years' scientific movements.) Vol . I. Budapest, 1928. p . 202. et seq. 
45 SZABÓ, I.: Op. cit. p . 71. 
46 The author of the draf t was Count F. Széchényi, father of the "greatest Hungarian", I. Széchenyi, who 
did his best to find a way for reconciliation between the Emperor and the nation. 
47 "We who were always among the first ones in the battlefields, have to be the first ones in following the 
immortal French" (sic!) as was echoed in one of the revolutionary pamphlets of the time under the title "Oratio 
ad Proceres et Nobiles Regni Hungáriáé, 1790. See FRAKNÓI, V: The conspiracy of Martinovics and Co. 
In: Egyház, műveltség, történetírás. (Church, culture, historiography.) Budapest, 1981. p . 219. 
48 BALLAGI, G.: A politikai irodalom Magyarországon 1825—ig. (Political writings in Hungary up to 
1825.) Budapest, 1888. Among others, also the renowned poet, Batsányi, J. greeted the "changes in France" 
in a passionate verse, which later nearly cost him his life. 
49 BENDA, K. (ed.): "A magyar jakobinusok iratai." (Documents of the Hungarian Jacobins.) Budapest, 
1952. 
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Society" with rather modest purposes, was intended for the use of the broad masses of 
the population, while the other association called "Society for Freedom and Equality" 
was meant to bring together the most devoted adherents of the French revolution. The 
two revolutionary "catechisms" drafted and circulated by the radical reformers, i.e. 
Martinovics and his friends, may be closely associated with the documents of previous 
revolutions in Western Europe both in general and in some details.50 
The catechism of the "Reformers" drafted in the form of questions and answers, 
represents a peculiar mixture and compromise between two kinds of traditions. On the 
one hand, it has some similarities to the English constitutional documents of the 17th 
century in enumerating past grievances of the noblemen caused by the unlawful acts of 
the Emperors and their officers, (e.g. assessment and collection of taxes without the con-
sent of Parliament, non-convocation of Parliamentary sessions, abolition of the freedom 
of the press, etc.); and with the documents of contemporary French development, 
inasmuch as several ideas and demands contained in the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen and in other revolutionary documents (separation of the executive 
power from the legislative one, freedom of worship, expression of opinion in speech or 
in writing, using one's mother tongue in public assemblies, free administration of justice, 
etc.) have been echoed in the catechism. Its drafters suggested to pass over to the 
republican form of government on the understanding that the Emperor, by his unlawful 
acts, had lost his legal rights as hereditary monarch and "had interrupted the thread of 
succession" as far as the House of Hapsburg is concerned. This argumentation, based 
on the conservative traditions of the land, played a great part also in subsequent 
controversies in the field of Hungarian public law.51 On the other hand, however, in 
order to obtain broader support from the adherents of the reform movement, the drafters 
laid emphasis on the traditional rights and privileges of the noblemen (e.g. inviolability 
of their property rights and the exemption from any taxation, etc.). 
The other catechism drafted originally in French language (!) and associated closer 
to the French model, went substantially further with its demands. Based upon the termi-
nology of contemporary natural law theories (civil society, social contract, natural rights, 
separation of powers, etc.) it condemned any form of despotism and proclaimed the right 
to rebellion against its privilegized supporters, i.e. monarchs, nobles and clergymen. As 
characteristic of its origin, the reasoning was based upon man's natural rights to life, 
freedom, property and equality, which must not be cut off or limited by anybody or by 
any public authority.52 
50 CONCHA, Gy. : A kilencvenes évek reformeszméi és előzményeik. (Reform ideas in the nineties and their 
antecedents.) Budapest, 1885. 
5 1 DEAK, F.: A d a l é k a magyar közjoghoz. (Contribution to the Hungarian public law.) Pest, 1865. 
52 "Question: Has the serf lost his rights? Answer: Not at all. The rights of man may not be cut off anyway. 
While man lives, he has the right to defend his life, freedom, property and equality. " Catechism of the Society 
for Freedom and Equality. In BENDA—ELEK: Op. cit. p. 165. 
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Revolutionary demands were also echoed in other writings of these bold reformers 
called Jacobins and especially in those of the eminent jurist, J. Hajnóczy who, probably 
the first one in Hungary, succeeded in achieving harmony between the wants of progress 
and those of patriotism.33 Hajnóczy's scientific career led him from traditional 
noblemen's conservativism towards, at first, the ideas of the constitutional monarchy54 
and then towards those of a republic with the characteristic features of the State of Law 
(Rechtsstaat).55 The consequences drawn from the idea of the social contract by Hajnó-
czy resembled the teachings of Rousseau about man's inborn rights which can not be cut 
off by obsolescence or given up by the contracting parties themselves. The free migra-
tion inside the country, the right to emigrate, freedom of conscience, religion, speech 
and press, the right to private property and the pursuit of happiness, as the most 
important components of the general idea of freedom, were dealt with by Hajnóczy as 
integral parts of the reforms proposed.56 The famous "ius resistendi" stipulated for in 
the Golden Bull, though itself inconsistent with the idea of the social contract, was inter-
preted by him as one of the most important guarantees of the aforesaid rights because 
without its acknowledgement the contract made between the monarch and the estates of 
land would amount to a "contractus leoninus" to the advantage of the former.57 But the 
chief guarantee for the stability of the social contract lies, according to Hajnóczy, in the 
joint efforts of persons disposing of moral or physical power, i.e. the spiritual and 
secular leaders of the country, and the masses of ordinary citizens. In taking the side of 
the idea of equality, Hajnóczy suggested to abolish the feudal burdens of the peasantry 
and to open public offices to all members of the nation, i.e. to persons of non-noble 
origin.58 
However, the movement of the Hungarian Jacobins based on French enlightened and 
revolutionary ideas ended in failure very soon. The poorly organized secret societies 
were disclosed, several of their leaders, inclusive of Martinovics and Hajnóczy, 
executed, hundreds of other members imprisoned,5' so the fulfilment of their demands 
had to be postponed into a better future. 
4) The decisive step tending towards the radical transformation of the Hungarian so-
ciety and state structure based mostly on the ideas of the French Declaration was taken 
53 BÓNIS, Gy.: Hajnóczy József . Budapest, 1954. 
54 Dissertatio polit ico-publica de regiae potestatis in Hungaria limitibus. 1791. 
55 De comitiis Regni Hungáriáé deque organisatione eorundem dissertatio iuris publici Hungáriáé. 1791. 
56 Ratio proponendarum in comitiis Hungáriáé legum. 1790. (Manuscript.) Archive of Széchényi National 
Library. Fol . Lat. 3635. IV. torn. 7 5 - 1 1 2 . f. 
57 Propositiones deputationi f ine elaborandae ablegatis incliti comitatus ad comitia mittendis instructionis 
exhibendae. 1790. (Manuscript.) Archive of Széchényi National Library. Fol . Lat. 3635. IV. torn. 113—114. 
f. 
58 Ratio proponendarum in comitiis Hungáriáé legum. Ibid. 
59 BENDA, K . - E L E K , J . : Vizsgálat Martinovics Ignác szászvári apát és társai ügyében. (Investigation in 
the case of the abbot of Szászvár, I . Martinovics and his companions.) Budapest, 1983. p. 146. et seq. 
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in 1848, the year of revolutions in the heart of Europe. Undoubtedly, on the way of 
modernization several measures were also taken earlier in the first decades of the 19th 
century, called the "Reform Age", as a consequence of the developing legislative activity 
of the Hungarian diet.60 One of its most important results may be mentioned as the toll 
imposed on all passengers using the newly built bridge on the Danube between Pest and 
Buda (1836), as the first break-through of the traditional immunities of the noble 
class.61 The declaration of Hungarian as the official language of the realm, replacing 
the traditional Latin, may also be understood as a necessary means of strengthening na-
tional feelings and independence. Between the years 1790 and 1844 not less than seven 
laws were enacted by the diet on the obligatory use of the Hungarian language in legis-
lation, public administration, administration of justice, public education and worship.62 
Later on, the seed sown by the reform movement had a good harvest. The demands, 
forwarded by the revolutionary leaders and, at first, L. Kossuth, amounted to compre-
hensive reforms both in the political and economic structure of the country. These re-
forms, the defence of which the war of independence of 1848/49, one of the most re-
markable events in Hungarian history, had been waged, were retained in living memory 
after the defeat of the revolution as symbols of national independence and the profound 
transformation of the country according to progressive Western models. 
The structure of the Hungarian state before 1848 could be conceived as a peculiar 
mixture of various elements, i.e. those of bureaucratic absolutism and feudal self-gov-
ernment, centralization and decentralization organized according to diverse basic prin-
ciples. Legislative, executive and judicial powers were not consistently separated, their 
officials having been held responsible for their acts to two different, conflicting 
authorities permanently at odds with each other, i.e. royal or feudal county. Having their 
origin in an obsolete feudal system, social and legal inequalities indicated a sharp di-
viding line between two big parts of the population, i.e. those with and those without 
privileges,.63 Therefore, it stands to reason that in the center of revolutionary demands, 
parallel with the declaration of basic rights, the establishment of a new system of 
government took place. 
The laws enacted in April 1848 by both houses of the diet, and sanctioned by the 
Austrian Emperor in his capacity as King of Hungary, may be summarized as a new 
constitution of the land though, in accordance with her historical traditions, disregarded 
the form of a charter. 
60 EÖTVÖS, J.: Reform, Pest, 1846. 
61 No. XXVI. of 1836. 
62 It deserves mention that these measures taken by the Hungarian diet as means of self—defence against the 
centralizing and Germanizing efforts of Emperor Joseph П, remained then unopposedby the national minorities 
living in Hungary. 
63 FRANK, I.: A közigazság törvénye Magyarországon. (Institutions of Hungarian Law) Buda, 1845.p. 107. 
et seq. 
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As far as the declaration of basic rights is concerned, the principle of equal and pro-
portionate sharing of public burdens having been announced,64 all the feudal obliga-
tions, inclusive of the jurisdiction of the manorial courts administered by the landlords, 
were abolished forever and the compensation due to the members of the earlier privileg-
ized classes was put "under the protection of the nation's common fairness".65 Freedom 
of the press was re-established and, as a provisional guarantee for its realization, every-
body was entitled to publish and disseminate his or her ideas freely; censorship ceased 
to exist.66 Freedom of teaching and learning was, expressis verbis, guaranteed for the 
Hungarian university, free choice given to its students in selecting their courses and 
professors and authorizing, in addition to the ordinary professors, some "outstanding 
persons" to deliver lessons under conditions stipulated by law.67 Equal rights, without 
any distinction, were guaranteed to each of the lawfully adopted religions.68 
On the other hand, the establishment of the first responsible Hungarian government 
as the symbol and embodiment of national endeavors, may be held as the most important 
result of the new legislation. According to the laws enacted in 1848, the formerly 
unlimited executive power of the monarch was substantially restricted, inasmuch as any 
of his decrees, orders or appointments had to be considered as valid only when 
countersigned by a member of the new government.64 The legislation introduced a new 
form of ministerial responsibility; the members of the government could be held 
responsible for their acts before Parliament.10 Legislative power was held, under the 
new legislation, by the King and Parliament; parliamentary sessions had to be convoked 
every year, after general elections, in the (then separate) town of Pest.71 However, 
suffrage was given only to male persons of age and of a property or intellectual status, 
as defined by law.71 Provisional dispositions concerning the administration of justice 
and the prospect of substantial reform of the courts were also enacted.73 In order to 
progress with the radical transformation of the Hungarian legal system in general, 
provisions were taken for preparing a Civil Code, the draft of which had to be submitted 
at the next Parliamentary session.74 Important steps were taken towards modernizing 
the traditional county organizations75 and establishing a new system of local govern-
64 Act No . VIII of 1848. 
65 Act No . IX of 1848. 
66 Act No . XVIII of 1848. 
67 Act No . XIX of 1848. 
68 Act No . XX of 1848. 
69 Act No. Ill of 1848. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Act No . IV of 1848. 
72 Act No. V of 1848. 
73 Act No . XI of 1848. 
74 Act No . XV of 1848. 
75 Act No. XVI of 1848. 
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ments,76 and, last but not least, new guarantees were provided in order to protect the 
independence of public officers against any unlawful influence.77 
As a counterpart of these rights only a very few civil duties were stipulated in the 
laws of 1848. Chief among them was every citizen's duty to pay taxes78 and to serve 
in the newly-established national guard79. 
Later on, in 1849 the revolutionary Parliament passed a resolution on the dethronisa-
tion of the House of Hapsburg. According to the declaration concerned, as the new 
Hungarian government was responsible only to Parliament, no royal influence on its 
activities must be tolerated. Royal authority and people's power being incompatible with 
each other, their coexistence would lead necessarily to permanent clashes between the 
monarch and the deputies. Some plans for drafting a new written constitution based on 
the traditions of Enlightment and proclaiming liberty, equality and fraternity, connected 
by the principles of justice, were also forwarded.80 
However, the Acts passed by revolutionary Hungary and her other reform endeavors 
could not be realized. The revolution having been destroyed by the common efforts of 
two Empires, Austria and Russia, Hungary became degraded to the rank of one of the 
territorial units of the Hapsburg monarchy. The achievements of the revolution, with the 
only exceptions of the laws abolishing the feudal obligations and those providing for the 
general and proportionate sharing of public burdens, were annulled. It took some time 
till, as a consequence of the increasing national resistance and the developments in 
international affairs, the House of Hapsburg was forced to yield to Hungarian demands 
in restoring, though not entirely, the laws enacted in 1848 and in guaranteeing equal 
rights for Hungary in the newly established Austrian-Hungarian monarchy.81 
///. 
In summing up, some conclusions may be drawn from the aforesaid. As first of all, 
it is beyond any doubt that the ideas of the French Enlightment embodied in the Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man and Citizen had, though indirectly, a substantial impact on the 
theory and practice of Hungarian constitutionalism. These ideas, taken over rather early 
by the adherents of the Hungarian reform movement, spread with remarkable rapidity 
in the country and, despite their having been temporarily defeated and suppressed, 
survived up to the revolution and the war of independence in 1848/49, respectively. Part 
76 Act No. x x m of 1848. 
77 Act No. XXIX of 1848. 
78 Act No. VIII of 184. 
79 Act No. XXII of 1848. 
80 Az 1848/49. évi népképviseleti országgyűlés. (Parliament based on people 's representation in 1848/49.) 
Ed. BEÉR, J . Budapest, 1954. 
81 The Austr ian-Hungar ian compromise was enacted by the Grundgesetz No. 142 of 1867. in Austria, and 
by the Act No. XII of 1867. in Hungary. 
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of the French demands were also reflected in the laws enacted in 1848, laying the 
foundations of civil society and constitutional establishment in Hungary, exerting a 
lasting influence on subsequent development. 
On the other hand, however, it cannot be denied that in drafting their demands, the 
"founding fathers" in 1848 did not closely follow the French model. They did not 
choose the form of the declaration or charter which could have been included later, 
partly or entirely, into a new written constitution, though the laws enacted by them 
aimed, by abolishing several remnants of feudalism, at a substantial transformation of 
the country. The wording of the new laws did not echo the vocabulary of the revolution-
ary natural law, either. No mention was made in them of the "natural" or "inborn" rights 
of man and citizens; on the contrary, the Hungarian legislators often laid emphasis on 
the ancient Hungarian traditions of constitutionalism. Some of the political achievements 
guaranteed in the laws of 1848 were declared as re-establishments of ancient rights and 
liberties, and the new institutions re-framing Hungarian constitutionalism had to live 
together with traditional ones.82 The institutional patterns drafted in the French 
Declaration were taken over considerably by its Hungarian followers; however, some 
hesitation on the reformers' side could be felt in the relatively great number of new 
stipulations declared as only temporary, with the final solutions having been postponed 
until later legislation. The reason for all this may be found in the desire of many 
revolutionary leaders to avoid an open breach with Austria and to make progress only 
step by step. Consequently, at the beginning, only the plans for some moderate reforms 
were approved and the events took a more radical turn only later, under the pressure of 
subsequent circumstances. 
These tendencies could be ascribed, to some extent, to the English conservative 
traditions, having found a fertile ground in contemporary Hungarian political and legal 
thinking.83 The chief and decisive constituent, however, may be found in the charac-
teristic features of Hungarian history, limiting the reformers' freedom of movement and 
giving preference to the demands for slower and more moderate reforms.84 Taking into 
account the subsequent development that led to a revolutionary war and its defeat, an 
open question to be discussed has remained till now; which course could have best been 
taken in modernizing the out-of-date constitutional framework in Hungary. One of the 
answers, though a rather skeptical one, would echo the words of Count M. Zrínyi, the 
great Hungarian poet, commander and political thinker in the 17th century: "sors bona, 
nihil aliud", i.e. "being short of good luck no efforts could be crowned with success". 
However, as another political thinker, our contemporary, pointed out,85 on the evidence 
82 E .g . the most characteristic feature of the old Hungarian state organization, the off ice of the nádor 
(palatínus) as "homo regius" and permanent deputy of the king, was retained also under the new legislation. 
83 C O N C H A , Gy.: Az angolos irány politikai irodalmunkban a múlt század végén. (The "English line" in 
our political literature at the end of the last century.) In CONCHA, Gy . : Op. cit. p. 213 . et seq. 
84 GERGELY, A.: Egy nemzetet az emberiségnek. (A nation to mankind.) Budapest, 1987. p . 380. et seq. 
85 BIBÓ, I.: Válogatott tanulmányok. (Selected essays.) Vol. 2 . pp . 108-109 . Budapest, 1986. 
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of world history that even small nations are sometimes given the chance to make a 
choice between various paths to go on and, consequently, in these rare moments the 
members of such a nation may, to a greater extent, be held responsible for their choice. 
Surely, the French Revolution and its Declaration was one of the events in European 
history which threw open the way for these nations in assuming a new responsibility. 

Acta Juridica Hungarica 
1991 33 IT 1-2, pp. 75-105 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest 
Endre USTOR Developing Countries and 
International Law 
Reporting on its work during the first twenty-five sessions the United Nations 
International Law Commission stated: 
"The most far reaching development, whose full impact on the work of the 
Commission could only be felt in the course of the time, was the advent of the 
decolonization process. In the space of a few years, that process multiplied the number 
of sovereign States, thereby giving to an increasing part of mankind the opportunity to 
make its contribution to the the codification and progressive development of international 
In the same breath the report continues: "Decolonization also had vast consequences 
for law-making activities outside the Commission. The new chapter of international law 
relating to economic development and economic and technical assistance draws its 
essential significance from those economic and social inequalities which only became 
fully manifest in the process of decolonization. The new law of economic development 
appeals to a very old and inherent concept of all law, namely the concept of justice 
calling for equality of treatment of equals and, if need be, inequality of treatment of 
unequals in such a manner that justice may emerge in the final result..."1 
To this it may be added that the new members of the international community, the 
developing States are more and more aware that the strengthening of the rule of law in 
international relations serves their interest. And so does codification and progressive 
development of international law, a process whereby the old customary law is redefined, 
1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1973, vol. II. p . 228, par. 158—9. 
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supplemented and invested with the clarity characteristic of written, conventional law.2 
Customary law, as has been rightly stated, is the law of the strong, not of the weak.3 
The settlement of disputes by judicial means serves also the interest of the 
economically less developed countries being in a weaker position in international 
negotiations than their stronger partners. 
And last but not least, they are interested in the creation of a new law of economic 
development, a completely new law which will assist the developing countries in their 
own efforts to overcome the ills of underdevelopment. 
These are the themes to be discussed below. 
United Nations Decade of International Law 
By a unanimous resolution adopted on 17 November 1989 the UN General Assembly 
declared the period 1990-1999 as the United Nations Decade of International Law.4 
It is not uncommon that the General Assembly designates ten year periods as decades 
for a certain purpose. Thus e.g. the years 1990-2000 (sic!) were already declared 
"International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism;5 a decision was taken to 
declare the 1990s as the "Third Disarmament Decade"6 and to adopt an international 
development strategy for the fourth United Nation development decade.7 In the field of 
international law, however this is a startling innovation, therefore it seems appropriate 
to take a closer look into the matter. 
The history of the initiative, as reflected in the records of the General Assembly, is 
as follows: On 24 July 1989 the Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the 
Movement of Non-Aligned Countries addressed a letter to he UN Secretary General 
requesting the inclusion in the agenda of the 44th session of the General Assembly a 
supplementary item entitled: "United Nations Decade of International Law". An attached 
memorandum explained the motives of the request in the following way: 
2 AGO, R . : Yearbook of the ILC, 1981, 1666th meeting, par 7. 
3 M A R E K , К. : Thoughts on Codification, 31 Zeitschrift fiir Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht, p . 502, quoting f r o m SOHM, Institutionen, Geschichte und System des römischen Privatrechts 
(16th ed. München, Leipzig 1920): "Das Gewohnheitsrecht ist der Freund des Starken. Es unterliegt dem 
Einfluss der herrschenden Klassen. Das Gesetzesrecht ist der Hort der Schwachen; es bändigt die Macht der 
Herrschenden durch den geschriebenen Buchstaben. Das Aufkommen des Gesetzesrechts hängt daher ganz 
regelmässig mit dem Aufsteigen de r Niederen zusammen. Es ist die der Menge zugute kommende 'plebejische' 
Form der Rechtserzeugung" (pp. 62—63). 
4 A/Res/44/23 of 17. Nov. 1989 
5 A / R e s / 4 3 / 4 7 o f 2 2 . Nov. 1988 
6 A/Res/43/78 L. of 7. Dec. 1988 and A/Res/44/118 H - 1 5 of 15 Dec . 1989 
7 A/Res/43/182 of 20 Dec. 1988 and A/Res/44/169, 19 Dec. 989 
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" 1. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held a ministerial meeting at The Hague, 
from 26 to 29 June 1989, on the topic "Peace and the rule of law in international 
affairs". 
2. The Declaration emanating from the meeting and adopted by the Ministers is 
officially referred to as "The Hague Declaration of the Meeting of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to Discuss the Issue of 
Peace and the Rule of Law in International Affairs". 
3. In the Declaration, the Ministers call upon the General Assembly of the United 
Nations to declare a decade of international law, beginning in 1990 and ending in 1999, 
to coincide with the celebration of the centennial of the first International Peace 
Conference, held at The Hague in 1899. 
4. During the decade, a commission, led by a distinguishedjurist, would be established 
to organize and conduct the activities of the decade of international law and to prepare 
a third peace conference at its conclusion. 
5. The work of the decade of international law would emphasize, inter alia, the 
following: 
(a) The promotion and enhancement of peaceful methods for the settlement of 
disputes between States, including resort to the International Court of Justice and 
compliance with its judgments; 
(b) The achievement of general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear 
disarmament, and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; 
(c) The promotion of the respect for international legal principles against the threat 
or use of force, intervention, interference and other measures in international relations; 
(d) Public education for the better understanding of international law; 
(e) Preparations for and commencing of a third peace conference at the conclusion 
of the decade of international law, which would consider and adopt appropriate 
international instruments for the enhancement of international law and the strengthening 
of methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, including the role of the 
International Court of Justice. 
6. A copy of "The Hague Declaration of the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to Discuss the Issue of Peace and 
the Rule of Law in International Affairs" is appended to the present memorandum.8 
The request for the inclusion of the item in the agenda was granted and subsequently 
on 15 November 1989 a draft resolution was submitted which—as a result of extensive 
consultations among the different groups of States—reflected a streamlined version of the 
Non-aligned States' Memorandum.9 
This draft—which during the ensuing debate was praised in the plenary meetings of 
the General Assembly as a compromise formula—was sponsored not only by 46 
8 A/44/191 
9 A/44/L. 41 and add. 1. 
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nonaligned States but also by 19 members of the Western European and Others group, 
among them by France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Soviet Union 
and 8 Eastern European States were among the sponsors also.10 
The test of the draft, which after a relatively short debate has become resolution of 
the General Assembly" and will certainly attract world-wide attention, is reproduced 
here in extenso: 
"The General Assembly, 
Recognizing that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end to bring about by peaceful means, and 
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace, 
Recalling the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations12 and the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes,13 
Recognizing the role of the United Nations in promoting greater acceptance of and 
respect for the principles of international law and in encouraging the progressive 
development of international law and its codification, 
Convinced of the need to strengthen the rule of law in international relations, 
Stressing the need to promote the teaching, study, dissemination and wider 
appreciation of international law 
Noting that, in the remaining decade of the twentieth century, important anniversaries 
will be celebrated that are related to the adoption of international legal documents, such 
as the centenary of the first International Peace Conference, held at The Hague in 1899, 
which adopted the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes14 and 
created the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the 
Charter of the United Nations and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nation, 
1. Declares the period 1990-1999 as the United Nations Decade of International 
Law; 
2. Considers that the main purposes of the Decade should be, inter alia: 
(a) To promote acceptance of and respect for the principles of international law; 
10 Adopted on 17. Nov. 1989 
11 See above, note 4. 
12 Resolution 2625 (XXV), annex 
13 Resolution 37/10, annex. 
14 See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 
1907 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915). 
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(b) To promote means and methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes between 
States, including resort to and full respect for the International Court of Justice; 
(c) To encourage the progressive development of international law and its 
codification; 
(d) To encourage the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of 
international law; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States and 
appropriate international bodies, as well as of non-governmental organizations working 
in the field, on the programme for the Decade and on appropriate action to international 
peace conference or other suitable international conference at the end of the Decade, and 
to submit a report thereon to the Assembly at its forty-fifth session; 
4. Decides to consider this question at its forty-fifth session in a working group of 
the Sixth Committee with a view to preparing generally acceptable recommendations for 
the Decade; 
5. Also decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item 
entitled 'United Nations Decade of International law'." 
Some points made in the debate of the General Assembly 
The Rule of Law. All representatives who took the floor in the course of the 
debate15 preceding the adoption of the resolution upheld the idea that there is a "need 
to strengthen the rule of law in international relations". Thus the representative of 
Yougoslavia who introduced the draft in the name of the non-aligned sponsors, said that 
"current developments had thrown into sharp focus the respect for international law and 
for the rule of law in international relations ... this was the proper way to promote 
peace, social and economic justice, human rights and ecological equilibrium ... not 
everything can be achieved by purely legal means yet the transition from confrontation 
to co-operation can not be accomplished without the strengthening of the rule of law. " 
Several speakers used the word "primacy", but most of them not in the traditional 
sense namely as primacy of international law over municipal law. Thus the delegate of 
Austria stated that his country had consistently advocated and upheld that the "primacy 
of the law in international relations must lead to the recognition by the States of the 
possibility to settle their disputes by resorting to international judiciary including the 
International Court of Justice. " 
The delegate if the USSR quoted from the message of Mr. Shevardnadze, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of his country addressed to the Hague meeting of non-
aligned countries in the following terms: "From our point of view the guaranteeing of 
a stable international state of law presupposes the primacy of law in the policy and 
practice of States, the priority of international obligations over international regulations 
15 A/44/PV 59 and 60 
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and the universal application of the generally recognized international principles and 
rules of international law. " 
The speaker referred also to the USSR memorandum entitled "On enhancing the role 
of international law"16 which stated inter alia that "the philosophy behind the Soviet 
Union's foreign policy is based on the need to ensure the primacy of law in the policy 
and practice of States". 
It was in this sense that Australia "emphasized the necessity for Member States to 
recognize the primacy of international law", that France—on behalf of the 12 States 
Members of the EEC—"believed in the primacy of law, both within the organization of 
(their) societies, where it serves to ensure justice and democracy, and in international 
relations". 
The Ukraine spoke about "upholding the primacy of international law in politics", 
New Zeeland demanded "respect for the primacy of the rule of law" and the United 
States stressed "the fundamental importance of international law to everything we do in 
the international arena, and that fully justified the idea of a decade dedicated to 
strengthening the role (sic!) of law. " 
Obviously, too much importance cannot be attached to the diversity in the way the 
delegates expressed their support for the idea of strengthening the rule of law—or the 
role of the law—in international relations; the General Assembly is after all not a meeting 
of legal theorists. (It must be noted that the expressions and phrases quoted above are 
based on the provisional verbation records of the Assembly, the final texts not being 
available at the time of the preparation of this paper.) 
The programme for the decade. Few delegations launched in the debate 
suggestions concerning the programme of the decade. Among those who did, Mexico 
ventilated the following ideas: 
1) A carefully planned appeal should be made to all Member States of the UN to 
issue a declaration accepting the binding jurisdiction of the ICJ. At present only 30.8 per 
cent of the membership (as calculated by Mexico) has accepted the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
2) Judgements and advisory opinions of the Court should be available not only in 
English and French but also in the other official languages of the UN "This in order to 
enhance international law in all corners of the world and to avoid its remaining the 
private reserve of only a small segment of the world." 
3) A campaign should be launched to broaden participation in UN treaties so that 
they would not remain dead letters in the archives. On the other hand, caution is advised 
concerning further proliferation of international instruments. 
4) The responsibilities of the General Assembly should be widened in the following 
sense: The UN Secretary-General should prepare yearly reports on "the legal advances 
that have been made within the United Nations and all other forums where international 
16 A/44/585 of 2 Oct. 1989 
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legal instruments are being negotiated." These reports would be presented to the Sixth 
Committee, so that the committee could consider not only the work of the International 
Law Commission and the UN Commission of International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
but practically all other works produced in the field of progressive development and 
codification of international law. 
5) A forum of a least one week's duration should be convened within the framework 
of the Sixth Committee every year for the purpose of overseeing and assessing the 
fulfilment of the Decade's programme and reviewing its plans for the subsequent years. 
Participating in this forum would be the chief legal advisers of the foreign ministries, 
the UN Legal Counsel, the directors of the legal departments of the Specialized 
Agencies, the President of the ICJ and the chairman of the International Law 
Commission. 
On the expansion of the domain of international law. Several speakers drew atten-
tion to this relatively new phenomenon. The representative of Uruguay said that interna-
tional law "has expanded its parameters, enriched its content and increased its functions; 
it has gone from the form of law which governed relations between a small number of 
States to a universal legal order which is binding in regard to many diverse subjects-
binding not only on States but also on international organizations and individuals. Up to 
a short time ago it was not much more than a system of norms which governed only ques-
tions relating to the political sovereignty of States, security and wars; now it has become 
a complex network of principles and norms which govern practically all areas of human 
activity. Once a law of prohibition, made up of norms which established limits on the 
exercise of national sovereignty, it has become a law of cooperation and coordination; 
and, recently, in the light of increasing acute global threats, such as deterioration of the 
environment, drugs and poverty, it has become an instrument providing social direction. " 
Guatemala referred to the specialization which takes place in the field: "We are 
entering the terrain of international economic law, international humanitarian law and 
international law relating to ecological systems and space." 
The representative of Canada held inter alia that "the programme for the decade 
should foster the development of the rules of international law on State responsibility, 
requiring States exploiting their resources to act more carefully so as to avoid harm to 
other States and the international community. The adoption in recent years of legal 
instruments on such questions as the protection of the ozone layer and the movement of 
hazardous wastes was testimony to the ability of the world community to respond to 
potential and actual environmental threats. However, much more effort was needed to 
address the many pressing environmental problems that threaten our planet, including 
the greenhouse effect, marine pollution, acid rain, land degradation and the extinction 
of numerous animal and plant species. The decade should help galvanize the international 
efforts in that domain." 
On the importance of a general agreement. The delegate of France speaking also 
on behalf of the European Economic Community expressed satisfaction over the fact that 
the desire for consensus prevailed in the negotiations on the draft resolution and wished 
that the same spirit would be in evidence in the course of the preparation of the 
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programme for the decade. This would be the responsibility of the working group in the 
Sixth Committee which could do an effective job only if it applies the rule of general 
agreement—the delegate of France stated. 
The representative of the United States declared in a similar vein: "...while our 
action today is only a beginning, it is a good beginning ... because all concerned have 
recognized the fundamental importance of the decision to declare a decade being taken 
by consensus... Consensus is important for all our work in the United Nations, an 
institution which has as one of its purposes 'to be a center for harmonizing the action 
of nations in the attainment of ... common ends'. Consensus strengthens the message of 
every resolution so adopted and negative votes and abstentions have the opposite effect. 
If this reasoning is generally true, it is particularly true in the field of international law. 
It is inherent in the legal regime of equal sovereign States that consent plays a critical 
role in the legal field. That is why the most noteworthy achievements of the Legal 
Committee have all been the outcome of work done on the basis of full recognition of 
the essential need for consensus. There is no other basis for work in this field that can 
yield positive results. " 
Caution with respect to financial implications. Several speakers (Australia, France, 
Canada) reminded the audience of the guidelines worked out by the Economic and Social 
Council'7 which recommended that proposals for international decades should inter alia 
indicate the modalities of financing the envisaged programmes. These delegations, 
however, went no further and joined the others in adopting the resolution. 
"Developing countries are the greatest advocates of respect for international law". 
Zimbabwe was the chief organizer of the Hague meeting of the Movement of the Non-
Aligned Countries, as it was the chairman of the Movement in 1989. Its representative 
in a pathetic speech referred to the increased interdependence of States. "If they cannot 
find a basis for common security, in the end nobody will be secure. From security to 
development, from the environment to drug-trafficking our interdependence is 
complete"—he stated. "Anarchy in the international system works most of all to the 
disadvantage of the smaller countries, which makes those countries the greatest advocates 
of respect for international law"—the delegate of Zimbabwe concluded, obviously 
inferring that this is ad oculos demonstrated by the initiative of the non-aligned countries 
concerning the international law decade. 
Excursus: The UN Secretary-General's Trust Fund to Assist States in the 
Settlement of Disputes through the International Court of Justice 
In the course of the debate on the decade of international law, several speakers 
(Austria, Zimbabwe) warmly greeted the striking initiative of the Secretary-General who 
in a Press Release dated 18 August 1989 made public his intention and on 1 November 
17 E/1989/INF/7, upon instructions of G.A.res .42/171 
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1989 formally announced to the General Assembly the creation of the Trust Fund. From 
the document containing the terms of reference, guidelines and rules of the Secretary-
General 's Trust Fund, the following portions may be quoted here: 
"3. Legal disputes may arise in various parts of the world over a wide variety of 
issues. There are occasions where the parties concerned are prepared to seek settlement 
of their disputes through the International Court of Justice, but cannot proceed because 
of the lack of legal expertise or funds. There may also be cases where the parties are 
unable to implement an ICJ decision because of the same reasons. In all such cases the 
availability of funds would advance the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
4. ... The administrative costs of the International Court of Justice are borne by the 
United Nations. But ... the parties must bear the costs of agents, counsels, experts, 
witnesses, and the preparation of memorials and counter-me mo rials, etc. The total can 
be considerable. Thus cost can be a factor in deciding whether a dispute should be 
referred to the International Court of Justice. ... 
6. ...The purpose of the Fund is to provide, in accordance with the terms and 
conditions specified herein, financial assistance to States for expenses incurred in 
connexion with: (i) a dispute submitted to the International Court of Justice by way of 
a special agreement, or (ii) the execution of a Judgement of the Court resulting from 
such special agreement. 
7. The Secretary-General invites States, intergovernmental organizations, national 
institutions, non-governmental organizations, as well as natural and juridical persons to 
make voluntary financial contributions to the Fund. ... 
9. For each request for financial assistance, the Secretary-General will establish a 
Panel of Experts composed of three persons of the highest judicial and moral standing. 
The task of the panel is to examine the application ... and to recommend the amount of 
financial assistance to be given and the types of expenses for which the assistance may 
be used: e.g. preparation of memorials ... interpretation ... cartographic evidence ... 
costs relating to the execution of an ICJ judgement (e.g. demarcation of boundaries). 
10. The work of the Panel of Experts shall be conducted in strict confidentiality. ... 
15. An annual report on the activities of the Fund will be made to the General 
Assembly."18 
The Making of International Economic Development Law 
At its thirtiest session, in 1975 the General Assembly had before it a draft resolution 
entitled: "Consolidation and progressive evolution of the norms and principles of 
international economic development law", submitted by the representative of the 
Philippines. 
18 For a full text see: 28 International Legal Materials 1589 (1989) 
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According to the draft "there has been a long-felt need for a comprehensive code 
of economic behaviour, based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common 
interest and co-operation, that should guide international economic relations, particularly 
at this time when the world is faced with a general economic crisis and with mounting 
problems of underdevelopment in most developing countries" 
Consequently the Secretary-General was requested "to study the question of the 
consolidation and progressive development of the norms and principles of international 
economic development law, and the feasibility of their codification. "" 
This was in 1975 and ever since the item has been on the agenda of the Sixth 
Committee, year after year. The title of the item was modified twice. The latest version 
is: Progressive development of the principles and norms of international law relating to 
the New International Economic Order. 
During the years States were asked for comments on the matter. These came in 
rather sparingly. 
In 1980 the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) was requested to 
prepare an analytical study. 
That request was complied with in 1984 and the study was promptly submitted by 
the Secretary-General to the General Assembly.20 
Five more year elapsed. The last resolution of the General Assembly adopted up to 
the present is dated 4 December 1989 and numbered 44/30. This shows a modicum of 
progress. While the Assembly "...requests the Secretary General to continue to seek 
proposals of Member States concerning the most appropriate procedures to be adopted 
with regard to the consideration of the analytical study [of UNITAR] as well as the 
codification and progressive development of the principles and norms of international law 
relating to the new international economic order..."; "[it] recommends that the Sixth 
Committee should consider making a final decision at the forty-sixth [i.e. 1992] session 
of the General Assembly on the question of the appropriate forum within its framework 
which would undertake the task of completing the elaboration of the process of 
codification and progressive development of the principles and norms ... etc." 
Like most of the previous resolutions this one was adopted with 24 abstentions. The 
abstaining votes were those of the "Western and Others" group of States. 
The system of the UNITAR analytical study. The study identifies the following 
"principles and norms": 
a) preferential treatment for developing countries; 
b) stabilization of export earning of these countries; 
c) permanent sovereignty over natural resources; 
19 See in: Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its thirtiest session, Supplement No . 
34/А/10034/, page 78 . For a fuller history o f these developments see: ELIAS, Т. О. : T h e United Nations and 
Law in Development, in: International Law at the Time of its Codification, Essays in honour of Roberto Ago, 
Milano, 1987, vol. II. p . 167 
20 UN Doc. A/39/504/Add. 1. 23 Oct. 1984, Annex Ш. 
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d) right to benefit from science and technology; 
e) entitlement of developing countries to assistance; 
f) participatory equality of developing countries in international economic relations; 
g) common heritage of mankind.21 
It is apparent—the study states—that all these principles derive from and revolve 
around two of the most fundamental principles of international law, namely sovereign 
equality and the duty of States to co-operate with all others.22 
The study explains that it uses the term "principle" to describe a norm of a general 
nature and scope. General principles, however, are rarely self-sufficient—it says—and 
have to be complemented by more specific norms and rules, to which they, in tum, 
provide a rationale and a direction.23 
In the following the main points made by the UNITAR study are summarized and 
commented upon. In doing so a certain weight will be given to the views and comments 
coming from the world of the developed countries and particularly from those belonging 
to the so called Western and Others group. It is obvious that if the purpose of the 
endeavours of the General Assembly is to achieve tangible results, then the views of 
those States must be given particular attention. 
While these views are sometimes couched in diplomatic language they do permit the 
conclusion that these States are not willing to enter into a general discussion and possibly 
into arrangements which can satisfy contrary interests. 
Thus can be read a cautious comment of the United Kingdom made "on behalf of the 
European Community and its twelve member States" dated 22 August 1986. 
"While the [UNITAR] study reveals a considerable measure of agreement within the 
international community on the nature of the problem and the action which is needed, 
it does not conceal the difficulties which have been encountered and the differences of 
opinion which have emerged. In general, it is a valuable survey which permits evaluation 
of the progress and gradual clarification of the principles and techniques of international 
economic co-operation. " 
True, the longish comments of the EEC come to the following conclusion: "... the 
UNITAR study offers an in-depth analysis of the evolution of international economic 
relations as reflected in the texts adopted in particular within the framework of the 
United Nations. In the above comments we have stressed the complexity of the issues 
involved and have indicated some of the areas in which we see particular difficulties. 
The Community and its member States therefore conclude that, following this compre-
hensive study, no further work appears to be called for. 
21 UNITAR study, par. 33 
22 Ibid. par . 34 
23 Ibid. par . 9 - 1 8 
24 A/41/536, 15. Sept. 1986, par . 3 and 26 and see below: The question of farther procedure. 
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The principle of preferential treatment for developing countries. If we accept—the 
UNITAR study explains—that the main purpose of the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) is to re-equilibrate international economic relations . . . the positive 
discrimination or preferential treatment would in one way or another be at the basis of 
all corrective actions. ... Thus all the principles which follow can be reduced, in toto or 
in part, to the principle of preferential treatment.25 
The rationale of the principle is thus very general and capable of application to all 
rules of international law regulating international economic relations—the study 
asserts.26 
The principle is enunciated in abstract and general language in article 19 of the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which reads as follows: "With a view 
to accelerating the the economic growth of developing countries and bridging the 
economic gap between developed and developing countries, developed countries should 
grant generalized preferential, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment to 
developing countries in those fields of international economic co-operation where it may 
be feasible."27 
To what extent can it be said that this concept of preferential treatment has 
crystallized in international law, at least in international trade law, particularly as 
reflected in the Generalized System of Preferences?—the study asks and replies as 
follows: 
"The GSP is both preferential and non-reciprocal, thus fulfilling the substantive 
requirements of affirmative action. But it is neither general nor non-discriminatory. 
Indeed the developed countries could not agree on a single uniform system of 
preferences, so they went ahead with individual schemes... The result is that we do not 
have a generalized system, but a multiplicity of individual schemes which are not 
uniform in content and from which each preference-giving country or group of countries 
can exclude certain or certain categories of developing countries; and can, as well, 
modify or withdraw preferences in whole or in part being that they do not consider the 
grant of preferences as constituting a legally binding commitment. "28 
The GSP, the "enabling clause " and the necessity of further study. The quoted 
parts of the UNITAR study seem to be a correct analysis of the situation. They do not 
take full account, however, of the fact that the enumerated features of the system are 
part and parcel of the GSP, which was adopted as a matter of compromise between 
developed and developing States.29 
25 UNITAR study par . 138 
26 Ibid. par. 140 
27 Ibid. par. 141 
28 Ibid. par. 144 
29 F o r a fuller analyses see: YUSUF, A.: Legal Aspects of Trade Preferences for Developing States, A study 
in the influence of development needs on the evolution of international law, Maitinus Ni jhof f , 1982. 
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The "Agreed Conclusions" reached in 1970 contain a detailed provision concerning 
the "Legal status" of the "tariff preferences to be accorded within the framework of the 
Generalized System of Preferences to the beneficiary countries by each preference giving 
country individually". According to this provision the legal status of the tariff 
preferences will be governed by the following considerations: 
(a) The tariff preferences are temporary in nature; 
(b) Their grant does not constitute a binding commitment and, in particular, it does 
not in any way prevent: 
(i) Their subsequent withdrawal in whole or in part; or 
(ii) The subsequent reduction of tariffs on a most-favoured-nation basis, 
whether unilaterally or following international tariff accommodations; 
(c) Their grant is conditional upon the necessary waiver or waivers in respect of 
existing international obligations, in particular in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. " 
Such a waiver was granted on 25 June 1970 under Article XXV:5 of the GATT. 
In a further development on 28 November 1979 the Contracting Parties of the 
General Agreement in the framework of the Tokyo Round adopted by consensus a 
"Decision on differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller 
participation of developing countries" what is now commonly known as the "enabling 
clause". The essence of this clause was summarized in a letter by the GATT Secretariat 
as follows: "... This decision allows GATT contracting parties to provide differential 
treatment in favour of developing countries in respect of: (a) tariff preferences accorded 
under the Generalized System of Preferences, (b) non-tariff measures governed by codes 
negotiated under GATT auspices, (c) tariff and, under certain conditions, non-tariff 
preferences granted to one another by developing countries in the framework of regional 
or global trade arrangements; and (d) special treatment of least developed countries. The 
decision requires that any action taken under it be designed to facilitate and promote the 
trade of developing countries and to respond positively to those countries' development, 
financial and trade needs. Arrangements providing for differential treatment of 
developing countries must not prevent the further reduction of trade barriers on a most-
favoured-nation basis nor create obstacle to the trade of countries not parties to the 
arrangements. Differential treatment by way of GSP preferences or under codes 
regulating the use of non-tariff measures, can be modified to respond to the changing 
needs of developing countries. The decision establishes consultation procedures that may 
be used to deal with any difficulties arising from such modifications or from other 
aspects of the operation of arrangements covered by it. . . " 
What kind of change does UNITAR envisage in respect of the GSP? This has not 
been made sufficiently clear for the reader. According to the UNITAR study the donor 
countries "evidently resist the advent of a horizontal institutional set-up (or general 
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system), where decisions are collective and based on purely objective criteria or 
considerations".30 
Another complaint is that "the structural components required to transform the 
substance from the level of particular arrangements into a general norm or principle of 
the international law of cooperation" have not been generally accepted.31 What is 
needed—according to the study—is "a self-sufficient normative proposition on the 
operational level" and further a "specific legal regulation is necessary in order to 
determine in each content, inter alia, the nature, scope and extent of the preferences, the 
conditions under which they are given, the preference-giving and receiving States, the 
procedures, and mechanisms for their administration."32 
These ideas obviously need further study and elaboration. 
In this connection the twelve member States of the European Community in their 
above mentioned comments point out inter alia that "...the enabling clause allows but 
does not oblige contracting parties to accord differential and more favourable treatment 
...". And further: "... the Community, like other developed countries, views its scheme 
of generalized preferences as an autonomous arrangement, though this in no way 
prevents it taking part in talks at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment about preferences or trying to improve the scheme to the greatest extent 
possible. "33 
Preferences for developing countries in the Law of the Sea Convention. While 
under the heading "The principle of preferential treatment" the UNITAR study does not 
deal with the numerous provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (it does so later when it comes to discuss the principle that assistance has to 
be given to developing countries and to the principle of the common heritage of 
mankind), it might be instructive to quote some of these provisions as follows: 
Article 140 of the Convention, under the heading "Benefit of mankind" provides that 
"activities in the Area (i.e. the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction) shall ... be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a 
whole ... taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of developing States 
and of peoples who have not yet attained full independence or other self-governing 
status recognized by the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 
1514/XV/ and other relevant General Assembly resolutions." 
Article 143 on "Marine scientific research" provides inter alia that "States Parties 
shall promote international co-operation in the Area by ... ensuring that programmes are 
developed ... for the benefit of developing States with a view to: 
(i) strengthening their research capabilities; 
30 UNITAR study, par. 145 
31 UNITAR study, par. 146 
32 UNITAR study, par. 147 
33 A/41/536 , 15. Sept. 1986, par. 18 
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(ii) training their personnel...; 
(iii) fostering the employment of their qualified personnel in research in the Area;.. ." 
Article 148 on "Participation of developing States in activities in the Area" provides 
that "The effective participation of developing States in activities in the Area shall be 
promoted ... having due regard to their special interests and needs..." 
Article 150 on "Policies relating to activities in the Area" provides that "Activities 
in the Area shall ... be carried out in such a manner as ... to promote international c o -
operation for the over-all development of all countries, especially developing States, and 
with a view to ensuring: 
(h) the protection of developing countries from adverse effects on their economies 
or on their export earnings resulting from a reduction in the price of an affected mineral, 
or in the volume of exports of that mineral..." 
Article 152 on "Exercise of powers and functions by the Authority" provides that: 
"1) The Authority shall avoid discrimination in the exercise of its powers and 
functions, including the granting of opportunities for activities in the Area. 
2) Nevertheless, special consideration for developing States ... shall be permitted." 
Similar and other types of preferences are given to developing States in a large 
number of other provisions of the Convention e.g. in Article 61 on the "Conservation 
of the living resources" [in the exclusive economic zone], in Article 62 on "Utilisation 
of the living resources" [in the same zone], in Article 119 on the "Conservation of the 
living resources of the high seas", in Art. 160. on the "Powers and functions of the 
Assembly (which none of the principal organs of the Authority), in Article 161 on the 
"Council" (another principal organ of the Authority), its "composition, procedure and 
voting", in Article 164 on the "Economic Planning Commission" (an organ of the 
Council), in Article 202 on "Scientific and technical assistance to developing States" [in 
the field of protection and preservation of the marine environment], and in Article 203, 
entitled: "Preferential treatment for developing States". This reads as follows: "Develop-
ing States shall, for the purposes of prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the 
marine environment or minimization of its effects, be granted preference by international 
organizations in: 
a) the allocation of appropriate funds and technical assistance; and 
b) the utilization of their specialized services. " 
The list of these provisions is not exhaustive. 
The "soft law" character of these provisions. What is strikingly peculiar in the 
quoted provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is the way of their drafting. 
They are intentionally not precisely worded and do not specify the exact obligations under-
taken or the rights granted. The reason for drafting the quoted provisions in this way was 
evidently to ensure special favours for developing countries but combined with flexibility 
and freedom to manoeuvre according to the requirement of the given circumstances. 
This kind of drafting is not uncommon in the realm of international law relating to 
development. A typical example is Part IV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade entitled "Trade and Development". This text, notwithstanding its uncertain 
wording ("The developed contracting parties shall to the fullest extent possible ... give 
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effect. . . etc.") provides a legal basis for systematic examinations of the trade problems 
of developing countries and the search for solutions to them. This kind of draft-
ing—because couched in treaty form—is called by some writers "legal soft law" in 
contradistinction to non-binding or voluntary resolutions and codes of conduct, or 
guidelines formulated and accepted by international and regional organizations ("non-
legal soft law")34 
The principle of stabilization of export earnings of developing countries. The main 
points made in the UNITAR study are the following: International commodity markets 
are characterized by a high degree of instability i.m. frequency and wide margins of 
price fluctuations; the tendency for stocks to accumulate and for prices to 
collapse.35 
After the second world war, the Havana Charter of 1947 developed the modern 
concept of commodity agreements, associating on an equal footing both producers and 
consumers...36 
With the advent of UNCTAD in 1964, the main concern becomes the secular adverse 
movement of the terms of trade of commodities, which constitute the bulk of the exports 
of developing countries, against industrial goods, which constitute the bulk of their 
imports. In consequence, the aim of commodity agreements becomes not only the 
stabilization of commodity prices against short-term fluctuations, but their stabilization 
in the long run at a "remunerative and equitable" level compatible with the requirements 
of development.37 
The Programme of Action on the Establishment of a NIEO provides: 
Until satisfactory terms of trade are achieved for all developing countries, 
consideration should be given to alternative means, including improved compensatory 
financing schemes for meeting the development needs of the developing countries 
concerned.38 
Two such schemes functioned at the time of the preparation of the UNITAR study, 
"one ... on interregional level within the Lomé Conventions between the EEC and the 
associated ACP countries; the other on a more general, or universal level, namely the 
Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) established within the IMF in 1963. In addition 
several schemes were under study, the most important among these being UNCTAD's 
"Proposal for a Complementary Facility for Commodity Related Shortfalls in Export 
Earnings. "39 
34 CHINKIN, C . M. : The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, in: 38 
International and Comparative Law Quarter ly , 1989, p. 851 . 
35 UNITAR study, par. 150 
36 Ibid. par. 151 
37 Ibid, par 152 
38 G. A. res. 3 2 0 2 / S - V I / 
39 UNITAR study, par. 156 
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Since the preparation of the UNITAR study, CFF has been replaced by the 
Compensatory and Contingency Facility (CCFF) in August 1988. This continues to 
provide resources to help countries meet shortfalls in export receipts and/or excesses in 
the cost of cereal imports, and can provide members pursuing Fund-supported ad-
justment programs with broader protection against adverse changes in external economic 
conditions.40 
The facility is formally not limited to developing countries though in practice this is 
the case.41 
Compensatory financing is thus a species of corrective remedial action, which applies 
after the fact, thus avoiding any tampering with the market forces. It merely purports 
to mitigate or alleviate the hardships these forces may cause.42 
Can we speak of a principle of compensatory financing?—the study raises the 
question. The question is legitimate, indeed. The answer of the study is unable to go 
further than this: 
"... in spite of the widening acceptance of the principle ... it does not constitute a 
selfcontained normative proposition. In merely defines the aim or objective and serves 
as a general framework which has to be filled in each context by a specific regulation 
providing for the conditions and modalities of the functioning of the particular scheme, 
including the institutions needed for its implementation."43 
To this the comments of the European Community are worth quoting: "... the very 
fact that a number of compensation systems—differing in aims, methods and level of 
participation—exist, does not in the Community's view mean that there is a generalized 
desire to establish compulsory machinery..." And further: "... it would probably be a 
mistake ... to fix a be-all and end-all type of intervention which ... does not of itself 
sufficiently solve the basic problems facing developing countries in the field of 
commodities ... efforts must also be made to diversify output, increase productivity, and 
step up processing and marketing activities ... this more comprehensive flexible approach 
to commodity problems, with due attention paid to long term market trends, can promise 
an effective and lasting solution. "44 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Quoting Jessup (A Modern Law 
of Nations, 1952, pp. 95-6) the study states: "This is an old question which was subject 
to much controversy and litigation between capital exporting and capital importing 
countries during the 19th and early 20th century. The outcome of these confrontations 
necessarily reflected the balance of power between these two categories of States. "45 
40 IMF Survey, August 1989, Supplement on the Fund. p . 11. 
41 UNITAR study, par. 157 
42 Ibid. par. 159 
43 Ibid. par. 161 
44 A/41/536, 15. Sept. 1986 
45 UNITAR study, par. 52 
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In the era of the United Nations the General Assembly made it a point to situate the 
principle within the framework of general international law, declaring "that the right of 
people freely to use and exploit their natural resources is inherent in their sovereignty 
and is in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations".46 
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties formulates the general enunciation of 
the principle in Article 2, par. 1, as follows: 
"Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including 
possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic 
activities. "47 
Article 4 (e) of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order48 is more specific in its articulation of the relationship between the 
natural resources, the economic activities relating to them and the exercise of permanent 
sovereignty: "In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise 
effective control over them and their exploitation..." But it is the extent of this control 
and whether it is subject to any limitations imposed by international law, and if so which 
ones, that constitutes the crux of the matter.49 
Both the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1803 of 1962 (paragraphs 2, 3, 
and 8) and those of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of 1974 [Article 
2, paragraph 2 (a)] affirm the right of the State to regulate foreign investment according 
to its own economic objectives. Beyond that the Charter emphasizes the freedom of the 
State, by prescribing that it shall not be compelled to grant preferential treatment to 
foreign investment, while resolution 1803 of 1962 goes on to specify that once the State 
authorizes foreign capital, the investment will be governed by the terms of the 
authorization, national legislation and international law, and that agreements freely 
entered into should be observed in good faith.30 
Nationalization is the breaking point in the relation between the State and the foreign 
investor. General Assembly resolution 1803 of 1962, in its paragraph 4, provides: 
"Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons 
of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognised as overriding 
purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner 
shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State 
taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with 
international law. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to 
controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be 
exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties concerned, 
46 G. A. res. 626/VII/ , par. 56 
47 UNITAR study, par. 57 
48 G. A. res. 3201 /S-V1/ of 1. May 1974 
49 UNITAR study, par. 61 
50 Ibid. par. 63 
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settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or international 
adjudication."51 
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States provides in Article 2, 
paragraph 2 (c): "Each State has the right: . . . To nationalize, expropriate or transfer 
ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid 
by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations 
and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question 
of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law 
of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed 
by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the 
sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice 
of means."52 
The study then analyzes these provisions from various points of view and deals with 
the problem of compensation. This is—according to the study—the most important and 
most controversial question in the practice of nationalization or the taking of foreign 
property.53 
What is the meaning of the term "appropriate compensation"?—the study asks and 
admits that a generally accepted elucidation of that meaning might prove impossible.54 
In any event it is necessary to distinguish between "compensation" as an element of 
"lawful" nationalization and "reparation" for injury caused by a "delictual" or "illegal 
act" of nationalization.55 
Invoking the maximalist claim of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation on 
the one hand and the widespread practice of global settlement agreements amounting to 
partial compensation on the other,56 the study concludes as follows: "... beyond the 
meaning that some compensation has to be paid (whose quantum would thus depend on 
the particular circumstances of each case) the normative content of the requirement of 
compensation is undeterminable for lack of sufficient consensus on a common 
understanding.57 
On the settlement of disputes over compensation the study points out that the above 
quoted both texts prescribe recourse to and exhausting remedies provided by national 
jurisdiction and that recourse to international procedures is a pure matter of agreement 
and depends on the consent of the State or the States concerned.58 
5 1 Ibid. per. 68 
52 Ibid. par. 69 
53 Ibid. par. 76 
54 UNITAR study, par. 79 
55 Ibid, par 80 
56 Ibid. par. 88 
57 Ibid. par. 92 
5 8 Ibid. par. 9 4 - 9 5 
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Lastly the study refers to the passive obligation incumbent on all other States to 
respect the exercise of the right to permanent sovereignty i.e. not to interfere with, 
hinder or set obstacle to such exercise and a fortiori not to take reprisals (in the legal 
sense) by reason of it.59 
It must be evident from these excerpts that the UNITAR study has no magic formula 
for a text which would solve all the problems related to the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources. This does, however, not detract from the usefulness 
of the study which may serve as a good basis for fruitful discussion and could lead to 
the adoption of a comprehensive consensus text on this matter. A consensus in this 
respect would be all the more desirable also from the point of view of the developing 
countries, as a too rigid attitude on their part would hurt their own interest if it hindered 
the influx of foreign investments. 
The principle of the right to benefit from science and technology. The Declaration 
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order provides as one of its 
principles: "Giving to the developing countries access to the achievements of modern 
science and technology and promoting the transfer of technology and the creation of 
indigenous technology for the benefit of the developing countries in forms and in 
accordance with procedures which are suited to their economies. "№ 
The Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order provides in its Part IV, entitled "Transfer of Technology " as follows: 
"All efforts should be made: 
(a) To formulate an international code of conduct for the transfer of technology 
corresponding to needs and conditions prevalent in developing countries; 
(b) To give access on improved terms to modem technology and to adapt that 
technology, as appropriate, to specific economic, social and ecological conditions and 
varying stages of development in developing countries; 
(c) To expand significantly the assistance from developed to developing countries in 
research and development Programmes and in the creation of suitable indigenous 
technology... etc."61 
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties contains the following general statement: 
"Every State has the right to benefit from the advances and developments in science 
and technology for the acceleration of its economic and social development. "62 
The UNITAR study refers to two on-going negotiations where efforts are made at 
concretizing the principle by elaborating a more specific international regulation. These 
are: the United Nations Conference on an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer 
of Technology and the seventh revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property. 
59 Ibid. par. 96 
60 G. A. res. 3 2 0 1 / S - V I / par. 4 
61 G. A. res. 3 2 0 2 / S - V I / 
62 G. A. res. 3281/XXXIX/ Art. 13, par . 1 
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The difficulties facing these negotiations are substantial. They are increased by the 
fact that most of the technology sought by developing countries is patented and the patent 
holders are in most cases private persons or corporations.63 г 
(On the western view concerning this principle see below the comments of the 
European Economic Community relating to the principle of entitlement of developing 
countries to development assistance.) 
Not mentioned in the UNITAR study are several provisions of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which provide for the transfer of technology 
to developing States. Thus Part XI, Section 2 of the Convention dealing with the 
"Principles governing the Area" contains Article 144 entitled "Transfer of technology" 
providing as follows: 
"1. The Authority shall take measures in accordance with this Convention: . . . 
b) to promote and encourage the transfer to developing States to such technology and 
scientific knowledge so that all States Parties benefit therefrom. 
"2. To this end the Authority and States Parties shall co-operate... In particular they 
shall initiate and promote: 
a) programmes for the transfer of technology to the Enterprise and to developing 
States with regard to activities in the Area, including, inter alia, facilitating the access 
of the Enterprise and of developing States to the relevant technology, under fair and 
reasonable terms and conditions; 
b) measures directed towards the advancement of the technology of the Enterprise 
and the domestic technology of developing States, particularly by providing opportunities 
to personnel from the Enterprise and from developing States for training in marine 
science and technology and for their full participation in activities in the Area. " 
Part XIV of the Convention is entitled: "Development and transfer of marine 
technology. Within this Part of the Convention Article 266 on "Promotion of the 
development and transfer of marine technology", Article 268 on "Basic objectives", 
Article 270 on "Ways and means of international co-operation", Article 272 on 
"Cooperation of international programmes", Article 273 on "Co-operation with 
international organizations and the Authority", Article 274 on "Objectives of the 
Authority" and Article 276 on "Establisment of regional centers" deal with various 
aspects of transfer of technology to developing States and their nationals. 
It is apparent that these provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention are of the 
same "legal soft law" character as demonstrated above with respect to other provisions 
of the Convention granting preferential treatment for developing countries. 
The principle of entitlement of developing countries to development assistance. 
Although—this is the starting point of the UNITAR study with respect to this prin-
ciple—each developed country devotes a certain amount of resources each year to 
development assistance, and each developing country receives every year from diverse 
63 UNITAR study, par. 166 -170 
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sources a certain amount of assistance and may rely on it, it is not legally possible yet 
to assert that there is a legal obligation resting on the former with a corresponding right 
in favour of the latter.64 
Efforts at specifying the content of the principle all build on Articles 55 and 56 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. The former directs the Organization to promote 
"higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development". The latter clause provides significantly that: "All Members 
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization 
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." 
In 1960, at the beginning of the United Nations (First) Development Decade, the 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 1522 /XV/, entitled "Accelerated flow of capital 
and technical assistance to the developing countries" in which it "expresses the hope that 
the flow of international assistance and capital should be increased substantially so as to 
reach as soon as possible approximately 1 per cent of the combined national incomes of 
the economically advanced countries..."65 
By 1970 the G. A. resolution on the International Development Strategy for the 
Second United Nations Development Decade (res. 2626 /XXV/) expressed the hope that 
(as a sub-target) "each economically advanced country will exert its best efforts that 70 
per cent of this 1 per cent should be in official development assistance (ODA) and that 
the conditions of assistance should be improved (terms softened, financial aid unencum-
bered or without strings, etc."66 
In fact, however, for almost two decades now, development assistance has been 
moving away from, rather than towards, these targets, especially the target of 1 per cent 
of the gross national product in assistance. 
Developed countries particularly resist the claim for the progressive increase of the 
proportion of assistance flowing through multilateral channels and procedures, i.e. for 
increasing institutionalization. Indeed, most development assistance is by nature 
subjective and is always based on a consideration, strategic, political, economic, or 
other. 
Institutionalization would make it possible to treat development assistance legally as 
a right or entitlement of developing countries vis-à-vis the international community at 
large.67 To this the observation can be made that "institutionalizing" of development 
assistance is very close to the idea of a "Global development tax on international trade" 
which would constitute "a promising new source of international finance for developing 
64 Ibid. par. 179 
65 Ibid. par. 181 
66 Ibid. par. 182 
67 Ibid. par. 1 8 6 - 1 8 8 
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countries."68 The idea of another type of tax was put forward by Judge Bedjaoui, 
namely 1 per cent on military budgets.69 
One cannot but concur with the remark made in the UNITAR study that "such 
proposals remain for the time being politically moot" and that "we cannot count [on the 
establishment of an income tax] in the foreseeable future". 
There is, however, one instance which in the future may open a direct and 
autonomous source of assistance for developing countries. This is the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention of 1982. This proclaims the "International Area" of the sea-
bed (that lying beyond national jurisdiction) "and its resources ... the common heritage 
of mankind" (Article 136), and establishes an international institution, the International 
Seabed Authority, to regulate and administer the exploitation of these resources (Articles 
156-158). This exploitation can take place either directly by the Authority through its 
operational arm, the "Enterprise" (article 170), or indirectly through the granting of 
licenses to public or private enterprises against a fee and a proportion of their net 
proceeds (Annex III). The revenues are to be distributed on a "non-discriminatory basis" 
(article 140, par. 2), according to a formula that will take "into particular consideration 
the interests and needs of developing States..." [article 160 (f-i)].70 
Apart from this unique example it can be said that the need for massive financing 
is generally recognized, and the development assistance from developed countries, 
though insufficient, continues to flow. But what is missing from a normative point of 
view is the legal and institutional framework of relating the one to the other—concludes 
the study of UNITAR.71 
On this principle the comments of the European Community can be summarized as 
follows—and these comments apply mutatis mutandis also to the principle of the right of 
developing countries to the benefits from science and technology: "... The flow of 
external resources is generally held to be an indispensable element of support for the 
developing countries' own efforts. Aid targets have been set out in a number of 
internationally endorsed texts... Most developed countries have an aid heading in their 
budget... The Community and its member States devote considerable sums to aid... Can 
we speak of a 'right to aid'? There [is] certainly a presumption ... that aid is necessary 
. . . t o that extent it may be legitimate to speak of 'expectations' ... but not 'right' in the 
strict sense of the word..."72 
The principle of participatory equality of developing countries in international 
relations (full and effective participation in international economic decisions). The 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order provides, in 
68 Ibid. par. 193 
69 BEDJAOUI, M.: Propos libres sur le droit au développement, in: Etudes en l 'honneur de Roberto Ago, 
vol. II. p . 42 in fine 
70 UNITAR study par. 190 
71 Ibid. par. 194 
72 A/41/536, 15 Sept. page 16, par. 1 2 - 1 3 
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article 4 (с) as one of the principles on whose full respect the NIEO should be founded: 
"Full and effective participation on the basis of equality of all countries in the solving 
of world countries...73 
Similarly, Article 10 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
provides: "All States are juridically equal, and as equal members of the international 
community, have the right to participate fully and effectively in the international 
decision-making process in the solution of world economic, financial and monetary 
problems, inter alia, through the appropriate international organizations in accordance 
with their existing and evolving rules, and to share equitably in the benefits resulting 
therefrom. "74 
Both resolutions speak of "full and effective participation" but neither instrument 
specifies the modalities of such participation, i.e. whether it necessarily implies "equal 
participation" in the sense of equal weight in the decision-making process. 
It is significant that Article 10, when referring to "the appropriate international 
organizations" (those "through" which "inter alia" this principle is to be applied), takes 
care to add: "in accordance with their existing and evolving rules." In other words, the 
claim is not for a revolutionary normative proposition overriding existing instruments, 
but for an evolutionary one, which would work itself out through these arrangements 
towards the attainment of the objective it sets for them. 
The real problem is with the existing rules of the Bretton-Woods institutions, which 
adopt a weighted voting formula and that gives the Western States a comfortable 
majority. 
The major economic decision in the international monetary field in recent years (if 
not since the creation of the Fund), namely the severance of the link between the United 
States dollar and gold in 1971, was taken unilaterally by one State, though it has 
profoundly affected and changed the international monetary system, including the IMF, 
and greatly eroded the monetary reserves of the developing countries. 
What is called for—the study concludes—in a more balanced "power-sharing" 
formula at the decision-making level which would not reflect exclusively either 
economic power or the sheer weight of members, but would accomodate or take into 
account, i.e. associate and aggregate, all the interests present. Thus while taking into 
account "economic power", it would give developing countries a greater say in the 
process and would allow them to bear more substantially on it, where the process 
particularly affects and conditions their situation.75 
One may be permitted to observe in this connection that the transformation of the 
cited ideas of the UNITAR study into reality will undoubtedly need a large measure of 
bold imagination and political skill. 
73 Res. 3201/S—VI. 
74 Res. 3281/XXIX/ 
75 UNITAR study par. 1 0 8 - 1 1 8 
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The principle of common heritage of mankind. This is a relatively new 
principle—the study states—having come to prominence in the process leading to the 
adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982-as was briefly 
described above in the context of the principle of entitlement of developing countries to 
development assistance. 
The main elements of this principle were expressed already by the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States whose Article 29 provides as follows: 
"The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind. 
On the basis of the principles adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 2749 
/XXV/ of 17 December 1970, all States shall ensure that the exploration of the area and 
exploitation of its resources are carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes and that 
the benefits derived therefrom are shared equitably by all States, taking into account the 
particular interests and needs of developing countries; an international regime applying 
international machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be established by an 
international treaty of a universal character, generally agreed upon. " 
While it is commonly known that the system as adopted by the 1982 Convention on 
the Law of the Sea did not enter yet into force, the study finds it important to note that 
the developed countries which did not sign the Law of the Sea Convention and which 
have adopted national legislation permitting enterprises within their jurisdiction 
unilaterally to explore and exploit the resources of the "international area" without 
submitting to the regulatory and institutional regime of the Convention, have provided 
for earmarking of the proceeds for assistance purposes. They thus recognize the 
existence of an obligation in this regard, or accept the "common heritage" principle in 
its equitable sharing of benefits component, though they do not yet accept its regulatory 
and institutional, i.e. structural dimension—concludes the study on a rather optimistic 
note.76 
There is another sphere where the "common heritage" principle has gained ground, 
namely outer space. 
In a general way the principle has been declared in the 1963 General Assembly 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space (Res. 1962/XVIII) ("The exploration and use of outer space shall 
be carried on for the benefit and in the interest of all mankind"). 
Similarly in the 1867 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. 
("The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies 
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of 
their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all 
mankind.") Lastly the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
76 Ibid. par. 204 
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other Celestial Bodies, adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 1979 provides 
as follows: 
"Article 11. Par. 1. The Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of 
mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this Agreement, in particular 
in paragraph 5 of this article... Par. 5. States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake 
to establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become 
feasible..." (Annex to G. A. resolution 34/68). 
Can this principle find further specific application beyond the two spacial areas 
already declared "common heritage of mankind", namely the sea-bed beyond national 
jurisdiction and outer space?—the study raises the question and holds that the 
proclamation as common heritage of mankind of these areas was made politically feasible 
by the fact that no appropriation claims were asserted over them. Optimistic is about the 
future Castaneda, who writes as follows: "Le régime de la Convention [sur le droit de 
la mer], dont nous espérons qu'il deviendra une réalité, aura pour effet d'attribuer la 
propriété des ressources des fonds marins, pour la première fois, à l'ensemble de 
l'humanité, tout au moins en ce qui concerne leur exploitation et leur administration 
équitable. L'humanité jouira d'un patrimoine propre, différent du patrimoine de ses 
composants. L'organisation chargée de l'exploitation de ces ressources représentera 
l'ensemble de l'humanité dans la défense de ses intérêts. Ainsi est crée, en conséquence, 
une nouvelle forme de personnalité juridique internationale pour l'humanité. Il y aura, 
en définitif, une entité, il est vrai que partielle, mais reconnue juridiquement, pour la 
protection d'une propriété identifiée comme étant la sienne propre. Elle créera des 
organes qui agiront en son nom et veilleront sur ses intérêts. Cette conception nouvelle 
et révolutionnaire est riche en possibilités futures. 
En fait le principe révolutionnaire du 'patrimoine commun de l'humanité' aidera les 
peuples à surmonter les barrières qui les séparent et à comprendre que leurs intérêts 
convergent fréquemment au-delà des frontières."77 
In the world of utópia leads us the idea of judge Bedjaoui who in his highly 
interesting article writes as follows: "On jugera sans doute utopique la proposition que 
nous faisons à cette occasion de considérer toutes les 'ressources alimentaires mondiales 
essentielles' dont les peuples ont besoin, comme appartenant à l'ensemble du genre 
humain. Elles doivent être déclarées 'patrimoine commun de l'humanité'. Utopie 
aujourd'hui en ces temps crus. Mais il est dangereux d'enfermer quatre milliards 
d'hommes dans ce qu'on ramène trop commodément à des incantations exaltées."78  
Right to development-one of the principles of human rights law. After several years 
of committee-work, the International Law Association adopted at its Seoul session in 
1986 a Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of Public International 
77 CASTANEDA, J.: La conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer et l 'avenir de la diplomatie 
multilaterale, in: Etudes en l 'honneur de Roberto Ago, Milano, 1987, vol П. p. 84 
78 BEDJAOUI: Op. cit. p. 42 
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Law relating to a New International Economic Order. At the time of the adoption 
of that Declaration the Association was informed of the UNITAR analytical study for 
which it "expressed great appreciation" and, indeed, heavily relied on it. The Declaration 
identified beyond the seven principles set out in the UNITAR study (giving them partly 
different names) five more. These are as follows: The Rule of Public International Law 
in International Economic Relations, Pacta sunt servanda, The Duty to Co-operate for 
Global Development, The Right to Development, The Principle of Peaceful Settlement 
of Disputes. 
From among these the principle of the right to development needs some comments. 
The Declaration explains briefly that "the right to development is a principle of public 
international law in general and of human rights law in particular and is based on the 
right of self-determination of peoples". The next two paragraphs state that both 
individuals and peoples have a right to development. 
This is in conformity with General Assembly resolution 34/46 of 23 November 1979 
which declares that the right to development is a human right and with Article 1 of both 
Human Rights Covenants which declare that one of the attributes of the right of the 
peoples to self-determination consists in the free pursuit of their "economic, social and 
cultural development". 
It was after the adoption by the ILA of the Seoul Declaration in August 1986 that 
the General Assembly adopted resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986 proclaiming the 
Declaration on the Right to Development. 146 States voted for, one (US) against the 
resolution and only eight delegations abstained from voting. 
The cornerstone of the Declaration is paragraph (1) of the first article stating: 
"The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every 
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. " 
One of the preambular paragraphs states that "the efforts to protect human rights on 
the international level should be accompanied by efforts to establish a new international 
economic order. " 
On the "right to development" the UNITAR study states in its conclusions that "such 
a right is not just necessary for equitable and harmonious global development and the 
fulfilment of the ideals of justice and equality of the Charter of the United Nations. More 
concretely it is a conditio sine qua non for the full realization of the economic, social 
and cultural rights of the individual, which together with civil and political rights make 
up what is known as internationally recognized human rights..."79 
What is the status of the principles in International Economic Development Law? 
One of the preambular paragraphs of the Declaration adopted at Seoul explicitly 
acknowledges that the Declaration includes "principles in the sense of generally 
recognized legal principles as well as others that need acceptance by treaty or as 
79 UNITAR study, par. 214 
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customary international law in order to obtain binding force." This text of the 
Declaration was critized on the ground that it failed to distinguish with sufficient clarity 
between the provisions which were to be regarded as falling within the category of 
generally recognized principles and those which were not.80 
No such problem arises in connection with the analytical study of UNITAR that 
holds of the status of the principles as follows: 
"The New International Economic Order consists of a bundle of economic objectives 
and policy measures which can be classified in a few clusters, each addressing itself to 
a major area in North-South economic relations..." 
"NIEO is meant to be a blueprint for the international community (what the French 
call "un project de société')..." 
"NIEO cannot be brought about at once by a single decision or act ... it would be 
a long progressive process to have it translated from 'law on the book' to 'living law'." 
"In the present conditions of the international community, NIEO can only be realized 
progressively through a multitude of negotiations in various fora and through the 
behaviour and practice of States and other international economic agents."8' 
All this sounds rather like a programme and thus largely coincides with the 
conclusions of Seidl-Hohenveldem, who in his Hague lectures bluntly explains—if not 
always fully supports—the northern position in the North-South dialogue. 
Audiatur et altera pars. The New International Economic Order as proclaimed by 
the General Assembly and other international organs is not yet part of contemporary 
international economic law—at least in its entirety. Exceptions are Part IV of the GATT 
in general and GSP in particular, being part of "living international law", says Seidl-
Hohenveldern.82 
According to the same author the principles and rules of the New International Order 
have been embodied in the various resolutions because the States of the Third World 
dispose of comfortable voting majorities in most world-wide organizations. However, 
these principles and rules are not accepted by the industrialized market-economy 
countries, which still dominate world-wide economic relations. Hence the manifestations 
of the resolutions differ greatly from the rules actually applied. 
And further: No one would deny to a sovereign State the right to develop by its own 
force as it sees fit. However a corresponding duty to development assistance is only of 
a moral character and exist legally only insofar as special commitments have been 
entered to such effect. The International Court of Justice can be quoted as having held 
that the giving of aid is "more of a unilateral and voluntary nature" (Judgement of 27 
June 1986, Nicaragua v. USA, Merits, ICJ reports 1986, p. 138, par. 245). 
80 FREELAND, Sir J . : Report of the Sixty-second Conference of the International Law Association held 
at Seoul, August 24 to 30, 1986, p. 477 
81 UNITAR study, par. 2 - 7 
82 Recueil des Cours , vol. 198, p. 26 
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Summarizing obviously the extreme position of the "Western and Others" group the 
argument goes on: 
"The North, in principle, agrees to support the quest for development of developing 
countries. It does so without recognizing any legal obligation, but out of a spirit of 
world-wide solidarity. The North thus hopes to stave off the danger of a world-wide 
rebellion of the poor agaist the rich States. Yet, in the mind of the North, such solidarity 
can be no one-way street. The North tends to make its assistance dependent on the 
South granting the North access to coveted raw materials and on the political alignment 
of the Southern States, often accompanied by some camouflage phraseology of "aid 
without ties". At least, when granting assistance, Northern States will require the 
receiving countries they assist to increase the efficiency of the aid grants by measures 
to be adopted by them in the field, e.g. of family planning and agrarian reform, or by 
cuts in military expenditures. " 
The distinguished author hastens to add that "such open or implied conditions 
attached to Northern grants of development aid are bitterly resented by the recipient 
States. Even where the elites in the newly independent countries basically agree on the 
necessity of these measures they resent such paternalistic intervention in their domestic 
affairs."83 
Unanimity in principle—compelling need for action. "One would have to be a 
moral defective not to recoil at the persistence of grinding poverty and the dreadful 
social conditions under which so many of our species live. " These are the words of Prof. 
M. Reisman from Yale 84 and who would not agree with him? "Poverty anywhere 
constitutes danger to prosperity everywhere" remind us P. H. Pareekh from New 
Delhi.85 "The existing inequalities are revolting in more than one sense of the word: 
they are shocking and prone to lead to revolutions" wams Prof. Seidl-Hohenveldern 
from Austria.86 
A considerable amount of ingenuity will be necessary to change this sad state of 
affairs and for that purpose—among many other things—creation of a new law of 
economic development is needed. 
As stated in the report quoted in the introduction to this paper the new law of 
economic development appeals to a very old and inherent concept of all law, namely the 
concept of justice. 
However old this concept, it is firmly anchored in the determination expressed in the 
Preamble of the Charter "to establish conditions under which justice ... can be 
maintained" and "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom". 
83 Ibid. p . 27 
84 Report of the fifty-ninth ILA Conference held at Belgrade, 1980, page 298 
85 Report of the sixty-second ILA Conference, Seoul, p. 478 
86 Op. cit. Recueil des Cours, vol. 198. p. 30 
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Justice demands concerted action by the rich States and also by the poor ones 
which—let us not forget that principle—bear primary responsibility for their own 
development as stressed in the Charter of Algiers and in the resolution on International 
Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade.87 Steps 
toward economic planning on a worldwide scale will probably be needed.88 
"The real difficulty concerns the further lawmaking process—we are told by an 
eminent teacher of international law—its growth at a speed commensurate to the urgent 
needs of those most concerned. The profound crisis, the risk of catastrophy call for 
mutual comprehension and agreement, decisive action and change, enshrined by law, so 
that it can be effective and, indeed, usher us into a new era of economic co-operation 
and new quality of life for the great majority of mankind."89 
The "further law-making process" has not been moving forward up till now at a 
particular speed. Still the milder international political climate, the seemingly better 
chances for effective disarmament—which may release funds—improve the prospects. 
Last not least, General Assembly resolution 44/30 of 4. Dec. 1989, envisaging the 
creation of "an appropriate forum within the framework of the Sixth Committee" for the 
purpose of the elaboration of the principles and norms relating to the new international 
economic order, augurs well for progress. 
The question offiirther procedure. The summary records of the Sixth Committee 
reveal that the group of "Western and Other" States is not altogether happy with the 
terms of the above quoted G. A. resolution 44 /30 of 4 December 1989 because it 
envisages the continuation of the work begun. While these States did not oppose the 
adoption of the said resolution, their abstention was seemingly nothing more than a nice 
way of saying no. 
According to the records the delegate of France in the name of the twelve States of 
the EEC said on 11 October 1989 that "they did not believe that the time had come for 
the codification of law in the field under consideration. A prerequisite for the 
codification of that law was that there should be a certain amount of agreement among 
the members of the international community on what principles and norms would be 
acceptable. There was, however, no such agreement as yet. International economic c o -
operation was constantly evolving and any initiatives that might artificially bring that 
process to a halt should be avoided. "90 
The statement made by the representative of the United States on 21 November has 
been recorded as follows: "... serious consideration [should] be given to the possibility 
of putting an end to further deliberations on the item. Since there was no point in 
87 G. A. res. 2626/XXV/, A/11 
88 Op. cit. at note 1, p. 104 
89 LACHS, M. : The Development and General Trends of International Law in Our Time, Hague Receuil, 
1980, IV. vol. 169, page 100 
90 A/C.6/44/SR.16, par. 9 
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discussing draft resolutions on an item which created divisions. The divergent views and 
the interests and concerns of States should be reconciled and a consensus should be 
achieved before principles and norms were formulated which were not sanctioned by 
international custom or practices. "" 
To these objections the developing States could reply that it was certainly not 
fortunate to employ the expression "codification" in the text of a resolution entitled: 
"Progressive development of principles ... etc. " It was mostly not codification they were 
aimed at. Their purpose was "progressive development of international law" in the sense 
as defined in the Statute of the International Law Commission namely "preparation o f 
draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or 
in regard to which the law has not been sufficiently developed in the practice of States". 
That means in plain language that the developing countries think of creating completely 
new law based on the study of UNITAR and on compromise texts to be agreed upon in 
the course of negotiations where mutual concessions are made and ultimately consensus 
is reached. 
The negotiators will also have to agree on the form to be given to these texts; they 
will have to choose the treaty form or any other and to decide whether they wish to 
establish hard and fast rights and obligations or "softer" commitments and corresponding 
rights—following inter alia the example of Part IV of the GATT or the numerous 
provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, e .g . those referred to earlier in this 
paper. 
If the representatives of the States participating in the negotiations make use of their 
freedom, act in good faith and employ their bold imagination, then it can be hoped that 
their efforts will bring fruit—during the 90s, the years of the "decade of international 
law". 
91 A/C.6/44/SR.44. par. 86 
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Raising Rights Consciousness 
Report on the 1991 Workshop 
For the four weeks of June 1991 a group of 23 specially selected English-speaking 
lawyers from the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe met in Budapest, Hungary, 
for an intensive four-week workshop on the foundations of Western jurisprudence. The 
participants represented Albania (one lawyer from Tirana), Bulgaria (three from Sofia), 
the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic (one from Brno, one from Bratislava), Estonia 
(one each from Tallinn and Tartu), Hungary (four from Budapest), Lithuania (one from 
Vilnius), Poland (two from Warsaw, one from Cracow), Romania (three from Bucharest, 
one from Satu Mare) and Yugoslavia (one each from Novi Sad, Belgrade, and 
Skopje). 
As we learned during the banquet opening the workshop on June 3, the Albanian 
expression for "cheers" is "Gsoor". Thereafter toasts were frequently heard, and of 
course we relied upon this salutation from the latest country in the region to break away 
from single party rule. 
The sponsors and organizers of the workshop were the Democracy after Communism 
(DAC) Foundation in Budapest, Katalin Koncz, Director, and the Center for Law and 
Democracy at the Columbia Law School in New York City, George P. Fletcher, 
Director. All participants received room, board, and travel expenses. Funding came from 
the National Endowment for Democracy and the German Marshall Fund, both in 
Washington, D.C. 
The faculty consisted of eleven distinguished professors from the United Sates and 
Europe plus eight guest lecturers representing the best of the Hungarian legal and 
political community. The faculty prepared case law, textual and statutory materials in 
advance, which were reproduced as a series of coursebooks at the Columbia Law School 
and then transported to Hungary. The on-the-ground organization by D A C was 
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impeccable. All participants were met at the train station and airport. The logistics of 
the entire month proceeded without a hitch. 
The first week of the workshop focussed on constitutional and human rights. 
Professor Charles Fried from the Harvard Law School offered four extended seminars 
as an introduction to civil liberties under the United States Constitution. Among his 
themes were the currently controversial issues of abortion and flag burning. His seminars 
introduced the Eastern Europeans to the socratic method as traditionally used in 
American law schools, and the students proved adapt at responding to Professor Fried's 
probing questions. An Estonian showed how quickly he had mastered the intricacies o f 
the Bill of Rights. In response to Professor Fried pressing the students from a textual 
justification for the right to sexual privacy, the newcomer to the U.S . Constitution 
suggested that the foundation for the right lies in the first amendment's guarantee of 
peaceable assembly. With this witty beginning, the students continued to be adroit 
interpreters of the constitutional text. 
Professor Cole Durham from the Brigham Young Law School offered a daily course 
for first two weeks on the relationship of Church and State under the Constitution. The 
questions posed under the establishment clause proved to be of lesser relevance to the 
participants, for their countries regard the governmental funding of religious schools as 
proper and legitimate. Yet the free exercise question posed in cases like Yoder (whether 
the Amish sect must send their teenage children to public schools) engaged the interest 
of everyone. On the whole, however, the participants showed themselves reluctant to 
recognize religious convictions as a basis for special exemptions from laws of general 
application. 
Parallel to these courses on American constitutional rights, Professor Guy 
Haarscher from the Free University of Brussels offered a course on the European 
Convention on Human Rights against the background of a general theory on the 
categories and development of human rights. The Convention was of utmost 
practcal relevance to the participants; in Hungary, Poland, in the Czech and Slovak 
Federated Republic, and presumably in the rest of the region as well , the Convention 
will soon be enforcable law. The juxtaposition of the European Convention with the 
American Bill o f Rights stimulated interest and demonstrated the value of comparative 
legal analysis. 
Professor Haarscher typically taught at 9:30 A . M . and his hour came to be known 
as l'heure française. His lectures flowed in impeccable English, but at meals and during 
breaks the francophones in the group, mostly from Romania, delighted in having a 
French-speaking colleague. Haarscher's successor in l'heure française was multi-lingual 
Professor Michel Rosenfeld from Cardozo Law School in New York, who beginning in 
the second week of the workshop, offered a course on the subject of his expertise: equal 
protection and affirmative action. In response to Rosenfeld's socratic style, the 
participants quickly mastered the intricacies of the American case law. They began using 
the terms "strict scrutiny" and "rational relation test" as though the same analysis were 
indigenous in their home legal systems. Admittedly, affirmative action was an innovative 
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idea for them, and this as well as other recurrent themes directed attention to the 
explosive minority issues in Eastern Europe. 
With Professor Sajo's short course on environment law, the focus shifted 
slightly from human rights to more general policy issues troubling the region. No 
answers emerged from the seminars on environmental policies, but the participants 
became sensitive to the range of market and non-market devices that might be used in 
cleaning up the befouled environmental legacy of socialist state economies. 
Professor Kent Greenawalt arrived at the beginning of the third week and offered a 
series of three seminars on the jurisprudential issues raised by his forthcoming book 
"Law and Objectivity". The seminar introduced the Eastern European to current disputes 
in American jurisprudence, including the perennial question whether legal rules entail 
unequivocal answers. The participants proved to be as adept as American lawyers in 
their employing legal imagination to search out ambiguities and find a way around 
language that appears, at first glance, to be clear. A seminar on feminist jurisprudence 
generated a spirited debate among the lawyers, approximately half o f whom were 
women, about the impact of Communist rule on the family and the status of women. 
The last two weeks of the course shifted attention away from constitutional law to 
the private law of property and torts in a market economy. Professor Michael Moore 
from the University of Pennsylvania offered a series o f lectures of the foundations of 
property law. A centerpiece in his argument was a recent California case resulting from 
University doctor's removing the plaint i f fs cancerous spleen and, without informing the 
plaintiff, using the spleen tissue to develop a patentable cell line from the spleen tissue 
that turned out to have a multi-billion dollar commercial value. As it happened, on the 
day of this lecture we received a visiting delegation of American judges, including Chief 
Justice Malcolm Lucas of the California Supreme Court, who had joined in an opinion 
holding that the patient did not have a property right to his spleen after it was 
separated from his body. With Chief Justice Lucas sitting in the back of the seminar 
room, Professor Moore engaged in systematic dissection and critique o f the Court's 
opinion. 
This exercise, as well as the professors' participating in each other's lectures, 
yielded one of the most valuable lessons of the workshop. Used to an authoritarian 
system both of government and university education, the Eastern European participants 
were surprised to find professors publicly criticizing judges and even more significantly, 
professors challenging the legal arguments presented in their colleagues' lectures. 
Observing that no one felt insulted by the jury system as superior to a trial dominated 
by a professional judge, he encountered stiff resistance from Hungarian, Slovak and 
Polish lawyers. 
In addition, in the area of private law, Professor Heidi Hurd from the University of 
Pennsylvania offered a course on the theoretical foundations of liability for causing 
physical injury. Her leading case was a famous California opinion on the legal 
consequences of a coke bottle's exploding in a waitress's hands. The next day Hurd 
found a coke bottle on the lectern, together with as sign reading "Danger". Though they 
had presumably never been exposed t о the rich literature on tort theory in the 
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United States, the participants greeted this systematic and principled approach with 
enthusiasm. On the basis of their study of socialist codes, the basic concepts of fault, 
causation and risk analysis seemed familiar to them. At the end of their two courses, 
Moore and Hurd joined forces in a joint seminar on the economic analysis of property 
and tort law. 
In counterpoint to the analysis of private legal relations, Professor Sanford 
Levinson presented a series of seminars on the foundations of the welfare state. He 
began with a case in which the state was not liable to a young boy who suffered 
permanent damage from child abuse; though the beating could have been avoided if the 
social worker in charge had been more attentive, the Supreme Court held that the state 
owed nothing to the boy. This case became a metaphor for the official indifference 
to second generation human rights-rights against the state to a minimal level of welfare. 
Professor Levinson correctly anticipated post-Communist resistance to the idea of a 
welfare state and therefore sought to challenge converts to the market system with a 
more traditional socialist perspective. As one student put in her anonymous evaluation 
of Levinson's teaching: "Very interesting to see a man with such views from the United 
States". 
A large number o f participants had a strong interest in criminal law and therefore 
were pleased by Professor Fletcher's introducing lectures on the trial of Bernhard Goetz. 
Each participant received a paperback copy of Fletcher's book about the case, 'A Crime 
of Self-Defense". Professor Fletcher conducted discussions on the theories and 
evidentiary issues raised by the Goetz case and Professor Meir Dan-Cohen from 
Berkeley began a series o f lectures on the theoretical structure underlying the norms of 
the criminal law. His v i e w that many doctrines in the criminal law can be analyzed as 
the interplay of decision rules directed to judges and conduct rules directed to citizens 
struck a responsive chord; most participants were disappointed that more time could not 
be spent on the theoretical issues raised by the criminal law. 
In the last week of the seminar the participants were exposed to two simulated trial 
experiences. A group o f state and federal judges, including Malcolm Lucas, came from 
California to demonstrate a jury trial. F ive of the participants appeared as witnesses (on 
the basis of materials distributed in advance) and twelve served as jurors. The trial posed 
problems of witness credibility and evidentiary sufficiency. At the end of the day, the 
jury was hung, ten votes for guilt and two for innocence. 
The following day the entire class saw the actual two-hour videotaped confession in 
the Goetz and then four of the more active students conducted oral argument. A Croatian 
legal advisor and an Estonian professor took the prosecution, and a young Hungarian 
specialist in criminal law and a lawyer of Tallinn shared the duties of the defense. 
Twelve members of the class constituted the jury and voted on the charge of attempted 
murder. The first vote was to eight for guilt, four for innocence—not much different 
from the first polling o f the jury in the actual case. 
In addition to these lectures, the group enjoyed guest presentations on various topics 
ranging from economic development to the politics o f the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court. All of this, taken together, generated a very heavy workload. The participants 
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spent an average of five to six hours a day in session. From the level of participation and 
sophistication, it seemed obvious that most of the participants devoted several hours 
every day to preparation. None of the 23 fellowship recipients took a casual attitude 
toward the program. 
There were several reasons that morale and commitment remained high. First, the 
accommodations were, on the whole, comfortable and conducive to serious study. The 
first week was spent in at the Panorama Hotel in the hills above Budapest, where the 
faculty and students had occasion to become acquainted at the swimming pool. For the 
second and third weeks, we retired to the Savoy Castle in Ráckeve on the Danube, about 
an hour by train south of Budapest. The castle provided a remarkably friendly and 
uplifting environment. There were no distractions, no amusements, but the setting of this 
refurbished, early 18th-century palace created the perfect framework for study and 
reflection. Admittedly, the delicious cuisine kept spirits high and on more than one 
occasion students and teachers were espied, after hours, dancing to the mind-clearing 
beat of local musicians. 
By the end of the third week, the pace had worn down even the most enthusiastic 
students, and therefore a weekend respite in the Mátra mountains was well appreciated. 
We returned to the Buda hills for the final week of intensive work. 
The most remarkable feature of the workshop was that the sessions were sufficiently 
interesting for the teachers to attend and contribute to each other's classes. They thereby 
raised the general tone of the workshop and, as mentioned above, their interventions 
demonstrated that figures of authority may disagree with each other. The discussions at 
meals were no less important. By spending time chatting and engaging in serious 
discussion with the participants, the teachers demonstrated respect for their Eastern 
European colleagues. At no time did the Eastern Europeans express the feeling that the 
Westerners had come to teach them "what law was all about". The student participants 
were treated as responsible lawyers and they responded by working hard and committing 
themselves to a serious intellectual exchange. 
George P. FLETCHER 
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Professor Imre Szabó, ordinary member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, died 
before completing the age of 80, leaving behind an enormous oeuvre, the real value of 
which we are unable even to estimate correctly at present. 
Academician Imre Szabó was a truly creative scholar. His creative mind has been 
reflected in his scholarly and educational work as well as in his activities in organizing 
and animating legal science in Hungary. His creative scholarship was permeated with 
unflagging zeal and devotion, as evidenced in his more than 100 scientific publications. 
His interest ranged over the entire domain of theory of law. His contribution to legal 
theory earned him international recognition, expressed not only in the publication in 
foreign languages inside and outside Hungary of several of his books, but also in his 
becoming honorary President of the International Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphi-
losophie. Besides taking an interest in legal theory, he thoroughly studied problems of 
comparative law, and was appreciated by the Association Internationale des Sciences 
Juridiques and the Académie Internationale de Droit Comparé by electing him President. 
Imre Szabó was persevering and tireless in pursuing research and writing in 
jurisprudence as much as in teaching and educating generations of Hungarian lawyers. 
As a young man he became university professor, and worked at the Department of 
Political an Legal Theory of the Faculty of Law of Eötvös Lóránd University for more 
than 30 years. The quality and standard of his teaching and scholarship are hallmarked 
by honorary degrees he received from Eötvös Lóránd University (Budapest) and the 
University of Paris. 
His career and work took him beyond the realm of jurisprudence. He headed the 
Institute of Legal and Administrative Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
for more than 25 years. We can safely say that his tenure marked the brightest period 
of the Institute. 
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A long t ime is yet to pass before we grow fully aware of all what his respectable 
personality, deeply penetrating legal philosophy and his activity of education of 
generations o f lawyers have meant for jurisprudence, the teaching of law, legal practice, 
and for the entire legal profession in Hungary. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 




M. KLOEPFER-E. REHBINDER-E. SCHMIDT-ASSMANN (in collaboration with 
Ph. Kunig): Umweltgesetzbuch. Allgemeiner Teil, Berlin, Verl. Schmidt, 1990, pp. 
504. 
The Environmental Law of the Federal 
Republic Germany (FRG) occupies a rather 
prominent place even by international 
comparison. (Of course, historical priority 
is undoubtedly taken by US legislation). At 
the same time, the German legal material 
constitutes an intricate maze of enactments 
and decrees as well as a vast body of 
administrative regulations by the Federal 
Republic and Federal States (Bundesländer). 
A similar situation naturally obtains in other 
countries too. 
Given the German propensity for 
systematization, several well known lawyers 
have for some time emphasized the need for 
codification of the relevant legal instru-
ments. It is probable that their views have 
to some extent influenced the Ministry for 
Environmental Protection in its decision to 
set the ambitious goal of proposing a 
comprehensive and unified code incor-
porating the fundamental general rules of 
environmental law. This is in contrast to a 
more conventional approach involving a 
legal regulation based chiefly on environ-
mental media (soil, water, air) and hence 
necessarily particular in nature. The prepa-
ratory work on the General Part of the Code 
on the Environment started in 1988 and was 
finished in a 1990 Draft which is likely to 
be of international significance. The Draft 
was prepared by three leading scholars in 
the field of German environmental law. 
The Draft consists of 169 articles and 
falls into 12 chapters, namely; General 
Provisions (I), Environmental Rights and 
Duties (II), Planning (III), Study of En-
vironmental Impacts (IV), Direct Control 
Provisions (V), Indirect Control Provisions 
(VI), Environmental Information (VII), En-
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vironmental Liability and Compensation 
(VIII), Participation of Interest Groups and 
Publicity concerning Procedure (IX), Legis-
lation and Administrative Rules (X), Orga-
nization and Administrative Responsibilities 
(XI), Final Provisions (XII). 
Structure of the Draft: the introductory 
part (pp. 1 to 36) is followed by the text of 
the Draft Code (pp. 37 to 104) and the 
underlying rationale for each chapter. The 
arrangement of the latter is particularly 
instructive. The pattern for each chapter is 
as follo/ws: I. Point of Departure 1. Sub-
ject-matter of regulation; 2. Current state 
of law: a) current law; b) experience 
acquired with the current law; c) previous 
proposals for reform; 3. Legal frameworks. 
II. Proposals 1. Concept; 2. Detailed 
rationale (for the draft provisions). From 
the outset, the primary goal of the codifica-
tion was to harmonize and unify the current 
law. 
The present review, however, singles 
out the proposed legal solutions which 
reflect departures of the Draft from pre-
vailing regulations, and which, above all, 
demonstrate the Code's progressive, for-
ward-looking character by international 
comparison. 
1. Extraterritorial elements. According to 
Draft Sec. 1 (4), the Code seeks to fulfill 
transnational functions of environmental 
protection, too, as it is alive to the inter-
national and European concerns in this 
field. This provision is stated to be of 
relevance for the interpretation of some of 
the other provisions of the Code. In par-
ticular, the Draft proceeds, on the one 
hand, from forms of behaviour relevant to 
domestic environmental protection in cases 
of transboundary environmental pollution. 
On the other hand, it covers activities in 
other countries which can be influenced (as 
far as possible) or prevented by domestic 
measures, considering that effective en-
vironmental protection can often only be 
achieved through cooperation at the inter-
national or at least European level. Accor-
ding to the rationale, European cooperation 
in the protection of the environment is far 
from being limited to the member states of 
the European Community, but extends to 
Eastern Europe (mainly to the immediate 
neighbours of Germany), the Scandinavian 
countries, Austria and Switzerland, which 
are not members of the European Com-
munity. 
The legal basis for international co-
operation in environmental protection is 
provided by customary international law, 
bilateral treaties, and "the general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations" 
(Art. 38 (1), of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice). 
The extraterritorial approach is also 
evident in other draft articles. We refer, by 
way o f example, to the provision on en-
vironmental research (Sec. 103), which 
states, inter alia, that "in the field of en-
vironmental research efforts shall be made 
towards cooperation with the European 
Community and with international organiza-
tions". 
2. Basic principles of environmental law. 
The three basic principles elucidated in 
German legal literature and evolved earlier 
are formulated in the Draft as ones gov-
erning legislation. These are: (a) principle 
ofpreventi ve-precautionary action (Vorsor-
geprinzip); (b) principle of liability (Ver-
ursacherprinzip); (с) principle of coopera-
tion (Kooperationsprinzip). The related pro-
visions of the Draft are forward-looking in 
terms of legal policy and legal theory alike, 
(a) The principle of preventive-precautiona-
ry action means the need "to ensure, by 
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appropriate measures, in particular by 
planning with foresight and by restriction 
of emission of pollutants as reasonably 
achievable by the degree of technical 
development, that any degradation of the 
environment either or avoidable with 
unforeseeable adverse consequences should 
be prevented as far as possible" (Sec. 4). 
The principle of prevention as spelled 
out in this fundamental provision covers the 
following cases, which generally occur in 
practice: prevention of hazards distant in 
time and space; prevention of adverse 
events with little likelihood of occurring; 
preventive measures where hazards can rea-
sonably be supposed to occur; prevention 
of discharge of pollutants which present no 
hazard separately but tend to cause damage 
in combination, where their elimination is 
technologically possible. 
The rationale for this provision makes 
adoption of preventive measures subject to 
two essential formal requirements: the pur-
pose and means of prevention must be duly 
substantiated (clarified); regulators taking 
such measures must state their reasons, 
(b) The rule on liability (polluter pays 
principle) (Sec. 5) provides: 
"(1) Whoever causes damage to or 
endangers the environment or creates 
environmental hazards shall bear respon-
sibility for such acts. 
(2) Where there is no one having caused 
an event or otherwise responsible for it or 
no one can be identified or identified in due 
time, or it would be unjust for the latter to 
be called to account, responsibility shall lie 
with the community." 
In effect, this provision regulates liabili-
ty in two ways: responsibility rests primar-
ily on the person to whom the occurrence 
of an event is imputable (subjective liability) 
and subsidiarily on the community (objec-
tive liability). As is stated in the rationale, 
German law essentially recognizes environ-
mental liability based on imputability, but 
the latter has no legislative coverage of a 
universal character, nor is the content of 
this legal principle clearly defined. This 
calls for inclusion of this provision in the 
Code. 
(c) The principle of cooperation expresses 
the general rule of cooperation between cit-
izens and the State. Thus, "the authorities 
shall not perform environmental functions 
except when citizens are unable or fail to 
do so" [Sec. 6 (1)]; "measures which leave 
scope for citizens to decide at their own 
option.. . shall take precedence over prohi-
bitive rules and administrative regulations" 
[Sec. 6 (3)]; and "the authorities may assign 
(environmental) tasks to other than State or-
gans . . . , but shall retain control over the 
fulfilmentof those tasks" [Sec. 6 . (4)]. New 
ground (juristisches Neuland) is also broken 
by Draft's definition of the principle of co-
operation. According to the rationale, the 
need for this regulation is mainly justified 
by the recognition that environmental pro-
tection is not a task solely for the State, but 
one to be addressed jointly by citizens and 
the State; it is desirable to define the tasks 
that are primarily for the State to solve; it 
is desirable to give priority to f lexible legal 
means; it is necessary to control the fulfil-
ment of environmental tasks o f citizens. 
It should be noted that the Draft means 
by "citizen" even enterprises owned by 
citizens, so the notion of citizen is far from 
being limited to natural persons. 
As can be seen, the principle o f cooper-
ation is characterized by its subsidiary 
nature: the State leaves performance of en-
vironmental functions chiefly to the private 
sphere, to citizens, only joining in this 
activity secondarily, when the need arises. 
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3. Environmental planning. Although the 
government regularly adopts periodic 
environmental programmes (Umweltpro-
gramme), they cannot be considered as 
comprehensive integrated plans for the 
protection of the environment. Therefore 
the Draft envisages comprehensive planning 
guidance for environmental management 
(Umweltleitplanung) that will embrace all 
environmental media (soil, water, air). The 
theoretical basis for this provision (Sec. 20) 
is the principle of preventive-precautionary 
action as well as the general rule of co-
operation. The goal is to introduce a 
comprehensive regime of far-reaching 
environmental planning, one intended to 
replace the current widespread practice of 
adopting ad hoc measures and rather 
random decisions. Environmental planning 
implies a certain measure of legal security 
and predictability in respect of actions by 
state authorities, thus rendering such actions 
more satisfactory and more acceptable. 
It is not desirable to draw up plans for 
environmental protection and land 
development which require years of effort 
to be substantiated by surveys and analyses. 
Such plans have little chance of realization 
and face stronger opposition. It would 
therefore be more convenient to formulate 
mediumterm plans focusing on priority 
areas (Grundlinien und Hauptpunkte), while 
aggregating the results of the existing 
system of specialized planning. 
After defining the concept of planning 
for environmental management, the Draft 
provides for the regulation of two hitherto 
employed methods of planning, namely 
preparation of plans for pollution abatement 
and programmes for environmental 
protection. However, the Draft deliberately 
omits provisions on the planning of large 
establishments and plants, as their planning 
falls within the domain of integrated area 
development plans. 
4. Indirect control. Indirect management of 
environmental protection is concerned with 
influencing the behaviour of those 
interested, namely by allowing them some 
scope for decision-making. By the use of 
these legal means the State establishes for 
its citizens certain behaviourial expectations 
(which it seeks to encourage through 
incentives or sanctions), but undesirable 
behaviour contrary to expectations is not 
against the law. 
Heading the list of means employed 
for indirect control is provision for envi-
ronmental charges (Abgaben) hitherto levied 
for pollution (Sec. 77 to 81). These envi-
ronmental charges are, together with other 
means of indirect control, supplemented by 
socalled flexible means, such as benefits o f 
use, representing a novelty in German law 
too, and various types of compensation. By 
benefits of use (Benutzungsvorteile) is meant 
a legal institution which serves to exempt 
low-waste or non-waste plants or manufac-
ture of such products from the application 
of prohibitive or restrictive rules (Sec. 88). 
According to the rationale, this provision 
seeks to promote innovative activities, a 
field where the " frindly to environment " re-
quirement imposed upon products, is likely 
to be relative as it naturally applies only in 
comparison with products on the market. 
It is deemed desirable to provide incentives 
for the manufacture and marketing of such 
products. 
The compensation envisaged by the 
Draft for industrial plants (Sec. 89) has a 
role to play first and foremost in connection 
with the protection of air purity, abatement 
of noise hazards, and disposal of dangerous 
industrial waste. The related Draft article 
provides for exceptional treatment of 
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installations discharging pollutants below 
established emission levels and allows room 
for joint treatment of several installations 
which are collectively discharging pollutants 
above established levels. 
In like manner, the Draft envisages 
compensation in case of other activities of 
environmental relevance. As is stated in the 
rationale, this provision may be of 
importance in, for example, agricultural 
production, the manufacture of motor cars, 
or in the production of packaging materials, 
where it is similarly possible for the pro-
duct-mix of industrial enterprises (the entire 
spectrum of activities involving low-waste 
or less polluting technologies) to be con-
sidered as a whole. 
However, application of these flexible 
means (incentives) is subject to the 
precondition that environmental pollution 
or hazards must not increase in the 
aggregate or that pollution must at least 
remain at the same level or must be reduced 
to a greater extent than required by 
regulations in force. 
5. The Corporate Contribution to environ-
mental protection. The Draft's incursion 
into the sphere of company law is a note-
worthy feature. It provides that every 
enterprise operating in the form of joint 
stock company or limited liability company 
must appoint a manager-in-charge of 
environmental protection (Sec. 94) to direct 
the full scope of relevant activities. That 
manager may, of course, have other respon-
sibilities too, but the essential point is that 
he must act to secure environmental protec-
tion at the level of enterprise management. 
The Draft retains the institution of of-
ficer-in-charge of environmental protection 
which was established in previous regula-
tions, in order to deal with "everyday 
matters". The rationale recommends that 
the status of the environmental manager be 
similar to that of the personnel manager. 
6. Environmental information. Environmen-
tal information is construed by the Draft in 
the broad sense as including environment 
research (Sec. 103), (which the current law 
does not require the State to do), provision 
of information on the environment (Sec. 
106), briefings on the environment (Sec. 
109), and the use of an Environment Label 
(Umweltsiegel). Inclusion of legislative 
provisions on the latter (which refers to the 
"Blue Angel", the emblem of the United 
Nations Environment Programme which has 
been used on thousands of products for 
nearly 20 years), is justified, in my view, 
mainly by the fact that judicial interpretation 
has raised several queries about this useful 
label. In some cases the Courts, including 
the Supreme Court, have objected to the use 
of this label o f certification on the ground 
that its imprecise information content 
renders it apt to mislead consumers. These 
Court decisions have invited a heated debate 
in legal literature. The Draft seeks to take 
the wind out of the sails of the protagonists, 
by stating, inter alia, that "the user of the 
Environment Label may, in his advertising, 
include the fact that his competitor is not 
qualified to use the Label on similar pro-
ducts". Such a legislative exemption from 
the prohibition on comparative adver-
tisements will, I believe, remove the diffi-
culties under the present law of unfair com-
petition, relations to the use of the Environ-
ment Label, which already acquired great 
popularity among consumers in the last 
years. 
In conclusion, it is worth mentioning 
that preparatory work on the Special Part 
of the Code on the Environment has also 
started. The task of drafting has been as-
signed to an 8-member Commission of Pro-
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fessors (Professorenkommission), which 
naturally includes the three professors who 
drafted the General Part. The Commission, 
likewise headed by Professor Kloepfer, has 
to complete work on the Special Part by the 
middle of 1993. 
At the same time the preparation of the 
General Part has arrived at a new stage: it 
is being considered by an Expert Committee 
composed of representatives of legal prac-
tice and science. The result of this work 
will constitute the basis of the Ministerial 
Draft, which will be the subject of a 
broader debate before its submission to the 
Parliament (Bundestag). To complete the 
picture, it is worth mentioning that a com 
prehensive Code on the Environment of 
similar nature exists only in Switzerland. 
The preparation of the German legislation 
is therefore of international significance. 
Apart from a number of substantive points 
of interest and some solutions offered by 
the Draft, the great foresight, diligence and 
thoroughness, characteristic of German 
lawyers, is exhibited in the preparation of 
this Code as is the technique of the legis-
lative drafting as well . It can thus be said 
without exaggeration that the Code is likely 
to bring influence to bear on the future of 
Europe as a whole. 
Alexander VIDA 
Bruno DENTEN-Francesco KJELLBERG. The Dynamics of Institutional Change. 
SAGE Publications, London-Newbury Park-Beverly Hi l l s -New Delhi 1990. pp. 191. 
The subtitle o f the volume is "Reor-
ganisationof Local Government in Western 
Democracies". In 1984 the Salzburg-based 
European Consortium for Political Research 
organized a series of consultations on, 
among others, the theory of reorganisation 
of local government. The two authors had 
already discussed this problem, which has 
become an urgent topical issue of the day 
in Eastern Europe. They point out an 
obvious discrepancy between the mass of 
empirical facts and the lack of analytical 
frameworks and theoretical perspectives in 
this field. All countries in East and West 
alike had to face the complex set o f prob-
lems concerning the reorganization o f local 
self-government, for the development of 
society creates imperative needs to be met. 
The public sector has greatly widened in 
scope and has presented new requirements 
for quality. The theoretical comparison of 
institutionsand their operation calls for new 
methods, because inquiries should be made 
into the dynamics of events. The question 
arises whether there is a need for a single 
reorganisation or for several consecutive re-
forms. Not all changes which take place 
within institutional frameworks are directly 
consequential upon some political or admi-
nistrativedecision, but, e . g . , several micro-
-decisions may result in one substantive and 
unexpected institutional change. 
The next chapter deals with the decent-
ralisation of the welfare state. The changing 
intergovernmental frameworks give rise to 
several problems in the field of social ser-
vices. The new social tasks do not require 
a nationwide approach, but need solutions 
with due adjustments for local conditions. 
The authors deal with efforts at the local 
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solution of social policy problems in dif-
ferent countries. 
A very interesting chapter informs us 
about the local government reforms in 
Scandinavia. In recent decades all four 
Scandinavian countries Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark and Finland have changed their 
local government structures completely. 
It is worthwhile to take a look at the 
structural and functional reforms in the 
development of the welfare state, with 
special attention to the autonomous model 
of local authorities and the integration 
model of relations between the central and 
local organs. Undoubtedly, there is a 
disquieting tendency towards changing the 
welfare state into an interventionist state 
in the most different spheres. Also, this 
chapter deals with the territorial reforms, 
which have taken place in the Scandinavian 
countries during the east decades, listing 
the successes and failures of the reforms. 
In Denmark these reforms have surpassed 
to Swedish and Norwegian reforms in terms 
of their political attributes as well as of the 
depth of reorganisations in the public sector. 
The quickening pace of urbanization in that 
country presented an imperative need for 
a comprehensive reform. In Finland too, 
it was thought that the relationship between 
the central and local organs constituted the 
key factor in modernizing the government 
structure. In Finland there are three main 
organisations of localities 1 ) Finnish Urban 
Association; 2) Association of Finnish 
Municipalities (with mostly villages as its 
members); 3) Association of Swedish-
Speaking Finnish Municipalities. 
Each Finnish locality is a member of 
one of these organisations. The activities 
and plans of organizations and localities are 
carried out by the municipal economic com-
mittee and the collective conciliation com-
mittee, both of which were set up in the 
early 1970s. A tendency can also be ob-
served in Finland to bureaucratization o f the 
self-governing local community, which is 
becoming a professional institution pro-
viding municipal services, more or less as 
specified by central directives and regula-
tions. 
In the next chapter the reader is in-
formed about the transformation o f local 
government in the United Kingdom and 
about the lessons to be learnt from it. The 
chapter deals with the significance o f ad-
ministrative boundaries and their relative 
flexibility. It quotes the witty aphorism of 
Tocqueville: The kingdoms and republics 
are forks of man, but the cities seem as if 
they were created by God himself. Thus, 
according to the authors, the rationality of 
the emergence and development of cities 
surpasses the rationality of the development 
of states. It is emphasized that citizens in 
smaller communities can be made more ac-
tive and more interested in settling their 
own affairs than at the national level. 
Interesting data are given in the table which 
compare the share of central government 
in general state expenditures between 1950 
and 1973. The ratio is highest in Australia, 
where the central government and its organs 
received 55.6 % of government appropri-
ations as late as 1973. The lowest is in the 
United Sates, where only 38.3% was spent 
for this purpose. 
The French experience of recent years 
is summarized as one of radical reform and 
marginal change. Since 1958 the central 
government has made almost yearly at-
tempts to introduce some reform of local 
government with so few system-wide 
results. It should be kept in mind that the 
French concept of state organisation is one 
of a traditionally centralized, hierarchical 
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system, in which the initiative has always 
come from above and that the préfets in all 
the 96 départements are representatives of 
the central government responsible for 
public administration as a whole . Links 
between local governments are rather 
difficult and multifaceted in that country, 
where the cleavage between cities and 
villages can be considered as a tradition. 
This chapter deals with the comprehen-
sive reform effort of President Mitterand, 
too. 
His reform was completed with more 
or less difficulties in 1985. There can be 
no question that it was the most important 
reform in this century and that it was 
carried out despite systematic obstructions 
by, and at times the active resistance of, 
numerous political factors, local as well as 
national. 
Last but not least, the volume covers 
the experience of the United States, the 
largest Western democracy, where there are 
nearly 83 .000 local government units, a 
large part of them municipalities, which 
provide various municipal services for the 
population, but some of them, e .g . the local 
school boards, deliver only one service. The 
causes of change in local services are 
usually very pragmatic and run into thou-
sands every year. The active participation 
o f citizens and limited scope of government 
activity are really durable, but by no means 
the only, values of American politics. The 
Americans are especially appreciative of 
effectiveness in the public service and of 
the moral integrity of the public servants 
w h o manage community programmes. The 
volume explains that regionalism has an 
important role to play in the United States, 
particularly in view of the country's size. 
It is also a characteristic American feature 
that the mayors of some big cities have 
much more national influence than the 
senator or governor of the given state. 
The last chapter of the volume treats the 
theoretical problems of local government 
reform and of legitimacy. The volume is 
complete with extensive lists of literature 
added to each chapter and with an index at 
the end of the book. This topical collection 
of essays is a higly useful source of in-
formation for theoretical and practical 
spec ia l i s t s in local government . 
Miklós UDVAROS 
Ludwik GELBERG: Rechtsprobleme der Ostsee (Legal problems of the Baltic Sea). 
Hamburg, Sample Verlag, 1989. pp. 175. 
This monograph presents the grave This Sea can be regarded as a virtually 
crisis of the current international law of the landlocked sea connected with the world 
sea and the efforts directed towards its oceans by nothing but the Danish Straits 
solution. Chapter I describes thehistoryand only a few kilometers in width. However, 
geography of the Baltic Sea and the sur- the Baltic Sea and its coastal states play a 
rounding countries, pointing out that the highly important role in the world economy 
geographical specifics of this Sea decisively as the trade flows of the seven countries 
determine the possibilities of traffic, the involved account for 2 2 % of world trade, 
fishing industry and commerce in its region. About 13 % of shipping takes place on this 
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Sea, and the rate of increase in the commer-
cial fleets of these countries has surpassed 
the world average in the last 10 to 20 years. 
Trade turnover, which is expected to in-
crease owing to favourable events of world 
politics in recent years, is handled by not 
less than a thousand seaports, smaller and 
larger. The struggle of countries for he-
gemony will therefore shift from the politi-
cal-military to the economic sphere. As 
early as the 16th and 17th centuries, these 
countries tried to find a way of regulating 
the rights of each country in this area within 
the framework of "dominium Maris Baltic", 
while guaranteeing the freedom of the seas 
at least for the surrounding nations. Of 
course, during the past centuries, including 
ours, this area was also visited by smaller 
or bigger military clashes, struggles for 
hegemony on land and at sea. The freedom 
of the seas and its possibilities have always 
been subject to different interpretations such 
was the case after the Second World War, 
too, when the military forces of NATO and 
the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact-countries faced 
each other. The volume points out that the 
Baltic Sea offers extraordinary opportunities 
for its users if they abide by the regulations 
on international maritime traffic. Recently 
the problems of more than a hundred impor-
tant sea straits and the extent of territorial 
waters have given rise to a great deal of de-
bate, especially at the international confe-
rence on the United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea. The relevant agree-
ments have regard for the interests and 
rights of the coastal States, while they 
guarantee free passage for the ships of all 
countries. This volume gives a detailed 
account of the regulations on passage 
through the Baltic Straits and famous legal 
cases involvingconflicting in teres tsof some 
countries concerning the use of sea straits. 
Countries lay claim to different extents of 
territorial waters; e.g. since the summer of 
1966 Sweden has claimed 12 sea miles of 
territorial waters in width against the 
similar law. By contrast, some other coun-
tries like Finland or the former GDR had 
been content with 3 sea miles of territorial 
waters, although the GDR later came to 
claim 12 sea miles. 
The next Chapter dealswith the legal 
problems of the continental shelf. On the 
whole, the Baltic Sea is rather shallow, its 
average depth varies between 60 and 150 
meters, meaning that a relatively small area 
is deeper than 200 meters, so under the 
Geneva Convention of 1958, it is suitable 
for exploitation of natural resources. So far 
no oil resources as rich as those in the 
North Sea have been found in the Baltic, 
ut significant phosphorus and metal reserves 
lie hidden in the continental shelf. Although 
the Baltic countries have accepted the 
Geneva Convention, each of them has given 
a different interpretation to some of its 
provisions, which has given rise to a sea 
law dispute between the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands; 
the dispute was finally settled by the Inter-
national Court of Justice. The volume 
dwells on the living resources of the Baltic 
Sea, particularly the possibilitiesof seafish-
ery. No doubt that in recent years the Baltic 
Sea has become one of the busiest and most 
polluted seas of the world, a fact which has 
dealt a serious blow to fishery. The Gdansk 
Agreement, which was signed by the seven 
Baltic nations in September 1973 and 
entered into force in July 1974, was in-
tended to protect the living resources of the 
Sea and the fishing interests of these 
nations. The efforts to save the living 
resources of the Baltic sea and the measures 
for environmental protection have been to 
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little purpose despite the fact that no serious 
tanker catastrophe has occurred in this area. 
The rest of the volume discusses questions 
concerning the legal status of the Baltic Sea 
and mutual assistance in case of accidents 
at sea. The volume is rounded off by the 
full texts of 12 significant documents 
ranging from the Agreement on the Straits 
of Sund and Belt (Copenhagen, 1857) to the 
Polish-Swedish Agreement on Fishery 
(1978). 
This volume is a source of useful 
information for readers taking an interest 
in studying the problems of the Baltic Sea 
as a special geographic area. 
Miklós UDVAROS 
Philip G. CERNY: The changing architecture of politics. SAGE Publications, London-
Newbury-New Delhi 1990. pp. 167. 
This volume is about the structure and 
institutions of States and the future of the 
State itself. Mention is made already in the 
introduction of the comprehensive structural 
changes which shape our world and of the 
need for a new way of thinking to promote 
the further development of politics and the 
State. There is no doubt that modem society 
in the twentieth century has failed to devise 
systems of political and state institutions 
capable of preventing the emergence of 
dictatorships, while opening new vistas for 
society to achieve social justice and build 
a civilized way of life. 
First of all the volume surveys the his-
torical periods of development of the 
modem State, the characteristic features 
marking the appearance of different struc-
tures, the laws governing change in decisi-
on-making processes and institutionsduring 
successive historical periods. It mentions 
that already in Platon's work "Republic" 
there show up some contradictions between 
aspects of culture and pragmatism, between 
ethics and imagined, or hoped-for alterna-
tives on the one hand and between material 
reasons of the moment and action suggested 
by the results of cost-benefit analysis, on 
the other. The mainsprings of society's 
development are sometimes apt to invite 
even self-destruction, a fact recognized 
back in ancient times. The related views, 
ideas, explanations and opinions crystallized 
over time into theories which remained 
valid for shorter or longer periods. The 
volume deals with the ideological trend 
known as "structural state theory" and 
points out the contrast between a democratic 
state of law, marked by a delicate political 
balance, and a centralized and bureaucr-
atized dictatorship, and the "transitions" 
between the two. Some authors go so far 
as to claim that the structural roots of politi-
cal modernisation are to be traced back to 
the development of political parties (Hun-
tington). 
In the next part the author calls on effi-
cient market, the hierarchies and the differ-
ent fields of political allocation as the 
driving forces of modem society. He argues 
that in the economic and political markets 
there can be neither order nor progress in 
the absence of comprehensive frameworks 
and without observance of the relevant rules 
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applicable to all, because these are essential 
attributes of a sovereign State. In this 
context he is concerned with the problems 
of effective pluralism and the specifics of 
public and private goods. 
Concerning the further possibilities open 
to the modem state at the crossroads, the 
author discusses the new opportunities for 
political action. He quotes Alvin Toffler, 
who maintains that change itself is a special 
precondition of stability in complex struc-
tures and that inertia and hesitation in the 
face of rapid development are liable to 
provoke destructive changes in the state and 
society. He deals with the types of state 
autonomy, namely he divides states into 
groups that are autonomous or dependent 
on their external relations. In them, the 
institutional systems develop in accordance 
with political possibilities, following cultural 
traditions and depending on economic con-
ditions. 
The volume deals with the limitations 
of political power, too, inquiring into the 
most important factors shaping the state and 
law of the 21st century. It refers to the 
growing importance of national peculia-
rities and to the objective laws governing 
the emergence of classical political elites 
and possiblecoalitions. Itdivides leadership 
styles into four categories: a) routine 
leadership, which combines representative 
with individual leadership. Here the author 
quotes Max Weber's words about the 
"routinization" of extraordinary, charismatic 
leadership; b) integrative leadership, which 
seeks to build consensus for its own ac-
tivities; c) catalytic leadership, the essense 
of which lies in initiatives, but these are not 
always in line with its intentions; d) trans-
formative leadership, which, unlike routine 
leadership, requires a certain type of 
"crisis" management in an effort to change 
the norms and structures of the State itself. 
The volume gives a comprehensive and 
detailed analysis of events at the end of the 
20th century, and outlines the options for 
future development in the light of present-
day realities. The volume is complete with 
an extensive bibliography and index. Its 
interesting analyses arouse the attention of 
readers taking interest in the paradigms of 
political and social sciences, either from a 
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Pál HORVÁTH Reflexions on Writing Modern Legal 
History in East-Central Europe 
The epochal changes in the last years have shaken what was earlier believed by many 
to be a stable body of knowledge of our recent history, and more so our perception of 
the historical precedents of our existing institutions. One should not overlook, of course, 
the fact that this state of affairs discounts nothing from the value of the factual material 
collected in the last decades being nevertheless a valuable addition to our knowledge of 
legal history. In fact, perhaps there has never been as great an interest as right now in 
confronting the history of contemporary positive law; no doubt, the renaissance of 
historical interest in law is due largely, if not exclusively, to fundamental changes in our 
perception of events and processes of contemporary history within and outside the 
domain of law. 
Legal historians were among the first in Eastern European legal scholarship who 
addressed themselves to the realities of administration of justice and pointed out the 
rift between "law in books and law in action" and the legal policy errors or 
distortions in different historical periods. The task of realizing the wide gulf between 
reality and theory to which the institutions were supposed to be based, was left, 
however, for the most time to the readers of our publications. This is why it has become 
an urgent need to spell out and, where appropriate, rectify omissions and errors whether 
caused by political or other factors; this is substantial for the purpose of providing solid 
factual basis to the public discussion on recent history in Hungary (and no doubt 
elsewhere). No single representative of any particular discipline of legal scholarship 
could feel himself or herself absolved from this duty; still, we have a vested interest 
in respecting the results already achieved by legal scholarship, even if this is, 
clearly, of limited scope and sometimes methodologically questionable. They contain 
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nevertheless a part of the historical truth, even if we must be aware of the fact that 
only a part of it. 
These insights may, perhaps, impart a fresh impetus to the efforts at identifying the 
outstanding problems of history of modem law in our region from a highly theoretical 
point of view. It appears to be more practicable and closer to the legal historian's mind, 
however, to begin the study with examining particular legal institutions. 
In dealing with the development of the political and legal systems in East-Central 
Europe we were often mistaken, especially in the last decades, in claiming that a 
particular legal institution or whole branch of law reached its stage of full development. 
Moreover, in certain countries the prevailing opinion asserted that the legal order as a 
whole satisfied the needs of a highly complex, "advanced" ["socialist"] society. In 
reflecting on the never ceasing "expansion of democratism", we were inclined to herald 
the birth of a whole range of new "socialist" constitutional devices, whereas in other 
branches of law the characteristic features due to the contingencies of the moment were 
presented, for example, as a "new wave of codification". The same phenomena are now 
regarded, at best, as a result of political and social constraints, or even producing 
counterproductive effects. 
This is not to question, anyway, that this particular period of legal development, 
called, rightly or wrongly, "socialist" or "communist" in the countries of East-Central 
Europe should be made in part or in its entirety a proper subject of research in legal 
history. Still, the extension of historical research to most recent times has, as it is well 
known, its own methodological problems; it is not, however, a mere experiment since 
modem legal scholarship, e.g. in Hungary, produced works of modern legal history, one 
is tempted to say, combining historical and legal methods in an exemplary way.1 
At the same time, I think we are entitled to claim that our endeavours are not 
motivated by pragmatic goals, since we gave up the approach of constructing mechanical 
schemes deducted from theoretical (or even ideological) premises, on the supposedly 
"correct" way of the development of law which had, naturally enough, its impact on 
viewing the past. One of the basic tenets of this approach was that the history of socialist 
law was characterized by its break with traditional legal culture, as the development of 
law was determined exclusively by social and historical (that is external) factors. Conse-
quently, the history of a particular type of legal systems and their long-term evolution, 
cannot be measured or evaluated by reliance to either on the postulate of "história est 
magistra vitae" or on the long-standing requirements of "adequate historical perspec-
tives". Thus, the modem legal history has shifted its focus, in fact, to exploring the 
1 An important piece of research of that kind is the comprehensive survey of East European constitutional 
development entitled "Az európai népi demokráciák alkotmányai" (Constitutions of the European People 's 
Democratic Countr ies) (ed. by KOVÁCS, I.) Budapest, 1983, an analysis of the whole history of "socialist" 
constitutional systems. 
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historical reality of the law in force, helping to understand an era which offers perhaps 
more lesson to profit from than any other for the benefit of our age.2 
Against this background the expectation that the modem legal historicism of today 
should also rely on social experiences likely to shape the future is raised by the scientific 
revolution of our time, rejecting the traditional forbearance which, hiding behind the 
slogan of "lack of adequate historical perspectives", released legal historians until 
recently from their duty to study the processes of legal development directly steering the 
course of the time they live in. Therefore the historical processes determined by the 
forces and factors of the present are to be seen not as a detached but as an organic part 
of the legal history as a whole. What I have in mind here is not a comparative analysis 
of law known to be equivalent to the fashionable research into contemporary history or 
(.Zeitgeschichte, histoire contemporaine) focusing on a panoramic, rather than strictly 
historical description of "legal systems of the world";3 rather, I think on the worldwide 
resurgence of interest in "legal development" in recent times. 
Collaboration between legal historians of the East-Central European countries has 
created several institutionalized occasions4 concerned entirely with the development 
history of our particular group of legal systems. Indeed, the endeavour for 
collaboration led to the international conference held in Prague in 1975 which announced 
the need to assess the social experiences of recent history.5 The historical study of legal 
development had not been unknown, as a matter of fact, earlier too; but the 
experience sporadically emerging in the development history of the neighbouring 
countries did not produce, at least as yet, results capable to serve as a sound basis 
for a broad historical synthesis of the modern legal history of East-Central Europe, 
except those similar to the Prague Conference mentioned before. Furthermore, it 
is of paramount importance for us that the new occasions for scholarly exchange 
referred to above be allowed a wide scope for source-based presentations of national 
legal systems, thereby laying the basis for a broader study of the recent history of 
the East-Central European legal systems. 
Our present knowledge makes possible to analyze both the regional components of 
East-Central European laws and the national legal systems, unfolding a wealth of 
experience capable of generalization and likely to contribute to a better understanding 
2 This was stated in respect to the history of "the really existing socialism" by an eminent Hungarian his-
torican; see PACH, Zs. P.: Történetírás és tudatformálás (Historiography and Social Consciousness) in: 
Történetszemlélet és történettudomány (Philosophy of History and Science of History), Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest, 1977, p. 84. 
3 See, e.g. the widely read outstanding works by WIGMORE, J., SEAGLE, M., DAVID, R. , 
SCHNITZER, A., and others. 
4 See the material of the Conference on "Entstehung und Entwicklung des sozialistischen Staates und 
Rechtes" held in Prague from 20 to 23 May, 1985. (Prispevky к dejinam socialistického státu a práva I-III.) 
Ed. by Karel MALY. Universita Karlova, Praha, 1987. 
5 For the two-volume material of the Conference, see Vznik a vyvoj socialistického práva. Ed. by Karel 
MALY. Universita Karlova, Praha, 1987. 
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of the timely problems of the present. Of course, not even these problems could relegate 
the national characteristics of legal systems into oblivion, but the participating scholars 
reached certain conclusions corroborating the existence of close historical interactions 
between the regional and the particular national elements. This very fact gives us 
encouragement to accord priority to a wider range of research by relying on the latest 
international experience gained in the subject. 
Against this background I hardly need to explain the particular interest in the recent 
history of Hungarian law, but there also seems to be an obvious need for a more 
complex sort of research to be undertaken once we are able finally to form a more or 
less complete picture of the course of legal development in other Central European 
countries.6 
This line of analysis should cover the contemporary period which means, for our 
purpose, the scope of study in legal history proper. The given period of East-Central 
European law embraces, however, a new and significant historical stage of legal 
development as well. Thus, the expectation that we shall disclose at least the some 
features of transition in the recent past to the recent present period of development of 
East-European state and law will be justified by the time our research findings will have 
finally reached the stage of general application. 
Research in the history of law revealed already the complexity of little less than a 
century of development and, in several cases, defined in clear terms the typical traits of 
what might be called a model legal development. In this context, our thinkers were, 
obviously, primarily not concerned with the distinction between different groups of law 
or with the interactions between those which had developed in the region, but with the 
problems evolving in the legal systems of the neighbouring countries and mutually 
influencing each another; the legal systems in this group showed palpable elements of 
both differentiation and integration. There is no doubt that the Soviet model shaped 
substantial branches of law, but research in recent general and economic history points 
also to contours of the different regions emerging as a result of the particular conditions 
of transition. Gradually we shall become able to observe7 in respect to individuals legal 
institutions as with respect to the legal development of the East-Central European 
countris8 there where substantial differences between the economically relatively 
developed, mostly Central European, countries, and those relatively more backward 
economically. 
These and similar problems became more and more apparent, even within the 
restricted field of the research on individual legal institutions. Thus historical analysis 
6 See from the author: A szocialista jog fejlődése (Development of Socialist Law), Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Kiadó, Budapest, 1984; idem: Az európai népi demokratikus jogcsoportrégió (The European People 's 
Democratic Group Legal Systems), in: Az állam és jog fejlődéstörténete (History of State and Law), Akadémiai 
Kiadó, Budapest, 1987. pp. 232 et seq. 
7 As it has been pointed out in the respect of on European socialist legal system. 
8 E.g. the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia (as they then were) . 
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could have noticed for instance relatively early the appearance of "economic law", as 
distinct from traditional civil or commercial law, in certain countries or its equally 
inevitable absence in others. Similar examples could be given of recurrent elements of 
legislation or, in other cases, of more radical models with transitory forms, in particular 
agrarian law. Similar ideas could be cited at length of course in the domain of the 
codification of public law, property law, family law, law of succession or the most 
recent arrangements in the wake of the systemic change with their legal relevance. 
In studying the last fifty years of the East-Central European group of laws, we can 
refer also to scholarly research that laid the ground for a thorough analysis of the various 
factors of legal development in different periods.9 These possibilities of research, 
however, are not exhausted completely with the arrival of a new period, although they 
are far from offering a historical experience suitable for generalization. Outsider 
observers could have every reason, naturally, to conclude that the history of certain legal 
systems are not relevant grounds for generalisation; rather they could be regarded as a 
sort of borderline case since its various components belong already to the realm of 
contemporary law in force. In addition, the actual material at our disposal tends to rouse 
the conviction that explorable historical processes remain, essentially, the processes 
subjected to analysis have not yet run their course. But who could question that 
historiography can provide direct lessons, if any, for the present precisely by probing 
into the most recent past.10 
In fact, the opportunity is here to enhance, also by the means of historical legal 
research, a more complex approach to the current problems in some branches of the 
positive law, while systematically integrating the results obtained in this way into the 
research in the several branches of law, but also comparative law, sociology of law, etc. 
on present day problems of law in East-Central Europe. 
The endeavour to disclose in a historical approach the emergence of the actual state 
of a legal system is, of course, not a new phenomenon in jurisprudence. On the 
contrary, it would not be amiss to claim that some of the relevant historical processes 
came to open room for summing up research results, but studies of the substance of the 
period reveal nevertheless, that, for instance, earlier of periodization understandably 
failed to serve as a guide even to delimiting the period of the so-called "people's 
democratic" ("socialist") state and law. Yet efforts at a comparative historical study of 
the group of laws were gaining momentum in historical processes. This makes it clear 
that the Conference in Prague mentioned earlier sought to establish a solid basic of 
9 For a survey see the author's A szocialista jog kialakulásának a történelmi tapasztalatai (Historical 
Experiences concerning the Emergence of Socialist Law), in: Jogtudományi Közlöny XXXV (1980), Nr. 5 , 
pp. 217-234. 
10 As correctly stated by PACH, Zsigmond Pál, "the historiographer of our recent decades probes into an 
era in which century-old processes of our history have just run their course", see Új Történelmünk (Our Recent 
History) 1977, pp. 581-522. 
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historical periodization,11 East-Central (socialist) legal system and that, as a result, it 
was then presumed that development in the countries of East-Central Europe entered into 
a new stage from the 1980s onwards, though with local discrepancies. 
The revival of interest in the period of the "people's democratic", "socialist" in the 
'80s, state and law in Europe has gone far beyond, for instance, the rather narrow field 
of legal scholarly of jurisprudence. In this sense it may be claimed that social and 
historical sciences in general have shown, in both West and East growing interest in 
legal development. Successive generations were motivated by this noble goal, but the 
forcible historical detours and the concrete set of historical conditions impeded efforts, 
down to the end of the 1980s if not to our days, to arrive at an understanding of the 
fundamental socio-economic and political conditions let alone explanation of the changes. 
Social changes in the countries of East-Central Europe followed one another as we 
remember with relatively short sequences the recent history of the region, but the 
complex maturing or the time-horizon of the historical processes has varied in intensity 
even by subregions. Still, it is understandable that the changes open also a possibility for 
a general East-European group of laws to attain its full stature. The transformation of 
the basic productive and property relations and the unfolding of inevitable reforms 
thereof have become, for instance, with a relatively short time lag, features common to 
such a law. Indeed, the related process did not get underway in the societies of the East 
European countries until the end of the 1980s and, as it is shown chiefly by social 
experience in recent years, it has also radically changed the structure and content of legal 
systems. All these warrant the claim that new era has been inaugurated. 
With the attention too much focused now on constitutional and, therefore, politico-
legal aspects,12 the danger may be naturally that the periodisation proper to the history 
of public law will prevail over other fields of law, a problem particularly important right 
now. What has been stated so far makes it obvious, however, that none of the processes 
expressing the novelty of the period appears to have run out its course, so the substantive 
change in a given state order has not been complete either, because the said socio-
economic and political conditions of the transition acquired new elements incessantly as 
they approached the present. Thus, for instance, the quest for possibilities of a new 
economic order as a general concomitant of legal development in East Europe and the 
full unfolding of related processes, gathering renewed momentum, cannot really be 
expected except in the future. In fact, this search for paths of a more intensive develop-
ment has, with local variations, actually characterized legal development in the countries 
of East-Central Europe from as early as the second part of the 1980s. In a similar 
manner, stronger emphasis was laid on the need for a creative legislative activity and 
renewed efforts were undertaken to expand the democratism of legal life. Therefore it 
11 See D O L E Z A L , M.: Hlavní etapy socialistického statu a priva. (Main phases of the socialist state and 
law), in: Vznik a vyvoj socialistického práva (1976), pp . 11-29. 
12 See the work referred to above, Az európai népi demokráciák alkotmányai (The Constitutions of the 
European People ' s Democratic Countries) (ed. KOVÁCS, I.), note 1. 
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appears practicable for us to keep track of these historical processes moulding as they 
do the shape of the future. 
In an historiographical sense, we are naturally making no new effort to apply a 
comparative approach of legal history to the legal development of "contemporary 
societies" in Hungary and the neighbouring countries, specifically for the purpose of 
promoting the exploration of the lasting values produced by the history of Hungarian 
law. This endeavour is motivated by the fact that for the study of Hungarian legal 
development in modern and recent times in the context of universal history we have not 
been equipped so far precisely with the decisive body of adequate knowledge which 
"incessantly influenced" our progress and which was conditioned by the same causes as 
were its sources by reason of their proximity and simultaneity.'3 Of course, it is not 
only in view of the relevant body of facts that we have undertaken little work so far 
concerning the legal development in these neighbouring regions, but even conjectures 
about historical interactions have remained unexplored, although this era, which has, 
with its actual material, offered possibilities for a systematic study of our legal develop-
ment14 in the context of the history of Central and East Europe, providing a framework 
for the long-standing tasks we share in this region.15 As it is stated by historical 
science, the relationships between universal and national histories and between 
neighbouring contemporary societies in the Eastern part of our continent are determined, 
despite their diversity, by the interdependence of modern civilizations16, and we are 
gaining an understanding of these interrelationships not only by disclosing the 
interactions of our legal development in modem times demonstrated in the foregoing, but 
practically in all spheres of material culture. 
Our references to the history of literature of East-Central Europe which led to us to 
agree with the conclusion of Sziklay stating that "parallel development has become, 
despite the often sharp disagreements between nations, particularly ostensible from the 
end of the 18th century down to the beginning of the 20th century" and even to our 
13 "[A]nd which stem, at least in part, from a common source". This thought, which may provide guidance 
to us in the development of our legal historicism in recent times, is quoted from Marc Bloch, the martyred 
great thinker of progressive comparative science. Cf. BLOCH, M. : A történelem védelmében (In Defence of 
History), Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1974, pp. 70-71. 
14 As we are also reminded by an apt conclusion of historical science. See BALOGH, S.—SIMON, P.: A 
magyar történettudomány időszerű kérdései (Topical Issues of Hungarian Historical Science), Magyar 
Tudomány Új Folyamata (1964), p. 488. 
15 Our legal thinking, too, approaches at Hungarian legal history as deeply embedded in social, economic 
and political condition, which can only be studied properly "by a parallel analysis of universal historical 
interrelationships". Cf. Történettudományunk helyzete, eredményei és feladatai (The Situation, Results and 
Tasks of our Historical Science), Magyar Tudomány N.S. XIII (1968) pp. 138 el s. 
16 See HEIDORN, G. : Az egyetemes és nemzeti történelem kölcsönös viszonyáról (On the Mutual 
Relationship of Universal and National History). Egyetemes történeti tanulmányok (Studies in Universal 
History) VII, Acta Univ. Debreceniensis, Séria Historica, XIX (1974), pp. 7-8. 
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times,17 not being alien to the mutual development of legal culture either. On the other 
hand, the vacuum obviously felt in this respect in our legal historiography until very 
recently can be explained only by unilateral Hungarian legal thinking which came to 
assess the one-time uniqueness of Hungarian legal development "through underestimating 
the similar values of neighbouring peoples".18 Consequently, the historiography of our 
time must change its approach radically with the help of research focusing on recent 
times lest, while being engaged in a study of the rich factual material we should "forget 
about the fact that the neighbouring peoples have virtually have experienced the same 
development of law" or lest science should produce one-sided results by ignoring the 
concrete interactions of history. 
However, the interrelationships as suspected by many should be supported by facts 
in order that research on legal history should achieve really lasting results. With a 
closing remark we must therefore recall the idea that studying the relevant phenomena 
in themselves and then comparing them will facilitate the task of finding the clues to 
their subsequent appearance. This is why Hungarian science, concerned chiefly with 
general legal history, undertakes, by relying on the latest research results to give, at least 
a survey of the legal development in recent times of those nations which have had a 
shared history with us. 
We accepted this challenge by presenting the complex legal development of East-
Central Europe," which includes the transition to modem times, in an effort to provide 
an insight, based on contemporary sources and on the latest research results, into the 
prehistory of the legal development of the respective nations in modem times. However, 
further progress was not possible until after the basic sources of the bourgeois-capitalistic 
era had been published,20 and we had to draw from the latest international experience 
of methodical research too,21 in our quest to form a picture of hopefully lasting value, 
by sorting out the chief components of the bourgeois (Western-capitalistic) group of laws 
of which not even an overall view was available previously. The northern neighbours of 
Hungary (the Czech, Polish and Baltic peoples), forced as they were into the imperial 
frameworks of the Prussian-German, Austrian and Russian state organizations were 
17 See SZIKLAY, L.: Szomszédainkról. A kelet-európai irodalom kérdései (On Our Neighbours. Aspects 
of East European Literature), Irodalomtudományi Közlemények, pp. 365-367. 
18 This exhortation was made by HADROVICS, L. as early as during the Second World War . See his A 
magyar és a déli szláv szellemi kapcsolatok (Hungarian and Southern Slav Intellectual Links), Budapest , 1944, 
p. 34. 
19 See the present author's 'A kelet- és közép-európai népek jogfejlődésének főbb irányai' (Trends in the 
Legal Development of the Eastern and Central European Nations). Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó, Budapest, 
1968, p. 494 . 
20 See: Bevezetés az egyetemes állam- és jogtörténet forrásaiba (Introduction to the Sources of History of 
Law and State (The Sources of Bourgeois Law)). Ill, Budapest, 1970; Ш/Ь, 1971. 
21 See the author 's Tudománytörténeti és módszertani kérdések a jogtörténet köréből (Questions of the 
History of Science and of Methodology in the Domain of Legal History). Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó, 
Budapest, 1974, p. 502. 
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covered only per tangentem by that survey. Rather than justifying this hiatus on the 
ground that those people, brought under the sway of the Prussian-German, Austrian and 
Imperial Russian legal systems which determined their specific features, did not have 
separate records of legal development at the time, we can refer to the fact that, at the 
same time, the multinational-based frameworks of political law carried in themselves the 
most important concrete body of knowledge about the legal development of the nations 
concerned. In this respect, therefore, Hungarian legal historical research has at lest the 
indispensable clues, which does not naturally eliminate the need to arrive some day at 
the stage of giving a fuller picture of East-Central Europe, devoting close attention to 
the modern legal systems of the Czech, Slovak, Polish, Ukrainian and Baltic peoples, 
each and all, which were equally ephemeral and developed under specific conditions of 
national oppression. 
This inescapable task is justified not only by our multifaceted historical links in this 
field, but also by the fact that almost all of the neighbouring people attained some degree 
of independent statehood during the crisis-ridden period of capitalist law in the 20th 
century. Indeed, without such a complex analysis, it is inconceivable to probe into the 
emergence of the early crisis experienced by East Europe's legal systems of a capitalistic 
type and their evolution into an East-European ("socialist") group of law.22 The 
question that might be said to concern the reason why modem legal history focuses its 
attention on that era full of contradictions in which may be considered now to be history, 
often intermingle with the socio-political problems of recent times. 
As regards in particular the tasks of Hungarian research, this question is easy to 
answer but the reader is left thinking that this most recent period of research in legal 
history calls for a number of questions to be reformulated and for a number of old 
paradigms to be removed. Were it really more beneficial for educating future generations 
if the painful facts of history's blind alleys and detours is buried in oblivion—provided 
of course, that this were possible? Science must by necessity adopt a firmly negative 
position in this question, among others because the historical transformation of decisive 
importance which we are priviliged to experience prompts people to carry out really 
historical tasks. This process, whether it will create a historically new type of legal order 
(which is probable) or not in East-Central Europe, certainly badly needs reliable 
information on the immediate past. In this context, the task to be undertaken by science 
is not only labour-consuming and tremendous, but, at the same time also elevating one; 
it has demonstrated its viability by the accumulated findings of research, the achieve-
ments of the legal historicism of our time, which have also proved suitable to establish 
a wider and more adequate, that is more European, Weltanschauung than any of the 
preceding ones. 
22 See the author 's A közép- és kelet-európai szocialista jogcsoportrégió kialakulásának történelmi 
körülményei (Historical Background to the Emergence of the Region of the Socialist Legal Systems in Central 
and East Europe), in: Az állam és jog fejlődéstörténete (Development History of the State and Law). 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1987, pp. 245-266. 
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On motion of the League against Capital Punishment, the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Hungary, in its decision published 24th October 1990, declared capital 
punishment unconstitutional and repealed all the statutory provisions concerning the 
infliction and execution of capital punishment. 
This method abolishing capital punishment is unprecedented in international legal 
practice and the resolution of the Constitutional Court was an unexpected and surprising 
step to the Hungarian general public. The question is justified: what made this step 
possible, what were the causes leading to it and why through the medium of the 
Constitutional Court? 
The social and political background for this step was created by the process by which 
the Hungarian regime changed. In 1989 it was already possible to see that in the course 
of building up a democratic and constitutional state, and of the change in political 
regime, the preservation or the abolition of capital punishment was becoming a social, 
political, ethical and, lastly, legal dilemma which the renewed Hungarian society would 
have to face sooner or later. Beyond this basic reason, several other circumstances led 
to the reconsideration of the problem of capital punishment. The movement against 
capital punishment has had very strong traditions in Hungary for over a hundred years. 
Since the reform period in the last century, progressive representatives of legal sciences 
and of the intellectual class have been consistently striving for the abolition of capital 
punishment or for at least its maximum restriction. However, in the last ten decades the 
various regimes have abused the use of capital punishment and used it primarily for the 
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destruction of their real or supposed political enemies. In addition, mainly legal, 
professional circles were aware of, and influenced by, humanist European development 
of law based on social rationality and the recognition of human rights which had already 
banned capital punishment from the arsenal of criminal law on the major part of the 
continent. 
In the past decades it was not possible to discuss the ethical, political or legal issues 
of capital punishment in scientific literature, not to mention in the regular channels of 
information of the general public in Hungary. In early 1989, lawyers, sociologists, 
writers, representatives of the press and several churches established the League against 
Capital Punishment. Their aim was fight for the abolition of capital punishment with the 
means at its disposal, primarily through the might of information and explanation. Soon 
the League counted more than 600 enthusiastic members, who propagated the aims of 
the League by individual and organized actions in various parts of the country. Several 
lectures were held and articles published in newspapers on the topic, to which the 
different layers of society reacted in very different ways. Initially the rejecting of the 
idea of abolition expressed in the roughest way, eventually the arguments found an 
outlet. However, the League could not count on the majority of the society to take its 
side after only a few months' duration. 
The government developing the political strategy of the transition was undoubtedly 
sympathetic to the idea of abolition, although it never committed itself to it publicly. It 
cannot, however, be considered to be a coincidence that Kálmán Kulcsár, the Minister 
of Justice in the government of the transition period and well-known legal sociologist, 
submitted a draft constitution to Parliament in the first half of 1989, which emphasized 
its intention to conform to internationally recognised norms such as those embodied in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights as well as those in International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. The draft constitution he submitted expressed the idea specifically that 
"it requires consideration even on the basis of the constitutional right to life whether it 
can be declared that the imposing of capital punishment is not reconcilable with that 
right". 
In its discussion of the draft constitution, Parliament did not take a stand on the 
question of capital punishment and the political parties formed later on also refrained 
from expressing their opinions. Actually there was not a single political party which 
supported the unpopular idea of abolishing capital punishment. At the same time, as 
wider and wider layers of the general public learned about the misuses of political and 
legal rights in the past decades, and in particular about the size and scope of the retribu-
tion after the popular uprising of 1956, the layers of the general public came to face the 
ethical and political dilemma of the problem and abandoned capital punishment. It can 
be attributed to the public's growing pressure, that Parliament carried the motion by 
Kálmán Kulcsár, Minister of Justice, on not imposing capital punishment for political 
offences (i.e. offences against the state), in the future. As a second step, Parliament 
accepted the motion by the Minister of Justice, undebated in the autumn of 1989, on the 
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re-regulation of offences against the state, one of the most essential features being that 
the new law did not include capital punishment among its sanctions. 
At the end of 1989 the League was planning to launch an extensive campaign on the 
complete abolition of capital punishment, in which it strove to persuade members of 
Parliament to accept the idea of abolishing capital punishment. However, at the same 
time as the idea of abolition was spreading among the members of Parliament, where 
there were adherents of abolition in every political party, the political parties did not 
dare to set the issue of abolition as one of their objectives, presumably for tactical rea-
sons. In addition, it became general knowledge that Parliament was so preoccupied with 
the preparation and debate of various statutes, mainly those facilitating political 
transition, that it was unable to deal with special issues like capital punishment. It was 
also impossible to count on Parliament addressing the issue in the course of passing the 
new Constitution, and in the end no comprehensive new Constitution was passed, only 
the old Constitution was partially amended (Act XXXI of 1989). The amendments of the 
Constitution stated, among other things, that: "In the Republic of Hungary all persons 
have a birth right to life and human dignity, which nobody can be deprived of ar-
bitrarily". And under paragraph 2, "Nobody can be subjected to torture, to cruel, 
inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment..." 
Considering all these factors, the League decided, because it seemed impossible for 
Parliament to deal with the issue of capital punishment, at this time, to take the case 
before the Constitutional Court formed in the meantime, because the League believed 
that capital punishment was irreconcilable with the principle of law expressed in Article 
54 of the amended Constitution. Thereafter in April 1989, the League submitted its 
petition to the Constitutional Court and made a motion that the Constitutional Court 
declare capital punishment unconstitutional. 
The reasons for the petition were presented by the President of the League in a 70-
page-long study. The study set forth in detail the European traditions of the movement 
against capital punishment, offered a survey of the state of capital punishment and its 
abolition, respectively, in the world, treated the history of capital punishment in Hungary 
and discussed the reasons for its abolition. 
II 
From the earliest times capital punishment in the Hungarian legal system was the same 
general means of punishment as used all over Europe. Characteristically at the beginning 
of the 19th century the feudalistic Hungarian criminal law still imposed capital 
punishment in 180 criminal acts. At the same time the ideas of the Enlightenment 
regarding criminal justice (I refer here first of all to the activity of C. Beccaria and the 
French encyclopedists) appeared in Hungary as well throughout Austria and Italy at the 
end of the 18th century. Maria Theresa already forbade the application of torture in 
criminal procedure and she sought to restrict the Hungarian jurisdiction in imposing 
capital punishment. Joseph II became an explicit abolitionist when he abolished capital 
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punishment in civil procedure in 1787. However, in later years the absolutist 
government, frightened of the French revolution, reverted again to capital 
punishment. Nevertheless, as a result of the endeavours of the Hapsburg govern-
ment, the infliction of capital punishment decreased considerably in the first quarter 
of the 19th century. And in the 1830s current European thought about abolitionalism 
made itself powerfully felt. 
In 1839 the Hungarian Scientific Society offered a prize for examining the problem, 
which was awarded to the paper entitled "On Punishment, in Particular on Capital 
Punishment"1 by Bertalan Szemere, the would-be Minister of the Interior and later 
Prime Minister of the revolution and war of independence of 1848-49. Bertalan Szemere, 
dismissed capital punishment without qualification and without exception. His main 
argument was, on the one hand, the inalienability of human life, and, on the other, the 
fact that capital punishment was not necessary for maintaining the social order. 
Szemere's arguments were accepted by the progressive public opinion of the reform 
period and, as a result, the draft of the Criminal Code of 1843 eliminated capital 
punishment from the penalty system of the Code. At the same time this was probably 
why the conservative powers of the Upper House did not let the bill pass. 
After the political compromise of 1867 between Austria and Hungary, the institutions 
of a liberal constitutional state were built up with together the modernization of the legal 
system. While the Criminal Code of 1878 was a step back as regards to capital punish-
ment from the radical standpoint of 1843, it still restricted the imposition of capital 
punishment to within extremely narrow bounds by limiting capital punishment only for 
cases of premeditated homicide (murder in the first degree) and for attempt on the king's 
life. As a matter of fact, between the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1878 and 
World War I, capital punishment was imposed solely for premeditated homicide. In the 
last decades of the 19th century the number of murder cases was rather high in Hungary 
compared to the European average; it was essentially at the same level as today, 
however, the frequency of inflicting capital punishment has decreased considerably. The 
number of death sentences carried out in the thirty years preceding World War I was 38. 
And even though the number of capital offences remained fairly consistent through the 
end of the century, the courts did not impose a single capital punishment between 1895 
and 1900! The time when capital punishment could be definitely eliminated from the 
penal system seemed close at hand by the end of the century. 
World War I, however, led to radical changes in the situation. The course of cata-
clysmatic social upheaval following World War I: the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, the revolution in October 1918, the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919, the 
Horthy-counterrevolution was accompanied by the imposition of capital punishment, 
widely applied initially against political opponents. One of the Horthy-regime's very first 
1 SZEMERE, В.: A büntetésről s különösebben a halálbüntetésről. Budán, 1841. (On Punishment, 
Particularly on Capital Punishment. Buda, 1841.) This "forgotten" work by Szemere was republished by the 
League Against Capital Punishment in 1990. 
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measures was the introduction of capital punishment for offences against the state. This 
measure was followed by similar laws—the so-called law of treachery, the code of 
military justice, etc.—in the '30s. After the stabilization of the regime, however, civil 
justice resumed the liberal practice of pre-World War I. In the years between 1923 and 
1941 the majority of court imposed capital punishment only for murder. The annual 
average of capital punishment for murder was below two. For political offences 
exclusively, exceptional (summary) court imposed capital punishment twice a year in 
1931, 1932 and 1941.2 
After 1945 the Hungarian justice system developed further leading to radical changes 
in legal practice. The wider application of capital punishment was closely related to the 
demand for impeaching the offenders of war crimes and crimes against humanity during 
World War II, and to protect the new social and political system. Later on it was used 
for the protection of the fundamental interests of the socialist state. Several laws 
facilitated the use of capital punishment to protect the public order, the economic order 
and, later on, that of the planned economy and social property. The imposition of capital 
punishment was possible for a wide range of offenses in the framework of summary jus-
tice, which was facilitated by a 1941 law which was used amply by the government from 
1945 to 1953. The development of law after 1946 widely expanded the use of capital 
punishment, making political and economic offences, offences against property and 
wilful homicide all potentially capital crimes. 
In 1950, Act II of 1950, replacing the general part of the old Criminal Code, regu-
lated capital punishment as a general punishment. The preamble to the Act noted, that 
"As regards capital punishment, it is obvious that the rising of the cultural standard 
and the implementation of socialism will make this punishment dispensable...". The 
pathetic words of the ministerial preamble were, however, far from reality. The 
facts show that what followed was an expansion of capital punishment as never 
before seen in Hungary. 
It is very difficult to give an accurate picture of how many death sentences were 
imposed by the courts in these decades. Reliable statistical data was not supplied after 
1945. The relevant data in the official Statistical Annuals is, to say the least incomplete; 
it does not include, among other things, the number of capital punishments imposed by 
the so-called "people's tribunals" and the military courts. Accurate estimates of the 
number of death sentences is further hampered by the fact that in the period between 
1945 and 1953, and again in the period between the end of 1956 and 1958/59, in 
addition to ordinary courts, several separate or "exceptional courts"—such as the 
people's tribunals, the military courts, the summary courts, and the separate divisions 
of the people's tribunals—operated which were permitted to impose capital punishment. 
By the cautious and critical consideration of the various data it is, however, possible to 
establish that, for example, for war crimes and for offences against humanity, the 
2 Source: volumes 1924-1942 of Annuals of Hungarian Statistics. The data does not include death sentences 
imposed by military courts. 
158 Tibor Horváth 
people's tribunals sentenced 414 persons to death until 31 January 1949, and at least 180 
of these sentences were executed.3 In the first half of the '50s civil courts, judging 
ordinary offences, imposed capital punishment in 15-20 instances on an annual average. 
At the same time we still do not know how many death sentences were passed in the so-
called "pre-conceptioned political trials" in those years and how many of them were 
executed. The statistical data published is incomplete; according to the register of an 
independent researcher, 196 persons were executed between 1947 and 1953, among them 
65 army officers. According to a statement by the under-secretary for justice, regarding 
the elimination process of the uprising of 1956 (counterrevolution in the official wording 
of the time) between 20 December 1956 and 31 December 1961 the courts imposed 
capital punishment on 277 persons all of whom were executed.4 In addition, according 
to data from other sources, at least 55 capital punishments were executed outside the 
capital during the same period, bringing the number of executed persons to 322. 
In 1962 a new period regarding the application of capital punishment started, its 
political origins can be sought in the stabilization endeavours of the Kádár-regime. 
It should be first of all emphasized that since 1962 the courts have inflicted capital 
punishment, almost without exception, solely for wilful homicide; in only six other 
cases was capital punishment inflicted for other offences. Between 1962 and 1987 
there were a total of 119 death sentences passed in non-military cases, the annual 
average being 4.5. This average was highest in the '60s: 7.5, in the '70s it was 3.4 and 
3.1 in the '80s; the tendency showing a definite decrease. The same tendency prevailed 
in military cases where 66 death sentences were passed between 1960 and 1988, with 
the annual average being 2.2. In the past three years capital punishment has not been 
imposed in a single case.5 
The demand for restricting the use of capital punishment emerged in legislation of 
the '70s. The amendment in 1971 to the Criminal Code overruled the regulations of the 
Code which permitted the use of capital punishment for offences against property. This 
legal development was summed up in the Criminal Code of 1978, which permits the use 
of capital punishment for 25 offences. These offences include six offences against the 
state, that is six political offences, four offences against humanity, two offences against 
public order, eleven military offences and the offence of the qualified cases of pre-
meditated homicide. As can be seen from the statistical data, capital punishment imposed 
3 Compare: LUKACS, T. : A magyar népbírósági j o g és a népbíróságok 1945-1950. Budapest, 1979 (The 
law of Hungarian people's tribunals and the activities of people's tribunals 1945-1950); MAJOR, A: 
Népbíráskodás—forradalmi törvényesség. Budapest, 1988 (People's jurisdiction—revolutionary legality. 
Budapest, 1988.) 
4 For the statement made by Borics, Gyula, under-secretary of state for the Ministry of Justice, see the daily 
Magyar Nemzet 11 May 1989. 
5 Source: volumes 1953-1989 of Annuals of Statistics. The data on sentences passed by military courts are 
not included in the Annuals, they were made available for the author of the paper by the Ministry of Justice. 
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for premeditated homicide and for political offences is of practical importance in the long 
list. 
Ill 
Apart from the short official explanations in university textbooks and annotations, the 
Hungarian professional literature has been silent on the issue of capital punishment for 
decades. In the early '80s this silence was broken, first by professional meetings with 
selected participants and then with articles in periodicals concerned with the issue in-
creasingly from social, political and ethical aspects.6 The League against Capital 
Punishment developed its position through comprehensive discussions both for and 
against capital punishment and, by relying on the experiences of Hungarian and 
international criminological research. According to the standpoint of the League, the 
problem has an ethical issue at its centre: can the right of the state to deprive its citizens 
of life be justified. The other arguments and counter-arguments judged the efficiency, 
expediency or inexpediency of this particular punishment from a utilitarian point of view. 
The theses of the League can be summed up as follows: 
1. The defenders of capital punishment suggest first of all that capital punishment is 
the only just punishment against offenders who have committed serious crimes. Their 
thesis justifying this statement is based on several thousand year old ethico-religious 
commandments. Indeed, as the Old Testament says: "life for life, eye for eye, tooth for 
tooth", that is, who has shed blood should have his own blood shed, who has killed 
should pay for it with his own life—this is what the people's natural sense of justice 
demands, or so the defenders of capital punishment suggest. 
Hungarian abolitionists reject the principle of jus talionis together with its 
justification in any ethico-religious or philosophical form—Kant, Hegel, etc. Conversely, 
they argue it as an ethical requirement that the state has no right to deprive its citizens 
of their life. Human life is irreproducible, individual, a value which is not comparable 
to any other value, which cannot be sacrificed for any absolute idea or collective 
interest. The state is bound to acknowledge and guarantee fundamental human rights 
irrespective of sex, race, nationality or the fulfilment of civic duties. By acknowledging 
human rights in this way and enacting them in the Constitution, the right of the state to 
inflict capital punishment becomes unfounded. 
Capital punishment cannot be ethically justified. It is an old historical experience that 
instead of strengthening belief in an ethical order and ethical values, the effect of capital 
punishment is exactly the opposite. The legal possibility of capital punishment in itself 
6 HORVÁTH, T . : A halálbüntetés és jövője a magyar büntetőjogban (tézisek és a konferencia anyaga) 
Jogász Szövetségi Értekezések, 1984. [Capital Punishment and its Future in Hungarian Criminal Justice (theses 
and material for the conference), Papers of the Association of Lawyers, 1984.] After the conference there 
followed a widespread discussion on capital punishment in various periodicals (Egyetemi Lapok, Mozgó Világ, 
Valóság). 
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undermines the universal value of human life. And the infliction of capital punishment 
destroys public morals and brutalizes human relations. 
2. The main argument of the defenders of capital punishment is of utilitarian 
character. They refer to the social utility of capital punishment and to the interest 
of the general prevention of crime. They argue that to the general preventive effect 
of punishment capital punishment is indispensable. They attribute a deterrent, 
retentive effect of capital punishment as to criminality as a whole, and particularly 
as to serious offences against life. It has been impossible, however, to demonstrate 
this deterrence effect by any reliable scientific evidence. Yet it has been possible to 
demonstrate the opposite. 
It must be emphasized that criminality as a whole has not been, nor can it ever be 
influenced in a deterrent, retentive way by the individual punishments. But only by the 
operation of public order, legal protection systems, ethical and cultural standards of the 
population and the operation of social mechanisms leading to law abiding behaviour. 
As for the deterrent or retentive effect of capital punishment on offences against life, 
sufficient evidence is totally lacking. The international studies conducted by the United 
Nations are well known (I refer here to the reports by Professor Marc Ancel and Profes-
sor Norval Morris submitted in 1962 and 1966, respectively) which again demonstrated 
that the abolition of capital punishment had not resulted in an increase in the number of 
homicides committed in areas which had previously imposed capital punishment. 
We come to the same conclusion also when examining the practice of death sentences 
and the development of crimes against life in Hungary. The level and number of serious 
offences against life have essentially remained unchanged for decades. Somewhat 
simplified, it means that in Hungary 200-220 persons die every year through wilful 
homicide. (Here the crime of attempt of wilful homicide is ignored, the development of 
which is very strongly influenced by the diverse interpretation of judicial practice.) At 
the same time the imposition of capital punishment in such cases has undergone consider-
able change in the past forty years. As compared to the 1950s, our courts have passed 
death sentences in a really meagre number in the past decades. All this proves that nei-
ther the higher number of death sentences, nor the recent moderate judicial practice have 
had a deterrent, retentive or restraining influence on the development of serious offences 
against life. 
3. The defenders of capital punishment suggest very frequently that in the case of 
a very serious offence only capital punishment can restore public order, which is what 
the public demands. 
This argument appears valid. It cannot be denied that the general public in Hungary 
is rather intolerant and aggressive and in favour of the idea of retaliation. This attitude 
is supported, or at least explained, by not only the earlier centuries of our history, but 
by the social and political processes of the recent past and the ideological phenomena 
accompanying them. It follows, however, from all this that the attitude of the general 
public can be framed in other directions as well. We have no reason to suppose that the 
attitude of the general public would remain unchanged in a democratic, constitutional 
state with a rational criminal justice system which presupposes an objective and open 
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dialogue of the general public together with a free discussion of international experiences 
and scientific information concerning capital punishment, which, to date, has been 
considered taboo. 
A significant change in the social judgement of capital punishment can already be 
felt. Today a wide strata of society—mainly the intellectuals—judge this issue more and 
more from an abolitionist point of view compared to five or ten years ago.7 
4. The argument that for serious offences only capital punishment can sufficiently 
serve the safety of society because of the chance, however slim, that the convict will 
escape and commit further homicides is often made by the defenders of capital 
punishment in close connection with the above arguments. This argument is unper-
suasive. 
The safe guarding of penitentiary institutions does not present any problems with 
today's prison architectural and safety techniques. The data for the recent decades shows 
that the number of escape attempts from prisons is insignificant, the number of 
successful escape is even lower and can be expressed only per thousand. It is beyond 
doubt that such phenomena can be expected in the future as well. These are the natural 
effects of prison life; it is a criticism of the conditions and atmosphere in the particular 
institution, but this problem must not be brought in connection with the issue of capital 
punishment. 
Finally, mention must be made of the argument of the defenders of capital 
punishment, which is often not worded—as it is indeed to be ashamed of—that capital 
punishment is less expensive than the long-term deprivation of liberty replacing it. The 
only answer to this can be that a society proud of its civilization, culture, social efforts 
does not destroy either the old, or the incurable, or deviant or expressly anti-social 
individuals on the basis that their sustenance lays a burden on society, that their life costs 
more than their death. 
5. It is beyond dispute that capital punishment as compared to any other punish-
ment—such as imprisonment fines—is an irrevocable punishment. Errors committed in 
this field cannot be corrected. Acknowledging all this, the defenders of capital 
punishment put forward the argument that though mistrial may have happened in the 
7 The Department of Criminal Sciences of the University of Miskolc held an opinion poll among university 
and local intelligentsia in Miskolc in 1987. The majority of those rejecting capital punishment were physicians 
and lawyers, although there is no doubt about the fact that the advocates of abolition represented a minority 
at that time. The attitude of Hungarian society underwent dramatic changes regarding capital punishment at 
the time of the political changes in 1989. The research survey conducted in this year on commission by the 
League Against Capital Punishment, and based on a considerable database, showed that more than half of those 
interviewed disapproved of the view that the only way for the society to protect itself efficiently from 
irreformable criminals was to maintain capital punishment. At the same time it was also found that it was not 
a value-centered approach but a political attitude, as the break with the past aided the development of opinions 
and views about the issue of capital punishment. This explains why these groups regarding their political 
radicalism, who all had actively liberal, bourgeois or reform-socialist views and prineiples all strongly rejected 
capital punishment, while fundamentalists interested in the maintenance of status quo and the silent majority 
unmotivated both ideologically and politically supported it. 
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past, it is impossible in the present legal system. Criminal proceedings have come to 
include legal guarantees such as the possibility of appeal, the principle of the obligatory 
supervision of death sentences, the procedure for clemency, etc.—which preclude the 
possibility of mistrial. Both international practice and domestic experiences contradict 
this statement. I only make here a short mention of the judicial experience of the past 
forty years in Hungary, the series of judicial murders first of all in the field of political 
offences, but the same can be said as regards the judgement of legal crimes. This cannot 
be sufficiently emphasized: however advanced the criminal procedure is, however 
sophisticated the guarantee system is, mistrials can, and do, take place. The objective 
and subjective conditions and means of judicial cognition are inevitably limited. To put 
it in a simpler way: the court is no less infallible than any other human institution. 
6. The irredeemable character of capital punishment is especially apparent in the 
field of political offences. Hungarian history of the recent past demonstrates it very 
convincingly that as soon as law becomes the direct means of political power, with the 
only or predominant function of which is the defense of power, justice becomes 
disfunctioned and the self-explanation of the law is replaced by ideological and political 
interpretation. The old and recent history of capital punishment both prove that the 
exclusive political power has always had a great propensity for using the means of 
capital punishment against its political opponents. There is no difference from this point 
of view between right-wing or left-wing dictatorships, or between "hard-line" or "soft-
line" absolutist regimes. 
There is only one way-out from this situation: if it becomes a provision of the 
Constitution that in a democratic constitutional state, criminal justice, and its sharpest 
means, capital punishment, cannot become a means of political showdown. 
7. The international abolitionist literature has emphasized for a long time that main-
taining capital punishment makes the operation of justice uncertain and unpredictable. 
The effect of this factor cannot be denied in Hungary, either. It has already been 
mentioned that annually 200-220 persons die as a consequence of wilful homicide in 
Hungary according to the criminal statistics of recent years. The offences committed in 
40-60-80 cases out of this number is punishable by capital punishment under Article 166, 
para. 2 of the Criminal Code. 
Death sentences are passed in less than 10% of the cases falling in this category. 
This means that the cburts must somehow decide between the offenders of wilful 
homicides whom to sentence to death. This selection process involves the greatest moral 
and legal dilemma of prosecution and courts. The question here is: once the law has 
selected the sphere of wilful homicide as those subject to capital punishment, upon what 
grounds does the prosecution and then the court make the further selection. 
8. The opinion that capital punishment is irreconcilable with modern theories of 
punishment, and with up-to-date conceptions of criminal policy is gaining ground in 
recent Hungarian criminal legal and criminological literature. The criminal codes of the 
19th century could work with capital punishment as their whole system of punishment 
was based on the principle of just retaliation and on the deterrent and retentive effect of 
punishments. Up-to-date theories of punishment and criminal policy broke with this 
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policy long ago, which cannot be justified in practice and has become outdated. The 
fundamental principle of Hungarian criminal policy enacted in statutes is the prevention 
of crime, which presupposes the reasonable and humane application of the means of 
punishment. This is why the criminal legal systems treat capital punishment as a foreign 
body, which legally appears in the fact that the criminal codes regulate capital 
punishment as an exceptional punishment. The new Hungarian criminal policy evolving 
in the framework of the democratic and constitutional state can solve this contradiction 
only by totally rejecting this foreign body from its system. 
On the basis of all this the final conclusion of the League Against Capital Punishment 
can only be that capital punishment, as the remnant of the age-old principle of jus 
talionis, cannot be ethically justified, it is irreconcilable with human rights, irredeemable 
and irreversible; it is an unsuitable, inexpedient means of punishment for the repression 
of the most serious forms of crime—in Hungary the offences against life. In a 
democratic, constitutional state capital punishment cannot be a means of oppressing the 
political opposition just as in a system of punishment based on a rational and humane 
criminal policy there can be no room for capital punishment. 
IV 
On 16 October 1990, the Constitutional Court heard the petition of the League in a full 
public meeting. During the meeting the Court gave a hearing to the representative of the 
Minister of Justice, to the President of the Supreme Court, and to the Chief Public 
Prosecutor of the Republic of Hungary, respectively. 
The Minister of Justice was of the opinion that capital punishment was unnecessary 
and inhumane, a punishment that cannot be morally justified; it did not serve the aim of 
punishment and was not suitable either for the protection of the society or for preventing 
the members of the society from committing criminal offences. The President of the 
Supreme Court voiced his moral and legal conviction that there was no room for capital 
punishment in Hungary any longer. Capital punishment was unjustifiable from the point 
of view of criminal law and, considering the relation between criminal legal regulation 
and the Constitution, it was anti-constitutional. After mentioning in advance that he 
himself was opposed to capital punishment, the Chief Public Prosecutor stated that 
Article 54, para. 1 of the Constitution itself did not render capital punishment arbitrary 
and that the decision required the interrelated interpretation of Article 8, para. 2 and of 
Article 54, paras. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. He was convinced that the most competent 
authority for making this decision would be Parliament but he did not assent that the 
Constitutional Court could not avoid giving a substantial answer. 
The full meeting included the statements previously invited experts. J. Földvári, 
university professor, did not consider capital punishment to be a justified punishment on 
the basis of the statutory wording of the aim of punishment. However, he considered the 
abolition of capital punishment to be not an issue of criminal law, but one of morals and 
politics. According to A. Sajó, university professor, capital punishment was anti-
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constitutional as it was an arbitrary and cruel punishment, offended human dignity and 
was contrary to the ideas of a constitutional state. L. Körinek, university professor, 
examined the statistical and criminological aspects of capital punishment and held the 
view that capital punishment was neither an expedient nor necessary means in the fight 
against crime. 
During the meeting the President of the League also made a speech and summarized 
the position of the League in response to the expert opinions. 
Subsequently the Constitutional Court, which consisted of 9 judges on the occasion, 
decided to abolish capital punishment by a vote of 8:1. According to the minority 
opinion, the decision on the issue did not fall under the competence of the Constitutional 
Court and it should be submitted to Parliament together with a summary of the 
arguments against capital punishment in order to solve the constitutional controversy. 
Incidentally, the opinions of the judges of the Constitutional Court differed widely 
regarding the reasons of the decision, and in addition to the majority's opinion, five 
judges submitted parallel opinions. 
The Constitutional Court based its decision not on political, historical, criminal law, 
or criminological arguments, but exclusively on the natural legal conception of human 
life. Therefore it emphasized in its decision the following: 
The Constitution declares that "the Republic of Hungary acknowledges the inviolable 
and inalienable fundamental human rights, their respect and protection are duties of the 
state of primary importance". (Article 8, para. 1.) Later on the Constitution declares that 
"in the Republic of Hungary all persons have a birth right to life and human dignity, of 
which nobody must be arbitrarily deprived". (Article 54, para. 1.) Under Article 8, 
para. 4 the right to life and human dignity is qualified as a fundamental nght the practice 
of which cannot be suspended or limited, in times of emergency, martial law or other 
danger. 
By collating the provisions of the Constitution cited, it can be established that in 
Hungary the right to life and human dignity is the birth right of every person—irrespec-
tive of citizenship—a fundamental right which is inviolable and inalienable. As regards 
the right to life and human dignity, the Hungarian state has it as its duty of primary 
importance to respect and protect this right. Article 54, para. 1 of the Constitution states 
that "nobody can be arbitrarily deprived" of his/her life and human dignity. The 
formulation of this prohibition in itself does not exclude the possibility of depriving 
somebody of their life or human dignity in a non-arbitrary way. 
When judging the constitutionality of the statutory permitting capital punishment, it 
is, however, not Article 54, para. 1 of the Constitution, but Article 8, para. 2 provisions 
(inserted by Act XL of 1990 passed by Parliament on 19 June 1990 and coming into 
force on 25 June 1990) prohibiting the legislator to restrict the 'substantial contents' of 
fundamental rights. The Constitutional Court held that the provisions of the Criminal 
Code and of related regulations on capital punishment were contrary to the prohibition 
of limiting the substantial contents of the right to life and human dignity. Namely, the 
regulations on capital punishment not only limited the substantial contents of the 
fundamental right to life and human dignity, but represented its complete and ir-
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recoverable nullification. Therefore the Constitutional Court declared these criminal laws 
to be anti-constitutional and therefore void. 
In the last analysis of the Constitutional Court human life and human dignity 
constitute an inseparable unity and are the highest value preceding everything else. The 
right to human life and human dignity is a fundamental right constituting a unity which 
is the source and precondition of several other fundamental rights. The rights to human 
life and human dignity as absolute values represent a limitation against the punishing 
power of the state. 
Article 6, para. 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—to 
which Hungary is a party and which was promulgated by Law-Decree 8 of 1976 in Hun-
gary—declares that "every person has a birth right to life. This right must be protected 
by law. Nobody can be arbitrarily deprived of their life". The Covenant expects a 
process of development with a tendency to the abolition of capital punishment. Article 
2, para. 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, acknowledges the legality of capital 
punishment, however, Article 1 of the sixth supplementary protocol adopted on 28 April 
1983, provided that capital punishment was to be abolished. Nobody could be sentenced 
to death and capital punishment could not be executed. Article 22 of the declaration on 
"the basic rights and fundamental freedoms" adopted by the Council of Europe's 
Parliamentary Assembly on 12 April 1989, also declares the abolition of capital 
punishment. The development of the Hungarian Constitution is following this direction 
when, after creating Article 54, para. 1 not definitely excluding capital punishment, it 
re-formulates Article 8, para. 2 to exclude the statutory limitation of the substantial 
contents of a fundamental right. 
* * * 
It seems that the decision of the Constitutional Court has put an end to the centuries-old 
debate on capital punishment in Hungary. The general public has to understand whether 
it wants to or not that capital punishment cannot be inflicted on the perpetrator of any 
offence, on murderers, on terrorists or on the perpetrator of a political offence. 
The prohibition of capital punishment is absolute: it covers military justice just as 
well as the state of martial law, the danger of war, or any equivalent state of emergency. 
Nevertheless, further legal developments are to be expected, at least in two respects. 
Several issues of the punishment replacing capital punishment (e.g. deprivation of liberty 
for life) have to be settled urgently through legislation. There is already an argument 
going on—even among lawyers—as to the meaning of "deprivation of liberty for life" 
in the new situation, serving 20 years as required by the present regulation—the legal 
condition of eligibility for conditional release—or serving a shorter or longer term than 
that. With regard to this, the statutory limitation period of offences punishable with 
deprivation of liberty for life also has to be regulated. In addition, preparations have to 
be made for the legal step, unavoidable by legislation, that the new comprehensive 
Constitution of Hungary will declare the prohibition of capital punishment. Although it 
166 Tibor Horváth 
is hardly possible to name the time of enacting the new comprehensive Constitution, it 
is, however, certain that the constitutionality of criminal justice and the legality of the 
abolition of capital punishment demand that step. 
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Csaba VARGA Institutions as Systems 
Notes on the Closed Sets, Open Vistas of Development, and 
Transcendency of Institutions and their Conceptual Represen-
tations' 
I. A Logic of Systems 
1. Both institutions and their components are conceptually represented as organized into 
some sorts of systems. This is the obvious outcome of the classificatory nature of the use 
of concepts and conceptual representations. 
At the same time, human practice often abuses with conceptualization. Namely, it 
often overgeneralizes the reason of the choice taken in order to oversubstantiate the 
claim made. For reaching oversubstantiation, it puts the claims into a context more 
general than actually justified. 
Systems in practical operation by and through which we live and practise our social 
practices are contingent and casual in their basic character. Of course, this is not to say 
that the selection of their elements and the way of their organization is a gratuitous 
1 The draft version of the paper was presented as an invited commentary on Fabio Konder Comparato's 
working paper on "The Institution System of Liberalism and the New Function of the Modern State" at the 
Latin American Regional Institute of the American Council of Learned Societies' Comparative Constitutional-
ism Project, held at Punta del Este between October 31 and November 4, 1988. It is based upon earlier 
methodological papers by the author, including his "Quelques questions méthodologiques de la formation des 
concepts en sciences juridiques". Archives de Philosophie du Droit XVIII (Paris: Sirey 1973); "La séparation 
des pouvoirs: idéologie et utopie dans la pensée politique", Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 
XXVII (1985); The Place of Law in Lukács' World Concept (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1985); [with József 
Szájer] "Presumption and Fiction: Means of Legal Technique", Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 
LXXVII (1980); "Law as History? in: Philosophy of Law in the History of Human Thought, ed. Stavros Panou 
et al . . II (Stuttgart: Steiner 1988) [Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Supplemente 2]. 
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action within an empty space, only to be filled by the wish and might of the day. For 
instance, there is some connection between their taking a shape, on the one hand, and 
the factors that have been instrumental in shaping them, on the other—although the 
presence of these factors, as well as their actual impact, may be quite incidental from the 
point of view of the existence, moreover, of the emergence of those systems as systems. 
The constitutional system of liberalism as historically established is, for instance, one 
of the several possible materializations it could have had. It is one of the possible out-
comes of human efforts through centuries to overcome contemporary misery by setting 
new framework for human action in its relationship to the law and the state. 
At all steps, there is a close interconnection between the shaping of ideas, on the one 
hand, and the available store of instruments and their reconsideration at any time, on 
the other. Even the contents, directions and limits of human imagination are a function 
of such an interaction either. For in social total process, each step and contributing 
component has a variety of meanings, faces and links and developmental alternatives, 
and only later events and connections effectuated will decide which of them is to 
actualize. Or, the case is of a multi-faced and multi-directioned process with several 
competitive chances; something that could only be broken down by a finalist reduc-
tionism in order to be traced back to a single, straightforward line of development. 
In any case, to state that there has been some necessity in the course of actions to 
take a shape and to reach at a conclusion made is by far not to state that there has been 
a preexisting universal idea that has to have materialized in that way. Even the ontologi-
cal reconstruction of the factors in play in the social conditioning of the course of events 
is a reconstruction of the road run by, and the links bridging, the individual chains of 
that course of events, and not a statement about the universal idea as having been 
necessarily materialized in the historically concrete realization we have. 
3. To be more precise: when we are speaking of systems of institutions and of their 
conceptual representations, we do have in mind at least four types, or levels, of those 
systems. Notably, first, the actually existing concrete system, which is a unit functioning 
as it is (e.g. the constitutional system of liberalism as practised in a given area in a given 
time, e.g. in the United States nowadays) (type 1); second, the historically developed, 
concrete system which is a unit functioning as it has been (e.g. the constitutional system 
of liberalism as practised in a given area in a given period, e.g. in the United States 
since the time it was developed) (type 2); third, the generalization of the historically 
concrete systems as developed in our civilization (e.g. the constitutional system of 
liberalism as known and practised in our civilization) (type 3); and fourth, the core idea 
(1) of the functioning underlying to all kinds of generalization (e.g. the abstract universal 
formulation of the last principles of operation of which the constitutional system of 
liberalism is but one of the theoretically possible forms of realization) (type 4). As to the 
origins of such an abstract-universal formulation, it may be either gained by theoretical 
reconstruction or formulated as a preconceived idea, in order to offer a basis to deduce 
therefrom justification for the historical realization(s). 
As it can be seen, types 3 and 4 are not units functioning as they are or have been. 
Type 4 is an idea(l) in which "laws" (i.e. effects, interconnections) of functioning may 
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be observed in abstract generality on ideal conditions. Type 3 is one of the former's 
applications to, or materialization in, historically particular conditions. 
4. All systems ideas and realizations form an endless continuum. Types 1 to 4 are 
nothing but meaningfully definable stages of this continuum, and by far not its limiting 
points. This is the reason why almost all of them may display almost all the properties 
that can at all characterize them. 
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Abstractness, internal coherency and consequentiality, as well as ideality are decreas-
ingly, whilst concreteness and contingency, as well as reality, are increasingly all present 
in the line between the ideal and the actual functioning. 
At the same time and to a decreasing degree, types 1, 2 and 3 are all historical ones; 
and types 1 and 2, at the same time also empirical ones. Obviously, it goes without say-
ing that there would be no sense in projecting any ideal of functioning into a vacuum 
with no empirical background whatever. Consequently, at the same time, even empirical 
types may be used as ideal ones. And, obviously again, neither abstractness nor 
concreteness has end-point. For the question of whether I can define types more abstract 
or more concrete than they are is one of expediency in the determination of the levels 
of analysis. 
5. Historically only types 1, 2 and 3 are existing, representing historically 
characteristic typical configurations. They are at the same time needed for theoretical 
description as they hold the name of what is to be conceptualized as existing. 
Ontologically, the existence of each and all of them can be established. Albeit type 4 
claims to be over and beyond history, the social existence of the ideal representation it 
embodies can also be delimited historically. 
6. Human action is teleological by definition. Thelos as a model is at all times work-
ing in it in order to direct it. However, it does not tum practice into mere implemen-
tation. The ideal remains ideal, the practical practical. Both the motive force and the 
critérium of practice are what is considered practical. Of course, consideration of what 
is practical may also set the implementation of something ideal as target. But motive 
force and critérium remain unchangedly the one what is considered practical. Attributes 
of ideal, no matter what kind and weigh they are, can only exert an influence as filtered 
through the consideration of what is practical. 
II. Ideal Types and Historically Concrete Manifestations 
7. A notional distinction among the levels of systems ideas and formulations is a metho-
dological requirement. Since differing levels and corresponding concepts are often desig-
nated by the same name, it is not exceptional that they are treated in an undifferen-
tiatedly unifying way, which is a common cause of confusion. 
For instance, as to the doctrine of the division of powers, the only realistic 
references are those historical manifestations which are commonly characterized as 
realizations more or less distorted or imperfect (type 1). Those imperfect realizations are 
seen as variations on a historical descriptive type (type 2) which, on its turn, is the 
implementation of a historical ideal type (type 3). In such a way, all practical measures 
taken in a historically concrete situation get in the final analysis traced back to a broad, 
well-defined sociohistorical context which, in this case, includes huge a many things, 
from the fight for constitutionalism in England, via the way in which Montesquieu was 
to overcome absolutism in France by (mis)interpreting English constitutionalism, to the 
achievement of the fathers founding the Constitution in the United States, including the 
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way in which they (mis)understood both England, Montesquieu and their own 
perspectives, and also including the (mis)understanding, by all historical actors, of the 
richness of the store of means available in principle. But is it really so that the idea(l) 
of functioning underlying to the doctrine of the division of powers gets reduced to it? 
Obviously, without universalizing what is actually particular, I cannot say "yes" to this 
question in theory. If I still do so, which occurs too often in practice, it involves that I 
have opted also for some methodological consequences. Let us see just three of them. 
7.1. Universalization can only be done through assuming notion dichotomies between 
complementary concepts, С and non-C, which, albeit antagonistic to one another, are 
covering wholly the field. Thereby I erect an artificially rigid two-poled scheme to the 
exclusion of dialectics and historical sensitiveness. 
For instance, it is a rather general pattern for contemporary political philosophies to 
regard the "Third Road" typed searches of a way out from continued crises in East Cen-
tral Europe as by-products themselves of the same crises, fallen into irrationality. Well, 
this critique is an assumption of capitalism and socialism being, as historically 
developed, the only potentialities of capitalism/socialism and, thereby, also exclusive 
alternatives. Consequently, the universalistic assumption in work here excludes questions 
like "Is it this and only this that is capitalism/socialism?" "Is there indeed no choice in-
between these poor kinds of representation?" "And no choice beyond them, either?" 
7.2. As to the second consequence, my approach will be prejudiced from the very 
beginning if I can only count with the individual features of a concrete historical mani-
festation (type 1) as distortions of some underlying principle(s). If it is the case, it 
assumes the existence of something which they are nothing but the individual realization 
of. Well, this is also an assumption justifiable only by a finalist approach. 
7.3. Finally, universalization of the particular dispenses with the search for 
identifying last principles (type 4). If there are no last principles, what remains is to 
reflect historical types one to another, which has very limited profit, not transcending 
even the level of historiography. In contrast to it, theory starts with reconstructing the 
basic function (type 4), which makes it already possible to approach to the historically 
particular formulation (type 3) as intermediary concretization. 
For instance, the classical doctrine of the division of powers is not an empirical 
theory of development. Montesquieu did never say that power came at any place or time 
to being as divisioned in a tripartite way. He simply contrasted a positive Utopia to the 
negative one he had already had. Notwithstanding, his positive Utopia is usually treated 
as final formulation touching upon the topic. If it is so, no theory based on the 
concentration of powers should ever be reconcilable with his doctrine of the division of 
powers. 
Well, the bolshevik theory of the state has as a matter of fact since long professed 
to be antagonistic to western democratic traditions. But ideological claims, e.g. for 
complete disrupt and discontinuity, are not to be taken as a substitute to theoretical 
analysis. In order to assess what is the whole dispute about, even a historical reference 
may be revealing. In fact, bolshevik theory was launched on as a revolutionary program 
of why and how to seize power, and bolshevik critique of Montesquieu theorized about 
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power at the time when it was at the threshold of actually seizing it. In response to that 
confrontation, it too misinterpreted Montesquieu, not to recognize anything from his 
teaching but an antirevolutionary program of resigning, once for all, of the seizure of 
power. 
Or, in sum, it means that both disciples and critics have instrumentalized Mon-
tesquieu's positive Utopia, by transforming his statements into ideology. Western 
tradition has developed universalized terms which are, however, valid in their proper 
context only, in contradistinction to the Russian revolutionaries who have narrowed them 
down only to mean the negation of their dreams. 
The genuine problem is that, in fact, none of them has realized that what they actu-
ally did was to intermingle different levels of analysis, and that is the reason why they 
had to become mutually antagonistic. To be sure, none of them stated something 
different on the same subject, but differing statements on differing subjects. 
At the same time, it is to be noted that a doctrine of a "division of labour" in power 
machinery was finally developed by the bolsheviks, pushed to offer (no matter how 
much imperfect, but, after all, a king of) an alternative to the western conception of the 
division of powers. Presumably, this principle of the unity of powers with only a mild 
and light "division of labour" within it will remain in force so long as the one-party's 
rule can impose itself upon society. On the other hand, even a system of "division of 
labour" in power machinery can develop working with some further—even if rather 
limited—potentialities. 
As to the relationship of these conflicting approaches, mutual exculpation qualifies 
itself as bare ideology. Theoretically both are levelled at type 3. 
111. Ideal Type as a Normative Ideology 
8. All the systems, conceptual representations and operations we have surveyed by now 
are of a descriptive character and function, called into being as instruments to grasp 
conceptually what does institutionally exist. In short, they qualify as theoretical 
representations. 
As is known, theoretical activity is a specific domain of homogenizing human activi-
ties, distinguished from both other domains of a homogenizing effect (e.g. custom, 
convention, such as speech, law, politics), on the one hand, and the huge field of the 
heterogeneity of everyday life, on the other. Still, it does not involve that the various 
forms of objectification of one area could not be made use of on other areas as well. 
Ontological investigation suggests that all kinds of ideal representation and objectifi-
cation, no matter whether they are of a theoretical or practical character, can turn into 
ideology. All this can be done by putting them into another context and making their 
specific use. 
That is to say that, 8.1, everything theoretical can be made a factor of practical 
action by putting it into a practical context; and, 8.2, everything in a given homogeneous 
field can be taken out from it and either lifted in another homogeneous field (e.g. the 
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linguistic, semantic, or rhetorical aspects of law, or the law's political use) or merged 
into the heterogeneity of everyday life (e.g. the uses of social convention, language, law, 
or politics in a way annihilating their particularities)—well, in both cases with prior 
determinations suspended in order to let them act as adapted to their new environment. 
9. Being adapted to new environment is a change of memberships of the systems. 
In case of conceptual representations, a positive value-judgement and/or a deontic 
operator attached to them can effectuate this change. For a theoretical statement 
becoming a standard for practical action is already an ideological use. It involves its 
transformation into normative ideology. 
10. Systems may be used as normative patterns in three situations: 10.1, in case of 
conflict with the systems idea in question, to modify the underlying system in the given 
direction; 10.2, in case of an internal contradiction within the underlying system, to 
resolve it in the given direction; and 10.3, with no external or internal conflict provided, 
to prescribe it the change as needed or to define the direction and substance of its further 
development when needed. 
11. One of the fields for normative ideologies to provoke change by defining who 
is to act, when, on what, why, and how, is the so-called filling of gaps. As is known, 
"gap" is a normative concept, being the function of a normative framework a) to qualify 
any establishment within the system as a gap, in order b) to fill it, c) in a given way, 
d) with a substance taken from within the system by the effect that, e) at least 
ideologically, the filling of the gaps does not implement any genuine modification in the 
system, albeit it strengthens its individual position within, as a member of the system, 
as made to be more conform to the system. 
Filling the gaps is one of the most important factors of the practicability of the 
systems, as it makes it possible to them to preserve their identity while to make them 
keep in pace with time. Or, there have ever been two basic means of sublated innovation 
in institutions: transplantation (i.e. injecting something not known in the system which 
is said to have been known within the underlying system), and fiction (i.e. claiming that 
what is in point of fact new in the system is nothing else but the implicit extension as 
made in the system). 
(In the field of law, it seems to be a common place that, in addition to fiction proper 
as the earliest and most common and lasting instrument to provoke and, at the same 
time, veil change, almost nineteen twentieth of the four thousands years of legal history 
was dominated by innovative legislation, veiled as bare restitution of what the "old, good 
custom" of the country had been, in usage already in Hammurabi's Prologue to his Law 
Book and surviving till the enacting clauses by the last French king.) 
And the reason for its success is easy to see: it has been a conveniently flexible 
means, suited to meet two basic requirements contradicting one another, i.e. to effectuate 
change as needed (i.e. to function as readapted to the changing needs) and to preserve 
the system's identity (i.e. to reproduce its basic continuity over all the series of actual 
discontinuities) within an apparent harmony. 
12. In principle, each and every one of types 1 to 4 can be used as normative ide-
ology if reflected to each and every other one of the same types. Even the conceptual 
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representation of the concrete actual functioning (type 1) can be made a normative ide-
ology by reflecting it to the conceptual representation of its posterior functioning. 
(Taking into consideration the open texture of concepts and the inherent fuzziness of 
argumentation, we have to realize that there is a large room for transcendency both 
among the concepts undifferentiated we use and among the systems undifferentiated we 
refer to. To avoid transcendency is a question of the formulation of premises, an opera-
tion that has nothing to do with reflection of one concept to another in their normative 
usage.) 
13. The normative use of ideal systems and conceptual representations is the 
explanation of the fact way and how these systems and representations can be of use, or 
turn to be of use, or turn to be a deciding factor in social processes even if for long a 
period they only could at best be qualified as empty classes. For as they are normative, 
expectations towards them do not disqualify them even if not met with success. Or, what 
is more, even dead systems and representations can finally exert a decisive influence to 
overcome the inertia and to push forwards, or turn back, a process. 
For instance in Hungary, the wish for implementing the Soviet-patterned Constitution 
of 1949 into practice seemed for long years an idea aborted from the very beginning. A 
decade ago, the ever growing gap between words and facts induced some constitution-
alists to demand realism instead of illusionism, i.e. the adaptation of its wording to 
prevailing practice, to the hard fact of one-party rule. Happily enough, this proposal 
failed by the fear that thereby the only thing remained, the bare possibility of fighting 
for more or truer parliamentarism through referring to a text enacted by the communists, 
would also be lost. 
IV. Objectivity and Contingency of Systems 
14. For a given historical actor in a concrete situation, a huge amount of social 
objectivations, conventions, institutions, etc. are given. They form to him what we call 
tradition. All the components of tradition serve to him as an objectively given framework 
in respect to which he may have the only alternative of either contacting it or escaping 
from it, but in any case he will not be in a position to freely disposing with it. 
Escaping from social bounds contradicts to the very notion of social activity; 
moreover, paradoxically, in modem society even the first attempt at escaping is itself 
only conceivable through conventionalized social practices. In short, socialization, i.e. 
a very specific learning process, is the only available pattern for the individual in his 
relationship to social totality in modem society. 
At the same time, the individual is certainly not an isolation but a component part 
of social totality. What seems to be objectively given to him in individual situations has 
in fact no existence of its own, independently of the total set of individual social 
practices in the same totality. What a social tradition is, in the last analysis, a function 
of the total sum of social practices, reproducing the tradition through practising it. 
Consequently, reproduction of a tradition is a continued learning process, in which 
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taking its cognizance will amount to readapting it, and its interpretation to reinterpreting 
it, as part of social practices. In other words, each and every human act establishing 
what we call the homogeneous can only be performed within the boundaries (and upon 
the basis and for the sake) of (and, in the final resort, as subordinated to) what we call 
the heterogeneous. In the same way: each every human consideration to what we call 
epistemic can only take place within the boundaries (on the basis and for the sake) of 
(and, in the final resort, as subordinated to) what we call ontic. 
15. In the light of an ontological description, the search for a practical solution is 
volens, nolens a model patterned reaction to a given situation—independently of the 
agent's subjective intention. At the same time, also independently of any intention, that 
what is to come objectively out of this will be something more or less, in any case else, 
than what the original intention was. It will necessarily be a practical answer to a 
practical challenge as it was sensed and interpreted by the agent acting. Thus, it will 
necessarily be an imprint of all the moments, which have been present in the situation; 
contingent from the point of view of the social totality. 
There is a particular dialectics in play here. For the reaction, no matter to which 
extent and how intentionally it is model-patterned, will be the issue of practical 
considerations in a practical context. Even what is manifested as non-practical is made 
so by practical consideration. And this applies to everything. Anything claimed to be 
eternal is a function of practical interest to project it as fetishized. It is ideology that is 
in word both here and in cases of interests overgeneralized. 
To qualify a statement as ideology is an ontological statement upon actual use, and 
not a judgement upon foundation or value. As is known, ideology is a form of 
consciousness called into being to influence practical human (re)action. As contrasted to 
it, theory is a form of consciousness called into being to reconstruct the interconnections 
of any process, including its ideology. 
16. The theoretical reconstruction I have in mind can be nothing but ontological. For 
the result epistemological reconstruction can arrive at, may at most be a negative one, 
demonstrating, e.g. the false conclusion, reached by false inference, from false 
premises—i.e. its own incompetency for through reconstruction. It is only 
ontological reconstruction that can answer why the relevancy of epistemology is 
limited, why it is that forms of false consciousness can be instrumental, even 
sometimes socially needed. 
It is ontological reconstruction that can only offer an explanation to the paradox of 
interpretation amounting to reinterpretation or misinterpretation, and of reproduction 
amounting to production or misproduction. 
17. Systems are located in a continuum of a constant motion and change. It is a con-
tinuum for both their hierarchical structuralization and their self-reproduction in a con-
tinued process in social totality. 
To be more precise, to exist as being placed in a continuum may have two senses. 
Ontologically, it is a form of existence through constant self-reproduction in an endless 
series of reinterpretation. (Reinterpretation here is an ontic sequence of purposeful 
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practical reactions, and not a critical attitude, which is epistemic.) Epistemologically, it 
denotes an ideal existence through having necessarily fuzzy conceptual boundaries. 
These features are common to objects of social ontology. Nevertheless, I wish to 
emphasize to what considerable an extent the links are epistemologically loose among 
sequences in both the systems' lines of development and their hierarchic structures. The 
systems in question are historically developed sets in which all may have had alternatives 
to those actually established (albeit they do not). It is most plausible to realize it in 
limiting cases at both micro- (type 1) and macro- (type 4) level. 
As, for instance, to the micro-level, each concrete, actually functioning system of 
constitutional liberalism bears the imprint of the place and time of its formation, i.e. 
characteristics that are only explainable in the context of their actual shaping. As to the 
macro-level, the connection of ideality and actuality is only explainable exclusively by 
their development. Let us assume that I should have to invent the constitutional system 
of liberalism now. As a matter of fact, I can by far not take it for granted that I would 
lay its foundations by the same philosophical, anthropological, etc. assumptions as it was 
done several centuries ago. And the same holds true vice versa too. I cannot be sure that 
any concrete system of constitutional liberalism that has ever existed could be 
inferred from or justified by the assumptions suggested by human inventiveness now. 
And I must to add that theoretical variations are, in contrast to actual occurrences, 
practically endless. 
The same loose contracts can be characteristic of actually operating systems too. 
Theoretical reflection often groups together systems of autochthonous development (e.g. 
ones in England or in the United States), whose past may count more in centuries that 
others that, due to recent transplantation of imposition (e.g. in the Federal Republic of 
Germany or Japan), may count in decades. 
It is due to these features precisely that they tum to be genuinely historical phenom-
ena, both marking and made by history. For otherwise, if they were units unchangedly 
identical with themselves, their history could only be quasi-history at most, with mere 
alternation of blocks in a mechanical world, made up of discrete moves of discrete ele-
ments. To put it another way: the continuum the systems embody is the outcome of their 
dialectic character. Their dialectics is one of sublation, that is, of unceasing preservation 
and change. 
18. It is also their existence as a continuum that makes it possible to understand why 
their historical nature is so important from the point of view of practical action as well. 
For their being a continuum in a constant motion and change is also a function of their 
environment, in the interaction with which they are shaped. Or, the way they transcend 
themselves and by which their reproduction through their continued reinterpretation is 
done is not only a function of them but of the general culture and field cultures 
(political, legal, etc. ones) as well, and it is so to such an extent that even the fight for 
them may have alternative actions to take. Namely, an action directed to them may aim 
at their shaping in a direct way (as, in the case of law, directed to its enacted text), as 
well as in an indirect way, through the cultural context in the interaction with which they 
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are shaped (as, in the case of law, with the mediation of legal policies and legal culture, 
made to be strong enough to be able to have genuine role to play). 
V. Limits and Bonds, Consequentiality and Practicability of a System 
19. The question of what are the properties, features and traits a system may develop 
or take over by transplantation from another system is quite open, having no restriction 
from the point of view of social totality. It is not even a system-related question; it can 
only be raised as a question of the limits of law, politics, etc. in a final resort by 
ontology: what can be practicable, i.e. fulfilling a genuine function, in a social system? 
On the level of abstract generality, the answer is rather vague. For, in point of prin-
ciple, there is no limit predetermining what can tum to be instrumental or practicable 
in a social context as everything whatsoever can. 
It means that the possibility of systems coming into being as mixed is so to speak 
endless. One could even state that only mixed systems are practicable in practice, or that 
non-mixed systems are, without exception, issues of a theoretical reduction. 
20. Is there any precondition for systems being identifiable as such just because they 
have some definite elements as organized into a system The question is directed to their 
own determination from inside. That is, is there any limit set up by the systems, defining 
their own identity by minimum contents as necessary and sufficient conditions for their 
existence? Or is there any self-imposing limit of the system which might of course be 
ignored, but only with the consequence of placing itself out of the system? 
This is a topical issue, with enriching debates in the western hemisphere centering 
upon them. Only to mention but few: nationalization versus privatization; planning 
versus invisible hand; leftism versus rightism in the same system, etc. This is a key issue 
for the contemporary crises of actually existing socialisms as well. Only to name but 
few: economic reform and petrified Stalinist superstructure; bankruptcies of sham 
liberalization; wish of one-party self-legitimation with no offering for being legitimated, 
etc. The case of Hungary is a renewed proof of the hard bonds of a system. For 
economists claimed years ago that partial reform, softened and extended in time with no 
breakthrough in the political field was a planning for failure taking granted; and again, 
they were right. The dilemma now is hardened: is the tabooing of party-rule by one-
party simply setting framework for a reform, or is it a touchstone of the left for aspiring 
even the cosmetic surgery, too much well-deserved? 
21. To learn that, defying human imagination, systems human kind have established 
are only storehouses of contradictions and they still function well—this realization is 
shocking an experience for human mind to accept. But to expect systems with maximum 
cohesion, consequentiality and freedom from contradictions is a mere theoretical require-
ment, reflecting more of the subject than of the object, who, due to the logical ideal of 
thinking, is limited in imagination. And theory reflects, in addition to external world, its 
own homogenizing principles, too. 
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In fact, systems do function according to their own homogeneities, which are far off 
from the ideal of logic. As practical systems, they are to cope with practical problems 
resulting in compromise solutions to the detriment of the principles of cohesion, conse-
quentially and uncontradictoriness, that is, to the detriment of logic. 
At the same time, contradictoriness with tensions in functioning is a basic fact of 
ontology. It stands not for temporariness and deficienciness of anything human after the 
first sin was committed and its authors ousted. It stands for a character everywhere and 
everywhen present, which may grow to be a burden but, in most cases of balanced 
development, serves rather as one of the most powerful reserves for the internal renewal 
of the system. Internal renewal is a way of making maximum optimum use of the 
systems's own potentialities, in order to make it possible for it to keep pace (through its 
continuous readaptation by continued readjustments) with overall development. This is 
the reason why systems process outer conflicts into inner ones by forwarding competitive 
arguments to solve them. This is the reason why systems develop conflicts through series 
of temporary solutions, with stillstand being just a name for the theoretical dividing line 
between situations of conflicts in succession of one another. 
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Law is not sacrosanct— 
more than that: it is rule 
Frigyes Karinthy 
I. The Problem 
To begin with, let us consider the following imaginary cases: 
One: in a country A (call it Armania), there is a government under legal system SI, 
under which there is no private property (with some exceptions) and substantial part of 
human rights is not respected, but the legal system is undoubtedly valid and effective. 
Citizens and foreigners, as well as foreign governments consider this legal system valid. 
They conclude treaties with this government even though they express their criticism 
against the constitutional order of that country, maybe using legal means, in particular 
international law, to do so. One day the constitutional order of that country changes, and 
consequently its legal system. Parliament adopts a statute, called "Law of Validity" 
which declares that every legal act done under the former system was illegal, since the 
former/prior legal system was a wicked legal system that is, invalid ab initio. 
Two: let us suppose that following a change in constitutional order, or even without 
it, Armania unites with another state B, called Bermania, whose language and culture 
are similar, but if with which maintained not necessarily war-like, but certainly highly 
conflictual political relations, although undoubtedly on the basis of international law. 
Thus, Armania joins Bermania, in such a way that the legal system of Bermania will be 
in force from a given date on and with certain provisional exceptions in Armania. Then, 
the authorities of Bermania prosecute the head of the Armanian Intelligence Bureau, the 
chief spy of the country, for high treason, that is, committing a criminal act against 
Bermania by his former activity. In Armania, he had received the highest Armanian 
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order, the "Armanian Great Cross" for his patriotic services, which are, as a matter of 
fact, the same for which he is now prosecuted. 
Three: Armania adopts a nationalisation law expropriating private proprietors; as the 
constitutional order changes, a new property law is passed declaring every acquisition 
of property under the nationalisation law null and void, obliging unlawful possessors 
(which are of course, proprietors under the prior legal system) to return immediately 
"unlawful" possessions to the "lawful" proprietors. 
Four: The Parliament of Armania passes a law punishing for theft those MP's who 
voted for the Nationalisation Act. 
Five: Armania, formerly a province of Bermania, declares its independence from 
Bermania. The Independence Act states that no legal relationship based on the laws of 
former Bermania will be recognised as operative in Armania, except explicit provisions 
of the Independence Act. It states further that "every event or fact taking place, 
happening, being committed or done" before the independence shall be deemed to be 
done under the laws of independent Armania. 
Six: Armania is a state in which, under the constitution, the majority, or at any rate 
a substantial part of the population, on the ground of ethnic origin has restricted or no 
political rights, in particular the right to vote. Later on, political changes take place in 
Armania, and political rights are extended to the population as a whole. The new 
Legislative Assembly passes a law which declares that no official act (including any legal 
norm) performed under the former constitution, that derived its validity from that 
previous constitution, shall be considered valid in regard to any person who had no right 
to vote under that (i.e. the prior) constitution. 
Seven: following a tum in the political system, the Armanian National Assembly 
adopts an "Act of Expiation and Justice", which orders the punishment of officials of the 
former regime who acted according to certain laws (as defined in the Act) of the former 
regime, now repealed but no doubt in force at the time when the official acts to be 
punished took place. The same act prescribes the punishment of ordinary citizens in 
certain cases who obeyed certain laws of the regime, such as the "Law on the Defence 
of Political Order" which required citizens to inform the authorities on anti-regime 
activities of fellow citizens. 
These cases are indeed invented, but certainly not unfamiliar, since there is hardly 
a country in the world whose history would have failed to produce similar events. Even 
recently, many countries of the world, and not only European countries east of the Elbe, 
are facing similar problems. Politically they might be called the "post-revolutionary 
phase" of political change, provided one uses the concept "revolution" in a wholly 
neutral way. In other words, from a legal point of view, one could describe these events 
as consequences of the change in the sovereignty of the state. That is a change of the 
nature, or even the subject of the political authority behind the legal sovereign. This is 
provided, of course, that one is prepared accept sovereignty as a legal concept at all.1 
1 See e.g. on this topic JENKS, W.—LARSSON, A. (eds.): Sovereignty within the Law. London, 1965. 
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This is an important and recurrent phenomenon of history certainly not restricted to 
modern Europe. I do hope that the examples describe the legal puzzle I wish to analyze 
in this essay, viz. the effect of a certain kind of abrupt change in the political system and 
consequent in change of the political sovereignty (which I hesitate to call revolution tout 
court) may have on the legal system and the particular problems created by it. 
I think it is not entirely inappropriate to say that the cases above are in a sense 
paradigmatic for a certain type of legal change, which might be described as the change 
of the political superior or that of the legal sovereign in a legal system. In order to 
conceptualize our puzzle, I will, as a preliminary step, distinguish between change of a 
legal order and change of a legal system. I am quite aware of the fact that most legal 
theorists use, if they use them as a term of art at all, the words 'legal system' and 'legal 
order' interchangeably. I suggest to distinguish between the concepts of legal system 
change of legal order in the following way: I would call change of the legal order the 
change of the primary norms in a given legal system,2 that is, the change of norms 
creating rights and duties, immunities and powers and all their possible modalities for 
the subjects of law; change of legal order means by and large the same as 'change of 
ordinary laws' of a legal system. Change of the legal system is by contrast, a change of 
the block of norms of a system which I will call in this essay "legality-norms", i.e. the 
systemic parts of the legal system, or a change of those elements of the legal system 
which renders a given set of norms a legal system. Needless to say, there is a good deal 
of difference between the two cases. Thus I shall use the expression 'legal system' to 
denote a (structured) set of norms3 bound together and, second, the term 'legal order' 
will mean, if not stated otherwise, both legal order (that is, primary norms) and the 
systemic parts of law. 
II. The Concept of Legality and the Problem of Ex Post Facto Political 
Justice 
One form of the legal puzzles created by the change of sovereignty is the problem of "ex 
post facto political justice" of which the cases mentioned in the introduction were 
examples. In this paper I shall try to give a formal-legal, although I hope not formalistic, 
analysis of the ex post facto4 political justice plans emerging recently after political 
2 I use the terms 'primary norms' and 'secondary norms' in the Haitian sense; see his The Concept of Law, 
Oxford , 1961, Ch. V. 
3 This is the most general and neutral meaning possible, see: e .g . KELSEN, H.: General Theory of Law 
and State (transi. A. Wedberg), Cambridge, 1946; RAZ, J.: The Concept of a Legal System, Oxford, 1970 
etc. ALCHOURRÓN, С . E.—BULYGIN, E. : Normative Systems, New York, 1971. 
4 It might be called alternatively "retroactive" justice; but I prefer the term ex post facto (or backward 
looking) because doing justice, in the sense of retributive justice is, by definition, always "retroactive" that 
is, a reaction to an injustice previously committed. 
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system changes in East-Central Europe.5 Formal-legal analytic approach has in this 
context at least two different meanings: first, it means that I have no intention to analyze 
the moral, political or simply prudential aspects of the ex post facto justice problem; my 
argument has nothing to do with the substantial justice or any possible moral, political, 
or other justification of ex post facto justice projects. Second, I am not concerned with 
all legal problems involved in ex post facto political justice; rather, I am interested in 
a single, although I think decisive, aspect of "doing justice", i.e. in the question of their 
legality. What I propose is a contribution mainly to the theory of legal systems; in 
addition, I do hope it will prove that legal theory is an indispensable tool in dealing with 
really important practical legal issues. Moreover, this paper is an exercise in applied 
legal theory; since practical legal thinking is inherently theoretical in the sense that it is 
inextricably based on certain theoretical assumptions, although they remain implicit, 
unarticulated in normal legal reasoning simply because they are generally accepted and 
therefore rarely questioned at all. There are, however, "hard cases" (not necessarily in 
the Dworkinian sense6) lacking a crystallized normal (or standard) solution elaborated 
in court practice or in legal dogmatics7 or both, and therefore, legal reasoning must go 
behind the theoretical level and assumptions of legal discourse. In such cases theoretical 
assumptions otherwise unquestioned become matters of dispute. This is just the kind of 
legal dispute in which applied legal theory has a role to play since in these cases 
theoretical argumentation, usually undisclosed in a routine case, makes up the core of 
the dispute. Or, perhaps more properly, cases are hard because there is no prima facie 
deductive solution based on accepted methods and premises of legal reasoning; therefore, 
in this type of legal dispute the fundamental assumptions (or "principles", if you will) 
themselves of law and legal reasoning are the rules of decision. In a normal case, on the 
contrary, the rule of decision is a secondary legal norm and solution of the dispute is 
derived from that norm by unchallenged methods of legal reasoning. 
5 I have in mind of course mainly the Hungarian version, called "Justitia Plan " which was a comprehensive 
and systematic attempt of backward-looking political justice, although it applies to any similar legislative or 
judicial policy to do "justice after communism". Moreover, my aim is to go much further and my analysis, 
I hope, is applicable to any change of the political sovereignty of the legal system. 
6 See e.g. DWORKIN, R.: Taking Rights Seriously, London, 1977, pp. 81 et seq. There is, however, an 
important similarity with the Dworkinian idea of 'hard cases', viz. that according to Dworkin in hard cases 
judges and legislators are inclined to 'political', as opposed to legal, decisions based on 'principles ' . 
7 By "legal dogmatics" I mean the language of legal discourse including standardised solutions to typical 
cases and the intellectual tool of legal argumentation, theoretical or practical. Legal dogmatics forms part of 
the legal system sensu largo since it is the meta language of the norms of the legal system. On the other hand, 
legal dogmatics articulates theoretical assumptions on the nature of law, legal system and the directives on the 
use of norms of the system, definitions of legal concepts etc. Indeed no legal system can function without that 
meta-level of legal thinking. Thus legal dogmatics is in a sense similar to a paradigm of legalism in the well-
known Kuhnian sense of the concept. See: AARNIO, A.: Rational as Reasonable, Dordrecht etc. 1986, pp. 
10 et seq., 47 et seq.; and KUHN, T . S.: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. Chicago, 1970 
(First ed.: 1962), see also HARENBURG, J . : Die Rechtsdogmatik zwischen Wissenschaft und Praxis, 
Stuttgart, 1986. 
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As a first step, I shall proceed to define the concept of legality, since my purpose 
is to analyze the idea and plans of ex post facto justice exclusively from the point of 
view of their legality. I propose to define legality as the observance within the legal 
system of the norms regulating the legal system itself. It seems to me that this definition 
by and large corresponds to the use of this concept in legal language and legal 
scholarship;8 even if it were not so, I maintain that one should distinguish between the 
various undistinguished uses of this concept in legal language. Thus, legality is not the 
same as "lawfulness", not even the "observance of law", it is not the equivalent of the 
concept of "following a rule" and it does not correspond wholly to the concept of 
"lawful application of law", although most legal systems do contain expressly or by 
implication norms prescribing to their organs (courts of law, administration) the 
obligation to observe the primary norms of the system.9 In this way the concept of 
legality includes the postulate of lawful administration of law as a norm relating to the 
system itself. But the core meaning of legality remains intact even here: the postulate of 
conformity with law is a postulate reaching outside the legal system (and it is therefore 
the precondition of the existence of the legal system and so that of legality too) while 
legality is a concept denoting normative relations within the legal system. Hence legality 
is a relationship between norms, belonging to the same legal system, i.e. the conformity 
of a legal norm with another; legality is the regulation of the functioning of the legal 
system by its own rules. Norms of legality do not prescribe what subjects of law are 
obliged to, i.e. legal rights, obligations etc., but rather they prescribe how the legal 
system should behave. For this reason, legality as a property of a legal system, and the 
relationship between the legal system and human conduct regulated by the primary norms 
of the legal system, are clearly distinguishable. Obviously enough, legality is a necessary 
property of any minimally sophisticated legal system, since at a certain level of 
complexity—and that level of complexity modem legal systems reached hundreds of 
years ago—a legal system cannot exist without regulating its own functioning in order 
to remain effective. It is also clear that the concept of legality presupposes that of the 
8 I have found, however, only a few definitions similar to mine in legal writing. The one closest to mine 
I have been able to locate seems to be that of Georges Vedel: "La légalité d 'un gouvernement est sa conformité 
au droit. Pour ceux qui distinguent la légalité et la légitimité, c 'est plus précisément sa conformité formelle 
au droit." (Italics in the original.) See VEDEL, G.: Manuel élémentaire de droit constitutionel, Paris, 1949, 
p . 276. For a recent analysis of the concept of legality in modem French thought see: CHEVALIER, J . : 'La 
dimension symbolique du principe de légalité', 105 Revue du droit public, 1651 (1990). 
9 The concept of "lawful application of law" might appear contradictory, or, if you please, redundant. But 
it is not so, for several reasons: first, if there were no rule of the legal system directing courts and other organs 
of the legal system to apply the norms of the system according to their content, i.e. "lawfully" or "faithfully", 
the system would loose its systemic character, since there would be no connection between norms and the 
organs applying them; second, in that case there would be no legal (normative) ground in the system to control 
the implementation of the primary norms of the system. This is in fact one of the postulates of Fuller in his 
formal natural law; see below. 
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legal system, since norms of legality are norms relating to a legal system or rather, 
regulating it. 
The concept of legality is also closely connected to constitutionality, although 
there are substantial differences between the two. First, constitutionality is 
characteristically a substantive concept and applied to a legal system it is a 
substantive postulate: it denotes a certain ideal or wished for state of a legal system; 
constitutionality contains a lot of norms, not connected necessarily to the concept of 
legality, like separation of powers, human rights and the like. Second, however, in 
so far as the requirements of constitutionality become part of the legal system, 
constitutionality will be part of the legality of that legal system in the sense that 
unconstitutionality will also be a breach of legality, provided that constitutional 
requirements are conceived as norms defining the necessary content or limits of the 
norms the legal system. In that case any organ of the legal system10 acting 
unconstitutionally will act necessarily against the legality, seen from the standpoint 
of the legal system. It is one of the characteristic techniques of modern 
constitutionalism that the norms of the constitution are incorporated into the legal 
system, so to speak, double faced. On the one hand, constitutional requirements are 
rules of legality; that is, they regulate the legal system internally. On the other hand, 
the same rules are also defined as norms creating rights for citizens bound to be 
protected by courts. Thus a breach of legality will also usually be a breach of an 
individual constitutional right creating a claim for individuals to attack it in the 
courts; in this way, one is tempted to say, legality itself becomes a postulate of legality. 
A well-known example of the judicial protection of legality is the French type of 
administrative jurisdiction, which is, in principle, nothing but the judicial protection of 
pure legality; the protection of individual rights is nothing but a salutary consequence of 
the judicial supervision of the legality of administrative acts." 
More closely related to legality is the concept of constitution in the "logical sense", 
as Kelsen (and generally the Vienna school)12 calls it, "logical" in the (Neo-Kantian) 
sense, that certain rules are necessary, inevitable, and constitutive components of any 
legal system. These rules regulate the creation of norms within the system, the 
10 An organ of a legal system is either an organ conceptually necessary for the existence of a legal system 
(e.g. norm producer) or an organ constituted by the legal system, so that it cannot exist without the legal 
system, such as a court of law. 
11 French theory usually calls it "objective", in the sense that the protection given by administrative courts 
is destined to protect legal order , i.e. legality in the sense used here. See e.g. RIVERO, J.: Droit 
administratif, 1 Ith ed. Paris, 1985, pp. 244 et seq., p . 248: ' . . . le recours tend, non à la reconaissance d 'un 
droit subjectif, mais á la sanction d 'une règle de d ro i t . . . ' . Rivero calls expressis verbis the recours pour excès 
de pouvoir 'sanction du principe de légalité' (p. 244), although he admits of a certain shift into the direction 
of the protection of rights rather than norms. 
12 See for example: KELSEN, H. : 'The Function of a Constitution' (transi. I. Stewart) in: TUR, 
R.—TWINING, W. (eds.): Essays on Kelsen, Oxford , 1986, pp. 109 et seq.; or, alternatively, his General 
Theory of Law and State (transi. A. Wedberg), op. cit . , pp. 124 etc. 
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conditions of validity of norms belonging to the system (membership-rules), the 
hierarchy of norms, the sources of law, etc. Indeed, one cannot even imagine a legal 
system without systemic norms, which are, in my definition, norms whose breach 
amounts to the breach of legality of the system. No doubt, the constitution of a legal 
system in the "logical" sense is an inevitable part of the rules, the observance of which 
constitutes the legality of a legal system, provided that the rules of it are rules of positive 
law. But historically this has not always been the case; the fact is that the political claims 
of constitutional state, rule of law, Rechtstaat etc. were, at least in part, demands to 
codify explicitly in the form of written rules of positive law, the postulates of minimum 
formal legality, that is the constitution in the "logical" sense. The legal primacy of the 
constitution as the highest law is, from this point of view, nothing but the corollary of 
the fact that norms of legality are meta-norms, i.e. norms relating to norms. On the 
other hand, at a certain level of sophistication and complexity in the legal system, the 
explicit positivation of the norms of legality is also a technical necessity. Clearly, 
constitutionalism is much more than that; still it is true that legality is part of 
constitutionalism in any meaningful sense of the concept. 
The main use of legality as defined in this essay will be what I would call tentatively 
the immanent criticism of law, or the self-criticism of the legal system. It is a double-
edged criticism, since it serves in fact as a basis for two different kinds of criticism of 
the law by itself. For one thing, legality could mean a substantive control over the 
content of primary norms of the system (if, of course, the system does contain rules to 
assess within the system the content of its norms) and for another, legality means 
criticism of the law based exclusively on the systemic norms of the legal system. Using 
the terms introduced earlier in this paper one could say that the first is the legality of the 
legal order, and the second is the legality of the legal system. Accordingly, legality 
renders law "reflexive" in the normative sense13 making possible a critically reflective 
attitude toward law without leaving the self-defined limits of the legal system and 
remaining within the confines of positive normativity. Aphoristically, one could say that 
the legality is the legal fairness of the system. 
I trust it has became clear by this point that an examination of the legality of "expost 
facto political justice" projects is also an analysis of their constitutionality. However, the 
analysis of the legality is another kind of analysis than that of substantive constitutional-
ity: it is restricted to what I would call formal constitutionality. One should add that 
"formal" is by no means equivalent to something like "unsubstantive", but rather an 
independent standpoint of analysis in which one investigates the constitutional-legal issue 
exclusively in the light of the formal correctness of a solution, without examining the 
merits of the outcome in itself. In Haitian language one would say that the analysis of 
13 So I do not intend to use the concept of "reflexive" in the sociological sense: this will distinguish my use 
from the Luhmannian school of thought, e.g. from Günther Teubner's ideas as exposed in his Recht als 
autopoietisches System, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, in particular p. 84; and see Luhmann's Rechtsoziologie, 
2nd ed., Opladen, 1983, pp. 213 et seq. 
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legality is an analysis based exclusively on secondary norms within the legal system as 
applied to primary norms, but disregarding the content of primary norms; alternatively, 
using my conceptualisation, it is based on the systemic parts of the legal system. Thus, 
a formal analysis as proposed here is made on the basis of the secondary norms of the 
system, and it is formal in the sense that its result does not depend on the actual content 
of primary norms, but exclusively on systemic norms. In other words, a formal analysis 
does not concern directly the rights and duties (including their modalities) in force under 
the given legal system, but rather the norms of the system governing the process of 
creating, applying, terminating, etc. the norms upon which the individual rights, duties, 
etc. are based. 
Perhaps the most important advantage of formal reasoning is that it is more exact, 
since formal criteria are, indeed they are supposed to be, more precise and semantically 
more unequivocal than substantive criteria. In short, formal reasoning is liable to 
produce a technically more perfect, more convincing solution to a legal problem, which 
must be accepted as correct, since it is deduced from unquestionable, evident as it were, 
premises by a formal and undoubted logical sequence. That is, "formality" is an abstract 
method which disregards the usually more controversial content-side of the legal issue 
and it bases the solution on neutral (or at least much more neutral) premises, moreover 
the formal process of reasoning itself is much more subject to rational control than the 
content based, substantive reasoning. Formal reasoning in this way avoids substantive, 
highly value-laden arguments which are by definition more controversial and less likely 
to gain reasonable, if not rational14 acceptance. Arguments based on the claim of 
legality are by their nature formal: legality type arguments are essentially arguments 
from the consistency of the legal system; and consistency is not only an eminently 
"formal" kind of argument, but it is also, at least from certain views, the very basis of 
logical, or more broadly, rational reasoning.15 Legality is an argument from consistency 
because it is based on the postulate that a legal system could not require lawfulness (that 
is conformity with law) if itself is unlawful. Unlawfulness is by definition an inconsisten-
cy of a human conduct with (at least one) primary norm of a legal system; an 
inconsistent legal system is, however, a different case: it is an inconsistency with the 
system's own norms, that is, with those (secondary) norms of the system, which give 
it—at least in the legal sense—the quality of being legal. Aphoristically speaking, one is 
tempted to say that a legal system cannot claim conformity with its norms if it does not 
conform with the norms created for itself. If it were so, and that is, not a technical or 
logical impossibility, the legal system would destroy the main general (and highly 
formal) value of any legal system, i.e. the idea of any normative order, namely that 
norms are made to induce conformity with them. Anyway, I do not argue that legal 
14 I use here the distinction between rational and reasonable in the sense introduced by PERELMAN, Ch . : 
Justice et raison, Bruxelles, 1961, and AARNIO, A.: Rational as Reasonable, op. cit . , in particular, pp. 77 
et seq. 
15 See STRAWSON, P.: Introduction to Logical Theory, London, 1951, pp. 1 et seq. 
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systems are in fact consistent, but rather that they ought to be, if they will conserve their 
legality as defined by law itself. 
Here we achieved a point where the problem of ex post facto political justice and that 
of legality meets, since as I shall try to set it out, any backward looking justice attacks 
the core of legality and therefore it must fail if the legal system maintains its legality. 
This is so because ex post facto political justice is (as I shall argue later on) based 
inevitably on the assumption of the "illegality" of the former legal system: it must 
assume that the former legal system was at best a distorted non-law, a wicked legal 
system and therefore all the rights and generally every legal relationship created by that 
legal system could not be (or at least need not be) regarded in the new and of course lawful 
legal system as legally perfect, or fully valid. Thus, the new legal order may, unbounded in 
law, change, modify and, of course, terminate rights and legal positions created in the former 
legal order at its discretion, since they are—being "illegal"—not protected by the 
constitutional limits of state power. One is tempted to say that the new sovereign starts with 
a "clean slate" in relation to the former one16 at least in law, if not in fact. 
The most fundamental claim upon which all kinds of ex post facto political justice 
are by necessity based is, to formulate it in neutral language, the claim of discontinuity 
of the former and the subsequent legal systems. The point here is by no means that the 
proponents of ex post facto justice indeed argue more or less explicitly in this way 
(which may be true, although not necessarily) but that ex post facto justice could not be 
based on any other sound argument except the discontinuity thesis, provided, of course, 
that it wishes to remain within the bounds of legality. I conclude, therefore, that the only 
possible and plausible legal construction of ex post facto political justice is the 
withdrawal of the status of legality from the prior legal system in the subsequent one; 
that is to destroy, metaphorically speaking, the bridge between former and subsequent 
legal systems. If it is so than the legal criticism of ex post facto justice can be successful 
only if the following two theses are proved: 
(1) There is a necessary connection between the legality of ex post facto justice 
on the one hand, and the discontinuity between the prior and subsequent legal 
systems on the other hand. That is, it must be proved that the former proposition 
logically depends on the latter: one cannot accept both without being inconsis-
tent. 
16 This problem is usually more thoroughly studied in international law than in constitutional law or legal 
theory, as the problem of "succession of states in international law" and the creation of states in international 
law. Indeed, in international law and relations it is vital to define, in cases of change of the political superior, 
the relationship between the former and the subsequent sovereign. In internal law, the problem of the identity 
and the continuity of states also causes equally great problems. But here, as it were, the sovereign must not 
face other sovereigns, so the real (in contrast to legal) possibilities are greater than in international law. See 
in particular: MAREK, К. : Identity and Continuity of States in International Law, Geneva, 1954, 
O ' C O N N E L L , D. P.: State Succession in International and Municipal Law I-II, Cambridge, 1970 and 
C R A W F O R D , J.: The Creation of Sûtes in International Law, Oxford, 1979. 
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(2) One must define what are the criteria of the continuity (and so that of 
discontinuity) of legal systems, and examine, how far these criteria were or were 
not satisfied in recent political changes or, generally, in any case of change of 
the legal sovereign. 
These are, in my opinion, the fundamental jurisprudential issues involved in ex post facto 
political justice, susceptible to a neutral-formal legal analysis. As a matter of fact, this 
framing of the issue also rests on certain highly abstract and formal assumptions, which 
require no more than the acceptance of the idea that a legal system must be in 
conformity with itself. This assumption, although of course not immune from discussion 
too, still could claim a reasonably wide acceptance. But before I proceed to the core of 
the argument, it appears to be appropriate to set out in some detail the various versions 
of er post facto political justice, as proposed actually in Hungary and elsewhere in the 
former "socialist" countries of Central Europe. Then I shall analyze the possible 
theoretical arguments in favour of the legality (or, generally, legal acceptability) of er 
post facto justice plans. After having made this detour I shall return to the fundamental 
issue, and try to offer a solution to the legal puzzle. Therefore the reader interested 
exclusively in the theoretical argument of this essay might wish to pass over the next 
section immediately to Section IV. 
III. Ex Post Facto Political Justice: Taxonomic Analysis 
Fundamental changes of political system have historically almost always aroused a 
variety of attempts to change legal positions retrospectively and retroactively for political 
motives. The common ground of them, notwithstanding essential differences in method, 
means, scope and so forth, has been the ambition to treat legal order (in the sense 
introduced above) as a means to requalify a posteriori real events into what they in fact 
never were. Thus ex post facto justice always contains an element of reversal of legal 
qualification of acts and facts, or more properly speaking, depriving them from the legal 
quality they undoubtedly had when they were done, committed or happened, by 
redefinition of the law then in force. This is, in a sense, a particular form of legal 
fiction17 ordering that norms of a legal order valid at a certain time and place ought to 
be regarded from a certain date on as not having been valid as they were; thus at least 
certain facts and acts will be retrospectively requalified. This is not, it must be 
emphasized, the problem of retroactive laws; rather, on the contrary, the problem of 
admissibility of retroactive laws is a smaller part of the topic discussed here. 
This introduction will suffice to precede a detailed analysis of ex post facto justice 
as a politico-legal idea and its paradigmatic cases. Needless to say, ex post facto justice 
is a recurrent phenomenon of political and legal history, so that my sketch is intended 
17 See FULLER. L. L.: Legal Fictions, Stanford. 1967 (originally published 1930-31). 
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to be applicable more broadly than in present day post-socialist Central and Eastern 
Europe. In the following I shall set out the main elements of ex post facto justice plans 
not pretending of course, that each element is to be found in every plan, not even that 
they are logically independent of each other. Of course, the various elements of ex post 
facto justice plans are closely related to each other, but their connection is, at least at 
the first sight, practical rather than logical: all of them share a common aim, viz. "doing 
justice". I wish to point out, however, that they are, in spite of the apparent differences, 
thoroughly connected by their common presuppositions. Admittedly, though they deduce 
somewhat different conclusions from mostly the same assumptions. Their common aim 
("doing justice") is used here in quotation marks, since I do not want, being a lawyer, 
to analyze the distinctly moral aspects of the problem (which makes it clear, that I am 
a positivist); moreover, such kind of justice has little if anything to do with the moral 
or legal justice: it is, at its best, a sort of political justice, provided of course that 
political, i.e. purely political, justice is not a contradiction in terms. Accordingly, the 
quotation mark wishes to express my opinion that ex post facto justice is in its substance, 
a political idea, therefore, it could be justified, if it is possible at all, by political 
arguments. Ex post facto justice plans contain, in fact, a set of political measures to 
implement a certain policy. An important aspect of the analysis of ex post facto plans 
would have been the connection of law and politics, but I shall restrict myself here to 
a strictly legal analysis, or even more narrowly to a particular aspect of legal scrutiny, 
that of legality. 
The first, and in many cases foremost, element of ex post facto justice plans 
concerns, of course, the extension of criminal law responsibility to certain political or 
politically motivated acts for which the normal legal conditions of criminal responsibility 
did not exist, or, if existed, do not exist anymore. It is of no theoretical importance 
(albeit, the practical difference could not be denied) that some would intend the 
punishment to be only symbolic; others would demand only the extension of statutory 
prescription of crimes or, in cases where it has already been completed, the reopening 
of the lapse of the time necessary for the prescription for certain crimes; still others 
would punish certain kinds of acts which were not unlawful, or were explicitly 
prescribed when committed. It is important to note that the criminal responsibility or 
punishment proposed is inevitably not normal criminal law (indeed it could not be by 
definition) but rather a set of criminal law rules valid only for a particular group of 
persons setting aside the general rules of criminal law which would remain in force for 
the rest of the society. There is some reason to contend that this first type is in fact the 
paradigmatic case of ex post facto justice since it contains its essence: the intention to 
"punish", in the sense of "moral-political" expiation rather than as a legal sanction, and 
the element of retrospectivity. 
The second essential element of "ex post facto justice" proves this statement. It also 
contains a punitive element, since it wishes to oblige a certain group of persons defined 
by political criteria such as former political function in party, government or economy, 
to "compensate" the society through expropriation of their property, repayment of 
financial advantages received and so forth. Part of this kind of punishment would be not 
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only the substantial or symbolic reduction of pensions received by high functionaries, but 
also the withdrawal of decorations, medals, and honours conferred by the former regime 
(or what amounts to the same, the prohibition to wear them) including the repeal of the 
eventual privileges or advantages to which the holders of the honours had been entitled. 
These measures are destined, according to their proponents, to produce more social 
justice, through the takings from those "undeserved" thus reestablishing the social 
equilibrium by taking and compensation. The primary aim of this type of Justice is 
clearly the punishment of selected social groups. Undoubtedly, the means to this end are 
more social, political, or even "moral" than criminal. It still remains, however, 
punishment since the withdrawal of rights or privileges acquired as unrepealable rights 
under the legal system is nothing but "punishment" as punishment is, among other things 
the (temporary or final) repeal of otherwise intangible rights in a legal system. From this 
point of view it does not matter too much that some of these rights are merely symbolic 
and/or moral, and as such without direct or clear practical use. The other element of 
punishment is also present here: the lawgiver, in adopting this kind of laws, is not only 
taking vested or intangible rights but he is also critically reacting or responding to the 
conduct of a person. (A punishment for another's deeds would be absurd, because it is 
contrary to the idea of the punishment itself; responsibility for another's actions is of 
course well known in every modern legal order but not as punishment, i.e. responsibil-
ity, but as liability or Haftung.) Thus, if the lawmaker repeals certain rights as a general 
measure valid for every person without distinction, say a general reduction of pensions, 
it still could well be described as contrary to legality, but it would not be a punishment. 
The ex post facto character is abundantly clear if one considers that the conduct criticised 
by way of ex post facto legislation had been undoubtedly lawful as it is recognised by 
the measure itself. 
The punitive element is also present in proposals suggesting to adopt prohibitive laws 
against former political activists, defined by various criteria, declaring them ineligible 
to obtain politically important posts in government, or eventually in society. No doubt, 
these are also punitive laws, both on account of the purpose and methods used, since 
they want to restrict otherwise generally available rights of a group of citizens because 
of the their conduct in the past; in addition, in most positive legal orders, such as in 
Hungary, limitation of political rights is actually a form of criminal punishment. 
Fourth, ex post facto justice projects include—and included in history repeated-
ly—indemnification for personal injuries or financial losses caused by formerly 
lawful acts. Here it would be difficult to discover, at least at first sight, the 
elements of punition. But, even in this case, there are undoubtedly punitive 
moments, although not in its retributory side, but rather in the expiatory aim and 
purpose. What is lacking is the well-defined set of persons punished: rather, in 
case of indemnification or restitution, the society as a whole (that is, everything 
taken into account, those not indemnified) who are, if not punished in the strict 
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sense, but held liable to pay for the losses caused by the former sovereign.18 No 
doubt, indemnification is inseparably part of the ex post facto justice ideas, as it 
is undoubtedly retrospective too; it is part of the bulk of legal measures aiming at 
the radical change of the formerly existing political and social system, and what 
is of paramount importance for me here, its legal system, guided by motives which 
might be described as the direct reaction or response to the legal norms of the 
former system now considered unjustifiable. The consequence of this is that 
legislation on "indemnification" changes the legal qualification of certain acts and 
states of affairs for the future so that lawful acts and states of affairs under the 
former legal system are now declared—at least in part—illegal and are, therefore, 
the basis for an indemnification. Thus indemnification is connected to patently 
lawful acts under the former legal system. Indemnification is the legislative 
approximation and expression of the idea of the restoration of the former legal 
order at least as far the law of property and related subjects are concerned. Total 
reprivatization would be the ideal fulfilment of this philosophy in post-"socialist" 
countries, as far as property rights are concerned. But even where the reprivatiza-
tion is not pursued so radically and intransigently, if only for practical reasons, the 
starting point remains the given state of affairs at a certain momentary legal 
system) in the past which serves as a standard to which compensation is measured. 
The essence, here too, remains the retrospective change in legal order. These 
measures should, however, be clearly distinguished from correctional measures, 
such as compensation for (lawful or unlawful) imprisonment or other restrictions 
of personal freedom, in particular deportation, or compulsory domicile, etc. Those 
types of legal measures are obviously connected to certain prior acts of the state, 
but they are not guided by the idea of retrospectivity. In some cases this could be 
bound to the repeal of criminal sentences previously made either by courts or by 
general legislative acts, or both; if it were so, one should, at least in theory, 
distinguish between sentences lawful at the time they were announced, and 
sentences which were unlawful even under the law in force at the operative time, 
while both could be judged morally exactly in the same way. The consequence is 
only that originally unlawful sentences could have been declared invalid at any 
moment without legislative intervention, which does not apply to those lawful when 
made. 
Therefore, the legal substance of the ex post facto political justice plans could 
be defined roughly as follows: any change in the legal system/order destined to 
change the political and social order which changes the legal order not exclusively 
18 The most notable case of it in history was, to my knowledge, the indemnities and reparations payed by 
West Germany to certain groups of those who suffered injuries from Nazism, under the name of "Entschädi-
gung" and "Wiedergutmachung". See the series published by the Bundesminister der Finanzen under the 
general editorship of SCHWARZ, W. : Die Wiedergutmachung nationalsozialistischen Unrechts durch die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vols. I-VI. München, 1974-1985. 
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pro future and for acts and states of affairs in the future; rather it is a change in 
the legal order which in some way connects the present legal position of persons 
to legal acts and states of affairs existing prior to the moment the norm became 
operative; this is done it with the aim of redefying their legal qualification in the 
prior legal system. The essential element is, broadly speaking, the retrospective 
change in law; ex post facto justice plans are inseparably and inevitably backward 
looking in time; they have, then, a certain undeniable restorative flavour. In the 
rest of my essay I shall try to assess the legal possibilities and limits to such 
political measures. 
IV. Legal Justification of Ex Post Facto Justice 
In examining the crucial issue, the legal justification—and, as I have said, only that—of 
ex post facto justice plans, I shall proceed not on the basis of justificatory arguments 
actually propounded by supporters of such programmes in particular in Hungary; rather 
I intend to investigate any plausible justification for ex post facto justice plans whether 
actually proposed or not. More importantly, in doing so I wish to discover the essential, 
(in the sense of ineluctable) legal presuppositions of ex post facto justice plans; it will 
be the precondition to explore how far, if at all, ex post facto justice projects could be 
implemented without causing injury to the legality of a legal system. It should be noted 
that in this essay I treat the theories to be examined simply as the best possible, or 
eventually the typical, representatives of characteristic arguments; thus, the discussion 
that follows is not intended to be a full-fledged and fair criticism of the various theories 
on their own right. 
Previously I made some efforts to point out that ex post facto justice programmes 
necessarily involve retrospective, i.e. backward-looking changes in legal order; in fact, 
ex post facto justice plans if pursued with the minimum consistency would amount to 
such a radical and fundamental disturbance of the legal system that it would inevitably 
question the legality of the legal system, that means, in last analysis, its existence as a 
legally ordered set of norms. To be sure, it would not question the mere factual 
existence, or, "being" of the legal order as such but simply (if it were simple), its legal 
quality or better even, its legal seriousness. In short, the ex post facto justice plans are 
not purely proposals to change radically the legal order, but also, at least in the sense 
defined above, they seek to change the legal system, which is a much different and much 
more difficult task. This circumstance, of course, did not escape the attention of those 
arguing for ex post facto justice; anybody arguing for legal measures of such a weight 
must be aware of the paramountcy of the intervention into the legal system they propose. 
If there is a single proposition accepted both by proponents and opponents of ex post 
facto justice projects, it is that they are not normal legislative operations. Such an 
intervention into the legal system requires, no doubt, serious legal justification; and the 
burden of proof therefore lies on the side of its proponents. 
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Now I shall proceed to examine the various theoretical arguments serving to justify 
ex post facto justice. 
A. Substantive Natural Law 
The argument from natural law is, of course, the most ancient and traditional (and the 
most philosophical) way of reasoning. I do not want here reargue the case Natural Law 
v. Positive Law with all the dissenting and concurring opinions in the context of my 
topic, since I do not think it will add anything to the long chain of arguments already put 
forward. What I want is to simply point out certain features of natural law theories 
which concern legality. Interpreting natural law as asserting merely the primacy of moral 
rules (or, better, norms of a certain well-defined morality) over rules of any legal 
system, at least under certain conditions, would not be very interesting, still less 
dangerous, for legality, not even in a stronger (and I would maintain this is the authentic 
one) version contends that these moral, or morally justified norms are in some legal 
sense "stronger" than other rules of law, such as the well-known "übergesetzliches 
Recht" ("Law above the laws" in free translation) of Gustav Radbruch. 
A natural law containing criteria of just law—Hart remarks very pertinently that 
justice is the most legal of the virtues"—would be natural law only if it would be able 
to destroy legally the specific legal quality, that is, the validity, of any positive law 
contrary to natural law. A weaker version, say in which natural law is only a means to 
discover, which law is unjust,20 would not be relevant here, since it would not even 
contend that a legal norm contrary to natural law would be deprived of its legality. The 
point is that if natural law makes an unjust norm invalid only proforo interne then it has 
still nothing to say about its legality. That kind of natural law reasoning is useful as a 
legal argument—but in that case for the positive law—after the previous legal order had 
passed away, but not before it. The argument from natural law served in most cases to 
justify the ex post facto non-recognition of the legality of certain legal norms or laws (the 
distinction between the two is now not in question) in the legal order following the one 
in which it was unquestionably of full legality. Remember that the judgements cited in 
Radbruch's well-known article on "unlawful laws"21 were made after the fall of the nazi 
regime; the same applies to the judgements of the International Military Tribunal and the 
judgements pronounced by the American Military Tribunals in Germany after the World 
War II. As Kirchheimer convincingly pointed it out,22 the IMT was careful enough to 
base its judgement as far as possible on legal norms having the least possible dubious 
19 HART, H.L .A. : The Concept of Law, op. cit., p . 163. 
20 Like that of FINN1S, J. : Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford, 1980. 
21 RADBRUCH, G.: 'Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht ' (1945), reprinted in his Rechts-
philosophie (ed. WOLF, E.), Stuttgart, 1950, pp. 347 et seq. 
22 KIRCHHEIMER, O.: Political Justice, Princeton, 1961, pp. 326-327. 
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legality (in the terminology used here). One is inclined to say that the natural law 
arguments of the type cited above, quite independently of their moral value and 
convincing force, are in fact, from the point of view of bare legality simply rules of the 
legality of the system consecutive to the system in which they were fully valid (which 
is of course a question par excellence of legality). In sum, my thesis is that 
arguments based on (that is deriving their force from) substantive natural law are 
unable to affect the legality of legal norms as long as they are legal according to the 
rules of an existing legal system;23 they could surely be interpreted as norms 
identifying the laws of the legal order which should be obeyed by citizens, in some 
other sense than its legality (or "legal force") or even which do not have to be 
obeyed. This does not solve, however, the question of legality. Namely, how far, 
if at all, a consecutive legal order may in a legal sense (although undoubtedly can) 
enact rules to punish citizens or officials (say, judges) because they obeyed or 
enforced or even (provided they were legally entitled to do so) created manifestly 
unjust laws. It is perhaps not entirely missing the point to say that natural law rules 
in these cases serve as norms of positive law of the posterior/consecutive legal 
system ordering punishment for obeying certain norms of the previous legal system 
because they were (morally or under natural law) gravely unjust. Thus, in that case, 
the binding force of a moral precept is regarded as a good ground for regarding 
positive law norms as defective ex post facto. Obviously, the moral (as distinct from 
legal) acceptability of such an enforcement of positivated natural law will always 
depend at least on two factors: first, on the moral weight of the norm violated in the previous 
legal order (a good example of this is the Nazi law in breach of elementary norms of 
humanity, i.e. violating really the lowest minimum standard of generally accepted morality) 
and second, on the independent moral value of law: the value attributed by the positive 
morality of a society or a group of people to pure legality. Note that the latter factor is 
moral, not legal: it is the moral value of law irrespective of its content. 
A variant of the substantive natural law justification is the contention that certain 
legal orders (but not legal systems) were "invalid" because they were contrary to the 
human rights norms of international law. This reasoning would use international law as 
a substitute for, or a kind of, natural law. This argument is based on highly unrealistic 
assumptions, most eminently on the doctrine of unity of international and domestic law; 
if this assumption is not accepted, human rights cannot be reasonably said to be based 
on international law. I have tried to prove this thesis elsewhere24 so that I shall not 
pursue this matter further here. 
23 Of course, the existence of a legal system as a system, as distinguished from single norms, or groups of 
them belonging to it, could also be a matter of discussion. It would lead too far to discuss this problem here. 
At any rate, I suppose for the purpose of the present argument, that the existence of the legal system remains 
undisputed throughout. 
24 BRAGYOVA, A.: Ts It Possible to Base Human Rights on International Law? ' , in: MAIHOFER, 
W.—SPRENGER, G. (eds.): Revolution and Human Rights, ARSP, ВН. 41 (1990), pp . 141 et seq. 
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B. Formal Natural Law 
There is however, a second, and in a sense a more pertinent, version of natural law 
argumentation, which is that of Fuller.25 The Fullerian formal natural law seems to be 
more pertinent to the subject of legality for the simple reason that it is in fact, nothing 
else but the codification of the precepts of legality couched in natural law terms. 
Thus, at least in one formulation it is possible to say that in Fuller's thought legality 
and justice are closely bound together: in fact, he writes of "[the] deep affinity between 
legality and justice".26 This contention is not concerned with the substantial aim of law, 
Fuller says, but it is clear that a just law must respect the standards of the inner morality 
of the law, because a law (or better, the legal system to which it belongs) even if it is 
just in its substantial aims, still cannot be just law, since it fails to possess legality. This 
view is bound to a type of moral-ethical rationalism, as it was referred to before, binding 
inextricably together moral validity and rational action in an apparently questionable 
way. 
The main difficulty with the Fullerian natural law of legality as it might be called, 
is, however, that it neither proves the falsehood, nor causes the invalidation of the rule 
of law violating the Fuller-criteria in any meaningful legal sense of the word. Of course, 
for Fuller, a law contrary to the precepts of legality ("inner morality of law") is not law 
at all; but this formulation, much debated27, does not, it seems to me, resolve the 
problem. Leaving aside conceptual problems ("is there such thing as a critical definition 
of a concept?"), it is not clear what happens, at the operative time, with the law defying 
the norms of legality. The only consequence of it would be that Fullerians will not 
regard it as a law but rather as a mere fiat or simply a phenomenon purporting to be law 
without corresponding to the definition of law adopted by those who follow Fuller's 
ideas. The problem still remains, even in that case, the same: what happens to the 
validity of the norm (or law) contrary to the inner morality of law.28 The solution 
Fuller offers, viz. that it is not law and therefore could not possess the quality of 
validity (or "binding force") by and large in the same sense as it would be, at best, 
25 FULLER, L. L.: The Morality of Law. New Haven. 1964. 
26 FULLER, L.L. : op. cit. p . 157. 
27 I mean of course the well-known Hart-Fuller debate. See, in addition to Ful ler ' s 'Morality' quoted above, 
HART, H .L.A. : 'Fuller, L. L.: The Morality of Law' and 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals ' 
now both in his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford, 1983, pp. 43 et seq. and 343 et seq. For 
Fuller's reply see 71 Harvard Law Review, 630 (1958). See also BOUKEMA, H. J. M.: The Hart-Fuller 
Debate, 14 Rechtstheorie 29 et seq. (1983). 
28 1 leave here aside a possible purely sociological interpretation of this argument which would argue that 
a society consisting, at least in vast majority, of Fullerians would not. probably, obey norms contrary to 
legality criteria. Provided this were so, that would only be a sociological argument , since it would assert a 
causal, but not a normative, relationship between the legal immorality of law and its chances to be obeyed. 
But the point here is the normative effect of the legal immorality of law and not the social effects of legally 
bad laws. 
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meaningless to say that a whale walks on the street (except, perhaps, in poetical works); 
thus it could not be obeyed, not because it is not valid, but rather it is not valid because 
it is not law, so it cannot be valid at all (since validity is a quality reserved exclusively 
for rules of law). This is a rather absurd kind of reasoning; its absurdity will be clear 
at once if one considers that it is exactly of the same type as the argument which one 
meets quite often in aesthetic debates: it is the same structure as arguing that the sound 
a piece by Alban Berg or Pierre Boulez makes is "not music" at all, and not simply "bad 
(or disliked)" music.29 
This argument, I would maintain, is contradictory, for the following reason: it 
asserts in fact that a given definition of law (or music in the example) must be obligatory 
in the sense that everybody (every subject bound to obey the laws of a legal order) 
should accept it. If it is so then Fuller's theory is—as I think most natural law theories 
indeed are30—a theory of obedience to law, i.e. that of political (or moral) obligation 
and should be most properly judged as such. But, if one will disobey an unjust law, it 
is undoubtedly presupposed that the law in question is valid in the sense that it exists in 
a positive legal order. If it were not so, one had nothing to disobey, and in fact the 
whole problem would be meaningless and obsolete, as it would be obsolete or moot at 
the very moment the legislator repeals the unjust law or changes its practice contrary to 
the morality of law. Thus, I submit, the Fullerian natural law, in fact, splits the concept 
of law in two parts: first, it proposes an evaluative-critical concept of law, corresponding 
to the criteria of inner morality of law, and second, it contains a value-neutral concept 
of positive, existing law. Indeed any natural lawyer must assume (by definition) the 
duality of positive and natural law; therefore the crucial question is, at least from the 
present essay's point of view, whether it could be proved that natural law would deprive 
positive law of its validity in the sense of its legal existence. I find the conclusion 
inescapable that whatever the merits of natural law reasoning may be for other purposes, 
it fails to produce meritorious effects in an existing legal system, so long as the legal 
order survives. 
Another question is whether natural law reasoning, as I tried to point it out, and the 
same applies to the Fullerian version, may be used in a subsequent legal order as an 
argument to justify the denial of legal quality from norms which were no doubt valid as 
positive law in some previous legal order (or are valid in another legal order considered 
to be defective). For this purpose a Fullerian line of reasoning would be excellent. In 
29 One cannot fail to remark that the debate on the question whether international law is 'law properly so 
called' or not shows similar traits, as far as the conceptual, methodological side of the problem is concerned. 
In addition, it is usually thought—on both sides, 1 believe—that the qualification as not 'law' would be 
downgrading for international law, although nobody would deny (not even Austin) the existence of the set of 
norms called (properly or improperly) 'international law' . Cf . AUSTIN, J. : Lectures on Jurisprudence, 
London, 1873, lectures I and V, VI, Vol . I, pp. 81, 88-171; and see GLANVILLE, W. : The Controversy 
concerning the Word "Law", 22 British Yearbook of International Law, 1945, pp. 146 et seq. 
30 In fact, SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS formulated, at least in one instance, the fundamental question of 
natural law in the same way. See: 'Summa Theologicae' I I I . quest. 96, a 4-6. 
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fact, this type of argumentation seems to be recurrent in the treatment given in Germany 
to the norms of the former GDR legal system, which became part of the legal system 
of the Federal Republic of Germany (i.e. the unified German state) as of 3 October, 
1990. The main argument is, roughly, that the GDR legal system was defective by the 
standards of the Rechtstaat (rule of law), i.e. legality, and therefore it could be treated 
by (post GDR) German courts as if it had not been of the same legal quality or validity 
(for the past) as West German law is. No doubt this argument is conceived in a broadly 
Fullerian vein, although it does not pretend explicitly that the GDR legal order (or 
system) had been invalid; but it treats it as a legal order lacking the inner morality of 
law, hence not law "properly so-called". But, it should be repeated, this argumentation 
could not deprive the GDR law or, a fortiori any prior legal order (the norms belonging 
to that legal order) from legal existence retrospectively; it could not only justify the 
retrospective denial of its legal quality in the subsequent legal order. 
C. "Revolutionary Legality" 
The argument from "revolutionary legality " serves in the last analysis the same purpose. 
Revolutions are aimed at destroying the legality of the existing legal system; their 
peculiarity is just that: revolution, in that analytic sense,31 is a method of changing the 
legal order through changing the legal system. Thus, a revolutionary change in law could 
be distinguished from other types of change by its method of breaking the rules of the 
legal system in order achieve changes in the legal order; this implies, of course, that 
revolutionary change does not involve necessarily the use of force. A revolution 
destroys, or pushes away, the existing legality; therefore, apparently, this concept of 
revolution is not dependent on the political content of the change but it tries to define it 
only from the legal point of view. Thus, I would maintain that the concept of revolu-
tion—of course, in a strictly legal optics—concerns the very existence of the legal 
system, as opposed to the existence ("validity") of its norms ut singuli. That means that 
a revolutionary change of the legal system is a change of the basis of validity of the legal 
order as such.32 The concept of revolution, then, is reserved for a particular case of 
change in the legal system: that is, for cases in which the legal order changes through 
the change of the norms of the system relating to itself. This use of the concept of 
revolution allows to make a clear difference between a coup d'Etat or apronunciamento 
and a revolution: a coup is unlawful only insofar as the rules of the legal order govern-
ing changes in the highest public offices are concerned; but the basis of the validity of 
31 Cf. WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: 'The Analytic Concept of Revolution' in: MACCORMICK, N.—BANKOWSKI, 
Z. (eds.): Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution, Aberdeen, 1989, pp. 364 et seq. 
32 In this definition the secession of a territory from a state to which it belonged in certain cases would also 
be a ' revolution' . 
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the legal order33 remains intact. Moreover, this definition of revolution makes possible 
a further distinction between what I would call a "radical law reform" and revolution 
in the legal sense. In a radical law reform the whole legal order may change and still 
it will not be a revolution, since the basis of the validity of the legal order does not 
change. 
The concept of revolution is, then, inextricably related to the concept of legality as 
I use it here; the revolution attacks just the legality side of the legal order/system as 
such, and not simply certain norms of legality in the legal system but rather the legality 
as a whole (though, of course, it happens to break not necessarily each norm in the 
legality bloc of the system). "Revolutionary legality" is, by definition, a legality based 
on the denial of the legality of prior legal system. It is the very aim of a revolution to 
do so, as we have seen abundantly. In other words, a revolution in the correct sense 
creates a new legal order and at the same time it suppresses another one; it is new not 
in the sense that the content of its norms is entirely new—although most probably there 
will many new norms in it—but new on the ground of its validity, i.e. not based on the 
legality-norms of the prior, superseded legal system. Therefore the relationship between 
the prior and the subsequent legal order is an essential feature of a revolutionary legal 
system: a revolutionary legal system does not recognize as 'legal' the norms of the prior 
legal order; it should treat them as legally non-existent, which would not exclude their, 
as it were, de facto recognition. From the point of view of a revolutionary legality, 
every norm of the prior legal order had lost its validity by virtue of the revolutionary act 
destroying the legal system. More precisely, one is inclined to say that the prior legal 
order had not lost its legality, but rather, it is regarded in the revolutionary legality as 
if it had never existed as a legal order. In a milder version, it is not regarded as having 
an legality equivalent to the subsequent legal order. Obviously, in practice it is im-
possible (and from its own point of view not even necessary) for the revolutionary legal 
order to change all norms of the prior legal system (and order). Albeit the Russian 
Bolshevik revolution in and after 1917 succeeded in getting as close as possible to it. 
The same applies to the French Revolution, according to Burke: 
"No acts of the old government of the Kings of France are held valid in the 
National Assembly, except its pecuniary engagements; acts of all others [are] of 
the most ambiguous legality. The rest of the acts of that royal government are 
33 The concept of revolution will, then, depend on the explanation given by a legal theorist of the existence 
of the legal order. Thus, a Kelsenite would say that the change of the Grundnorm is a revolutionary change, 
a Haitian would link it to the change of the rule of recognition etc. For an interesting discussion of this 
problem from jurisprudential and practical point of view see: EEKELAAR, J.: 'Principles of Revolutionary 
Legality' in: SIMPSON, A. W. B. (ed.): Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Oxford, 1973, pp. 22 
et seq, and HARRIS, J. W.: 'When and Why Does the Grundnorm Change?' 29 Cambridge Law Journal, 
pp. 103 et seq. (1971) 
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considered so odious a light, that to have a claim under its authority is looked 
on as a sort of crime.1,34 
The point is, clearly, not the quantum of the change in the legal order; it is, more 
importantly, that the new legality may treat freely (according to its own norms) the 
norms of the prior legal system in selecting which one it would recognise as existing and 
which one it would not. 
Thus, the argument from revolutionary legality is, in essence, not too far from the 
natural law reasoning. The only difference is that the revolutionary argumentation is, in 
a sense, more radical or, perhaps, less circumstantial in its arguments. There is, how-
ever, a very important common point: both natural law and revolutionary legality might 
justify the non-recognition (or, better, ex post facto repeal) of the norms of the prior 
legal order in the subsequent one. From this particular point of view it is not material 
at all that this kind of "reversal" of the prior legal order happens (and for practical or 
prudential reasons must happen) quite rarely. In most historical cases, it had remained 
usually restricted to certain well-defined—and eminently political—classes of laws and 
legal situations created by them. Even if the new legal order in practice treats most 
norms of the prior legal order as valid in the new system, it still remains true that it is 
based on its own criteria and norms; thus, the revolutionary legal order remains unbound 
to the prior one through at least the ties of legality. 
The same applies to a particular type of revolutionary legal system, the counter-
revolutionary (or perhaps more properly, "restorative") legal order which is, under the 
definition given above, not less revolutionary than the one it replaces. The difference is 
simply that the new legal order created by the counter-revolutionary (restorative) legal 
order is purported to be the same as the legal order in force before it was overturned. 
Thus, the "new" norms of the revolutionary legal order happen to be the norms of a 
former legal order. (By the way, annexation or inclusion of a legal order into another 
preexisting legal system is a half way house between revolution and counter-revolution. 
It is a half revolution since the prior legal order is changed in a revolutionary way, i.e. 
by changing the legal system and its basis of validity, but the new legal order is taken 
from a legal order already in force.) In restorative legal orders (or in restorative situa-
tions) it might even happen that the revolutionary legal order is flatly declared invalid. 
A good example of this kind of restorative revolutionary legality is the Hungarian "Act 
on the Restoration of Constitutional Order and the Exercise of Supreme Power", adopted 
by the counter-revolutionary National Assembly in March 1920, after a revolutionary 
period from October 1918 till August 1919), which provided in its Article 9 the 
following: 
"[A]ll the acts, orders or other legal provisions whatever their name, issued by 
the organs of the so-called People's Republic and Soviet Republic shall be 
34 BURKE, E.: Reflections on the Revolution in France (ed. O'BRIEN, C. C.) , 1969, p. 208. 
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invalid. Similarly, every act and resolution of the so-called National Councils are 
invalid. The People's Acts and the People's Resolution shall be deleted from the 
Official Collection of Laws. "35 
Thus, the revolutionary legal order was regarded as legally non-existent ab initio and 
without any legal effect at all, with very limited exceptions; in addition, the pre-
revolutionary legal order was regarded as valid even during the revolutionary period. 
And this was not only a theoretical position: the courts held that in principle every act 
committed during the revolutionary period was to be treated as if the prior—and later on 
restored—legal order were in fact in force at the moment it had been committed. In this 
way a lawful act under the former legal order, for example the nationalisation of private 
property, was considered by virtue of this principle as robbery (as it was on the basis 
of the restored legal order) or a lawful action of the police or court martial was regarded 
as a murder and so forth. 
D. Unlimited Sovereignty 
A crude version of legal positivism may also serve as argument in favour of the justifi-
cation of ex post facto political justice. This is a very simple, perhaps the simplest 
possible, reasoning based on the simple and attractive assumption (or contention) that 
sovereignty is by its nature unlimited and legally illimitable. Of course, the question of 
limitability of sovereignty (or that of a personified sovereign) is a highly complicated 
problem of legal theory: this is, in a sense one of the key problems of legal positivism. 
I do not think that legal positivism, by its very assumptions, must necessarily recognise 
the legal illimitability of the sovereign or that of the legal order as such; still, it is true 
that many leading positivists (at least from Bentham to Kelsen36) recognised, albeit in 
various forms and not without certain reservations, that in the last analysis, positive law 
cannot be limited by (positive) law, and I think there are many positivists (and many 
natural lawyers too) who would endorse this view. 
The argument based on legal illimitability of the sovereign is best expressed in a 
classical statement of Austin: "Supreme power limited by positive law is a flat contra-
35 It was possible under the Act that certain laws adopted by the revolutionary authorities and certain official 
acts (e.g. marriages celebrated etc.) remain in force provisionally until the new legal order replaces them by 
its own new norms or decisions. 
36 See e.g. BENTHAM, J . : Of Laws in General (ed. HART, H. L. A.), London, 1970. Idem.: Principles 
of Morals and Legislation (ed. BURNS, J. H. and HART, H. L. A.) London, 1982; KELSEN, H.: Das 
Problem der Souverenität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts, Tübingen, 1920, idem.: General Theory of Law 
and State, Cambridge, Mass . , 1946, pp. 197 et seq. And see: BURNS, J. H. : 'Bentham on Sovereignty: An 
Exploration' 24 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly, 399 (1973) and in particular: HART, H. L. A.: 'Sovereignty 
and Legally Limited Government ' reprinted in his Essays on Bentham, Oxford, 1982, pp. 220 et seq. 
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diction in terms".37 It is not an easy task to define legal sovereignty, i.e. sovereignty, 
as a legal concept as opposed to sovereignty as a concept of political philosophy and 
theory, or as a practical political phenomenon. I will resist the temptation to discuss this 
question here and restrict myself to point out the connection between the phenomenon 
of legality and the argumentation on the Austinian line, contending essentially that there 
is necessarily, in every legal system, a single, unlimited law-maker capable to determine 
the content, validity and binding force of every norm of the system without any legal 
limitation. A paradigm case of this type of legal order is, of course, the British constitu-
tional order (which was the model of the Austinian theory) with the legally omnipotent 
Queen in Parliament on its top.38 But the same applies to a legal order making strict 
distinction between constitution maker and ordinary law-maker (such as Germany or 
France or even the United States among many others): the only difference is that in those 
legal systems it is the constitution-maker which is, in last analysis, legally unlimited.39 
The latter case may be (and frequently is) different in practice from the Westminster system, 
but theoretically—regarding the legal order as a whole—it is no less true that those 
systems do have a legally unlimited law-maker (the constitutional legislator), too.40 
There could be little doubt that there is a great deal of empirical truth in the reason-
ing roughly reproduced here. Nevertheless, the theories which contend that the sovereign 
law-maker is unlimited in the legal sense are in fact ignoring the phenomenon of legality. 
This is the reason why arguments referring to the sovereign "will" (of the state or 
eventually to that of the "people" in political discourse as an answer to political 
arguments in favour of rule of law) work so well for the purpose of arguing for setting 
aside the systemic norms of legal system, i.e. legality. Indeed, crude versions of legal 
positivism, such as that of Austin (and at least in part Somló41) ignore the analysis of 
the systemic quality of law as they regard law as a legal 'order', i.e. a set of homogene-
ous norms, and not as a legal 'system', that is, a structured set of norms. 
37 AUSTIN, J. : Lectures on Jurisprudence, op. cit., p. 270. 
38 The obligatory reference on this topic is DICEY, A. V. : Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, 8th ed. London, 1913, pp. 37 et seq. See also JENNINGS, I.: The Law and the Constitution, 
London, 1959, pp. 120 et seq.; and see MARSHALL, G.: Constitutional Theory, Oxford, 1970. 
39 I disregard here the famous puzzle (paradox) of legally unchangeable constitutional laws discussed by Alf 
Ross and later by Hart as the problem of 'self-referring laws' , because it is concerned with the logical 
possibility of the limitation of the constitutional (or generally the last resort) law-maker. See: HART, H.L.A. : 
'Self-referring Laws' in HART, H. L. A.: Essays.. . op. cit., pp. 107 et seq. and ROSS, A.: 'On Self-
reference as a Puzzle in Constitutional law' 78 Mind 1 (1969) for a different view. 
40 Certain constitutions, like the German Grundgesetz in its Art. 79, contain, in fact, limitations on the 
constitution-making power of the constitutional law-giver. Without willing to discuss here the logical possibility 
and legal value of this kind of limitation, it is doubtlessly true that an absolute constitutional limitation is bound 
to the very existence of the legal order, of which the constitution is the highest norm. See on this problem 
BACHOF, O.: Verfassungswidrige Verfassungsnormen?Tübingen, 1951. 
41 Cf . SOMLÓ, F.: Juristische Grundlehre, 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1927, pp. 191 et seq., 453 et seq., who speaks 
of 'promising laws'. 
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Once the legal system is regarded as a legal order, a collection of norms of behav-
iour for citizens issued by the sovereign law-maker and nothing else, there is no 
sufficient theoretical argument against any type of ex post facto political justice. Indeed, 
as Joseph Raz has pointed out in the case of Austin,42 sovereignty as a criterion of 
identity of legal systems is inapt to explain how a legal order could be the same in the 
course of time; in other words, as Raz points out,43 in that way the legal system is 
nothing but a series of momentary legal orders without any connection among the 
various states of the system. Now, this is the reason why an Austinian view of the legal 
order is so well suited to an argument for the discontinuity of the legal system: by its 
premises it conceives of the legal system as a series of discontinuous sets of norms. One 
is inclined to say that, for this theory, every legal system is constantly discontinuous. 
Thus, strictly speaking, the problem of discontinuity cannot even exist for this line of 
thought, since discontinuity is, so to speak, the natural condition of the legal order. As 
such it does not need justification at all. Alternatively, in a bit of paradoxical language, 
one could say that an Austinian legal order (which is, it should be remembered, not a 
system in the proper sense) is always in revolutionary change. Therefore, the problem 
which I call here 'legality' is practically nonexistent for an Austinian and for that matter, 
more or less to any post-Austinian44 theory of law. 
* * * 
The conclusion which could be drawn from the foregoing is that every possible justi-
fication of the ex post facto justice plans has one element in common: the contention of 
the discontinuity between a prior and a subsequent state of the legal system with certain 
extraordinary events between the two. Thus, the connection between the thesis of 
discontinuity of the legal order and the contention of the legality of ex post facto political 
justice plans (or for that matter, that of the irrelevance of legality) turns out to be the 
decisive point in every possible justification of ex post facto justice plans. In fact, I hope 
I succeeded to prove in examining the possible justifications of ex post facto justice plans 
that every plausible justification is bound to the discontinuity thesis. It appears to be, 
therefore, inevitable to examine in somewhat more detail this problem before reaching 
a conclusion. 
42 RAZ, J.: The Concept of a Legal System, Oxford, 1970, pp. 5 et seq. 
43 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
44 I mean for instance HOLLAND, T. E.: Jurisprudence, 13rd ed. , Oxford, 1924, Salmond, Jurisprudence, 
ed.: FITZGERALD, A. J . , London 1966, MARKBY. W.: Elements of Law, 5th ed., Oxford, 1886, or 
WILLOUGHBY, W.W. : The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law, New York, 1924. It should be remarked 
that the continental legal positivism, in particular the German, French, and the Italian is very similar in this 
respect to Austin. See e .g . LABAND, P.: Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Vols I-III. Tübingen, 
1876-1882. 
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V. Identity, Continuity and Legality of the Legal System 
I shall start my discussion with a few preliminary remarks on the relationship between 
validity and change in the legal system. 
It is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental characteristics of the legal system that 
the norms composing it are equally valid. This is probably a truism, but still a very 
important statement. Within the set of primary norms belonging to the same legal system 
(within a 'legal order') no distinction among the norms in respect to their validity is 
possible: there could be no Orwellian norms "more valid than others". This phenomenon 
is expressed, at least in part, in our usual way of speaking of the "unity of the law", 
where 'law' might well be read to mean legal order; other theorists with different 
philosophical backgrounds would speak of the "homogeneity of legal objectivation";45 
both, I presume, denote the same characteristics of the legal system. The (primary) 
norms of the legal system are equally valid. That is, there are no norms of the system 
"more legal", or legally more valuable than others; in other words, the legal force of all 
norms is the same within the legal system. 
One important consequence of this property of the legal system is that the 'legality' 
of the norms is their most important feature: the time, conditions, form or similar 
circumstances of the formation of the norm do not matter from the point of view of its 
validity. Nor has the hierarchy of the sources of law immediate influence on the validity 
of norms belonging to the same legal system: the hierarchy of the sources of law is not 
the hierarchy of their validity. It is, so to speak, the hierarchy of the sources of the 
norms, but not that of the norms themselves; an act of Parliament is not more valid than 
an order of a local council. The expression 'source of law' is, of course, a metaphor 
describing the particular procedures of the legal system of making valid norms, or, 
alternatively, the conditions of making valid norms within the system. In this context 
'validity' means basically systemic validity,46 and therefore, is denoting the property 
of the norm that it belongs to the system (corresponds to the "membership rules"). Thus 
the norms of the hierarchy of sources law belong to the norms of legality, the violation 
of which amounts to the violation of legality of the system; the violation of the hierarchy 
of sources may occasionally render the norm invalid, but even then none of the norms 
will be more valid than any other norm of the system. 
The hierarchy of the "sources of law", on the other hand, is intrinsicly connected to 
the rules of change of norms within the system. In this respect the rules of hierarchy of 
sources do have a function of guaranteeing the validity of norms: the higher the source 
of the norm stands in the hierarchy of sources within the system, the higher is its re-
sistance to change. If a norm N, is changed to norm N2 then there are two different 
kinds of changes possible: first, the change of the content of the norm (to which I shall 
45 See first of all PESCHKA, V.: Theorie der Rechtsnormen. Budapest, 1982, pp. 42 et seq.; idem.. Die 
Eigenart des Rechts, Budapest, 1989, pp. 153 et seq. 
46 R A Z , J . : 'Legal Validity' as reprinted in RAZ: The Authority of Law, Oxford, 1982, pp. 146 et seq. 
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revert soon), and second, the change of its guarantee against change. The latter case 
happens when the norm of the same content is raised from an act of Parliament to the 
constitutional level; now the "normative content" of the norm has remained untouched, 
but it became more resistant to change, because a higher norm (in this case the highest, 
at least in positive law) may be changed only if more complicated procedures are used: 
the higher a norm, the better it is entrenched. On the other hand, of course, the position 
in the hierarchy determines the subset of norms of the system capable to be changed 
by other norms of the system: the higher the position of the norm the greater is the 
subset which may be changed by the norm in question. In other words: an act of 
Parliament could be changed—except, of course, changing it by the same procedure it 
was made—only by changing the constitution.47 In this sense, the constitutional 
entrenchment of a norm means the highest possible guarantee of remaining valid (that 
is, guarantee against change) within the legal system. Thus, the norms of hierarchy of 
the sources of law are the norms regulating the change of norms within the system; this 
regulation is not restricted to the formal rules of change (that is, roughly, the procedures 
of change). But also, as we have seen, the higher norms at the same time limit the 
change of the normative content of the norms, since the field defined by the higher 
sources is a substantial limit as well to the change of the contents of the norms of the 
system. Still, it is true that the rules of hierarchy by their nature operate essentially 
formally, in the sense that they are applicable independently of the content of the norms. 
Another concept closely related to the change of the legal order is that of the momen-
tary legal system.** A momentary legal system is the set of norms belonging to the 
same legal system in a time span between two changes. Thus, a legal system remains the 
same momentary legal system as long as no new norm is added to the system or sub-
tracted from it. My definition of the momentary legal system differs from that of Raz 
in one respect: I suggest to define the momentary legal system by the change of the 
composition of the norms of the system, while Raz relates it to a certain moment in 
time. The two definitions are, in fact, not contrary to each other since any change 
(addition, substraction or modification of the validity conditions of a norm) in the 
composition of the legal system happens, of course, at a certain time. Therefore every 
new momentary legal system created by change corresponds to a momentary legal 
system as defined by a certain moment of time. The advantage of my definition is, I 
think, that it connects the concept of change in the legal system and that of the 
momentary legal system, since it defines the second in terms of the first. 
This connection, more explicit in the definition given above, makes it easier to define 
the concept of continuity—and for that matter, the discontinuity—of the legal system. 
I wish to approach this question—crucial, I believe, for the whole argument of this es-
say—from various points of view. First, I will define continuity and its criteria, then I 
47 The example, of course, is not applicable except in legal orders which possess a constitution higher than 
the ordinary act of Parliament. 
48 See RAZ, J.: The Concept of a Legal System, pp. 34-35, 187 et seq. 
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would like to distinguish the concepts of identity and continuity of legal systems. All this 
reasoning will throw, I hope, some light on the connection between legality and the 
limits o f change of legal systems. 
A. Identity and Continuity 
I think it is necessary to distinguish clearly the criteria of identity and that of continuity 
of the legal system. It is sometimes thought that only the question of identity may be 
answered by methods of jurisprudential inquiry; this is the view expressed in the seminal 
essay by Joseph Raz devoted to this problem. He writes: 
"The legal system is only part of the norms constituting the political system; 
most political systems include numerous non-legal norms... It follows that since 
the continuity of a legal system is tied to the continuity of the political system, 
the former is affected by the fate of the non-legal norms that happen to form part 
of the political system concerned... The substance of my contention is [he writes] 
that whatever form one's ultimate account of continuity takes, it must, in view 
of the relation of law and state, be based on the following two points: first, that 
continuity depends on the interaction of legal and non-legal norms, and the extent 
and manner of their change; and secondly, that among the legal norms concerned 
some are more relevant than others. Constitutional and administrative laws are 
therefore more relevant than, for example, the law of contract or torts."49 
Contrary to this view, I think that it is possible to distinguish between identity and 
continuity of the legal system, using exclusively legal criteria. This is not to deny that 
the problem of continuity has inevitably a political flavour; simply, I shall argue, the two 
aspects could be meaningfully distinguished. Raz seems to believe, as the text quoted 
above shows, that a political system change is in every case and by necessity a break in 
the continuity of a legal system; but, it is submitted, one can distinguish between at least 
two different ways of change in a legal system/order: first a political system change (or 
as Raz would say, change of "political norms") with continuity and second, a political 
system change which causes discontinuity of the legal system. The question I will try to 
answer is, of course, how one could distinguish the two cases. 
To start with, it should be recognized that the subproblem of continuity and identity 
is closely related to the concept of the momentary legal system; indeed, identity and 
continuity (or discontinuity) is a relationship between at least two momentary legal 
49 R A Z , J . : 'The Identity of Legal Systems' in RAZ: The Authority of Law, cit. pp 78 et seq. , p. 100. 
(Footnote omitted.) See also RAZ: The Concept of a Legal System, cit.. Ch . VIII. And see: FINNIS, J. : 
'Revolutions and the Continuity of Law' in SIMPSON, A. W. B. (ed.): Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 
Second Series, pp. 44 et seq. 
206 András Bragyova 
systems. Thus, when one discusses the identity and/or continuity of legal systems, it is 
a discussion of the relationship between a momentary legal system, MS,, and another 
momentary legal system, MS2; the crux of the problem lies in the nature of the relation-
ship between MS, and MS2, or perhaps better, in the rules or norms, if any, governing 
this relationship. Putting the question that way, it requires that one consciously neglects 
several other aspects of the problem, since, obviously, the present discussion is reduced 
to the normative aspects of the identity /continuity question; no doubt the relationship 
between the two momentary systems may be seen from various and completely different 
points of view. 
Two momentary legal systems could be said to be identical (or identical in part) on 
the ground of the relationship between the primary norms composing them: that is, this 
criterion is concerned with, or relates to, the substantive side of the legal order. 
According to this definition, two momentary legal systems are wholly identical only if 
they are composed of exactly the same norms. That is, if their content is exactly the 
same. Since I defined earlier the momentary legal system as a legal system of the same 
composition (i.e. by the change of the norms of the system), it is clear that only the 
same momentary legal system could be wholly or entirely identical with itself. Thus, the 
concept of total identity (or identity in general) presupposes the concept of membership 
of the legal system, that is, the systemic validity. If at least one norm is changed in the 
system, then the system is identical with the earlier in every primary norm except the 
one which had been changed. This definition of the identity, it is submitted, is essentially 
the concept we usually use in legal discourse when we are faced with similar questions, 
like, for instance this one: "is the tax law of Hungary identical with that of Iceland?". 
Such questions, if put in a bona fide manner, inquire into the differences between two 
legal orders; questions of identity (or, in practice, that of the scope of the identity) 
between legal systems are normal everyday practical problems in every sophisticated 
legal system. This is of particular importance if we conceive of this question as one 
relating to the norms composing the system, and not as one relating to the laws, since 
a frequent practical question in the case of new laws (say, a new labour code or criminal 
code) is how many new norms they really contain—i.e. to what extent are they identical 
with the previous code. Thus, identity is, contrary to continuity, a matter of degree. 
The question of identity, as the examples above show, is not concerned with the 
legality of the norms examined; indeed it is a legal inquiry which does not even 
presuppose the validity (or existence in some other sense, for instance "socially") that 
the group of norms whose extent or degree of identity is looked for: it is fully allowed 
to ask for the degree of identity between two groups or bulks of norms and still not 
assert that they exist, or at least setting aside the problem of their existence.50 More-
50 No doubt, practical interest is aroused normally by questions which concern existing legal orders; I 
contend only that this is not conceptually necessary. Anyway, it is standard legal inquiry if one investigates 
the relationship of a given legal order, e .g . Hungarian or Scottish to the Roman law, that was for a lot of 
centuries a non-existent legal order. 
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over, the latter could be said to be the typical case as lawyers quite often are looking for 
the changes of a given legal system within a defined period, e .g . in one year. Thus, the 
search of the degree of identity of two bulks of legal norms is a comparison between two 
legal orders, rather than legal systems, as defined above. 
Continuity of the legal system is, on the other hand, a concept describing the 
particular relationship between two (or more) momentary legal systems from the point 
of view of the norms/rules governing the very process of change of the momentary legal 
systems. In other words, the concept (and the phenomenon) of continuity of legal sys-
tems is intrinsicly related to the legality of the system concerned. As we have seen 
before (and know it very well from elsewhere), every legal system contains norms 
regulating the procedure and conditions of addition and subtraction of norms to the 
momentary legal systems; every operation of that kind changes the momentary legal 
system MS, into another momentary legal system MS2. Investigating the continuity of 
legal systems means, therefore, an inquiry into the norms constituting this connection. 
The relationship of continuity between two momentary legal systems is granted if (and 
only if) the change of MS, has been made in conformity with the norms governing the 
conditions and procedure of change of norms valid (applicable) for MS,; in that case it 
could be said that MS2 is in the relation of continuity to MS,. The inverse of this state-
ment does obviously not hold: legality according to the norms of MS2 would be a clear 
case of discontinuity. 
One would describe this state of affairs by saying that the legality of the change (i.e. 
the conformity with the norms relating to the system itself, as w e know) renders the 
various states of the legal system continuous. Thus, in deciding whether two (or more) 
momentary legal systems are in the relationship of continuity or not, it is only the 
legality, the legal regularity of the change, which decides. In short, the subsequent legal 
system is related to the prior one through its conformity with certain ("legality") norms 
of the prior system. As a consequence, if there is a continuity between the two (and 
every subsequent pair of) momentary legal systems, then the prior momentary legal 
system normatively predetermines the subsequent momentary legal system. Hence, in 
investigating the nature of continuity between two momentary legal systems MS, and 
MS2 we are interested in the nature of the link between the two (MS^MSj); w e are 
searching for what the symbol of the link '>' denotes. The link between the prior and 
subsequent momentary legal systems is the normative determination of the change of 
MS, into MS2 by the systemic norms of MS,. The normative determination of the 
subsequent momentary legal system by the prior one is, of course, not a full deter-
mination, still less a predetermination; it means simply that the legal process of change 
of the composition of the legal system is made in conformity with, and to that extent is 
determined by, the norms governing the formal and substantive conditions of change of 
the norms in the system. Formulated in other words, the new norms should be valid 
according to the norms (i.e. they should possess the legality of ) of the prior momentary 
legal system. In this sense, it is not unfounded to say that the subsequent momentary 
legal system normatively fol lows from the prior one; an alternative formulation would 
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be to say that the prior and the subsequent momentary legal systems are bound to each 
other in the legal sense through the normative link between them. 
Two remarks are, I think, necessary at this point. First, the concept of continuity 
exposed above presupposes that the momentary legal systems, bound together by the 
normative bridge of continuity, as it were, should not be fully identical; that fol lows 
analytically from the definition o f identity and continuity respectively, since the two 
identical momentary legal systems could not be in relationship of continuity as this 
relationship is possible only between two partly non identical momentary legal systems. 
The second, and perhaps more important, remark is that, contrary to identity, continuity 
has no degrees: while it is quite normal to say that a momentary legal system is partly 
identical with another one, it is meaningless to say that they are partly continuous and 
partly discontinuous (except of course if one uses the word 'continuity' in the sense of 
'identity' which is not allowed by the terminology adopted here). T w o momentary legal 
systems are either continuous or not while they are necessarily not identical. 
Thus, continuity of the legal system is a sequence of momentary legal systems bound 
together by systemic links; therefore, legality is a (or, perhaps, the sole) constitutive fac-
tor in cementing together a given series of momentary legal systems into a continuously 
existing legal system. It is only this normative link within any consecutive pair of mo-
mentary legal systems MS, and MS2 , that makes a sequence of momentary legal systems 
subsets of a legal system.5' It fo l lows from the foregoing that the validity of a norm in 
the system could be defined unequivocally by two parameters: first, the formal and 
substantive validity criteria, and second, the subsequent momentary legal systems which 
include (or included) the norm in question. One must add that legality is a concept that 
involves the requirement of the existence of norms (together with the claim of conform-
ity) relating to change in the legal system; since the application of the norms of the legal 
system to itself (as I have defined legality) necessarily includes the "dynamic aspect"52 
of the functioning of a legal system. 
In conclusion, the concept (and the phenomenon) of continuity is based exclusively 
on the systemic properties of the legal system; unlike identity, it is not a concept bound 
to the idea of legal order. A very important consequence of this state of affairs is that 
legal systems may be continuous without containing one primary norm in common, that 
is, without being even lightly identical. This observation is corroborated by practical 
experience: a legal system remains continuous even though after some time there will 
be no norm identical with its o w n previous state. Paradigm cases are the United States 
or Britain: the legal system of these states has been no doubt continuous, in the sense 
I use it, for centuries; and still one could hardly find but a few norms of common law 
5 1 See RAZ, J . : T h e Concept of a Legal System, op. cit. And see WRÓBLEWSKI, J . : 'Systems of Norms 
and Legal Systems ' , 49 Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto, 224 (1972). 
52 The use of this concept here is, o f course, the sign of my indebtedness to KELSEN. See his Reine 
Rechtslehre, 2nd ed . Vienna, 1960, pp . 196 et seq.; see also his General Theory of Law and State, op. cit. 
pp . 113 et seq. 
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which remained intact to change during the continuous existence of the legal system of 
these countries. This example shows that the concept of continuity has nothing to do (at 
least not directly) with the social content or function of the legal system or the norms 
composing it: a sociologist, an historian, or a political scientist would not necessarily 
agree with this statement from his or her own point of view. 
B. Legality and Continuity 
At this point we still do not possess the solution to the problem in which we are inter-
ested. Even though it was said that continuity is a property of a legal system which 
depends on the legality of the passage from MS, to MS2 and from MS2 to MS3 and so 
forth, we have not yet resolved the original problem. Up to this point I have tacitly 
assumed that the norms constituting the "block of legality" within the system have 
remained the same. The norms belonging to the block of legality, or the core of them 
which ultimately creates and/or maintains the continuity of the legal system have been 
described and explained, as it is well known, by important legal philosophers in various 
ways; I have in mind, as particularly relevant, Kelsen's Grundnorm and Hart's rule of 
recognition. Their influence had been not purely theoretical, because in certain countries 
where courts of law had to decide on the legality of a post-revolutionary legal system 
('revolution' is intended here to mean simply a political system change, not the legal 
concept) they in fact applied—and referred to—these jurisprudential statements.53 The 
question in which we are now interested is, however, a bit different: it intends to ask 
what happens if the norms within the block of legality change; that is, the problem o f the 
legality of the change in legality. 
In trying to answer this question at least approximately a reminder is perhaps neces-
sary: legality is the legal self-regulation of the legal system necessary for the existence 
of the legal system, as a distinct system. The norms forming the "block of legality" 
have, at least, a double character: first they are general postulates necessary for the 
correct legal functioning of the legal system (one could assume that they are by and large 
the same as the Fullerian criteria of the "inner morality of law" discussed above); and 
second—despite their different function and behaviour within the legal system—they form 
part of that legal system, like the other norms of which it is composed. The latter means 
that they are usually expressed in the same form as any other norm of the system; there-
fore, they could be changed, under certain conditions as if they were "ordinary" norms 
of the system. Needless to say, any important change in the "norms of the political sys-
tem", that is, political system change, simply cannot happen without important changes 
in the norms of legality. Reasonably typical examples of such transformations are the 
53 In several countries of the world, such as in South-Africa, Rhodesia (as it then was), Pakistan etc . See 
EEKELAAR, J . : Principles of Revolutionary Legality, op. cit.; HARRIS, J . : When and Why Does the 
Grundnorm Change? op. cit. 
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change in the procedures for creation of norms of the legal system, change in the legal 
competence of the organs of the state possessing legal power to issue norms, change in 
the procedure of the composition of the (highest) law-making organs or the change of 
these organs themselves, and the like. Many of these changes, or at least the political 
events leading to them, would be, I think properly, described by most political observers 
as 'revolutionary', since the changes are great enough to embrace not only the whole 
political process of transformation from an authoritarian rule to democracy, but its 
inverse too. It is important to note that these changes might well include the change of 
the highest legislator, that is, the legal sovereign of the system. However, from a legal 
point of view, they are not necessarily entitled to the same qualification, because it is not 
at all impossible that a legal system changes the norms regulating its own functioning 
(i.e. belonging to the "block of legality") exactly in the same way as any other norm 
belonging to the system. If the norms relating to the production of norms within the 
system are changed according to the prior rules of production, the change could be truly 
revolutionary in the political sense (say from the rule that the Tzar solely entitled to 
make laws to the rule that laws are adopted by the National Assembly which is freely 
elected) but it will not produce any break in the continuity of the legal system. The 
substantial condition of this continuity is the full recognition (by compliance with the 
pertinent norms of production) of the legality of the prior momentary system. In a case 
with this kind of change, it is a necessary condition that the change of the systemic 
norms be gradual. That is, in every subsequent phase of change, there should be always 
at least two common systemic norms in the prior and the subsequent momentary legal 
systems.54 This kind of change of the legal system is of course fully compatible with 
any subsequent fundamental change of the norms composing the legal system (i.e. that 
of the "legal order") to the extent that the new norms of the system allow it, without it 
amounting to the discontinuity of the legal system. 
There is another very important connection between continuity and legality: the limits 
set by legality in the case of continuity to the modification of the legal system. 
Essentially I contend that the main consequence of the continuity of the legal system is 
that it may not deny, legally, the legality of the previous momentary legal systems linked 
to it by the chain of continuity. It follows, then, that at the moment when the norms of 
legality were modified, observing the norms of legality within the system, the 
momentary legal system thus created included every norm which composed the prior 
momentary legal system. In consequence, the new norms relating to the addition, 
subtraction etc. of norms in the legal system are applicable to the norms "inherited" 
from the prior momentary legal system; however, due to the link of continuity, the fact 
that, the subsequent momentary legal systems are, in a way, successors of the prior 
ones, indicates that they are legally no less valid than any other norm belonging to the 
system. It is a general property of the momentary legal systems that the norms 
54 Expressed in different language, it is necessary that MS, and MSj contain at least one common systemic 
norm. This is, by the way, the minimal definition of continuity. 
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composing them as we have abundantly seen above, are equally valid, notwithstanding 
their origin, "rank" and so forth. 
It happens quite often that the modification of legality norms, if preceded or followed 
by radical political changes, continues with no fewer radical changes in the substantive 
norms of the legal system. This is in itself an unchallengeable procedure and compatible 
with legality, provided that it does not deny the legality of the previous states in the 
same system. And this is the point where legality hinders overly radical changes of the 
legal order. The most acute problem in this respect is certainly the problem of ex post 
facto, i.e. retrospective change or modification of the norms composing the legal system. 
One must clearly distinguish the case of an ordinary repeal of a norm from that 
extraordinary one. The former is a relatively simple thing (at least from the present point 
of view): a norm ceases to exist in the next momentary legal system; while the latter is 
an equivalent of the modification of a momentary legal system which legally could not 
be modified since it has been superseded by the subsequent chain of momentary legal 
systems, normatively linked together through the regular sequence of consequent 
momentary legal systems. The retrospective modification of a superseded momentary 
legal system would amount to the denial of the normative link binding together the 
subsequent phases of the same legal system. Therefore it would be, in fact, an indirect 
claim of discontinuity within the legal system. Now, we have already seen that there is 
no partial discontinuity in the legal system: a legal system is either continuous or 
discontinuous (and in that case there are two entirely different legal systems); in short, 
there is no half way house between the two, exactly in the same way that there is no 
partial legality in a legal system. Since the full denial of the continuity must, by 
necessity, lead to the self-denial of the legal system as such, it is in the legal sense 
nearly as dangerous an act as a revolution would be. 
There is another important aspect here. Retroactive legislation, i .e . a norm applicable 
to facts or states of affairs prior to its entry into force (which for our purposes may be 
taken to be the same as the moment in which the norm had been added to the legal 
system), is always of doubtful legality. Surely not on simple logical grounds: it is quite 
clear that a norm (or principle) like nullum crimen sine lege previa does not fol low 
"logically" from the concept of the legal system. On the other hand, it is also true that 
a legal order composed of exclusively or overwhelmingly retroactive norms would not 
be a legal order at all, since to quote the classical statement of Hobbes: 
"No Law, made after a Fact done, can make it crime [. . .] and a positive Law 
cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore cannot be Oblig-
atory".55 
But, all that being true (or perhaps even a truism), most legal systems usually allow 
in their practice laws applicable to states of affairs, conducts, facts etc. prior to their 
55 Leviathan, Ch. 27. The edition used is that of edited by C . B. Macpherson, London, 1968, p. 339. 
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creation.56 It must be said that even the principle of nullum crimen sine lege just 
quoted, requires the retroactive application of the criminal law norms advantageous to 
the defendant. However, it would be mistaken to cite these cases as argument for 
unlimited retrospective modification of norms within the legal system, since there is a 
fundamental difference between norms which modify or change only the legal 
consequences of facts prior to the entry into force of the norm, without withdrawing the 
legal quality o f the norms previously regulating the states of affairs and facts. 
Expressed in other terms, the main limit inherent in the legality of a legal system is 
that it may not reverse the fundamental legal qualification once given within the system 
(that is in an unbroken sequence of momentary legal systems) to a conduct or state of 
affairs reaching back to the momentary legal systems in which it was valid. That is, 
simply it may not declare prohibited retroactively what was legally permitted in a given 
moment in a given momentary legal system and so forth. A legal system doing so would 
reject its own systemic quality since it would legally qualify the same conduct and the 
same state of affairs within the same momentary legal system in a contradictory way. 
This would be in itself not a sheer impossibility—contrary to Kelsen57 and in accor-
dance with mainstream view—I do not believe that there could no contradiction in a legal 
order but this would be a contradiction of a very particular type. First of all, it would 
be a contradiction consciously introduced, in a sense just in order to create a 
contradiction between the norms of the system; second, it would create a contradiction 
between norms which is possible only if one rejects the legality, i.e. in this case, the 
legal validity of the system's own previous states; that is, the previous momentary legal 
systems would be regarded as if they had not been part of the same legal system of 
which the retroactive norms are supposed to be. 
The rationale of my view is the following: as we have seen above, a norm is usually 
a member in a series of consecutive momentary legal systems as long as it remains valid; 
it could be modified only in switching from MS, , containing the norm, into MS2 which 
does not contain it. Now, a retrospective repeal of a norm (including a repeal by a 
contrary norm) would, as it were, reel back the whole series o f consecutive momentary 
legal systems to the one containing the norm to be repealed. But, it must be stressed 
again, this could be done only by destroying the legality of the legal system for at least 
two reasons: first, as we know, every change in the composition of the legal system 
creates a new momentary legal system. Therefore a retrospective repeal would, in fact, 
"decreate", so to speak, each momentary legal system that existed between the repealing 
56 See in general KISKER, G.: Die Rückwirkung von Gesetzen, Tubingen, 1963; and AFFOLTER, F . : Das 
intertemporale Recht I II, Leipzig, 1902-1903. Cf. M U N Z E R , S. R.: 'A Theory of Retroactive Legislation' 
61 Texas Law Review, 425 (1982). 
57 See his Reine Rechtslehre, op . cit. pp. 209 et seq.; and see on this topic HARRIS, J. W. : 'Kelsen on 
Normative Consistency' in TUR, R.—TWINING, W. (eds.): Essays on Kelsen, op. cit., pp. 201 et seq. Of 
course, Kelsen later changed his view on the subject, see: 'Derogation', N E W M A N , R. A. (ed.): Essays in 
Honor of Roscoe Pound, Indianapolis, 1962, pp. 339 et seq. 
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and repealed norm; second, a retrospective repeal would be contrary to the homogeneity 
of the validity of the norms composing the system, since that homogeneity makes 
impossible any selection between valid norms within the system. They could perish only 
together with the system as a whole but not alone, as no selection among valid norms 
within the momentary legal system is permitted. 
It is essential to note that the same applies, mutatis mutandis, if one investigates the 
same problem, not in the case of norms, but for legally perfect legal positions created 
within and under the legal order, such as those which are (or became) under the 
operating rules unchangeable in law; a classic and simple example of such situations 
created by the legal order is the acquisition of property after the lapse of time required 
by law bv virtue of prescription (statutory limitation), or the prescription of crimes. In 
these cases, rights, and similar other legal positions, should be treated as if they were 
norms, if the rights or legal positions had been created immediately by the norms or 
guaranteed directly by them, and provided of course that the legal order declared those 
situations, under certain conditions, irrevocable in law.58 
VI. Conclusion 
My conclusions to this essay will be relatively brief. The essential point has been that 
the phenomenon I ventured to call "legality" is a fundamental quality of any self-
regulating legal system. The legality of the system remains unaffected as long as the 
norms of the system relating to itself are complied with; a particular aspect of the 
legality, or legal existence of the system is the question of its legal continuity which 
could be determined only by examining whether the legality of the system had been 
uninterrupted. The continuity of the legal system—unlike and independent from the 
identity of the legal order—could be maintained even in the case of fundamental change 
in the rules governing the working of the legal system, including the structure of the 
legal sovereign, which is equivalent to a political revolution. The only condition is that 
the legal regularity of the change within the system (its legality) must be maintained. 
This regularity may be identified, at least in part, with the "existence " of the legal system 
in the legal sense which is not necessarily identical with the non-legal (social, political 
etc.) criteria of existence (nor with the continuity) of the legal system. After all, it is 
quite reasonable to speak of the history of French or Hungarian law, although, rather 
obviously, there were several discontinuities in the legal sense in the history of these 
legal orders; still, it is meaningful to treat the history of French law as a historical 
continuity, as distinct from the legal one. From this point of view continuity, a crucial 
concept within legality, is a necessary, if not in itself sufficient, component of the highly 
complex phenomenon we call 'existence of a legal system' as distinct from, although not 
contrary to, the existence of norms of conduct ut singuli; a legal system which is not 
58 See the fine analysis of these problems in J È Z E , G. : Cours de droit public, La technique juridique du 
droit public français, Paris, 1924, pp. 1-105. 
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continuous does not—indeed cannot—exist in the legal sense as a system. This is, of 
course, not to say that continuity and existence of a legal system are the same, but 
simply that continuity is a crucial concept in explaining why and how different bulks of 
norms form a unity in time and may be reasonably referred to as a legal system distinct 
from others. 
An important aspect which should be mentioned with emphasis is that continuity (or 
discontinuity) does not affect directly the existence (in the sense of non-systemic validity) 
of the single norm components of the system. A "new" legal system created after a 
break in the continuous legality would certainly contain a lot of norms (most probably 
the majority) which were valid and continue to be valid in the "new" system built up 
after the rupture. Discontinuity would not have necessarily more import on the 
substantive components of the legal system (that which I called earlier 'legal order') than 
it would be possible in case of continuity; the difference is rather in the methods and 
procedures available to change the composition of the legal system. As I have tried to 
explain in the case of continuity, legality sets serious limits to retrospective change of 
the legal order; in general continuity implies that even if the legal sovereign has 
changed, it is bound by the bonds of legality to the prior normative acts of its 
predecessor. 
The last question I shall attempt to answer concerns a crucial aspect o f the problem 
discussed: what is the consequence of the violation of "legality"? What happens if the 
legislator infringes on the norms constituting legality, for instance those set out earlier? 
The answer can only be manyfold: on the one hand, this event could not be excluded, 
still less prevented by the norms of the system. But this is not all one can say on this 
topic, since an infringement of legality could nevertheless produce dangerous side effects 
for the violator. The grounds of these counter-productive effects could be discovered 
essentially in the circumstance that a law-maker or any other organ of the legal system, 
which infringes upon legality, contributes to the destruction of the system itself, thus 
indirectly to its own destruction, simply because the law-maker as an organ of the legal 
system is linked to it inseparably. A legal system regularly violating legality will be in 
last analysis a series o f minor revolutions; one is tempted to say that a legislator making 
laws contrary to the principles of legality becomes, whatever his or her intention is, by 
virtue of its violation of legality a revolutionary legislator with all the consequences, 
legal political and social, of a revolution. One should be reminded that the position of 
the revolutionary law-maker is at best ambiguous: as w e have seen the revolutionary 
legislator denies the legality of the prior legal system and at the same time claims full 
legality for the subsequent one. The revolutionary legislator is, therefore, inevitably a 
transitory phenomenon: for, either it becomes an ordinary legislator with legal authority 
(stemming from legality, and ultimately from the legal system) and than looses its 
revolutionary character; or, it remains revolutionary against its own system. But in that 
case, revolutionary legislation must end in the disruption of the legal system and in the 
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last analysis in the self-destruction of its own legislative authority.59 In sum, a legislator 
as the highest organ of the legal system, cannot command authority and obedience to the 
system (as distinguished from the norms composing it, since they could be accepted on 
independent grounds) if it constantly disobeys, and thus denies the validity of, its norms. 
A legal system cannot be composed of a series of minor revolutions without risking total 
decomposition. 
One must conclude, therefore, that ex post facto political justice, which by necessity 
presupposes, as I endeavoured to prove above, the discontinuity of the prior and 
subsequent states of the legal system, could not be implemented, not even according to 
their proponents, without accepting the discontinuity thesis. The least one can say is that 
it is necessary to examine most carefully whether the preconditions of discontinuity exist 
before adopting measures inconsistent with the continuity (and for that matter, legality) 
of the legal system. The problems raised in (and after) the process o f transition from 
"socialism" to constitutional democracy in Hungary and elsewhere in East and Central 
Europe are a good case for the reasonableness of this statement. Of course, the 
continuity of the legal system does not bar even the deepest possible transformation of 
the legal order, but it is equally true that it limits the methods available to do it; in 
particular it limits—not absolutely, nevertheless substantially—the retrospectivity of the 
changes introduced to the legal order. This may hurt perhaps, and in certain cases quite 
acceptably, the sense of moral justice of many; but this is the price a society must pay 
for the advantages of the relatively smooth functioning of the legal system or, 
occasionally, simply for its mere existence. 
59 Perhaps the best possible example of this ' paradox of revolutionary legislator', if one is allowed to call 
it so, is to be found probably in the Russian Revolution under the Bolsheviks: they wanted to legislate in order 
to destroy the legal order but found no better method to do so than to build up their own legal system, in part 
similar to the one they wanted to destroy. The theoretical problems are exposed e.g. by SCHLESINGER, R. : 
Soviet Legal Theory: Its Social Background and Development, London, 1946, pp. 17 et seq., 36 et seq. 
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The primacy of the Constitution is a basic postulate of a law-governed State meeting the 
intrinsic and extrinsic criteria of constitutionality. The Constitution represents the legal 
underpinnings of the exercise of power, a concrete order which, established in 
democratic processes and through consensus, is recognized by society as constituting the 
condition and framework for the functioning of its political unity. The Constitution is 
legal category, a statutory enactment deriving its specific quality, its peculiarity, from 
the distinctive primordial character it is invested with, in contrast to all other statutory 
enactments. All legal mechanism, all legal processes must be in conformity with the 
Constitution. However, this primacy of the Constitution is not some inner specific of the 
regulative procedure asserting itself automatically on the strength o f the declaration it 
embodies, but a requirement calling for institutionalized guarantees for the implementa-
tion of the Constitution and for a form of organization protective of the Constitution and 
capable of controlling the course and nature of its implementation. In point of fact, the 
political and state processes taking place by virtue of the Constitution do not lose, despite 
the fundamental norms governing them, their natural expression of interests, consensus 
and compromise, so they can be seen more as original decisions than as deductive appli-
cations of the Constitution without any formal proceedings. In order for the intrinsic and 
extrinsic aspects of constitutionality, of the implementation of the Constitution, or for 
the positive and negative requirements thereof to come into play, it is necessary to have 
an organization which, destined for the protection of the Constitution, will ensure a 
harmony between the Constitution and additional related (derivative) enactments, with 
the primacy of the Constitution upheld. 
Assurance of the primacy of the Constitution in all legal acts is a task of extreme 
complexity, mainly because of the need for the legal mechanisms linked up with the 
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Constitution to observe the limitations placed by the Constitution on the exercise of 
power by the State (negative aspect) and to allow scope for manifestations of the State 
which the Constitution has envisaged in furtherance of some significant goals (positive 
aspect). This is combined with the fact that the negative and positive aspects of the 
Constitution are enforced on different levels o f legal acts and state actions, on different 
tiers of hierarchy, so, as regards the nature of their linkages with the Constitution, they 
embody a wide variety of direct and indirect features. Another problem lies in that the 
Constitution, despite its primacy in the legal system, is nothing more or nothing else than 
a statutory enactment formulating a concrete order deemed to be fundamental (or to be 
attainable as such) and that, precisely for this reason, it cannot be regarded as an 
inexhaustible source of legal tenets and as an open-ended system of points of reference.1  
Like every statutory enactment, the Constitution contains legal tenets which carry their 
meanings, not in themselves, but in the way they are interpreted by their implementers 
or advocates. Hence the implementation of the Constitution is a logical and a value laden 
procedure varying with the interests in giving it effect and/or getting acquainted with it. 
It is this basic nature of interpretation with which it is necessary to reconcile the require-
ment, more or less contradictory at all times, that the Constitution should also be an 
objectivation existing in other than interpretation. Therefore the precept and postulate of 
the Constitution's primacy apply in respect to both the subject and the object of interpre-
tation. 
In light of the foregoing it can be seen that the tasks of implementing and protecting 
the Constitution imply real responsibilities and promise real results only in a State with 
a power structure that is based on the separation of powers and thereby of the interests 
involved in enforcing the Constitution. As was shown by the failure of the mechanism 
established by the amendment of the Constitution in 1983 for protecting constitutionality, 
moderate arrangements for the separation of powers are incapable of expressing the plu-
ralism of intents and interests relating to the implementation of the Constitution, which 
in tum is, in view of the diversity of constitutional requirements, an indispensable condi-
tion for enforcing the constitutional provisions in the entire system of state organizations 
with different interests in taking action. Implementation or protection of the Constitution 
cannot be the prerogative of a single state organ (or of some of them), for it has no 
chance of success except when the organic structure of the State is such that each of its 
components or units has its own functions and responsibilities to perform in respect to 
the implementation of the Constitution. Nothing but the state organization as a whole is 
capable of implementing the Constitution on a full scale. Precisely this recognition is 
reflected in the doctrine of the separation of powers which maintains, even in relation 
to sovereignty, that the creation and maintenance of the particular legal order prescribed 
by the Constitution is a task of every constitutional organ within, of course, its 
competence. This does not, naturally, rule out (but rather presupposes) differences in the 
nature and weight of functions performed by the various organizations in operating a 
1 BETHGE. H. Aktuelle Probleme der Gnindrechtsdogmatik, Der Staat, 1985, No. 3, p. 355 . 
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concrete order, yet it does exclude the possibility for any state organ to carry out its 
constitutional mandate by restricting or impeding similar activities of other organizations. 
The role of the Constitutional Court, which was set up by the Constitution as amended 
in 1989 and regulated in detail by Act XXXII of 1989, as well as the modes and avenues 
of its functioning should also be interpreted against this background of relationships be-
tween constitutionalism and the protection of the Constitution. 
The preamble to Act XXXII of 1989 determined, inter alia,the chief function of the 
Constitutional Court to be that of protecting the constitutional order and the fundamental 
rights recognized by the Constitution and, keeping in view the theory of separation of 
powers, proclaimed the Constitutional Court to be the highest organ destined to protect 
the Constitution. For the purpose of enabling the Constitutional Court to perform these 
functions the Act vested it with wide powers even by international comparison. Accord-
ingly the Court's powers2 include ex ante (a priori) control over the constitutionality of 
Acts of Parliament and international treaties, ex post (a posteriori) norm control, investi-
gation of eventual conflicts of statutory provisions and other legal acts of State with 
international treaties, consideration of constitutional complaints against violations of 
fundamental rights embodied in the Constitution, elimination of unconstitutionality mani-
fest in omissions, termination of specified conflicts between spheres of competence, 
interpretation of constitutional provisions, and proceeding in any matters referred to it 
by law.3 
A recurrent and still pending issue in foreign literature on constitutional jurisdiction 
concerns the nature of the constitutional courts.4 Related analyses proceed from the 
powers, established de jure, of constitutional courts and compare the conclusions drawn 
with de facto actions thereof. This line of inquiries is all the more justified since the 
scope of action open to constitutional judicatures by virtue of law and the actual activities 
thereof may be stated to be out of step in almost all cases. The actual activities of the 
overwhelming majority of constitutional courts do not exhaust all legally established 
avenues (chiefly because the courts exercise self-restraint), but a smaller number of 
constitutional courts can be observed to exceed their legally established powers 
essentially by operation of customary law. As regards the functioning of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court in this respect, there is as yet no sufficient experience capable of 
generalization to allow a reliable comparison. It is nevertheless necessary to discuss a 
few dilemmas in the light of legislation, because they are not irrelevant to possible future 
directions of the Court's activity in the protection of the Constitution. 
2 Art. 1 of Act XXXII of 1989. 
3 A case in point is the power vested in the Constitutional Court by Art. 31/A (5) of the Constitution, under 
which the responsibility of the President of the Republic for violations of the Constitution or other legal 
enactments during his performance of office shall be judged by the Constitutional Court. 
4 TRIBE, L. H.: American Constitutional Law, Mineola, 1978, pp. 9 et seq.; WEBER. A. : Verfassungs-
gerichtsbarkeit in Westeuropa, in: STARCK, Chr.—WEBER, A. (Hrsg.): Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in 
Westeuropa. I. Baden-Baden, 1986, pp. 60 et seq. 
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The Act on the Constitutional Court fails to give a legal definition of the nature of 
the Court. Yet, by reason of the term "court", what appears to be the acceptable view 
is that the Constitutional Court should be seen as a law-administering organ, one that 
applies specifically the Constitution. This interpretation is supported both by the logic 
of the division of powers and by the requirement of democratic legislation (that is public, 
based on consensus and open to control). If the Constitutional Court is conceived of as 
a law-administering organ, one may by all means raise some preliminary objections to 
its powers as established by law. The first relates ex ante (a priori) norm control, which 
is much discussed in foreign literature as well. Preliminary control over the constitutio-
nality of legal enactments may be objected to by reason of the fact that this function 
restricts in effect those of the organs vested with legislative power. If the Constitutional 
Court may declare a legal enactment to be unconstitutional before it is validly passed, 
thereby preventing its adoption, the Court is virtually involved as a participant (vested 
with the right of veto) in performing the function of an organ with legislative power. The 
Constitutional Court tentatively shares the decision-making competence of the organ 
affected by such control, so this line of its activity is much closer to legislation than to 
its proper function, that is the application of law. Giving concrete substance to constitu-
tional provisions, implementing or enforcing them, is primarily a task for the legislator, 
with its constitutional mandate and responsibility also consisting in this activity. Under 
the Hungarian regulation, ex ante (a priori) norm control is basically control over laws, 
which turns the Constitutional Court into an organ giving concrete substance to the Con-
stitution and, owing to its special right of veto, makes it no longer an adjunct to the 
legislative organ (which, for that matter, would clearly follow from the principle of 
primacy of the Constitution and its protection), but actually superordinate to it. The 
Court's function to interpret the Constitution, which is inadequately specified, may 
likewise be criticized for similar considerations. The problem lies in the mandatory 
nature of interpretation. If the Constitutional Court is viewed as a law-administering 
organ, its interpretational activity may equally concern interpretation of law enforcement, 
which, under the general rules of interpretation, may only relate to concrete cases, with 
no effect erga omnes. In fact, mandatory and general interpretation of the Constitution 
implies quasi legislation, at least in a negative sense, for the result of its interpretation 
of the Constitution thereby determines in advance (and may even be said to substitute 
for) the will of the legislature. The function of giving concrete substance to the 
Constitution in advance is inconsistent with the function of enforcing the law, 
particularly so in cases where such activity aims at adding to the content of the Constitu-
tion, for it amounts to a typical and constantly criticized form of tentative modification 
of the Constitution extremely disquieting from the point of view of constitutionalism.5 
Considering that the function of protecting the Constitution is assigned to more organs 
than one, even if there is a highest organ established specifically for that purpose, it is 
inadvisable to invest a single organ with too wide powers to watch over the constitu-
5 BETHGE: supra 1, fn 367. 
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tionality of the legal system. Depending on whether direct or indirect elements are 
predominant in the linkages of the legal system with the Constitution, we can speak of 
constitutional or legality control. The current state organization continues to include 
organs called upon to terminate such conflicts and contradictions in the lower echelons 
of the legal system as may be said to be disquieting from the point of view of constitu-
tionality. In this context, requirement of implementing the Constitution implies a 
protective function so indirect as to make it more appropriate to assign norm control to 
organs whose essentially similar functions are confined to lower levels of legislation. A 
problem directly affecting the law-administering nature of the Constitutional Court 
concerns the scope of discretionary powers, as it may be stated in general that even a 
certain extent of discretion tends to make law enforcement closely akin to (quasi) 
legislation. This aspect holds particularly true of the possibility for the applicability of 
legal enactments to be established on grounds of expediency. In this respect one may 
take objection to the provision of the Act on the Constitutional Court under which the 
Court may, by invoking a particularly important interest of legal certainty or of the 
applicant, disregard the date for annulment ex nunc of legal enactments and fix another 
date previous or subsequent thereto.6 What is involved here is not the procedure, 
otherwise copiously criticized or championed in foreign literature, under which estab-
lishment of unconstitutionality is virtually tantamount to a legal enactment being declared 
null and void in an appropriate legal ceremony, which clearly implies ex tunc but rather 
a problem concerning the discretionary powers of the Constitutional Court to determine 
whether or not a legal enactment shall lose effect, and, indeed, discretionary con-
sideration of a particularly important interest of legal certainty or of an applicant points 
beyond the scope of law enforcement, let alone the fact that, precisely under a system 
for the protection of the Constitution, it would be difficult to argue for the existence of 
an interest supporting the acceptability of shortening or lengthening the period for which 
a case of unconstitutionality may be allowed to subsist. 
Any criticism that may be addressed, under the adopted legal (legislative) arran-
gements, to the protection of the Constitution and to the highest organ established for 
that purpose implies nothing but possible anomalies in the functioning of the Constitu-
tional Court, first and foremost the fact that the too wide-ranging activity of the Court 
may even come to recast the basis for legitimating the constitutional order and thereby 
that order itself. No matter how important the function of the highest organ protecting 
the Constitution may be, it must not lead to "totalitarianism" in the protection of the 
Constitution in a state based on the rule of law and governed by the doctrine of the 
division of powers. Tilting the balance cannot, of course, be imputed solely to legislative 
regulation too loose and hence amenable to widening in scope, because it is coupled with 
the additional question of how the Constitutional Court uses the powers conferred on it 
by law. It should be seen, however, that the practice of self-restraint is itself based on 
discretion, or presupposes a discretionary power that transcends, in a large part of cases, 
6 Arts. 42 (1) and 43 (4) of Act XXXII of 1989. 
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the scope of protecting the Constitution, that is applying the law, meaning that is goes 
beyond the limit within which the primacy of the Constitution as a legal norm clearly 
prevails over all state organs. 
Today we may feel fortunate to say that constitutionalism or the protection of the 
Constitution are no mere theoretical questions. At the beginning of 1990 the Constitu-
tional Court started to function on the basis of a constitutional mandate and a legislative 
regulation. In the first few months of its work, which were most probably decisive to 
the development of its judicative practice and style, the Constitutional Court handed 
down over 20 published decisions.7 By interpretations of the Constitution and law, 
several of them contributed greatly to forming a judgement on the set of problems 
concerning constitutionality and on the prospects of future development. A breakdown 
of the decisions by the legally defined functions of the Constitutional Court does not 
allow, owing to the short period of time since the Court started its work, any far-
reaching conclusions to be drawn, but is nonetheless worthwhile to cite a few relevant 
figures. Out of the 22 decisions published up to 16 October 1990, four were concerned 
with interpreting the Constitution, two may be said to have dealt with constitutional 
complaints, and the rest (16 in total) related to ex post (a posteriori) norm control. A 
small number of constitutional complaints and a great number of decisions on ex post (a 
posteriori) norm control leap to the eye in light of international experience (with 
emphasis laid again on the short period of time available for a comparison). In countries 
serving as a model for developing the practice of the Constitutional Court, the 
judgements of constitutional courts deal with constitutional complaints for the most part8 
and those relating to ex post (a posteriori) norm control are rare exceptions. This is most 
probably associated with the fact that constitutional jurisdiction in Western Europe is 
increasingly developing into one concerned with the so-called fundamental rights,9 
related decisions being based precisely on constitutional complaints. However, the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court cannot also escape the pressure of heightened expecta-
tions about the effect of fundamental rights in creating a constitutional order. This 
explains largely why the Constitutional Court has made its most important statements 
affecting fundamental rights precisely in its rulings on norm control. For that matter, the 
relatively high ratio of proceedings involving ex post (a posteriori) norm control can 
7 By the time this study was completed the Constitutional Court had passed its decision, of great importance 
to the evolution of the concept of fundamental rights, declaring capital punishment to be unconstitutional. (In 
his dissenting opinion attached to the decision, judge SCHMIDT made noteworthy statements concerning the 
Court 's powers as well.) 
8 The Federal Constitutional Court of the FRG, for instance, considers some 3 ,000 constitutional complaints 
a year, whereas the total number of norm control proceedings between 1951 and 1985 remained below this 
figure. Cf. BENDA, E.: Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeitder Bundesrepublik Deutschland, I.; STARCK—WE-
BER (Hrsg.): supra 4, pp. 131, 133, 135. 
9 POKOL, В.: Alapjogok és alkotmánybíráskodás—jogelméleti szempontból (Fundamental Rights and 
Constitutional Jurisdiction—from the Point of View of Legal Theory), Jogtudományi Közlöny, No. 5 of 1990, 
pp. 144 et seq. 
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similarly be explained by the temporary situation in which the contradictions and tensions 
appearing within the law and hence resolvable within the framework of norm control 
tend to increase during the period of transformation of the legal system, a fact which 
understandably shifts the focus of the Court's activity to these aspects. In like manner, 
the peculiarity that the Constitutional Court has established cases of unconstitutionality, 
with their consequences enforced, in a relatively large number of its published decisions 
is illuminated by the contradictions accompanying the transformation of the legal system. 
The Court rejected only two motions for annulment, while, in the remaining 16 cases 
of relevance, the aforesaid four motions for interpretations of the Constitution should 
clearly be left out of consideration, although the Court decided full or partial annul-
ments. In the West European practice of constitutional jurisdiction based on a more 
stable legal order, the number of rejected motions is much higher than that of motions 
upheld by the constitutional courts.10 Of the decisions of the Constitutional Court 
establishing nullity, seven fixed a date subsequent to that of their publication in the 
official gazette. In the cases of unconstitutionality established, the annulments with 
subsequent dates and objected to in principle as indicated above are justified by the 
Constitutional Court mainly on grounds of avoiding gaps in law arising in consequence 
of annulment. This was also stated in Decision No. 10/1990 (IV. 27) establishing the 
unconstitutionality of regulation on widow's pension, the Court adding that the time-limit 
set was intended to allow time for the legislative, in that case the Parliament, to adopt 
an appropriate legal enactment in conformity with the Constitution. Also, there are cases 
in which the establishment of unconstitutionality is based on the inner contradiction of 
the legal system created by an omission of the legislative organ. The same reasoning is 
to be found in Decision No. 16/1990 (VII. 11) of the Constitutional Court. If the 
establishment of unconstitutionality within the framework of norm control proceedings 
were based solely on the ground that the contradiction of the legal system would be the 
concomitant of an omission alone, summons with a time-limit fixed would be a suitable, 
and practically the only, means of terminating a case of unconstitutionality. But in the 
event that a case of unconstitutionality involves a violation of the Constitution by both 
act and omission, as was the case with the last-mentioned decision, the concerns to be 
expressed in connection with cases of annulment at subsequent dates relate also to cases 
of violation of the Constitution purely by acts. For that matter, the intervening time-
limits fixed by decisions of the Constitutional Court establishing "deferred nullity vary 
between eight and two and a half months [as exemplified by Decisions No. 10/1990 (IV. 
27) and No. 22 /1990 (X.16), respectively]. 
In its judicative activity so far, the Constitutional Court has passed seven decisions 
annulling legal enactments with ex nunc effect on grounds of unconstitutionality, its 
reasoning being in all cases that it has found no interest deserving special consideration 
and justifying departure from ex nunc effect, which is stated by law to be the general 
10 In Austria, for example, the ratio of favourable and unfavourable decisions is 1 to 10. Cf. KÖRINEK, 
L. : Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Österreich, STARCK—WEBER (Hrsg.): supra 4, p. 174. 
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rule. Although the dilemma of annulment with ex nunc or ex tunc effect continues to be 
much discussed in foreign literature, and examples can be given of both rules within the 
decision-making competence of constitutional courts;" ex nunc annulment is consistent, 
if not with the dogmatic specifics of unconstitutional statutory enactments (i.e. invalid, 
or null and void ab initio, at least with the nature of protection of the Constitution. If, 
however, the ex nunc principle means nothing more than one recommended for the Con-
stitutional Court to follow in exercise of its discretionary powers regarding expediency, 
the first breach is made for the Court to work its way from the status of upholder of the 
Constitution to that of active shaper or developer of law. This tendency may be detected 
in Court Decision No. 5 /1990 (IV. 9) on the so-called tax on interest. The Constitutional 
Court annulled the contested Act and the related decree of the Council of Ministers with 
ex nunc effect, but judge Géza Kilényi, in his dissenting opinion attached to the 
Decision, argued in favour of ex tunc annulment by referring to the need for the Court 
to play a role in shaping the law and to take the lead in developing legal culture. In this 
respect the decisions of the Constitutional Court should be responsive to the "popula-
tion's sense of justice" and meet the requirement "to restore confidence in constitution-
ality". This view is apt to bring extra-constitutional aspects into the mechanism for the 
protection of the Constitution, thereby leaving scope for an active involvement of the 
Constitutional Court in developing the law, which at this point ceases to be consistent 
with the postulate of the primacy of the Constitution as a legal unity. However, in 
addition to the contested argument, Géza Kilényi's dissenting opinion contained an idea 
in support of ex tunc annulment which went right to the heart of the problem of constitu-
tionality presenting itself in this respect. He pointed out that the category of void and 
redressable acts is unknown to public law, as it is to civil law, and that the criterion of 
nullity lies precisely in such acts being gravely defective at the very moment of their 
adoption. In the course of implementing provisions of public law it is not for anyone to 
invoke grave defects, namely the nullity, thereof, because such legislative acts carry, as 
a rule, an obligation to enforce them, but it is possible for them to be declared null and 
void by an organ (the Constitutional Court in our case) empowered thereto. It is such 
a declaration that operates to incur and enforce the legal consequences of a grave defect 
which made the statutory enactment in question a priori unsuitable to attain the legal 
effect intended. This concept of nullity serves as a guide in the question of whether a 
decision of nullity has an ex tunc or ex nunc effect. Violation of the law-making proce-
dure and the hierarchy of legal sources in the course of adopting a legislative act results 
in so grave a defect as to provide a basis for enforcing the consequences of nullity with 
retroactive effect. Bearing in mind the aspects of constitutionality, one should agree with 
this line of reasoning, but one thing to be added is that the very concept of nullity as set 
out in the dissenting opinion concurrently rules out the Constitutional Court's discre-
tionary power and choice of options in respect to dates for annulment. 
I I RÁCZ, A: A jogszabályok törvényességének utólagos ellenőrzése (Ex Post Control of Legality of 
Statutory Laws), Állam- és Jogtudomány, No. 3 of 1982, p. 456. 
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The decisions relating to ex post (a posteriori) norm control include none of ex tunc 
annulment by the Constitutional Court, but Decision No. 20/1990 (X. 4) establishing the 
unconstitutionality of the act on property returns invokes the desideratum of legal cer-
tainty in substantiating its ex tunc effect. If the Constitutional Court has a legally es-
tablished right (and uses it) to invoke the same legal principle, i .e. legal certainty, also 
at a later date in motivating ex nunc and ex tunc annulments alike, we have the case of 
so wide a scope of discretionary powers as can hardly be reconciled with the logic of 
protecting the Constitution on the basic of its primacy. 
In exercising its function in respect to ex post (a posteriori) norm control the Consti-
tutional Court has examined the conformity of various levels o f legal enactments (law, 
law-decree, government decree, ministerial decree, council ordinance) with the Consti-
tution. Given the diversity and interrelationships of the regulations subjected to control, 
the decisions of the Constitutional Court show a rather wide-ranging pattern in the inter-
pretation of legal enactments and in the style of stating the reasons on which they are 
based. It may be stated in general that the Constitutional Court has relied on different 
decision-making techniques for arriving at a decision. Nevertheless, there emerge two 
basic types, markedly prevalent, of decisions, with allowance made for their diversity 
following from the nature of things. The Court's decisions relating to ex post (a pos-
teriori) norm control can be classed as belonging to either type depending as the Court 
sees the cause of unconstitutional conflicts o f the legal system in cases of (more or less 
formal) conflicting competence susceptible to interpretation by the traditional analytical 
technique of legal dogmatics or subjects the fundamental rights as the core and substance 
of law-making competence to its investigations on constitutionality. This distinction is 
known in foreign literature as well, and thus the modes of characterization are those of 
decision-making based either on legal positivism (for the first type) or on social sciences 
(for the second type). 
The type of decisions more interesting and more significant in both theory and prac-
tice is represented by implementation of the Constitution on the basis of fundamental 
rights. In exercising its function relating to ex post (a posteriori) norm control the 
Constitutional Court has handed down five decisions, which are profoundly influenced 
by its conception of fundamental rights. In Decision No. 2 /1990 (II. 18) the Court's 
conclusion that the contested provision of the Electoral Act on the election of MPs was 
not contrary to the Constitution resulted from an interpretation of the right to privacy and 
protection of personal data. In his dissenting opinion László Sólyom, then Vice-President 
of the Constitutional Court, ascribed greater intrinsic value to the two fundamental rights 
involved and thereby stated them to have a wider ambit of operation. On this ground, 
in his dissenting opinion important and peculiar to a dogmatics of fundamental rights to 
be developed by the Constitutional Court, he held that the contested source of law was 
inconsistent with the Constitution. In its Decision No. 8/1990 (IV. 23) the Constitutional 
Court was guided by the right of disposal conceived of as a "general personality right" 
in considering certain provisions of the Labour Code to be inconsistent with the Consti-
tution. The substance of the principle of equality was central in Decision No. 9 /1990 
(IV. 25), which rejected the application for nullity submitted against certain provisions 
226 Albert Takács 
of the Act on the Income Tax of Private Persons. Also, in its Decision No. 10/1990 (IV. 
27), the Constitutional Court invoked equality in declining to hold the regulations on 
widow's pension contrary to the Constitution. In Decision No. 13/1990 (VI. 18) the 
establishment of the unconstitutionality of the Law-Decree on savings deposits was 
founded on the freedom of contract, which the Constitutional Court regarded as a 
separate constitutional right. The fundamental right to privacy and protection of personal 
data was the guiding principle in Decision No. 20/1990 (X. 4), which declared to be 
unconstitutional an article of the Act requiring leaders in certain state and party posts to 
file property returns. 
A dualistic conception of fundamental rights is clearly palpable in the decisions of 
the Constitutional Court mentioned above. On the one hand, as they are guaranteed by 
the Constitution, these rights mean protection from and operate as a bar to interference 
by the State as a public power, that is to say, perform a protective function, and, on the 
other, they embody such objective values of the legal system as have their effect 
irradiating on all legal enactments even if the latter make no special mention of a 
particular fundamental right. In this sense, fundamental rights imply objective (and 
general) value-judgements. This dual view of fundamental rights reveals a certain 
contradiction inasmuch as they, construed as performing a protective function, are 
neither unrestricted nor insusceptible of restriction, but are, in the first place, subject to 
the legislature will. Having regard for the concrete set of conditions prevailing, the 
legislature may place more or less restrictions on them without the fundamentally 
protective nature of these rights ceasing to exist. With a view to maintaining such a 
protective function, restrictions by the legislature are limited by the fact that the core and 
substance of similar fundamental rights are not susceptible to additional restrictions. By 
contrast, the concept of fundamental rights as objective values is based on their 
expression of values which must be implemented as general principles and hence no 
restriction of them whatever can, as a matter of course, be imagined without eliminating 
their very nature as fundamental rights. The fundamental rights conceived of as objective 
values are of necessity part and parcel of a constitutional order materializing the ideal 
of a constitutional state, whereas this cannot be said in definite terms of the fundamental 
rights performing a protective function. 
In its Decision No. 2/1990 (II. 18) the Constitutional Court, considering the constitu-
tional aspects of the use of identity numbers, held that protection of privacy and personal 
data "is not [an] absolute or unlimited [right], just as the rest of fundamental rights set 
forth in the Constitution are not". This thesis can be construed to mean that under spe-
cified conditions the State has powers to restrict, through legislation, all fundamental 
rights contained in the Constitution (naturally without prejudice to their substance), be-
cause, on the strength of these rights, their subjects are entitled to demand non-inter-
ference by the State only within the scope unlimited by the State. Accordingly the 
Court's decision accentuated, under a moderately positivistapproach, the protective func-
tion of fundamental rights. This feature is enhanced by the statement in Decision No . 
3/1990 (III. 4) that "a fundamental right shall not be subject to any restriction except as 
provided for in a law of constitutional force". This thesis suggests only that the form of 
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restriction may be one of legislation emphatically based on consensus, but once such 
legislation has been adopted, restriction of a fundamental right is admissible and legiti-
mate. Again, the concept of fundamental rights as ones performing a protective function 
is reflected in Decision No. 13/1990 (VI. 18) of the Constitutional Court, which declares 
the freedom of contract to be a separate constitutional right, while recognizing the ad-
missibility of its restriction under specified conditions such as "the competitive position 
of financial institutions" or "a significant rate of inflation". By referring to other condi-
tions and circumstances (security of the State, protection of the internal order, public 
morals, etc.) Decision No. 20 /1990 (X. 4) confirms the restrictability of fundamental 
rights (though its dictum is confined to some of them). For that matter, the Court's 
concept of its self-restraining role in the protection of the Constitution should also fol low 
from its concept of fundamental rights as allowing protection against the State and dis-
allowing interference by the State, for the real scope of fundamental rights thus inter-
preted rests, not directly on provisions or rather declarations of the Constitution, but on 
the concreteness with which the legislature invests particular fundamental rights. This 
means that such fundamental rights are for the legislature to decide. In this case the Con-
stitutional Court has no other choice but to control the constitutionality of the legislature 
decision. Such an "attitude" of the Constitutional Court is excellently exemplified by 
Decision No. 5 /1990 (IV. 9) (on the so-called "interest tax"), in which the formal aspect 
is the decisive element, namely the two-thirds majority required for the adoption of a law 
of constitutional force, even though that aspect is regarded by the Constitutional Court 
as a substantive one at the same time, for, in point of fact, the law-making process as 
determined by the Constitution represents by itself the value and guarantee which 
manifest themselves in broad consensus, yet the constitutionality of consensus reached 
with the required formalities may then be judged by no further criteria. This is also 
expressed by the part of the motivation in the Decision on "interest tax" which sees a 
danger to principles like equality of rights, equality of opportunity, legal certainty, social 
security, or predictability in the absence of a two-thirds consensus rather than in the 
specific inner value of the act o f decision-making. In other words, the Constitutional 
Court would have recognized the Act on Interest Tax as constitutional had the latter 
satisfied the formal requirements, regardless of whether or not it conformed to a value 
or a legal principle (extraneous by comparison to the substance of the act of will). Since 
the doctrine of the illimitability of the substance of fundamental rights was unknown to 
the Constitution in force at the time the Court passed its judgement on "interest tax", the 
Constitutional Court had a right and found it easy to take the approach of viewing 
fundamental rights in their protective function, according to which, however, it should 
also come/should also have come to the conclusion that the fundamental rights involved 
are/were subject to the will of the appropriate legislator. 
Nevertheless, the practice of the Constitutional Court shows of a concept, too, under 
which fundamental rights are viewed as embodying objective (legal) value-judgements. 
A characteristic expression of this is to be found in President Sólyom's dissenting 
opinion attached to Court Decision No. 2 /1990 (II. 18). In connection with the 
fundamental right to protection of privacy and personal data, he pointed out that a 
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fundamental right was subject to restriction by the State only if and when restriction was 
necessary for the enjoyment of the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, provided 
that restriction was the ultimate recourse, and "it may be of an extent absolutely 
necessary for that purpose". As can be seen, the primary function of a fundamental right 
is to uphold a value which can be expressed in its subject's right of disposal rather than 
to afford protection from interference by the State. As is specifically stated by President 
Sólyom, "the substance of this right (i.e. the right to protection of personal data—A. T.) 
is in everyone's right to dispose of disclosing and using his personal data". This concept 
of fundamental rights focuses on their nature as objective values and therefore admits 
restrictions of them only in cases where such value would otherwise come into conflict 
with an other similar objective value. On the other hand, conflicts of values thus 
emerging cannot be resolved except by reliance on additional values grasped through 
interpretation, because there is no normative rule establishing the order in which and the 
extent to which conflicting values shall be upheld, precisely in view of the sui generis 
nature thereof. 
Another typical example of a value-based concept of fundamental rights is found in 
Decision No. 8/1990 (IV. 23), in which the Constitutional Court held to be unconstitu-
tional the trade right of representation without authorization, as laid down in the Labour 
Code, by claiming it to impair workers' (citizens') right of disposal, which was part and 
parcel of the fundamental right to human dignity as set forth in the Constitution. In fact, 
both rights are expressions of one and the same value, that of human autonomy. A 
fundamental right derives its substance not from the constitutional declaration on human 
dignity, as this gives rise to no normative requirement,12 but from the value (autonomy) 
which may manifest itself in the most diverse categories, irrespective of whether or not 
it is embodied in a constitutional precept. For that matter, this concept can be founded 
on Art. 54 (1) of the Constitution, which declares human dignity to be an inherent right 
of everyone. Recognition of human dignity as an absolute right would ensue from such 
a qualification as its basis, and the substance of the legislative provision is constituted 
by an objective value. In reality, the subsequent article of the Constitution is likewise in 
conflict with this interpretation when it prohibits arbitrary deprivation of human dignity, 
because, in a consistent interpretation, no one may be deprived, arbitrarily or not, of an 
inherent right. When deprivation or any kind of restriction is admissible, the essential 
point is not the objective value content of a declared right, but the protective function 
thereof, which in tum is not a distinctive feature of inherent rights, for, on the basis of 
values recognized as objectively existing, any restriction of fundamental rights is incon-
sistent with the substance thereof and hence, when their appropriate value is declared by 
the Constitution, this is even unconstitutional. This explanation stems from the context 
that the mutual relevancy of fundamental rights with a value content comes into play, not 
in the normative structure of law, but in the linkages of values manifest in a legal 
12 SAJÓ, A. : Az "emberi jogok" haszontalanságairól és lehetetlenségeiről (On Abuses and Absurdities of 
"Human Rights"), Világosság, No. 8-9 of 1990, p. 575. 
Dilemmas of Constitutionalism 229 
instrument. A value-based concept of fundamental rights allows even formally 
fundamental rights to take on a new meaning with the spread of values, whether 
reformulated or originally defined, that are made the concern of law. Of course, the 
Constitutional Court has a decisive role to play in such interpretation or reinterpretation. 
This is well illustrated by that part of the motivation to Decision No. 8/1990 (IV. 23) 
in which the Constitutional Court explains that the right to human dignity shall be 
deemed as one of the definitions of the "general personality right". In the approach to 
the Constitution as a rule of positive law it is quite obvious that what we have here is 
a generalization of a value present in the substance of the different fundamental rights, 
a definition of that value as a new one, since a general personality right is unknown to 
the positive Constitution of Hungary. The general personality right is a non-legal 
(ultimately a philosophical or a moral) value which may, precisely in the absence of 
legal normativity, constitute the substance of the most diverse legal provisions. Viewing 
such values as constituting the substance of legal provisions necessarily raises the 
problem of those values having a radiating effect, a phenomenon in which a fundamental 
right with a value content ceases to be a normative rule and serves as a generally valid 
model of interpretation. Since, given the interrelationships of the value content of 
fundamental rights, combinations of the modalities of upholding values are in theory 
unlimited, the discussed concept of fundamental rights is the main reason and basis for 
the so-called open interpretation of the Constitution. Nevertheless, undoubtedly elegant 
and attractive as it is, an open interpretation always carries the danger of dissolving the 
frameworks within which the normative unity of the Constitution is enclosed. Such 
danger is very real in the Decision of the Constitutional Court just cited, as the Court 
declared the general personality right as an "ancestor right" or a "subsidiary fundamental 
right", which may be invoked in defence of the individual's autonomy "whenever none 
of the concrete, or nominate fundamental rights are applicable". The postulate of a 
general irradiating effect was stated by the Constitutional Court to apply, not to a 
fundamental right specified by the Constitution (which does not know the type of 
fundamental right in question), but virtually to a fundamental value, the nature of which 
is consequently determined by a value-judgement rather than by positive law. 
Indisputably, there may be various concepts of fundamental rights and the battle 
between the different trends is still in the balance. Yet, on this score, I should like to 
refer to the criticism which terms the kind of practice of constitutional jurisdiction 
showing signs even in the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court as "constitu-
tional totalitarianism", or "fundamental rights dictatorship". The concept of fundamental 
rights as objective value-judgements, a few typical features of which have been indicated 
earlier, overstrains both the very category of fundamental rights and the law itself, as 
it even imparts a direct fundamental right relevancy to each legal provision, precisely 
on the strength of the irradiating effect of fundamental rights. Therefore, in point of fact, 
the other elements of the legal system become relativized in the light of fundamental 
rights. Again, an added problem lies in the fact that the value-based doctrine of 
fundamental rights implies not simply a certain value background to each legal provision, 
a broader and weightier one in the case of fundamental rights and a lesser and less 
230 Albert Takács 
significant one in the case of other rights, the real problem being posed by the fact that 
the values, when appearing as the substance of fundamental or other rights, prevail as 
the substance of a legal norm, because, in a consistent legal interpretation, the political 
decisions of the legislator are displaced—and increasingly so—as the orbit of fundamental 
rights widens and the interrelationships of their value contents become more inten-
sive—by the value-judgements of the philosopher. However, the universal value-content 
of fundamental rights is incapable of localizing, identifying or ranking the conflicts 
affected by legal provisions, because the set of social relations as the scene of conflicts 
tends to generate as well as to restrict values. The function of law resides, not in 
recognizing the reciprocity of social relations acting in this capacity, but in a special 
legal redistribution which neither the said set of relations nor the values operating therein 
are capable of accomplishing. Since, however, that scope of action of the law tends to 
be reduced by the "crude" values appearing in it, too wide an extension of the orbit 
(operation) of fundamental rights equally tends to weaken the efficiency of the legal 
mechanism itself. This does not naturally mean that the efficiency of a legal order 
functioning with a reduced quantity of fundamental rights is likely to lead to a wider use 
of legal means. Nevertheless I believe that the value-based concept of fundamental rights 
makes it more difficult to define the scope of applicability of law, so it does not but 
encourage the idealism of excessive expectations. 
The problem indicated above of implementing value-based fundamental rights 
consists in the impossibility of devices for resolving real conflicts to be deduced from 
conflicts of values. So there is also an indispensable need for a special "principle of 
distributive justice", otherwise equally based on a supposed value, to establish the rank-
order of values to be upheld in each particular case. The Constitutional Court was 
likewise unable to avoid this situation. In its Decision No. 9/1990 (IV. 25), which was 
concerned with a complaint against a provision of law allowing a deduction from the 
taxable income of parents with three or more children, it resolved the conflict between 
non-discrimination and equality by considering that positive discrimination based on 
equal dignity was admissible. If a social goal can be attained or a fundamental right 
recognized by the Constitution can be implemented only through failure to achieve a 
smaller measure of (quantitatively identical) equality of rights, positive discrimination 
cannot be deemed to be unconstitutional. In a conflict between the value of equality and 
the principle of non-discrimination, the rank-order of values depends on the conse-
quences which the realization of conflicting values entails for the realization of the value 
of fundamental rights concerned or of relevance to the case. Thus, in resolving 
conflicting values, the Constitutional Court practically chose to apply the consequential 
approach to establishing a rank-order and thereby constitutionality. Although the 
motivation of the decision makes no special reference to it, such consequentialism can 
hardly mean anything else than maintaining a balance of emphasis between the 
proportions in which the values involved are realized.13 Such consideration of values, 
13 Cf. ALEXY, R. : Theorie der Grundrechte. Baden-Baden, 1985, p. 272. 
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on the other hand, never follows from the weight of values per se, but from a 
comparison thereof inter se and with the real set of conditions. The postulate of 
proportionality as an idea central to distributive justice cannot be deduced from the 
relations between the values of fundamental rights alone. Its deduction also needs 
consideration of proportions as shifting between real sets of conditions as a consequence 
of interference with fundamental rights. This type of proportionality is stressed by the 
motivation to Decision No. 20/1990 (X. 4), arguing that the (legal) requirement for 
certain state and party functionaries to file property returns is a means unsuitable and 
unnecessary for preserving the purity of public life and hence fails to satisfy the deside-
ratum of proportionality. 
The contradiction between positive discrimination and the principle of equality was 
resolved in Decision No. 21/1990 (X. 4) of the Constitutional Court, which was quick 
to come to the fore, by reliance on the criterion of proportionality for a consideration 
of values and interests. That Decision (which was concerned with interpreting the 
Constitution rather than with norm control, but, given its relevance for fundamental 
rights, deserves mention at this juncture) pointed out that exclusive privatization of land 
or other objects of property qualified as positive discrimination and that it did not violate 
the principle of equality as narrowly understood and was not contrary to the Constitution 
only if the principle of non-discrimination was ignored "on a sufficiently strong 
constitutional ground". In the question of admissibility of positive discrimination the 
Constitutional Court referred primarily to the value of a fundamental right. In effect, it 
espoused the principle of equality by stressing the need for the parties to be treated on 
an equal footing in property sharing and "for the points of view of each to be considered 
with equal attention and equity". However, the Constitutional Court was certainly 
likewise aware that there was little chance of establishing the exact values of fundamental 
rights on the basis of equality and therefore, in its statement judging those values, it 
emphasized the need for a consideration of economic interests as well , for equality of 
rights and eventual socially required positive discrimination cannot be safely reconciled 
except when the consequence of reconciliation is "a sine qua non for social equality of 
fuller perfection and serves to lay the ground for the equality of private owners as actors 
of a market economy to be created". Although the reasoning proceeded from a 
fundamental right with a value content, the appropriate final conclusion can be drawn 
from the more favourable "aggregate social result" rather than from the substantive 
implication of values. Against this background it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that 
the fundamental right as interpreted in the Decision of the Constitutional Court did not 
but serve as a criterion for delimitating the problem and the content of the Decision was 
determined by a consideration of social interests regardless of the value of fundamental 
rights. It appears that fundamental rights with a value content cannot be conceived of as 
a normative guide, but that their role in the decision-making procedure lies rather in 
creating a form of integration and a formula of rationalization for the consideration of 
various values and interests. But once the integrative and rationalizing integument is 
removed from the fundamental rights invoked and interpreted in the practice of the 
Constitutional Court, one meets with a multitude of situations and conflicts to be 
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subjected to primary (i.e. political) consideration and insusceptible of being decided on 
a normative basis. The approach to a decision focusing on the concept of fundamental 
rights as values may easily overextend the capacity of the Constitution and come to 
replace the Constitution's basic political and legal order, which is necessarily limited in 
scope, by a relative order of values or, in a case of lesser gravity, to juxtapose the latter 
to the former, an order which is not within the grasp of political decision-makers. Yet, 
"objective legal value-judgements" thus formulated will fall outside the domain of the 
principle of "contestable democracy", a principle not negligible from a constitutional 
point of view.14 
Parallel to its judicative practice developing fundamental rights by principles of open 
interpretation, the Constitutional Court has handed down decisions construing the Consti-
tution as a unity of strictly positive legal provisions. This group of decisions may be said 
to include those based on norms of the Constitution relating to organization and compe-
tence or on norms other than governing fundamental rights. This other line of the "style" 
protective of the Constitution, clearly distinguishable from decisions on fundamental 
rights, focuses attention on the problem of constitutional dogmatics, still disputed and 
unclarified, that fundamental rights and the so-called organizational rights, which are 
deemed today to be two different components of the Constitution, are extremely difficult 
to regulate in conjunction, in their relevancy to each other, regarding the unity of the 
Constitution. This duality may be a source of problems particularly in the case of a con-
stitution like the Hungarian which has undergone a large number of progressive 
modifications, for such modifications are apt to reveal a strong trend of de-emphasis on 
the requirement that the functions of implementing and protecting the Constitution should 
not be blurred and that implementation of the Constitution and investing it with 
concreteness, including determination of the essential substance of fundamental rights, 
are a prerogative of the legislature in the first place. 
Observance of the positive procedures involving the legislative aspects of organiza-
tion, competence and courses of action is a constitutional question of prime importance. 
Regulation by the Constitution, or laws directly associated with it, of the forms and 
subject-matters of legislation, with allocation and determination of spheres of decision-
making competence, expresses the socio-political significance of the legislative body and 
even of the set of daily relations to be governed. Under a differentiated legislative 
system, the forms of enactments imply different possibilities for discretion and compro-
mise, so keeping them within their respective framework constitutes a basic postulate of 
a democratic exercise of power in addition to the stability of the legal system. Particular 
importance is therefore attached to the decisions of the Constitutional Court concerned 
with ex post (a posteriori) norm control, which come out first and foremost for the full 
maintenance of the legislative order as determined by the Constitution. Court Decision 
No. 3/1990 (III. 4) annulled a provision of the Electoral Act because, under the statutory 
14 Cf. SATTLER, A.: Die rechtliche Bedeutung der Entscheidung fur die streitbare Demokratie. Baden-
Baden, 1982, pp. 11 et seq. 
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provisions on legislation in force at the time, it limited the scope of franchise in the form 
of ordinary law, although a positive rule of the Constitution reserved that power for laws 
of constitutional force. The Decree of the Minister of the Interior on the public use of 
identity numbers and on stamp marks of firms was found unconstitutional by Decisions 
No. 11/1990 (V. 1) and No. 18/1990 (VIII. 1) of the Constitutional Court, because it 
had restricted a fundamental right, namely, that to protection of personal data, although 
such a restriction shall not be ordered by ministerial decrees. Departure from legal 
enactments on a higher hierarchical level is subject to an enabling provision of law, 
concrete and explicit. However, multiple Subdelegation of powers is not admissible in 
such cases either. Decision No. 12/1990 (V. 23) of the Constitutional Court annulled a 
section of the Land Act and the related Decree of the Council of Ministers on the 
acquisition of immovable property by foreigners on account of inadequate legislative 
powers. 
In like manner, Decision No. 14/1990 (IV. 27) of the Constitutional Court stated the 
unconstitutionality of a decree of the Metropolitan Council on account of inconsistency 
with the intended goal and concrete provisions of a high-level enactment. Decree No. 
15/1990 (VII. 11) annulled certain provisions of the General Sales Tax Act on the 
ground that they left the regulation of matters subject exclusively to regulation by a law 
to the records of the Central Statistical Office being a state decision not deemed to be 
a legal provision and thereby committed a grave violation of the Constitution. As the 
Decree of the Council of Ministers enforcing the Social Insurance Act had no power to 
depart from the provisions of the Act, Decision No. 17/1990 (VII. 31) of the 
Constitutional Court found it to be a legal provision adopted in exercise of inadequate 
powers and declared it unconstitutional by reason of violating the established order of 
legislation. According to Decision No. 22/1990 (X. 16), the Council of Ministers was 
found to have failed in its duty to exercise legislative powers in the question of compen-
sation for prisoners of war, thereby committing a violation of the Constitution by omis-
sion. Omission manifest in non-exercise of powers means non-compliance with a 
mandate under positive law and therefore prejudices the constitutional requirement to 
preserve the integrity of the legislative order, just as does an active trespass beyond the 
scope of legislative powers. 
The decisions founded on a positivist concept of the Constitution may be said to 
include most decisions of the Constitutional Court interpretative of the Constitution. 
Decision No. 1/1990 (II. 1) gave a reply to the question put in connection with a refe-
rendum on the date to be fixed the election of the President of the Republic and, the 
Court, by comparing the powers of the National Assembly with the relevant con-
stitutional provisions, relied on a sound legal argument for concluding that the Parlia-
ment was free to decide the manner of electing the Head of State. Decision No. 4/1990 
(III. 4), which was "outdated" by a subsequent amendment of the Constitution, 
interpreted the Constitution in connection with the modification of the Act on Family 
Law, stating that adoption of rules governing fundamental rights are reserved, regardless 
of the nature of regulation, only for laws of constitutional force. Considering that the 
category of law of constitutional force is since unknown in the present constitution, the 
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Decision had no effect on later decisions. This same fate is shared by Decision No. 
7/1990 (IV. 23), which interpreted the constitutional rules on the powers of the President 
of the Republic. The only exception so far in the practice of positivist interpretation of 
the Constitution is Decision No. 21/1990 (X. 4) cited earlier, which relied on an open 
interpretation of fundamental rights for arriving at the conclusion that the mode of land 
privatization, as planned at the time of handing down the Decision, was inconsistent with 
the purpose, as established by the Constitutional Court, of the article of the Constitution 
declarative of equality and prohibitive of discrimination. The second part of that same 
Decision interpreting the Constitution stated that the property of cooperative farms was 
within the protection of the Constitution. Although this part of the Decision interpretating 
the Constitution similarly refers to non-discrimination, it does not relate it to the value-
content of any fundamental right, but points out that the constitutional distinction 
between forms of property shall not be a source either of advantage or of disadvantage. 
In its interpretation of the Constitution the Court was probably led by inapplication of 
the fundamental rights approach to follow, in the second part of the Decision, a purely 
positivistic concept of law different from that in the first part. 
Both of the following Decisions of the Constitutional Court constitutional complaints 
are based on a positivistic interpretation of law. It should be noted on this score, too, 
that since neither constitutional complainant sought termination of a violation of a 
fundamental right, the Constitutional Court was practically not in a position to apply the 
technique of open interpretation of law. Decision No. 6/1990 (IV. 12) stated a violation 
of law on the ground that the owners and co-owners of holiday homes in the village of 
Balatonszepezd could not participate in the local referendum for lack of notification 
thereof, but, considering that the contested procedure had not influenced the outcome of 
the referendum to any significant degree, it did not annul the results of the referendum. 
Decree No. 19/1990 (IX. 19) was likewise concerned with the irregular conduct of a 
local referendum and in that case it established so grave a violation of law as to warrant 
the annulment of the administrative decisions which, contested in the constitutional com-
plaint, ordered and approved, respectively, a merger of villages. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 




Thomas DONALDSON: The Ethics of International Business, Oxford University Press, 
New York-Oxford 1989, 196 pp. 
"Pecunia non olet" said once Vespasian. 
Today, when the daily news is full of 
reports of dubious business transactions, 
from environmental pollution to insider 
trading we ought to observe strictly and 
objectively, what belongs to the worlds of 
business and ethics, how the things are 
related to each other and how they should 
be related for the sake of effectiveness 
integration. 
In 1987 the Peter B. and the Adeline 
W. Ruffin Foundations established a 
separate foundation within the framework 
of the Danden School at the University of 
Virginia in order to produce a series of 
lectures by outstanding sholars on business 
ethics. This volume by Thomas Donaldson 
is the first book-size publication dealing 
with the nature and morality of the inter-
national business community from the as-
pect how it should contribute to the morality 
and to the understanding of the current 
business climate, with the help of innovative 
and practical ideas in this field. The volume 
sets a comprehensive normative framework 
within which ethics can be interpreted in 
the global market. Moreover it proposes an 
"ethical algorithm " for international manag-
ers to consider while conducting their public 
affairs, solving those controversies which 
necessarily appear between their own 
country and a host country. Of course the 
author of this volume recognizes that 
philosophers, business theoreticians, poli-
tical scientists, economists and theologians 
survey his book, but at the same time he 
expresses his anxiety over the fact that 
precious few practical economic managers 
require such education. He emphasizes that 
a normative framework is gravely missing 
and produces a list of how the representa-
tives of the various sciences have avoided, 
until now the moral analysis of economic 
processes with it the consequent analysis of 
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their regulation as well. This has somewhat 
hanged let's say, from the end of the sixties 
to the beginning of the seventies. Scientists 
realized the links between society and 
business, the unification of the points of 
ethical theory and analysis—and not only 
on the domestic scene, but in the various 
scenes of international economic life as 
well. The looming interdisciplinary revolu-
tion, while presenting several unknown 
aspects of facts and values, has not yet 
reached the international markets. And 
while such political theoreticians as Beitz, 
Fishkin and Shue have attained remarkable 
results indeed, their work is almost exclu-
sively limited to a survey of the actions of 
some countries, neglecting international 
firms. Therefore their actions were more 
or less political actions instead of a legal, 
economic and business character. In the 
same way the philosophers have dealt with 
business ethical cases very intensively 
within a given country, but at the same time 
did not care about international business 
transactions. Even if these transactions were 
considered in the research, they were only 
in a very "case-specific" way, such as the 
Bhopal tragedy or the fate of South African 
investments. The scientists produced several 
empirical studies about multinational firms, 
and have entered in to board scale research 
in the field of the structure of global mar-
kets and international market strategies. 
Meanwhile hardly an essay was written 
about the moral viewpoints involved in the 
complex decision-marking between process 
countries. Not everyone agrees with the 
initial approach offered by Donaldson for 
those who intend to claim some success in 
this field of sciences; at the time of the 
writing of this book. The favourable change 
in international power relations and the 
positive elimination of a large segment of 
armament have promoted the fact that South 
Africa is once again accepted by the com-
munity of nations: in the Boer-Anglo coun-
try , slowly, but surely, progressive thinking 
prevails. 
In August, 1987 in Geneva in the coun-
tries of the world under the aegis of 
UNCTAD accepted a surprising agreement, 
whose preparation had taken four years. 
The developing countries agreed that free 
trade and private enterprises are more and 
more important for their economies, the 
industrial nations have reached the point to 
reduce somewhat the tragic weight of debt. 
The critics of this agreement say that the 
accepting parties do not take very seriously 
the agreement, but rather at a theoretical 
level they have taken it, stressing the recent 
trends in the global economy today; the 
move from central planning to deconcentrat-
ed initiatives, from the capital-intensive 
economies to labour-intensive production, 
from industrial programs to agricultural 
programs etc. Beside the changing process 
of economic opinions we can find the 
closely connected series of normative and 
non-empirical questions, which cannot be 
transformed and simplified into numerical 
data evaluated statistically or in to maximal-
ly successful strategies. These are related 
rather to the basic questions of fairness and 
decency, e.g. what kind of rights of a 
multinational firm can be realized in a 
developing country, that beyond the legal 
duties what kind of extra efforts should be 
taken by the enterprises to help their 
employees to enjoy their rights. Naturally 
these debates are more or less without 
solution, because the cultural heritage and 
the industrial and economic traditions of 
these countries are very much dissimilar to 
each other, and so cannot be compared. 
Any non-empirical quest to analyze the 
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global business dealings can be taken as 
completely out of the question, therefore 
some researchers ended to underestimate 
their surveys which were empirical indeed. 
However, the opinions of other researchers 
agree on this point: moral concepts can and 
should help international economic ac-
tivities. According to Donaldson both the 
realism of Hobbes and the cosmopolitan 
moral idealists are wrong, because they 
consider their transnational moral obliga-
tions from the most various aspects and in 
this way will never be really effective. The 
opinions differ in the multitude of the rather 
simple questions; it is necessary all of them 
are able to explain their own ideas. 
The book deals with the relations of 
enterprise and morality from a moral 
viewpoint while stressing the widening re-
sponsibility of a large and effective orga-
nisation as it is required by a developing 
technology. This is the "contract" which 
exists between any grade and form of pro-
duction and property, in the future it will 
matter more and more. The legal opinions 
concerning this chapter differ from each 
other, but agree on one point; they strive 
to increase the effectiveness of the enter-
prise, and better the lives of the employees. 
The next chapter taken a look at basic 
human rights, without which international 
business would not be able to exist and 
function at all. One of the most significant 
conclusions of this chapter is that the 
obligations of international enterprises 
relating to the observance of these rights 
differ somewhat from the duties of a 
nation-state or individuals. In the following 
chapter the author presents the practical 
sides of these rights, how the cultural 
differences and national integrity can be 
observed together. In this chapter the ethical 
algorithm can be found, which "according 
to Donaldson" may serve as a first-rate tool 
for the synthesis of differing expectations 
and hopes. In the further chapters the author 
surveys those modes, then in the concluding 
chapter he surveys the possibilities of 
disinvestment. He does not really go into 
the evaluation of fundamental political and 
economic questions dealt with by other 
popular and scientific works, but there is 
no need to survey these problems because 
the ethical and successful investments and 
their philosophy requires the estimation of 
several further aspects, so he deals rather 
with them, instead. In this century mul-
tinational enterprises have contributed in a 
lot of positive and negative ways to the 
development of the world economy. For ex-
ample, in 1910 the United Fruit Company 
with the help of a soldier of fortune, "Ma-
chine Gun" Malony, organized a coup d'état 
in Honduras in order to get the exclusive 
concession of the banana plantations in the 
country. Today perhaps there is no neces-
sity to do such actions, the successor of the 
United Fruit Company has achieved signi-
ficant successes in the "green revolution" 
specially in areas such as seeds which 
require few fertilizers but bring about 
high-protein produce. In order to decide 
whether the multinational firms are exploi-
ters, saviours or just neutral participants in 
economic life, we have to clarify those 
principles which are the basis to survey 
them and judge them, day by day, year by 
year. But does it make any sense? The 
experts dealing with the connection of 
morality and business, and the reasons for 
economic legislation can use this volume 
with considerable gain. A list of literature 
to each chapter and an index supplements 
the volume. 
Miklós UDVAROS 
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Herbert B. ASHER: Presidential Elections and American Politics (Voters, Candidates, 
and Campaigns since 1952), The Dorsey Press, Chicago 1988, 397 pp. 
Herbert Asher is a Professor of Political 
Sciences at the Ohio State University and 
also serves as special assistant for govern-
mental relations to the university president. 
The volume analyses the presidential 
elections in the United States from 1952 to 
the present from two perspectives: on one 
hand from the aspects of the citizen, who 
has to choose from the contestants, on the 
other hand from the viewpoint of the candi-
date, v. ho hopes for election (or reelection) 
from the electorate. The volume is divided 
into two main parts: in the first part the 
author dwells on those factors which heavily 
influence the strategic selection of candi-
dates. The volume is abundantly illustrated 
by various tables and statistics in order to 
support the argumentation. 
The first chapter gives a glimpse of the 
process which selects the candidate. This 
process begins years before the actual 
campaign and is influenced by important or 
less important issues. The comparison of 
the different candidates, or would be can-
didates, the overview of their previous 
records employ not only the television jour-
nalists and the newsmen generally, but, to a 
certain extent, the man on the street also con-
templates the comparable advantages and ex-
pected moves of these persons. 
As the aim of this volume is to make 
the dynamics of the presidential election 
understandable, it stresses the fact that the 
successive, four yearly presidential cam-
paigns should be examined by a more gene-
ral approach, from the dramatic, issue-
ridden fifties till the more optimistic and 
almost nostalgic Reagan-years. It is an 
undeniable fact that the pre-war New Deal 
and the Fair Deal of the Truman-era, and 
their issues, gradually lost their importance 
in the seventies and eighties, new problems 
appeared, as raging inflation, high interest 
rates and the periodical returning recession 
occupied the minds of citizens both in the 
course of the campaign and on the very day 
they cast their votes, to decide who would 
be the lord of the White House for the 
forthcoming four years (or even for eight 
years). 
The ten presidential election campaigns 
between 1952 and 1988 show a very chang-
ing picture from the aspect that there were 
such campaigns which emphasized the 
personality of the candidates, such cam-
paigns which stressed issues such as civil 
rights and racial problems, and it happened 
when the economic situation decided 
favourably or unfavourably on the person 
of the future president. It is obvious that the 
emergence of television in the fifties forever 
changed the style of the campaign or events 
contents to a certain extent. The usage of 
television requires an experienced media; 
the candidates "must sell" by all means. 
Since 1976 the candidates have received 
support from public funds as well. The 
electorate has also profoundly changed in 
the last 40 years. Specially the number of 
Southern coloured voters has increased 
significantly. Since 1972 18 year-olds also 
may vote, that means an extra 11 million 
voters. It is also undoubtedly true that the 
recent voters incomparable more informed, 
educated, and therefore more choosy than 
his ancestors were 40 years ago. Respect 
for governmental activities also drastically 
changed in times due to such issues as the 
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Watergate scandal or the struggles for civil 
rights. In the mid-seventies the respect of 
the President decreased, respect for Con-
gress, however, has increased. From the 
eighties, due to the dynamic personality of 
Ronald Reagan, respect of the presidency 
has also increased among the citizens. In 
the last decades the ratio between the two 
big parties also changed—the American 
electorate became somewhat more conser-
vative than it was in the middle of this 
century, the traditional New Deal-coalition 
has ceased to exist. There is a dispute going 
on in the literature: some of the experts 
doubt that the Republican Party can be a 
national majority party for a prolonged 
period of time, others emphasize the fact 
that, with the exception of Jimmy Carter, 
the Democrats were unable to send their 
candidate to the White House in the last 30 
years. 
The author deals with the issue of 
citizens and election in the next chapter. He 
explains the uncountable factors which 
influence the voters' behaviour, among 
other the relative ranking of issues, the 
expectations of the possible candidates. 
These factors are in such close interrelation 
with each other that they hardly can be 
separated at all. According to the research 
of Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold G. 
Rusk, delegates participating at the Conven-
tions evaluate the possible candidates both 
upon their personal characteristics and party 
politics. The possibility of the candidacy of 
this or that person has been accumulated as 
the specific mutual effect of the direct and 
indirect factors. If we consider the diffi-
culties of the candidates, then we see the 
fact that the American presidential candi-
dates are very much related to their cam-
paigns in a system where the political 
parties actually exist only in the period of 
elections. It is interesting too that the results 
of primaries can differ significantly from 
the results of the November presidential 
election. 
The next chapter informs us about the 
financingofcampaigns. Forseveral citizens 
the previous methods of financing the 
campaigns seemed to be so unsavoury, that 
in the seventies the majority strongly 
favoured the limitation of campaign funds. 
The costs of electing a president signifi-
cantly increased as one study shows: in 
1932 each presidential candidate spent about 
two million dollars on their campaign: in 
1984 the bigger campaign costs have 
reached 70 million dollars. The mentioned 
"public funding" may convince campaign 
managers in the future to put the expen-
ditures under a reasonable limit. An extra 
chapter talks about the struggle for the 
presidency. It emphasizes that the campaign 
should be viewed from several different 
perspectives. From the viewpoint of the 
citizen it is such a process which may 
inform him on the current issues and the 
available alternatives. The candidates— 
through the examination of their successes 
or failures can see their own chances in the 
further struggle, where the ultimate phase 
is the November election. 
Some elements cannot be left out of the 
campaign, e.g. the primaries cannot be 
ignored. Rockefeller tried it in 1968, conse-
quently he lost the possibility to participate 
seriously in the November election. Some 
experts raise the question what factors 
influence decisively the campaign: whether 
the more or less closely related factors 
influence the outcome of the election. 
According to the statistics relatively few 
citizen change their views during the 
campaign, but even this precious few may 
decisively alter the outcome of the election, 
240 Book review 
while we see the fact that hardly half of the 
eligible voters attend to vote. Altogether 
2-6 % of the voters make up their mind on the 
day of the election, 70 % of them decided long 
before. By all means the success or failure 
of the primaries influence quite a lot of 
citizens who may vote in November. 
In the last chapter the author thinks 
about the perspectives of the future. He 
raises the question whether the voters of Sou-
thern states went over to the Republicans. 
The volume is supplemented by an ex-
tensive list of constitutional regulations 
on elections, a list of literature and an 
index. The volume by Professor Asker 
is an exceptionally valuable contribution 
to American political literature to make 
the points of the American election 
campaigns more understandable for the 
European reader. 
Miklós UDVAROS 
PETRUCCI, A.: Mensam exercere. Studi sull'impresa finanziaria romana (II secolo 
a. C. .netà del III secolo d. C.), Jovene Editore, Napoli, 1991, XI + 418 pp. 
The author of the book to be reviewed 
here, due to his comprehensive study 
about the Roman and Latin colonies in the 
early Republic [Petrucci, A.: Colonie 
romane e latine nel V e IV sec. a. C. 
Napoli, 1989, 188 pp. (Estratto da 'Legge 
e società nella repubblica romana II, a 
cura di F. Serrao)], is not unknown to 
scholars of Roman law. In the present 
book the young Italian romanist deals with 
another no less interesting subject, the 
activity of the Roman "bankers". [Aiming 
at simplicity, I use the modern term 
"banker" for the ancient forerunners of 
this profession, although I agree with the 
author who makes a clear distinction 
between the ancient Roman mensae and 
present-day banks.] In recent years, four 
valuable monographs have been published 
on this topic [First of all, see Andreau, 
J . , La vie financière dans le monde 
romain. Rome, 1987, see also Maselli, 
G., Argentaria. Banche e banchieri nella 
Roma repubblicana. Bari, 1986, Bürge, 
A., Fiktion und Wirklichkeit: Sozialeund 
rechtliche Strukturen des römischen Bank-
wesens. SZ 104 (1987), Balbi de Caro, 
S.Z. , La banca a Roma, 1989], and also 
the earlier literature is relatively rich 
[Petrucci gives in the notes a more or less 
complete bibliography. The earliest 
monographs, Kraut, De argentariis et 
nummulariis commentatio. Gottingae, 
1826, is quoted. Since the seventies of the 
19th century, in every decade more books 
and articles have been dedicated to the 
Roman bankers.] Under these circum-
stances it has not been easy to write an 
original book about the argentarii. As far 
as the originality is concerned, the inten-
tions laid down in the introductory part 
of the book (pp. 16 et seq.) show sig-
nificant and modern aspects of the old 
problem, which have been more or less 
neglected in the earlier literature. Petruc-
ci 's aim is, on the one hand, to analyze 
the economic and legal organization of 
mensa interpreted as a particular type of 
financial undertaking. His aim is, on the 
other hand, to reveal the actual place of 
the bankers' activity in the Roman eco-
nomy and in the Roman law. The clear 
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explanation of these aspects is charac-
teristic or the whole book having a well 
arranged structure and written in a lucid 
style. This clarté, which is unfortunately 
so rare in the modern literature, is one 
of the significant values of this book. 
The author elaborates on a number of 
juristic and non-juristic (historical, 
literary and epigraphic) sources covering 
almost the entire material of Greek and 
Latin sources on the subject. It was a 
difficult undertaking to read the more than 
two hundred books and articles which are 
not only quoted in the more than one 
thousand notes but often also reviewed 
and critically evaluated. It would have 
been, however, useful to enclose also an 
authors' index (similar to the Index of 
Sources, pp. 403-418), because it is 
sometimes difficult to find the first 
citation of a given work (with the biblio-
graphical data). 
In Chapter I, entitled "The Roman 
Bank System In The Light Of Modern 
Views" (pp. 1-17), the author gives a 
general survey of the views in the modern 
literature concerning the 'sistema ban-
cario ' of ancient Rome and sketches the 
goals of his own research. As far as the 
dispute on the public or private character 
of Roman bankers is concerned, Petrucci 
states, in accordance with the prevailing 
view in the modern literature, that argen-
tarii, as well as the majority of the num-
mularii, were private bankers. [I think 
this plausible view is not contested by 
Maselli, op. cit., p. 152, stressing the 
significance of strict public control over 
the bankers.] 
It is an important observation of the 
author that the investigation of Roman 
banks as organizations, as well as the 
structure of mensae, the questions of the 
bankers' liability, the activity of managers 
like filii, liberti, servi and the societas of 
bankers are in general neglected by 
modern researchers including Andreau. 
As main fields of research, the examina-
tion of mensa as an economic and juristic 
organization, and the "collocation" of this 
kind of enterprise in the Roman economy 
are mentioned. The establishment of 
whether there were specific regulations 
on bankers in Rome as a social stratum 
is regarded by the author as an important 
task. 
In Chapter II, entitled "The Concept 
of Mensa as Enterprise Activity" (pp. 19-
62), the author deals with the appearance 
of bankers in Rome and the emergence 
of the notion of mensa. In his opinion, 
supported also by a number of epigraphic 
sources, the edictum de edendo was 
created between the end of the 3rd and 
the first decades of the 2nd century B. C. 
At that time, the concept of mensa already 
had a specific, well-defined meaning, 
namely referring exclusively to the enter-
prises of argentarii. Petrucci thinks that 
the edictum in question also meant a legal 
acknowledgement of the mensa argen-
taria. Accordingly, the argentarii were 
the first bankers in Rome, while the other 
types of bankers (nummularii, coactores 
argentarii) did not appear until the end 
of the 2nd century B. C. The mensa 
nummularia itself, however, according to 
the author's plausible opinion, emerged 
later, probably at he beginning of the 1st 
century B. C. 
The author emphasizes that the ac-
tivity of the argentarii can be well distin-
guished from similar activities in the light 
of the existing sources. Notwithstanding 
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this he states that there was also a general 
notion of mensa as a kind of negotiatio 
also attested by a general term on those 
having a mensa (mensularius). This term 
was namely related to the nummularii. 
It is a relevant statement of the author 
that mensae in the imperial age could also 
be enterprises connected with public ad-
ministration. 
The author's interesting explanations are 
always supported by a number of juristic 
and other sources including epigraphic ones. 
Also the views in the modern literature are 
quoted and critically evaluated. However, 
some questions appear to have been neglect-
ed only treated per tangent em. The author 
did not search for the causes of denomina-
tion of argentarii and did not analyze the 
meaning of the synonymous Greek expres-
sion trapezita in Roman usage. It would 
have been interesting to analyze the his-
torical and semantical relationship between 
these terms. The author seemingly identifies 
the meanings of these terms (see p. 68). 
Chapter III entitled " Historical Develop-
ment of Activities Characterizing the Mensa 
Argentaria" (pp. 63-251) is the most com-
prehensive part of the work amounting to 
almost half of the total volume. Firstly, a 
general, but at the same time thorough, 
survey is given on the basis of literary and 
epigraphic sources of the republican age. 
In this part, special attention is paid to the 
comedies of Plautus and to the Corpus 
Ciceronianum including the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium. 
Thereafter, the edictum de edendo is 
discussed. The author states that a con-
siderable part of our knowledge concerning 
the economic and juristic features of mensa 
argentaria in addition to the mensa num-
mularia results from the commentaries of 
the edictum de edendo. Surprisingly, this 
is largely neglected by Modern Scholars. 
The author analyses the relationship 
between the editio actionis and instrumen-
torum on one hand and the edictum de 
edendo on the other. In conclusion, he 
propounds the hypothesis that there was an 
independent rubrica in the Edictum Per-
petuum about the editio rationum of argen-
tarii in contrast to Lenel's reconstruction 
having a comprehensive title De edendo. 
Subsequently, the reconstruction of the 
original text of the edictum in question is 
treated with special regard to Fernandez 
Barreiro's criticism against Lenel's recon-
struction. [See Fernandez Barreiro, La pre-
via információn de adversario en el proceso 
privado romano. Pamplona, 1969, pp. 229 
et seq. The author also deals with the cha-
racter of the actio in factum adversus argen-
tarios and convincingly proves that this was 
a penal action having the function of pecuniary 
compensation. As demonstrated by the author, 
the liability of the argentarii was based 
exclusively upon dolus. [Cf. also Kühler, В., 
Die Haftung für Verschulden bei kontraktsähn-
lichen und deliktsähnlichen Schuldverhältnis-
sen. SZ 39 (1918), pp. 207 et seq.] 
It is interesting to read the comparison 
of praetorian regulation concerning the 
argentarii and on nautae caupones stabu-
larii respectively. According to the author, 
it is surprising that the former were privi-
leged while upon the latter strict liability 
was imposed. It can be added that the 
edictum on publicani was relatively mild. 
[See Brósz R., Nem teljes jogú polgárok a 
római jogforrásokban (Citizens without full 
legal capacity in the sources of Roman law). 
Budapest, 1964, pp. 166 et seq.] 
Thereafter, a comprehensive analysis 
of the passage D. 2, 13, 6, 3 (Ulpian) is 
Book review 243 
given. In this fragment the great jurist, 
quoting Labeo's opinion, enumerated 
activities belonging to argentaria and some 
activities extra rationem. As a conclusion, 
Petrucci delimits the circle of bankers' 
activities as follows: deposit and credit on 
the basis of ratio, open and closed deposit 
of sums of money, loans for interest and 
for financing commercial activities, payment 
by the client's order in favour of third 
persons, permutationes (transfer of money 
to another locality), nomina transscripticia, 
participation at auctiones in order to give 
credit, and the examination and change of 
coins. The author acknowledges that the 
acceptance of pawn and mandates could 
occur with in the activity of an argentarius 
but these were peripheral and not typical 
transactions being excluded from the ratio. 
In addition some problems of the re-
ceptura argentarii are dealt with in this part 
of the book (this legal institution is treated 
from another point of view in Chapter V) 
as well. The author criticizes many points 
of Bürge's conception. Petrucci contests that 
among other things, Bürge's hypothesis on 
the formal character of recept urn. It can be 
remarked that recently Nörr has proposed 
further arguments in favour of the originally 
formal character of the recept um. [Nörr, 
D., Aspekte des römischen Völkerrechts. 
München, 1989, pp. 30 et seq. It seems, 
however, that Petrucci does not exclude the 
possibility that receptum was originally 
concluded by sollemnia verba (see namely 
pp. 379 et seq.).] 
After the survey concerning the repub-
lican age, the single types of bankers' 
activities are thoroughly analyzed on the 
basis of sources relating to the first two 
centuries of the imperial age. In this part 
the author also applies an exegetic method 
of first analysing the juristic sources and 
the non-juristic sources. It is to be stressed 
that in this respect Petrucci extends the 
circle ofhisinvestigationstoa large number 
of historical, literary and epigraphic 
sources. Given the limited size of a book 
review I can only make some remarks on 
this valuable part of the book. 
Firstly, author deals with the deposit. 
There are interesting and profound analyses 
concerning the problems of open and closed 
deposits and the privileges in the case of 
bankruptcy. It is an original statement when 
Petrucci distinguishes three kinds of money 
deposits from an economic point of view. 
Regarding the fragment of Papinian in D. 
16, 3, 8, it would be interesting to consider 
the meaning of the expression fraudator in 
connection with a passage of Ulpian in D. 
42, 5, 24, 2 referring to the damaged 
clients' "fidem publicam secuti". [The 
expression "fides publica" is worth paying 
attention to in contrast to the expression 
"eorum fidem" concerning the nautae (see 
D. 4, 9, 1, 1) and makes the concept the 
argentarii as namely private bankers a bit 
doubtful.] 
Petrucci makes the distinction between 
the mutuum and depositum irreguläre quite 
clear when stating that the judge was 
entitled to determine the interest in the case 
of delay even in the lack of a special 
stipulation on usurae as attested by a 
genuine passage of Papinian (D. 16, 3, 24). 
Subsequently, the author treats the credit 
given by the argentarii with special regard 
to that given at auctiones. Although the 
problem of auctions in Rome seems to be 
elaborated sufficiently by the literature. [See 
e.g. Talamanca, M., Contributi alio studio 
delle vendite all'asta nel mondo classico. 
Roma, 1954, Thielmann, Die römische 
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Privatauktion. Berlin, 1961, Ankum, H., 
Quelques problèmes concernant les ventes 
aux enchères. Studi Scherillo I, Milano, 
1972] the author propounds some new 
hypotheses concerning the contractual 
relationship between the argentarius and the 
procurator. Beyond the thorough analysis 
of the sources, the author also evaluates 
modem literature in this part and he criti-
cizes the views of Mitteis, Andreau etc. 
In conclusion Petrucci states, among other 
things, that the activities of the mensa and 
those extra mensam can be clearly distin-
guished, and the bankers' activities are 
characterized by the central role of the ratio. 
After surveying the juristic sources, the 
author examines the historical, literary and 
epigraphic ones (e.g. the lex metalli Vipas-
censis). [As for the lex metalli Vipascensis, 
see also Demelius, G., Zur Erklärung der 
lex metalli Vipascensis. SZ 4 (1883), p. 39 
and Schönbauer, E., with the same title, 
SZ 45 (1925), p. 357 and SZ 46 (1926), 
p. 184.] 
As a general conclusion to Chapter III, 
the author states that the range of activities 
of the mensae argentariae was already 
shaped in the first half of the 2nd century 
B. C. In the subsequent period, an exten-
sion of the range of these activities can be 
observed on the basis of the sources. The 
typical activities show, however, a constant 
uniformity. There were also constant 
connections between the banks and the 
commerce in a broad sense. It is a relevant 
conclusion of the author that there was a 
special regulation on the argentarii, a ius 
speciale ruled by certain principles. 
In Chapter IV, entitled "The Mensa 
Nummularia and its Progressive Osmosis 
with Argentaria. Other Financial Enter-
prises Designated as Mensae" (pp. 253-312) 
the author deals with other types of Roman 
bankers, treating primarily the activity of 
the nummularii. Firstly, a very clear survey 
is given about the development of the 
mensae nummulariae on the basis of the 
sources and the modern literature. It is a 
relevant and an original statement that it 
was not exclusively nummularii who dealt 
with the examination of coins. Yet the 
examination of coins was not the only 
activity carried out by the nummularii. This 
the spectatio nummorum occurred in the 
practice of the argentarii as well. Further-
more Petrucci ascertains that among the 
nummularii there were slaves functioning 
nomine proprio employed by different social 
groups: senators, merchants, capitalists, but 
also by societates publicanorum, argentarii, 
and even by members of the imperial 
family. Original explanations can be found 
about the functional correlation of the 
mensae nummulariae with other enterprise 
activities which are generally neglected by 
the modem literature. 
Subsequently Petrucci deals with the 
process of the "osmosis" of the mensa 
nummularia and argentaria. In his opinion, 
this had already begun in the 1st century 
B. C. In the Augustean age, nummularii 
surely dealt with deposits. A relatively 
perfect integration can be dated from the 
2nd A. D., even if some differences be-
tween the two types of bankers survived. 
The probatio nummorum remained an 
important task of the nummularii though in 
contrast to the argentarii, they had never 
taken part at auctiones. Petrucci, contesting 
Bürge's view, attributes greater economic 
significance to the nummularii. He acknowl-
edges, however, that they, similar to the 
argentarii, were far from being bankers in 
a modem sense. 
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It is a disputed question in the literature 
whether Ulpian's fragment in D. 1, 12, 1, 
9 reports a prohibition of certain illegal acts 
or it refers rather to a general prohibition 
of certain activities of the nummularii. It 
is also under discussion whether the pro-
hibition in question concerned only certain 
persons or the nummularii in general. 
According to the author's plausible hypothe-
sis, this prohibition was a general one and 
concerned the participation of the num-
mularii at auctions and some types of 
falsification. Unfortunately, because of the 
lack of other sources, it is hardly possible 
to ascertain the actual meaning of the rule 
"temperent his quae sunt prohibita". 
In this regard a question emerges with 
special significance: Who was to qualify the 
bankers as argentarii and nummularii (if an 
official qualification at all existed), and 
what preconditions and criteria were applied 
in this respect? It would have been interest-
ing to deal with this problem. 
Next a thorough analysis is given about 
the coactores argentarii who were, accord-
ing to the author's plausible opinion, entre-
preneurs of mensae, too. Petrucci ascertains 
that further entrepreneurs (i.e. who neither 
argentarii, nor nummularii, nor coactores 
argentarii) cannot be regarded as having 
mensa even if dealing with financial affairs. 
In this connection, he refers to a fragment 
of Ulpian in D. 14, 3, 5, 2-3 in which a 
clear distinction is made between the mensa 
and the other types of negotiatio. Within 
the framework of the conclusions, the 
author stresses again that the differentia 
specifica of the mensae was the ratio being 
a decisive critérium of these special enter-
prises. 
In Chapter V, entitled "Structure and 
Dynamics of the Mensa" (pp. 313-392) a 
panoramic survey is given about the "anat-
omy" and the "physiology" of the mensae 
(especially of the mensa argentaria). The 
structure of this chapter is not only clear 
and logical but at the same time it shows 
a modern, even original approach, though 
it can be said that some inevitable repeti-
tions occur relating to the previous chapters. 
In the "static" part the forms with 
unlimited liability are analyzed. Thereafter, 
the bankers' enterprises with limited liability 
are discussed. Within the scope of these 
sub-sections, the individual and collective 
enterprises are examined separately. 
As far as the individual enterprises with 
unlimited liability are concerned, Petrucci 
makes a distinction between the small banks 
directed specifically by the entrepreneur 
himself and the larger banks managed by 
an institor who could either be a free person 
(in general, however, it was a freedman) 
or a slave. In these cases unlimited liability 
was based upon the praepositio, and the 
action involved was the actio institoria. In 
addition when the actio institoria extended 
to the bankers' enterprises is discussed. It 
is an original and plausible statement of the 
author that the terminus ante quern was the 
creation of the edictum de edendis argen-
tariis rationibus and that the extension was 
made not later than in the 2nd century B.C. 
Petrucci states it was not a rare pheno-
menon that more slaves were proposed to 
the same mensa as institor. In this respect, 
a remarkable observation is that slaves 
could obtain liberty by making use of their 
managerial abilities, too. 
Thereafter, an interesting case (Scae-
vola, D. 14, 3, 20) is analyzed, wherein the 
famous classical jurist excluded the liability 
of the libertinus institor after the death of 
the nummularius. Petrucci points out that 
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the libertinus institor promise of payment 
was given only in order to maintain the 
"good will" of the bank. 
As far as the collective enterprises 
with unlimited liability are concerned, the 
author treats the preposition of a common 
slave as institor as well as the societas 
without preposing such a manager slave. 
Petrucci states that the societas argen-
tariorum, characterized by active and 
passive solidarity, was one of the most 
perfect types of partnership in the Roman 
world. As an example, for extremely 
detailed and precise regulations even the 
validity of the pactum de non petendo 
concluded with the regulation one of the 
argentarii (D. 2, 14, 15 et seq.) . 
It is very interesting—in light the fact 
that the harmonisation of individual and col-
lective interests is a problem nowadays— 
how the author treats the problem of what 
incomes were to be shared with the partner. 
A relevant source in this area is a passage 
of Ulpian in D. 17, 2, 52, 5. 
It is the author's new hypothesis that 
during the 2nd century A.D. the special 
regulation of the societates argentariorum 
was extended to the partnerships of the 
nummularii and the coactores argentarii. 
As far as the individual enterprises with 
limited liability are concerned, the model 
is the mensa argentaria directed by a son 
or a slave when the pater or dominus is 
merely sciens or even ignorons. This type 
of enterprise is relatively separate from the 
res domini but still belonging to the pater's 
fortune. An unlimited liability of the pater 
emerges only if being volens or in posses-
sion of the rati ones. 
• It is a relevant statement of the author 
that in the Digest, apart from one single 
fragment of Ulpian (D. 2, 13, 4, 2-3), 
every time slaves are mentioned as manag-
ers and not sons. It can be remarked that 
this fact is in accordance with Robert 
Brósz' s conclusion stating that the peculium 
servi emerged considerably earlier than that 
of the fllius and remained more significant 
than the latter. [See Brósz, R., Peculium 
servi. Acta Antiqua Acad. Sei. Hung. 18 
(1970), pp. 308 et seq.] 
The author raises the question whether 
the regulation of the master's liability for 
his servant acting as an exercitor mensae 
is different from the regulation concerning 
the tabernae and other commercial enter-
prises. Petrucci analyses a number of 
juristic and other sources and compares the 
liability of the argentarii with that of the 
nautae caupones stabularii. As a special 
feature of the bankers' liability, it is men-
tioned that in the case of ignorance the 
dominus could be discharged from liability 
if swearing that he did not have the ra-
tiones. Another special feature of the 
bankers' liability is due to the penal 
character of the actio in factum adversus 
argentarios which is rightly compared by 
the author with the actiones in factum 
adversus nautas caupones stabularios. 
Petrucci proposes that the limited 
liability dumtaxat de peculio is a vicarious 
liability for a person in potestate. To this 
general statement it can be added that the 
eventual ignoratio domini and the existence 
of the peculium were special grounds of the 
limitation of liability. 
It is a very interesting hypothesis when 
the author, criticizing Andreau's view, gives 
a new interpretation to an inscription (CIL 
XI 1069) which documents according to his 
opinion, the existence of enterprises "a più 
piani" (dominus, servus Ordinarius, servus 
vicarius) which are concerned with the 
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mensae nummulariae too. It would be inter-
esting to know, why there is no reference 
in the juristic sources to such enterprises 
of bankers, while the existence of this type 
in other commercial activities is attested by 
the juristic sources themselves. [See e.g. 
D. 14, 4, 5, 1 (Ulp.).] 
Some general observations can be made 
about these valuable and in many aspects 
original explanations by the author. I think 
though acknowledged by the author, it 
should have been more expressly stressed 
that slaves could not only be institor but 
exercitores as well (p. 349). Similarly, it 
would have been useful, in my opinion, to 
pay more attention to the actual meanings 
of voluntas and scientia respectively as this 
is not always obvious in the sources of 
Roman law. Finally, it would have been 
beneficial to analyze the relationship be-
tween the existence of the peculium and the 
possibility of bringing the actio institoria. 
[Cf. namely Lenel, O., Das Edictum 
Perpetuum. 3 Leipzig, 1927, p. 259.] 
Having surveyed the structure of the va-
rious types of the mensa, the author exam-
ines some special institutionscharacterizing 
the "dynamics" of Roman banks. Though 
this part of the book is rather short, the 
questions dealt with here are very inter-
esting. Petrucci scrutinizes the problem 
of agere cum compensatione. As he 
stresses, this obligation is only imposed 
on the argentarii, and not on their clients. 
According to his plausible explanation, 
this different treatment is due to the fact 
that the exercitores mensae were those 
who had the rationes. 
Subsequently, the author deals with the 
receptum argentarii. A very interesting ana-
lysis is given on a fragment of Paulus in D. 
13, 5, 12, the text states that the essence 
of the problem is the delivery of a sum of 
money with slave assumed in the form of 
a constitutum. If the word "constituât" is 
genuine, the mentioning of Stichus cannot 
be explained. In the case of the substitution 
of the word "recipiat", it is not easy to 
answer why the debtor is discharged from 
delivering the slave which was not owed. 
Petrucci's conclusion in which the slave was 
deposited or otherwise promised is, in my 
opinion, not convincing as the text does not 
speak about such facts. I think the passage 
is considerably interpolated and shall be 
interpreted on the basis of Justinian's 
constitution in C. 4, 18, 2, 1. [To this 
passage see also Lenel, O., Beiträge zur 
Kunde des Edicts und der Edictcommentare. 
SZ 2 (1881), pp. 65 et seq., Partsch, J., 
Der ediktale Garantievertrag durch Recep-
tum. SZ 29 (1908), p. 415 and Astuti, G., 
Studi intorno alla promessa di pagamento 
II. Milano, 1941, p. 279.] 
In the next section the author deals with 
the problems of accounting. According to 
his plausible classification, the rationes 
could perform three functions: they were 
either documents for evidence, information 
for the clients, or they were constitutive 
documents for carrying out financial trans-
actions. Petrucci acknowledges that such op-
erations were used not exclusively by the 
bankers but he states that the codex rati-
onum was a fundamental means of bankers' 
accounting being characteristic for the 
mensae. [It can be remarked that according 
to the interesting hypothesis of Voigt, M., 
Ueber die Bankiers, die Buchführung und 
die Litteralobligation der Römer. Leipzig, 
1887, p. 17; the diffusion of accounting in 
Rome was due to the argentarii coming 
from Latium, though also the Romans 
themselves had books of this kind before. ] 
Relevant and original explanations are 
to be read furthermore about some criminal 
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aspects of bankers' accounting (actio servi 
corrupti, lex Cornelia de falsis etc.). 
Finally, the author deals with the 
problems of the transfer of banks and with 
bankruptcy. As for transfers the author 
thoroughly analyses a fragment of Papinian 
in D. 31, 77, 16. According to Petrucci's 
interpretation, a fideicommissarius buys 
the ensa (managed by a servus negotiator) 
by making use of a cautio. The author 
thinks that Papinian, in contrast to Ulpian's 
opinion in D. 15, 2, 1,7, granted the actio 
de peculio to the creditors against the 
fideicommissarius. This interpretation seems 
to be more brilliant than convincing. The 
passage is undoubtedly very obscure. Perhaps 
a possible explanation is that the cautio is not 
related to the payment but to the assurance of 
the heirs so that the buyer will not claim them 
if he himself is claimed by the creditors of the 
defunct us (" Indemnität e heredum per cau-
tionem"). Furthermore, Papinian\ч reference 
to the emptio venditio only expresses that this 
case is similar in some extent to the emptio 
spei, namely the fideicommissarius acquiring 
the bank free of charge. This must not be 
claimed if damages exceed benefits. [It is 
remarkable that this passage is not related by 
the comprehensive textbooks on Roman law 
of succession (Fadda, Voci etc.) and—apart 
from a note of Beseler in vol. 45 (1925), 
p. 473—not even in the first 100 volumes 
of the Savigny Zeitschrift, either.] 
As far as bankruptcy is concerned, the 
author states on the basis of a fragment of 
Papinian in D. 16, 3, 8 that privileged credi-
tors obtain statisfaction on "omnesfacultates" 
of the banker. Petrucci raises a plausible hypo-
thesis stating that this rule could be applied 
also on enterprises with limited liability. 
In the last Chapter VI, entitled "The 
M ensa in the Framework of Financial Ac-
tivities: Reflections and New Perspectives of 
Research" (pp. 393-401) the author draws 
general conclusions and sketches the possi-
bilities of further research on the topic. 
Petrucci convincingly criticizes extremist 
tendencies of modem literature on ancient 
economic history. He contest that mensae did 
not have a significant role in ancient economy 
(as assumed by Heichelheim, Frank, De 
Martino and Bürge). He also states here that 
credits given by the Roman bankers were used 
not only for consumption but also for econo-
mic purposes. He expresses his aversion for 
the concept of the last decades of the 19th and 
the first decades of the 20th century which 
regards the mensae as being similar to modem 
banks. Petrucci's well-balanced conception is 
close to that of Rostovtzeffs, attributing a 
significant role to the banks in the developed 
period of Roman economy. 
Many scholars' works end with a pathetic 
conclusion. It is the author's merit that this 
book has no such decorative "Schlussakkord". 
Instead of drawing a final conclusion, open 
questions requesting further research are 
sketched. Petrucci refers, among other things, 
to the role of the different social strata in the 
financial enterprises, to the problem of the 
permutationes publicanorum, and to the 
deposit in temples. These problems have not 
been explored sufficiently so far. 
Pondering Aldo Petrucci's book, we can 
ascertain that this work is a modem, original 
and excellent elaboration of the subject. The 
author's theses, which could only fragmentally 
reviewed here are based upon a thorough 
analysis of the almost entire circle of ancient 
sources and a critical evaluation of the modem 
literature. The author is undoubtedly a Toma-
nist ex asse, who is not only properly cautious 
against the extremist views, but at the same 
time his book is rich in original thoughts and 
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new hypotheses as well. My remarks made 
above suggest only possible alternative solu-
tions and are not necessarily more plausible 
than those of the author. 
This book is dedicated first of all to 
Professor Feliciano Serrao. This dedication 
shows that the author follows the modern 
orientation of the school lead by the great 
Italian romanist of our times. Petrucci's 
book, being a valuable contribution to the 
literature on Roman bankers, is not the first 
evidence of the fertility of this approach. 
András FÖLDI 
P. SCHLECHTRIEM: Schuldrecht, Besonderer Teil (Law of Contracts, Special Part) 
J. C. B. Mohr Verlag, Tübingen, 1991, 2nd edition, 391 pp. 
It is no small enterprising work to 
attempt a concise presentation of the special 
part of the German law of contracts as the 
relevant legal material is covered in 420 
articles by the Civil Code (BGB) alone, not 
to mention the supplementary legislative 
enactments, and even the so-called Brief 
Commentary (Kurzkommentar) by Palandt 
discusses the special part of the law of 
contract in over 500 small-type pages 
running to four times the size of the text 
book to be reviewed here. 
Apart from the vast scope of the mate-
rial being condensed in a nutshell, a special 
acknowledgement is due to the impressive 
ease with which the author, Prof. Schlecht-
riem of international fame, controls this 
voluminous subject-matter. Commendation 
is also deserved for the fact that the volume 
has hardly changed in comparison with the 
previous edition despite considerable 
development of the law during the four 
years since the first edition. Few authors 
are capable of this accomplishment, with 
even the best hardly resisting a temptation 
to enlarge their material in successive 
editions. 
The genre is "short textbook" (Kurz-
lehrbuch) which is functionally equivalent 
to university notes, but represents the most 
demanding type thereof, as can indeed be 
expected of a renowned legal scholar. 
The author states in the Foreword that, 
along with presenting the basic structure of 
the German law of contract, he has sought 
to outline the sets of problems (Problemen-
bereiche) which are likely to witness 
development in the near future or in which 
development is imminent. In dealing with 
related questions he has not consealed his 
own legal convictions even thought their are 
at variance with the prevalent views on 
some aspects. He maintains that although 
the statement of his own concepts, at times 
singular, in a short textbook may be objec-
tionable, it is not necessary for them to be 
left unsaid precisely in a textbook suggest-
ing an orientation or new orientations in 
respect to fundamental questions, because 
present-day university students will grow 
tomorrow to be law enforcement officers 
and jurists and it will be precisely for them 
to revise what are now regarded as tradi-
tional concepts. 
The focus of the textbook is on the 
contract of sale as well as on questions of 
liability for damage caused out of contract 
and for unjust enrichment. What will strike 
the eyes of foreign readers is in particular 
a detailed exposition of questionsof liability 
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for unjust enrichment, although the German 
law, unlike other laws, has always devoted 
a rather wide space to this set of problems. 
Foreign readers will find it to be an even 
more striking feature of the book that 
liability for damage caused out of contract 
and for unjust enrichment is discussed in 
the special part of the law of contracts. This 
has, of course, nothing to do with the 
author's eccentricity, but can be attributed 
to the structure of the BGB, which included 
the related forms of conduct in the special 
part of the law of contracts, namely in the 
last articles following the types of nominale 
contracts. 
Next we shall refer to four aspects, as 
mentioned by the author himself in the 
Foreword, which represent a novelty in 
comparison with the first edition. 
The Federal Republic of Germany 
acceded to the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) with effect from 1 January 
1991, so the Convention is now applicable 
in Hungarian-German relations as well. 
Therefore, in this respect, the author's 
statements on the differences between the 
Convention and the provisions of German 
law are particularly illuminating. Such 
differences can be observed in, e.g., the 
following aspects: 
— contract of sale involving carriage 
of goods, which is performed by handing 
the goods over the first carrier for transmis-
sion to the buyer (para, (a) of Art. 31); 
— rule for performance according to 
quality and description required by the 
contract (Art. 35, I), which is known to 
German law only in respect of goods 
specified in kind; 
— the documents relating to the goods 
must be handed over together with the 
goods (Arts. 30 and 40); 
— if the parties do not fix the price, it 
must be taken to be that generally charged 
at the time of making the contract for such 
goods (Art. 55), whereas under the German 
law the price is for the court to determine 
in such cases; 
— the buyer must pay the price at the 
seller's place of business (Bringschuld, Art. 
57, I), whereas German practice is content 
with remittance of the price (qualifizierte 
Schickschuld)-, 
— if the contract of sale involves car-
riage of the goods, the risk pases to the 
buyer only when the goods are handed over 
to him (Art. 67); 
— if the goods do not conform with the 
contract, the buyer may require the seller 
to remedy the lack of conformity by repair, 
unless this is unreasonable having regard 
to all the circumstances (Art. 46, III), 
whereas under German law withdrawal 
from the contract, reduction of the price and 
claim for damages are the only remedies; 
— if the seller fails to perform any of 
his obligations under the contract, the buyer 
may claim also damages (para, (c) of Art. 
45, I), whereas liability is of a narrower 
scope in German law. The author, without 
saying a word on the advantages of the 
Convention on contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (of which he himself 
was an architect and advocate), refers to a 
few deficiencies of the BGB in comparison 
with the convention, such as those relating 
to liability for breach of contract and claims 
for damages on that ground, and relies on 
the strength of facts for convincing the 
reader of the usefulness of more streamlined 
arrangements. 
By introducing uniform legal solutions 
the Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods has considerably 
increased legal certainty, for application of 
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choice-of-law norms would often produce 
different results, which is in no way de-
sirable from the point of view of inter-
national trade. 
Another new legislation discussed in the 
textbook is the Consumers; Credit Act (Ver-
braucherkreditgesetz) on hire-purchase, which 
also became operative on 1 January 1991. We 
shall mention but a few distinctive features 
of that Act, because it is applied in exceptional 
cases in relations between Germany and 
Hungary. Such features include the re-
quirement for contracts to be made in writing, 
the determination of conditions for the credi-
tor's withdrawal in case of the buyer's default 
in payment, the effect of dissolution of 
contracts of credit on contracts of sale (the 
two types of contract are made by different 
enterprises on the creditor's side), the conse-
quences of withdrawal on the relationship 
between the bank and the buyer, the repudia-
tion of payment by installments in case of 
faulty performance. In connection with these 
provisions of law we have roughly outlined 
here, the author refers to in footnotes to legal 
practice and the principal views prevalent in 
literature on the subject. 
The new provisions of law briefly dis-
cussed in relation to damage caused out of 
contract inlude: 1) the Act on liability for 
products (Produkthaftungsgesetz); 2) the 
Act on liability for the pollution of the 
environment; 3) the Act on gene tech-
nology. 
The texbook is complete with a detailed 
index and a list of sources of law for ease 
of reference. 
It follows from the nature of things that 
this textbook is in fact of real interest only 
to people concerned with the German law 
of contracts, but the author's concise style 
and exposition of subject may serve as an 
example for authors of textbook in other 
countries in treating voluminous and compli-
cated legal material in condensed form in 
an exoteric style. 
Finally, mention is also deserved for the 
fact that this material concerns the contract-
law of a country which is a leading power 
of the European continent today and is 
destined by its economic potential to play 
a determinant role in world trade as well, 
and, given that the international sale of 
goods under discussion is of great impor-
tance precisely in the latter context, one 
cannot but welcome Germany's acceptance 
of international communis opinio by its 
accession to the relevant United Nations 
Conventions, renouncing a policy to impose 
on its trading partners the provisions of its 
own national law, which has otherwise 
proved its worth. For his contribution to 
this achievement the author of the textbook 
outlined above can also claim great credit, 
which I believe would not be appropriate 
to pass over in silence in this review. 
Alexander VIDA 
Gábor HAMZA: Comparative Law and Antiquity, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 
1991, 186 pp. 
Gábor Hamza's book under review, 
which has now been published in English 
on the basis of its 1985 edition in Hun-
garian, covers a significant and timely 
subjectas indicated by its title. Comparative 
law has become of decisive importance in 
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modern jurisprudence with greater reliance 
placed on the comparative method in a 
number of other disciplines. The need for 
a harmonization of the national systems of 
law reserves a large role for it especially 
in today's Europe. The novelty of the 
subject discussed is an added source of 
interest, since the work to be reviewed here 
is known to have made the first attempt at 
giving a comprehensive in-depth analysis 
of the relationship between the legal systems 
of the ancient Mediterranean (first of all 
Roman law) and comparative law. 
The relationship between comparative 
law and antiquity offers several and com-
pletely diverse topics for the researcher. 
One may think primarily of theoretical foun-
dations for and methods of comparing 
ancient laws as well as of the results to be 
expected of such investigation. The Roman 
law naturally has a determinant role to play 
in this domain, particularly as regards the 
extent to which the Roman law, undoubted-
ly the most developed of ancient laws 
undergirding as it does even the laws of our 
time, can be taken for a basis of comparing 
ancient laws. No less important is the 
question of how to define the scope of 
ancient laws, for antiquity is virtually 
understood to mean Greek-Roman, or 
classical antiquity only. 
Still on the subject of antiquity, one 
cannot ignore another aspect of the relation-
ship between comparative law and antiquity, 
namely the question of whether the seeds 
of comparative law can be found, and to 
what extent, in the works of ancient think-
ers, i.e. primarily the Greek philosophers 
and rhetors concerned also with law as well 
as of the Roman jurisconsults. 
Again, closely related to both subjects 
is the question concerning the degree of 
interaction between ancient laws and the 
underlying socio-economic foundations, 
which similarly form a background, present 
in the actual set of circumstances, to the 
said theoretical problems, and the real basis 
which exploration of that interaction can 
provide for drawing appropriate theoretical 
conclusions. 
Along with these aspects, which may 
perhaps be called "horizontal", of the 
relationship between comparative law and 
antiquity, equally interesting are those 
concerning the influence exercised by 
ancient laws, first of all Roman law, on the 
legal development of later ages and, in this 
context, the comparability of ancient with 
modern laws. 
Finally, an independent area of inves-
tigation is that of how all these questions 
have been treated in the history of science. 
Thus the relationship between comparative 
law and antiquity implies historical, theore-
tical, dogmatic, methodological, and science 
history aspects alike, which could be subjects 
of separate monographs, as is noted by the 
author himself in the introduction to his book. 
Nevertheless, Gábor Hamza's work can claim 
credit, inter alia, chiefly for a combined 
discussion of these questions, which are in fact 
inseparable from one another. 
In principle, this method is apt to 
present the danger of the analysis remaining 
at too general a level, where lack of a 
detailed discussion of some elements of the 
diverse problems involved may call into 
question the substantiation of answers. In 
our view, however, the author has suc-
ceeded in overcoming that danger. 
His scope of investigation into ancient 
laws is limited a priori to those of the Medi-
terranean world. As the author writes, "this 
is the geographical area where the econo-
mico-political relations, necessary for com-
parison, are more or less given". He does 
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not go into details of institutional history 
except in relation to the concept of contract, 
but in the chapters of a theoretical nature 
he did deeply penetrating research, often 
relying on partial results of relevant litera-
ture, which contains studies of certain 
partial aspects of the interrelationship of 
comparative law and antiquity. Gábor 
Hamza's book gives a synthesis, too, of 
existing partial results by amplifying them 
in a comprehensive and separate system of 
exposition. He has the added merit of filling 
a gap in this field. 
The book consists of five chapters. 
Chapter I (Comparative Law and Graeco-
Roman Antiquity, pp. 5-23) uncovers the 
seeds of comparative law by analysing 
works of ancient authors. Chapter II (Com-
parative Law and Antiquity in European 
Jurisprudence, pp. 24-92) is a summary of 
the history of science on the subject from 
the humanists until today. Chapter III 
(International Economic and Political 
Relations and Their Reflection in the 
Ancient Mediterranean World, pp. 93-191) 
analyses the economic and social conditions 
serving as a basis for a comparison of 
ancient laws. Chapter IV (The Possibilities 
and Limits of Comparative Law in the 
Analysing the Laws of Antiquity, pp. 192-
220) is a methodological investigation into 
the comparison of ancient laws. Chapter V 
(The Concept of Contract and the Laws of 
the Ancient Mediterranean World, pp. 221-
242) illustrates the application of ancient 
comparative law and gives documentary 
evidence of its usefulness in respect to a 
concrete institution of law. 
There remain essentially two aspects of 
the manifold relationship between com-
parative law and antiquity which the author 
could not undertake to discuss, at least 
analytically, as a separate subject, namely 
the sets of problems concerning the interac-
tion of ancient laws and their effects on 
subsequent legal development. These 
questions, otherwise of high importance, 
could form the subject of a separate study, 
and in this work the author could not but 
indicate, by way of laying a theoretical 
groundwork, certain principles and methods 
to guide a possible approach to them. 
Interaction is not a methodological problem 
of comparative law, but a phenomenon that 
can be elucidated, inter alia, precisely by 
a comparison of laws. 
This notwithstanding, we would have 
felt it necessary for an analysis of the 
relationshipbetween ancient laws (naturally 
the Roman law in the first place) and 
modern laws, a relationship which is chiefly 
manifest in the survival of Roman law, to 
be methodologically carried out at the 
theoretical level precisely from the aspect 
of applicability of the comparative method, 
as the author has done so competently in 
respect to the interrelationship of ancient 
laws. 
Apart from these critical remarks, the 
five chapters discuss the subject in its 
entirety. Of course, its coverage does not 
mean a full-length study on the material. 
Rather it is the formal aspect, the arrange-
ment of material, that we think may be 
arguable. In the introduction to his book the 
author himself refers to the aforementioned 
multidimensional relationship between com-
parative law and antiquity, but he gives no 
fuller treatment thereof. Therefore the 
theoretical basis of the sequence of chapters 
does not emerge with full clarity, at least 
explicitly, while the last chapter dealing 
with the concept of contract would seem 
better to be an appendix to the book. 
In this general presentation we cannot 
fail to mention the exceptionally broad 
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range of special literature and the rich 
sources which this study has drawn upon. 
The bibliography enumerates some 700 
works, the overwhelming majority ofwhich 
have been published in the German, Italian, 
French, English, Spanish, Portuguese, 
Russian and other languages. Of course, the 
author has also heavily drawn upon ancient 
sources in Latin and Greek. The remark 
that the author did not study the ancient 
sources of the East in the original Eastern 
languages could only be made in the role 
of advocatus diaboli, for very few Roma-
nists in the world are capable of studying 
the legal sources of the ancient East in the 
original languages. It is no exaggeration to 
say that the mere collection and survey of 
this immense material represents a sig-
nificant scientific achievement. 
In Chapter I, examining the ancient 
germs of comparative law, the author states 
that political particularism and the equal 
rights of certain city-states provided an 
a priori favourable basis for the comparison 
of laws, in ancient Greece, but he rejects 
the view that the Greek philosophers looked 
on law only in terms of political thought. 
Proceeding from these objective and subjec-
tive premises, he analyses in depth the 
relevant works of Plato, Aristotle and 
Theophrastos, pointing out that, in Nomoi 
Plato takes into account the laws of city-
states and even those of foreign countries, 
but his comparison of laws is not yet con-
scious, his goal being the idealization of law. 
In respect to Athenaion politeia, one 
of Aristotle's 158 works on the Greek 
constitutions which has fortunately come 
down to us and is often referred to by 
scholars dealing with comparative law, 
Gábor Hamza points out that Aristotelian 
comparison follows from the empirical 
method. 
Seen by the author as the real Greek 
forerunner of comparative law, thought not 
yet as a comparative jurist, is Theophrastos, 
who, particularly open as he was to legal 
dogmatics, made references in one of his 
works to elaborate legal device concerning 
contracts. 
The main reason for the lack of compre-
hensive comparative analyses is seen by the 
author in that there evolved in Athens no 
jurisprudence to match the Roman, mainly 
because the Greek philosophers were unable 
to break away from positive law in dealing 
with law. 
In connection with the Roman juriscon-
sults the author underlines that they took 
into account foreign (chiefly Hellenic) law 
particularly on a theoretical plane. In 
addition to literature on jurisprudence in the 
strict sense, he subjects Cicero's works to 
scrutiny noting that they contain frequent 
references to Hellenic law, but also show 
signs of ignoring laws other than the 
Roman. According to Gábor Hamza, this 
ambivalent approach could have been a 
general characteristic of the attitude of 
Roman jurisconsults. He states that, despite 
certain trends to comparative law, Roman 
jurisprudence reveals no outline of a com-
parative analysis, a fact which the author 
attributes primarily to the Romans' aspira-
tion and inclination to independence. 
Also, among the general conclusions, 
he points out that comparative law in Rome 
would have been of importance in the field 
of criticism of the prevailing law, which in 
turn was likewise alien to the Roman 
jurisconsults. 
In Chapter II, reviewing the comparison 
of ancient laws in the European history of 
jurisprudence the author states that prece-
dence in this field is taken by the humanists 
(first of all Hotman), although similar 
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references can also be found in the works 
of medieval jurists. Then he proceeds to 
explore, with occasional in-depth analyses 
in separate subsections, the relationship of 
the trend of natural law (Raguellus, Seiden, 
Conring, Duck, Leibniz, Grotius, Heinec-
cius, Johann Stephan Pütter, Schilter, 
Schott), the historical school of jurispru-
dence (Hugo, Savigny), the trend of general 
legal history (the two Feuerbachs, Karl 
Theodor Pütter, Gans, Unger), the ethnical 
trend (Bunsen, Oppert, Rossbach, Schön-
bauer, and also Maine and Jhering), the 
orientalists (Revillout, Lapouge) and the 
late-nineteenth-century scholars focusing 
increased attention on the Eastern laws 
(Mitteis, Goldschmidt, Müller), the science 
of comparative law (Bernhöft, Kohler, 
Post), the trend of antike Rechtsgeschichte 
(Wenger, Carusi, De Zulueta), and the 
more recent literature (Ellul, Monier, 
Cardascia, Imbert, Gaudemet, Gillissen, 
Seidl, Taubenschlag, Volterra) to com-
parative research into ancient laws. 
The author's investigations are aimed 
primarily at exploring how much signifi-
cance the representatives of different trends 
attached to Roman law in the comparison 
of ancient laws. Evaluating the various 
trends in this context, he highlights the 
economic, social, and history-of-ideas 
backgrounds of the attitude to Roman law. 
Another aspect which the author considers 
of importance is the so-called question of 
derivation and the wide range of rather 
divergent views held by representatives of 
the different trends concerning the supre-
macy of Roman law. 
A presentation of the profound, critical 
and thoroughexpositionsof related subjects 
would go beyond the scope of this review, 
but there is one inescapable question of a 
general nature to ask, namely that of how 
to interpret Roman law when speaking of 
its role tertium comparationis, for we think 
that when the Roman law is relied upon for 
analysing the dogmatics of other ancient 
laws it is no longer the one of antiquity to 
serve as a basis for investigations, but that 
role is reserved for the classical dogmatics 
that has evolved directly from the Roman 
law. Of course, this legal material is just 
as difficult, and almost impossible to delimit 
from the Roman law stricto sensu as the 
said dogmatics still based purely on Roman 
law is to separate from the dogmatics of 
modern civil law. [Cf. Brosy, R. : Bekäm-
pfung versteinerter Vorurteile und andere 
aktuelle Aufgaben im Unterricht des römi-
schen Rechts, Acta Jur. et. Pol., Szeged, 
torn. XVII, fasc. 17, Szeged, 1970.] It 
appears to us that it would have been useful 
for this problem to be considered. 
Chapter III, which deals with inter-
national economic and political relations in 
the broad sense as the basis for a com-
parison of ancient laws, is a highly valuable 
part of the book and perhaps one attracting 
the greatest interest, not only because the 
author points out the presence in antiquity 
ofnumerous modem categories (monopoly, 
cartel, commercial company, private inter-
national law, etc.), but also because he has 
subjected to scrutiny the highly important 
problem of relationship between the econo-
mic sphere and legal regulation. 
The lack of appropriate source material 
on the subject raised difficulties to the 
author's investigations, difficulties that were 
only increased by an often anachronistic 
backward projection of modem categories 
in secondary literature. It commends the 
author's qualities that he has overcome 
these difficulties and dangers and has drawn 
his conclusions by relying on available 
sources (Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Expositio 
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totius mundi, and legal sources), stating 
inter alia that, for the Roman jurisconsults, 
law was in a kind of "splendid isolation" 
from reality, a fact that is responsible for 
the lack of scientific analyses in antiquity 
of the relationship between the economy and 
law. As regards regulation by positive law, 
he points out that roman law did not regu-
late the economic sphere except when 
regulation was of great importance for 
political reasons, e.g. in the interest of 
securing supply of grain. In respect to 
regulations on "cartels", he maintains that 
it would be anachronistic to speak of a 
separate anti-trust Roman law, yet the 
restrictions on private autonomy are proof 
that the possibility for legal regulation of 
economic life was not unknown to Rome. 
Next the author discusses in detail the 
sets of international economic and political 
relations, analysing and evaluating the 
practice of concluding interstate treaties, 
which he considers of importance to the 
interaction of the various ancient laws. 
As concerns the much discussed ques-
tion of equality of ancient laws, he takes the 
view, while not questioning the primacy of 
Roman law in terms of its standard, that the 
absence in "Greek law" of jurisprudence, 
so typical of Rome, is compensated for, 
inter alia, by interpretation of law, so there 
is no obstacle to recognizing equality in the 
practical field. This is proved by the author 
on the plane of the specific too when he 
concludes that Greek law cannot be re-
garded as a mere form of legal thinking 
without a certain system, just as the concept 
of nomos cannot be said to be less delimited 
than that of lex. 
After a detailed analysis of the problem 
of the civil law system the author proceeds 
to discuss the question of ancient private 
international and commercial law. His 
cautious and circumspect explanations, 
avoiding the extremes of the rather contro-
versial literature, convincingly draw the 
outlines of Roman private international law 
of an interprovincial level and point up the 
emergence of conditions for the institutions 
of commercial law, without falling into the 
error of anachronistic backward projection. 
At the level of theoretical generaliza-
tion, the author formulates what we may 
be permitted to call "ars poetica" in Chap-
ter IV, which analyses the possibilities and 
limitations of comparing ancient laws. This 
synthesis at the level of legal theory is 
perhaps the main thrust of the work and its 
most important message to scholars engaged 
in comparative law, or comparative juris-
prudence. 
It is on the basis of an extensive and 
profound analysis that the author draws the 
conclusion that, while the dogmatics and 
terminology of Roman law can be used for 
a dogmatic discussion necessary in respect 
of ancient laws, as well, the extent of 
reliance on them should not be greater than 
that placed on the dogmatics and terminol-
ogy of modern law applicable in research 
into Roman law. In addition to formulating 
these general methodological principles, 
the author calls attention to the dangers 
present in the anachronistic approach, the 
preconception of a "homogeneous" ancient 
law, rash conclusions experienced in 
connection with similar institutions (the 
so-called question of derivation), and the 
ignorance of differences in standard 
between ancient laws. 
Outstanding importance is attached to 
the author's statement, made at the level of 
legal theory, to the effect that comparison 
of ancient laws necessarily contains ele-
ments of valuation, which are a prerequisite 
for conscious criticism. 
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In this connection, basically agreeing 
with the author's conclusions advising 
cautious and circumspect analysis, the 
reviewer wishes to reiterate his view 
concerning the need to clarify in the first 
place the preliminary—one might say 
praeiudi-cialis—question of what is to be 
meant in effect by the "dogmatics and 
terminology of Roman law". As is men-
tioned by the author himself, "the dogmatics 
and terminology of Roman law are of dual 
meaning ", but we think this question would 
need further clarification. 
Similarly, Chapter V on the ancient 
concept of contract does not "sink" to the 
level of institutional history, but is an 
excellent example of the author's conception 
as outlined in the preceding chapter and 
formulated in light of a profound com-
parative analysis of this central institution 
of law. As regards the category of legal 
institution, the author states it to be an 
artificial devise of 19th century juris-
prudence, which, however, is applied 
even by today's legal literature as a 
technical term in the broad sense. The 
contract, which in the author's view can 
be used as a kind of working hypothesis 
in analysing ancient laws, is one such 
institution. Nevertheless the author 
emphasizes that to him, in opposition to 
György Diósdi, the contract is a neutral 
category for purposes of comparative 
analysis rather than a legal institution of 
an artificial system of law. 
The thesis that one cannot speak of a 
single concept of contract in ancient laws 
is proved by the author on the basis of 
detailed analyses. And, in respect to the 
contractual system of Roman law, which 
has acquired exclusive status in the course 
of its subsistence, the author notes that the 
Roman law's device of consensual contract, 
although it is a great achievement, is but 
one of possible devices. On this score we 
may cite the author's closing conclusion, 
giving rise to fresh shoots of thought, that 
the comparative analysis of ancient laws by 
illuminating alternatives may also have a 
serious importance for the practitioner of 
present-day civil law, who quite often 
focuses his attention on a single alternative 
alone, although he may choose from among 
several concepts which often have a many-
thousand-year old past. 
By way of a general appraisal of Gábor 
Hamza's book it may be stated that this 
monograph has carried out, at the standard 
of contemporary international science, a 
comprehensive analysis of a subject which 
scholars concerned with different disciplines 
(comparative law, Roman law, history of 
ancient laws) have not yet studied in a 
complex way precisely because of its 
borderline nature. 
Very sympathetic and exemplary are the 
author's circumspection and precaution in 
drawing his conclusions from the sources 
by avoiding the traps of the pertinent 
literature, refraining from rash and un-
founded hypotheses, and withstanding 
preconceptions rather widespread in litera-
ture and distortions resulting from the 
anachronistic approach. 
Based on ample and exceedingly wide-
ranging sources, containing wide coverage 
of an enormous literature thoroughly studied 
in an evaluative-critical manner, and reflect-
ing the author's captivating control of his 
material, this work is a comprehensive and 
systematic discussion of an extremely 
ramified subject, with theoretical conclu-
sions drawn in each chapter in addition to 
giving a synthesis, while formulating new 
significant scientific results. Thus Gábor 
Hamza's book is at once a high-standard 
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summary of scientific results already 
achieved on the subject and a presentation 
of a new system of theory providing encour-
agement and guidance for further research. 
This makes the study highly recommendable 
reading for lawyers concerned with Roman 
law, legal history, comparative law or civil 
law. It is gratifying to note that after 
publications of several partial studies in 
foreign languages this work is available 
again in its entirety to the international 
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